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LEADING CASES
I. CONsTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Commerce Clause
Dormant Commerce Clause - Application to Nonprofit Entities. -
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has struck down un-
der the dormant commerce clause several discriminatory state tax
incentive programs for businesses.' Last Term, in Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,2 the Court held unconstitu-
tional Maine's charitable property tax exemption statute, which ap-
plied to nonprofit firms performing benevolent and charitable
functions but excluded entities serving primarily non-Maine residents.3
By refusing to treat state tax exemptions for nonprofit, charitable enti-
ties differently from exemptions for for-profit, business firms, the
Court wisely avoided further complicating its dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence. However, the Court missed two opportunities to
strengthen its opinion. First, it overemphasized the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing nonprofit from for-profit institutions and neglected to ex-
plain that this distinction is irrelevant in light of the specific purposes
of the dormant commerce clause. Second, in treating the terms "non-
profit" and "quasi-governmental" as if they were coextensive, the ma-
jority failed to address the dissent's legitimate concern regarding the
unique complications raised by state regulation of quasi-governmental
entities. As a result, the Court ignored the fundamental constitutional
tension that this case exposes - the tension between state autonomy
and national union.
In April 1992, Camps Newfound/Owatonna (Camps), a Maine
nonprofit corporation that operates Christian Science summer camps
in the state, demanded that the Town of Harrison refund its property
taxes and grant it a continuing property tax exemption under Maine's
charitable tax exemption statute.4  The statute exempted "benevolent
I See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274-80 (1988) (holding unconstitutional
a credit against Ohio's motor fuel tax that was based principally on the quantity of Ohio-
produced ethanol a company sold); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (in-
validating a Hawaii liquor tax from which certain locally produced liquors were exempted); Bos-
ton Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 38, 328 (1977) (striking down a New York secu-
rities transfer tax that applied lower rates to transfers involving sales within New York state and
that advantaged New York brokers). For a thorough study of the Court's recent dormant com-
merce clause treatment of state tax incentives, see Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce
Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 8I CORNELL L. REv. 789, 793-825
(1996).
2 117 S. Ct 1590 (I997).
3 See id. at x595-96.
4 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 655 A.2d 876, 877 (Me. 1995).
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and charitable institutions"5 from property taxes but disallowed ex-
emptions for nonprofit institutions "conducted or operated principally
for" nonresidents of Maine.6 The Town applied the statute to deny
Camps the exemption. 7 The superior court granted Camps summary
judgment on dormant commerce clause grounds."
On appeal, the supreme judicial court vacated and remanded. 9
The Maine court first inquired whether the statute facially discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce or regulated "evenhandedly with
only incidental effects on interstate commerce." 10 The court deter-
mined the latter characterization to be more accurate because, rather
than favoring all in-state camps over out-of-state camps, the statute
-simply favored, among in-state camps, those camps that served pri-
marily Maine residents.' The court deemed legitimate the state's de-
sire "to relieve the charit[ies] from the burden of taxes on their limited
budgets and thereby to recognize and promote the public benefits that
they provide."' 2 In addition, it found that the statute did not impose
significant burdens on interstate commerce.' 3 Thus, the court held
that Camps had failed to meet "its heavy burden of persuasion that the
exemption statute [was] unconstitutional."' 4
Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed.' s Writing for a five-
Justice majority,16 Justice Stevens held that "disparate real estate tax
treatment of a nonprofit service provider based on the residence of [its]
5 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652(I)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
6 Camps, 655 A.2d at 877 (quoting title 36, § 652(I)(A)(I)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 See id. Approximately 95% of Camps's campers were nonresidents. See id.
8 See id. at 878. Camps also argued in both the Maine Superior Court and the Maine Su-
preme Judicial Court that the exemption statute violated the Equal Protection Clauses of Maine's
Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. See
id. at 879-80. Both courts denied these claims, see id. at 877, 879-8o, and Camps did not raise
them before the United States Supreme Court, see Brief for Petitioner at x-2, Camps (No. 94-
1988), available in 1996 WL 24552.
9 See Camps, 655 A.2d at 878, 880.
10 Id. at 878-79. Statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce on their face are sub-
ject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity," which may only be overcome by a showing that the
regulation "advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1988) (ap-
plying this test to a discriminatory tax credit program). Under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970), if an evenhanded state regulation affects interstate commerce only incidentally,
courts must evaluate whether the state's interest in the statute is legitimate, and must compare the
relative weight of the interstate burdens and the local benefits. See id. at 142. If a legitimate lo-
cal purpose exists, courts should sustain the statute unless the burden on interstate commerce is
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
11 See Camps, 655 A.2d at 879.
12 Id.
13 See id.
14 Id.
is See Camps, 117 S. CL at 1595.
16 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined in Justice Stevens's opinion.
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consumers" is unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause.17
The Town argued that the camp was not involved in interstate com-
merce because the campers were not articles of commerce and be-
cause it delivered its product entirely within the State of Maine; Jus-
tice Stevens rejected these arguments.' 8 The court also dispensed with
the Town's argument that the dormant commerce clause was inappli-
cable because the statute created an exemption to taxation of real es-
tate, an area that Congress cannot regulate.' 9 Even assuming argu-
endo that Congress could not enact a national real estate tax under its
Commerce Clause powers, the Court held that the dormant commerce
clause still prohibits states from levying a real estate tax, just as it does
any other tax, in a manner that discriminates against interstate com-
merce.
20
Second, the Court analyzed the statute under the dormant com-
merce clause.2' The Court likened the Maine law to statutes limiting
nonresidents' access to natural resources, statutes that the Court had
found discriminatory in prior cases.22 It acknowledged that the Maine
statute did not create a complete ban on out-of-state access to Maine's
nonprofit entities, but it concluded that the statute did create an un-
constitutional incentive, comparable to that created by the intangibles
tax struck down in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner,23 for Maine's charitable
institutions not to do business with nonresidents. 24
Third, having resolved that, "if petitioner's camp were a profit-
making entity, the discriminatory tax exemption would be impermissi-
ble, ''25 the Court examined whether the Maine statute would fall
within any exception to the dormant commerce clause, and specifically
investigated the propriety of an exception for state regulation of the
nonprofit sector.26 Justice Stevens noted that the Court had applied
17 Camps, ii7 S. Ct. at 1596.
18 See id. at 1596-97.
19 See id. at 1597.
20 See id. at 1597-98. Justice Stevens explained that such a rule as the Town proposed would
allow states to evade the enforcement of the dormant commerce clause by enacting any discrimi-
natory tax in the form of a tax upon the real estate used in connection with the taxed activity. See
id. at 1598.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 1598-99 (citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338
(1982)).
23 116 S. Ct. 848, 852 (1996) (striking down an intangibles tax, the level of which was tied to
in-state operations).
24 See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 2599. The majority also declined to give constitutional significance
to the distinction between a direct discriminatory tax on out-of-state consumers and an indirect
tax imposed on those consumers through the institutions with which they do business. See id. at
i599-i6oo (concluding that that the Maine statute "functionally serve[d] as an export tariff").
25 Id. at 1602.
26 See id. at 16o2-o7. The Court rejected the Town's other two arguments that the statute
should withstand dormant commerce clause scrutiny. The Town argued first that the exemption
should be upheld because it operated as a constitutional subsidy of Maine charities. See id. at
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commercial regulation to the nonprofit sector in the past, and found no
reason that the dormant commerce clause should not similarly apply.27
The Court explained that nonprofit institutions constitute major forces
in the competitive marketplace.28  Although the Court recognized
Maine's reasonable desire to encourage its nonprofit institutions to fo-
cus their charity locally, it stated that the dormant commerce clause
forbids protectionism, whether targeted at nonprofit or for-profit enti-
ties.2 9 Having found that the statute facially discriminated against in-
terstate commerce in violation of the dormant commerce clause and
that it came within no exception to that clause, the Court held the
statute unconstitutional. 30
16o4-o5. Second, it argued that the statute fell within the "market participant" exception to the
dormant commerce clause because it allowed Maine to purchase charitable services for its resi-
dents, services that the state would otherwise have to supply. Id. at 1604-07. Under Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), when a state enters and participates in a market, its
actions that discriminate against nonresidents are not subject to dormant commerce clause review.
See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 16o6-07; Hughes, 426 U.S. at 8og-io.
Responding to the first of these arguments, the majority held that the exemption should not be
treated as a subsidy. See Camps, II7 S. CL at 1604-o5. Although the Court had earlier likened
the statute to a discriminatory export tariff, see id. at 16oo-oi, here the Court saw "no reason to
depart from" its strict exemption/subsidy distinction through a functional examination of the eco-
nomic operation of the exemption, id. at i6o6. Rather than inquiring more deeply into the eco-
nomic effects of the Maine statute and providing a fully developed rationale to support special
treatment for subsidies, the Court relied on the qualitative and "constitutionally significant differ-
ence between subsidies and tax exemptions." Id. at 2605; accord id. at I6os nn.23, 25. Justice
Stevens also noted that the recent decision in New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988),
and Justice Scalia's concurrence in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. i86 (1994),
turned on the exemption/subsidy distinction. See Camps, I17 S. CL at 16o5-o6. This posture sig-
nals that the Court will continue to avoid restricting state subsidies on dormant commerce clause
principles but will continue to invalidate other discriminatory state regulations that function
analogously to subsidies. The Court had a number of arguments to draw from to support its
"subsidies-are-different" jurisprudence; it cited to some of them, but it did not elaborate. See id.
at 16o6.
Turning to the Town's market participant argument, the Court concluded that the state had
acted in its governmental capacity to enact a tax exemption and had not acted in a proprietary
capacity to enter and participate in a market; only the latter type of action is excepted from the
scrutiny of the dormant commerce clause. See id. The majority emphasized the narrow scope of
the market participant exception and warned that, if the Town's argument were to prevail, virtu-
ally any discriminatory tax exemption could fall within the exception. See id.
27 See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 1602-03 (citing, inter alia, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, ioo n.22 (1984) (applying antitrust law to nonprofits), and Associ-
ated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 203, 128-29 (i937) (applying labor law)). Justice Stevens further
recognized that the dormant commerce clause had previously been applied to regulation of activi-
ties undertaken with no profit motivation. See id. (citing Edwards v. California, 324 U.S. i6o,
172-73 (1942)).
28 See id. at 1602-04 & n.i8 (noting the multi-billion-dollar revenues of nonprofit nursing
homes, child day care centers, and hospitals); see also Brief of The Christian Legal Society et al. in
Support of Petitioner at i8-ig, Camps (No. 94-1988), available in 1996 WL 243471 (describing the
size of the nonprofit sector).
29 See Camps, 117 S. CL at 16o4.
30 See id. at 1607-08. The Court noted that, if a need for an exception to the dormant com-
merce clause for nonprofits existed, Congress was empowered to and better suited to formulate it
than was the Court. See id. at 16o4.
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Justice Scalia dissented.31 He emphasized that the Maine statute
was narrowly focused to cover only institutions serving quasi-
governmental functions, and he contrasted this understanding with the
majority's conception of the statute as one broadly covering the entire
nonprofit sector.32 Largely due to his perception that these quasi-
governmental entities serve an overriding state interest, Justice Scalia
argued that the statute survived dormant commerce clause scrutiny or
justified a general exception to the clause for state-supported chari-
ties.33
First, Justice Scalia argued that the Maine statute did not neces-
sarily facially discriminate against interstate commerce.34 He con-
tended that, although the statute treated entities that provide charita-
ble services to nonresidents differently from those entities that
primarily serve in-state clients, this disparity did not constitute dis-
crimination because the two types of entities are not similarly situated
- the latter type eases the state's welfare burden, whereas the former
type provides virtually no such benefit to the state.35 Under this view,
the statute only incidentally affected interstate commerce and should
have been upheld, because the local purpose of providing charitable
31 See id. at 16o8 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Ginsburg joined in Justice Scalia's dissent. Justice Thomas also penned a separate dissent, joined
by Justice Scalia and joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist See id. at 1614 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). Justice Thomas argued that the Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence "was
already both overbroad and unnecessary." Id. at x615. He contended that the judicial role in this
area should be limited to striking down discriminatory taxes and that even this power ought to be
exercised under the Import-Export Clause rather than under the dormant commerce clause. See
id. Because Justice Thomas's -rguments are beyond the scope of this Comment, references to
"the dissent" or "the dissenters" denote Justice Scalia's dissent and those Justices joining it.
32 See id. at 16o9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the Maine statute was "de-
signed merely to compensate or subsidize those organizations that contribute to the public fisc by
dispensing public benefits the State might otherwise provide." Id. To support his assertion that
the exemption would not be universally applicable to nonprofit organizations, Justice Scalia cited
Holbrook Island Sanctuary v. Inhabitants of Brooksville, 214 A.2d 660 (Me. 1965), which held
that a wildlife sanctuary could not receive the exemption because its prohibition on deer hunting
conflicted with state game management policy. See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 16xo (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Holbrook Island, 214 A.2d at 666-67).
33 See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 1614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34 See id. at i6ii.
35 See id. Justice Scalia compared Maine's statute with the statute upheld in General Motors
Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811 (1997). See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Tracy
upheld an Ohio state use tax that exempted regulated sellers of natural gas (all of which were
Ohio companies at the time of the case) but not other sellers (all of which were out-of-state com-
panies at that time). See Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 8x8-ig. The Tracy Court explained that the Ohio
tax structure did not violate the dormant commerce clause because the regulated entities were not
similarly situated to the other fuel distributors and because the entities served other important
goals. See id. at 823-30. In Camps, Justice Scalia argued that the goals that Maine's statute
served were no less crucial than the goals served by the statute upheld in Tracy. See Camps, 117
S. Ct. at 6i1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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services was legitimate and the burden on interstate commerce was not
excessive. 36
Next, the dissent asserted that the statute should have been upheld
even if it did facially discriminate against interstate commerce and was
therefore subject to the "virtually per se rule of invalidity. '37 Justice
Scalia based this argument on the lack of reasonable nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives available to achieve the statute's legitimate local pur-
pose of providing charitable services to Maine residents.38 In response
to the majority's contention that a general subsidy to Maine users of
charitable services would provide such a nondiscriminatory alterna-
tive, the dissent argued that a subsidy would be equally discrimina-
tory.39
Finally, the dissent suggested that state regulation of domestic
charities should be excluded from dormant commerce clause review.40
Maintaining that General Motors Corp. v. Tracy 4 created a new excep-
tion to the clause, Justice Scalia argued that, in this case, the Court
should likewise have looked beyond its traditional "market participant"
and "subsidy" exceptions and created a "domestic charity" exception to
the clause. 42  The dissent contended that a state's direct or indirect
provision of social welfare benefits to its own residents "implicates
none of the concerns underlying our negative-commerce-clause juris-
prudence."43
Although the majority reached a prudent conclusion, two critical
omissions leave its opinion unsatisfying. First, because the opinion
failed to show the lack of relation between a nonprofit or for-profit
36 See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at I6II (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at i6o8-ii (emphasis omitted).
38 See id. at 1611-12. Justice Scalia analogized the exemption to regulations that limit the
provision of welfare assistance and state services to residents and that constitute a discriminatory
practice that courts have invariably held constitutional. See id. at 1612 (citing Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)). However, statutes conditioning benefits on duration of residency have
been held unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, because they abridge the right to
interstate travel. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 58-65 (1982) (finding no rational basis
for a law distributing benefits in proportion to duration of residency); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 629-33 (i969) (finding denial of benefits based on residency requirement violative of the
Equal Protection Clause and the right to travel interstate).
The dissent also asserted that the Court, in Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U.S. 553 (i9o6),
had already approved state regulation that compensated or subsidized charitable providers with
the aim of indirectly providing social services to state residents. See Camps, 117 S. CL at 1612-13
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Illinois, 203 U.S. at 562-63 (allowing a state in-
heritance tax exemption for in-state charities and denying it to out-of-state charities)).
39 See Camps, 117 S. CL at 1612 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40 See id. at 1612-13.
41 117 S. CL 811 (1997).
42 Camps, 117 S. CL at 1614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43 Id. This section of Justice Scalia's opinion echoes Professor Donald H. Regan's argument
that discriminatory purpose ought to be the touchstone of dormant commerce clause review. See
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. Rav. 1o91, 1143-6o (1986).
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mission and the values protected by the dormant commerce clause, it
did not adequately address the reasons that the nonprofit character of
the institutions regulated by the Maine statute is irrelevant to the dor-
mant commerce clause analysis. Second, the majority failed to con-
front the dissent's understanding of the Maine statute's peculiarity -
that it only regulated entities providing quasi-governmental services.
This omission is troubling, because it allowed the majority to skirt the
most difficult issue that Camps presented - how to reconcile the com-
peting constitutional impulses to allow the states to reserve some state
benefits solely to residents, on the ground of state autonomy, and to
prevent state favoritism of local interests, on the ground of antiprotec-
tionism."
The majority wisely refused to create "any categorical distinction
between the activities of profit-making enterprises and not-for-profit
entities"*s for purposes of the dormant commerce clause. As the ma-
jority noted, the nonprofit sector has grown enormously in both size
and diversity;46 the increasing similarity of many nonprofit institutions
to their for-profit counterparts makes the nonprofit/for-profit distinc-
tion a poor proxy for whether an entity participates in interstate com-
merce. The majority could have bolstered its analysis by emphasizing
that any distinction between nonprofit and for-profit entities is mean-
ingless in terms of the values that the dormant commerce clause seeks
to preserve. The majority did state that "[p]rotectionism, whether tar-
geted at for-profit entities or serving, as here, to encourage nonprofits
to keep their efforts close to home, is forbidden under the dormant
Commerce Clause. '47 However, instead of simply rejecting the non-
profit/for-profit distinction without considering the context in which it
arose, the Court should have examined the purposes of the clause to
show the irrelevance of nonprofit status to the dormant commerce
clause analysis.
The dominant value underlying the dormant commerce clause is
the prevention of state protectionism.48 One commentator has identi-
fied three objections to state protectionism: the "concept-of-union," "re-
sentment/retaliation," and "efficiency" objections.49 These evils of pro-
44 See Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 487,
490-93 (ig8x).
4S Camps, 117 S. CL at 16o3.
46 See id. at 16o3 & n.iS. In 1995, the IRS noted that 1,164,789 tax-exempt organizations ex-
isted, and nonprofit organizations currently control over one trillion dollars in assets. See JOHN
HAWKS, FOR A GOOD CAUSE? 14-I5 (1997).
47 Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 1604 (citation omitted).
48 See id.; New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); Regan, supra note 43, at
1110-25.
49 Regan, supra note 43, at II12-16. Regan argues that the dormant commerce clause should
concern protectionism alone and that the Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence does
just that. See id. at 12o6. Regan also restricts his theses to those cases after 1935 involving the
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tectionism do not discriminate along profit lines. Excluding nonprofit
institutions that provide services to residents of other states from bene-
fits accorded to similar entities serving home-state residents under-
mines political and economic union in the same way as does a dis-
criminatory tax structure concerning for-profit organizations5s Tax
exemption exclusions like Maine's could also certainly engender dan-
gerous resentment and retaliation from other states.
Finally, tax exemptions structured to exclude entities serving non-
residents are inefficient in the sense that they function to shift business
away from presumptively lower-cost (foreign) and toward higher-cost
(local) consumers of charitable services "without any colorable justifi-
cation in terms of a benefit that deserves approval from the point of
view of the nation as a whole."'" Assuming that all charities would be
on equal economic footing without the exclusion, the exemption sig-
nificantly raises the costs of charities serving foreigners by forcing
these charities to pay comparatively higher taxes. S2 Because the stat-
ute at issue merely encouraged the transfer of resources from entities
serving residents of other states to entities serving Maine residents, it
lacked a colorable justification in terms of a benefit deserving national
approval. Under any of the three objections to protectionism, provid-
ing nonprofit entities with tax incentives to serve principally state resi-
dents is no more constitutionally appropriate than protecting in-state
for-profit businesses that similarly benefit the state and its residents.5 3
The second missing element of the majority's opinion is a result of
the Court's treatment of the terms "nonprofit" and "quasi-govern-
movement of goods, see id. at 1093-94, zo98-iIoI, but his formulation of the values that are ill-
served by protectionism may be applied more broadly.
SO Tax discrimination among nonprofit institutions also implicates dormant commerce clause
concerns about economic union and a national common market in exactly the same way as it does
among for-profits. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 43, 43-45, 63-64 (1988).
SI Regan, supra note 43, at 1118.
52 See Brief of The American Council on Education et al. in Support of Petitioner at 13-17,
Camps (No. 94-1988), available in 1996 WL 249495.
53 Another justification for the dormant commerce clause, one that is little utilized in the
Court's opinions, is that provided by process theorists, who argue that the clause's purpose is to
provide virtual representation for the interests of foreign constituencies likely to be unrepresented
in state decisionmaking processes. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE LJ. 425, 435-74 (1982); see also Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 395, 396 (1986) (describing the two main purposes
of current dormant commerce clause jurisprudence to be the furtherance of free trade and the
prevention of discrimination against outsiders unrepresented in the political process). See gener-
ally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82-88 (igo) (describing the process theory of
judicial review, from which the process theory of the dormant commerce clause emanates). Al-
though the statute in this case regulated only Maine corporations, their potential out-of-state cli-
ents were harmed by the incentive created for charities to focus on an in-state clientele. Because
these out-of-state interests have no representation in Maine, the process theory would, like the
three evils of protectionism, also require dormant commerce clause review, regardless of the regu-
lated entities' nonprofit or for-profit status.
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mental" as if they were coextensive. Camps differed from prior dis-
criminatory tax incentive cases, because the entities regulated were
nonprofit and quasi-governmental institutions. However, an entity
that possesses one of these characteristics does not necessarily possess
the other. The majority and the dissent each focused on only one of
these characteristics, but they failed to appreciate the consequences of
each other's emphases.
The majority focused on the difficulty of meaningfully distin-
guishing for-profit and nonprofit institutions in today's economy. It
stated that protectionism, regardless of the motivations of the pro-
tected institutions, is intolerable under the dormant commerce clause S4
In contrast, the dissent rested its arguments on the underlying assump-
tion that quasi-governmental institutions, which provide services that
reduce the state's burden, should be treated differently from other
regulated entities for purposes of the dormant commerce clause.55 The
similarities of the nonprofit and for-profit sectors aside, this view con-
tends that distribution of governmental services should be valued
highly enough either to pass dormant commerce clause scrutiny or to
escape review entirely.5 6 By failing to recognize the issues raised by
the dissent's emphasis of the camp's "quasi-governmental" character,
the majority missed the opportunity to confront the dissent's key criti-
cism of the Court's position and to grapple with the competing inter-
ests in state autonomy and national union that Camps presents.
The dissent's position is understandable. As Justice Scalia asserted,
a state's protection of charities seems qualitatively different from its
protection of local businesses.5 7 Because states can assist charities in
various ways, most notably through the structure of their tax systems,
protection for in-state charities does not evoke suspicion of protection-
ism as strongly as does regulation sheltering for-profit business en-
deavors. Further, it seems anomalous to require review of a state's in-
centive structure for private organizations offering aid to state
residents but not to subject distribution of public assistance directly
from a state to its residents to dormant commerce clause scrutiny.
However, the majority could have argued that the dissent's position
that quasi-governmental organizations should be treated differently is
neither definitive under dormant commerce clause jurisprudence nor a
practical approach to the problem in Camps. The cases upon which
the dissent's arguments rely were decided under other constitutional
54 See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 1602-04.
55 See id. at x6o9-io (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that "there is no valid com-
parison between ... the State's giving tax relief to an enterprise devoted to the making of profit
and ... the State's giving tax relief to an enterprise which ... has the same objective as the State
itself (the expenditure of funds for social welfare)." Id. at 1613 n.4.
56 See id. at 1612-13.
57 See id. at 1613 n.4.
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analyses and are thus distinguishable.58 The Court could have stated
that, although many constitutional clauses attempt to balance protec-
tion of state autonomy and prohibition of discriminatory state regula-
tion - including the dormant commerce clause, the Interstate Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause59 - it
would continue to deal with these constitutional objections under
separate standards. 60 Additionally, the Court could have relied upon
its jurisprudence of limiting exceptions to the dormant commerce
clause 6' to argue that creating an additional exception to the clause on
any ground would be unwarranted. The trend of cabining exceptions
to the clause includes the Court's limitation of the "subsidy" exception
to formal subsidies, a rule it employed in the Camps opinion itself. 62
Finally, the majority could have argued that a rule providing for
differential dormant commerce clause treatment for nonprofit entities
performing quasi-governmental functions would suffer practical limi-
tations. First, it is very difficult to determine whether a particular
function is "governmental" or "quasi-governmental," as the Court's re-
treat from a similar categorization exercise in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority63 makes clear.64 Second, it would be
difficult to justify limiting differential treatment to nonprofits serving
quasi-governmental functions, given that for-profit industries also per-
form such functions, either in partnership with or in the absence of
government entities. 65 For these reasons, a rule that distinguished en-
tities on the basis of their "quasi-governmental" functions would be
very difficult to administer.
Noting both the nonprofit sector's magnitude and potency and the
broad sweep of the dormant commerce clause's antiprotectionist man-
58 See id. at 1612 (citing Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 32r (1983) (rejecting challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause and the right to travel interstate), and McCarthy v. Philadelphia
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (rejecting a challenge under the right to travel inter-
state)).
S9 See Varat, supra note 44, at 487-90.
60 See id. at 492-93 (observing the lack of a general theory "to separate those publicly pro-
vided benefits belonging peculiarly to state residents and those to which nonresidents must be
accorded equal access" and linking current dormant commerce clause and Interstate Privileges
and Immunities Clause doctrine).
61 See, e.g., South-Central 'imber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). In South-
Central, the Court emphasized that the market participant exception must be applied by defining
markets narrowly to avoid "swallowing up the rule that States may not impose substantial bur-
dens on interstate commerce even if they act with the permissible state purpose of fostering local
industry." Id. at 98.
62 See Camps, I17 S. Ct. at 1604-07. The dissent would surely have challenged any "cabining"
argument by the majority on the ground that last Term's decision in General Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 117 U.S. 8i (1997), created a new exception. See Camps, 117 S. Ct. at 1613-14 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); supra note 35.
63 469 U.S. 528 (1984).
64 See id. at 530.
65 See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE 223-25, 231-39 (x995) (de-
scribing the role of for-profit institutions in providing welfare and other social services).
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date, the Supreme Court wisely struck down Maine's charitable prop-
erty tax exemption statute, just as it would have done "if petitioner's
camp were a profit-making entity. '66 However, the Court could have
strengthened its argument against differential treatment for regulation
of nonprofits by demonstrating that the values underlying the dormant
commerce clause render the nonprofit/for-profit distinction irrelevant.
In addition, the Court's opinion would have been considerably more
persuasive had the majority recognized that regulation of quasi-
governmental institutions tests the boundaries of current dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence. As the dissent understood, Camps
stands at the crossroads of two competing constitutional interests: the
federalism interest in allowing states to provide some benefits only to
their residents and the national interest in preventing states from dis-
criminating against nonresidents.67 By omitting any discussion of this
tension, the majority left the dissent's criticisms, as well as the most
difficult issues that Camps raised, essentially unanswered.
B. Constitutional Structure
x. Federalism - Compelling State Officials to Enforce Federal
Regulatory Regimes. - Since the Supreme Court's decision in New
York v. United States,' debate has renewed about Congress's power to
enlist state officials in the execution of federal regulatory regimes.
Last Term, in Printz v. United States,2 the Court held that Congress
has no such power at all, and accordingly invalidated portions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.3 Although the challenged
provisions of the statute may well have been unconstitutional, the
Court's bright-line rule against federal commandeering of state offi-
cials rests uncomfortably with its prior jurisprudence, and leaves law-
makers with little guidance as they address new policymaking chal-
lenges in an era of federalism.
In 1993, Congress responded to the nation's rising "epidemic of gun
violence"4 by passing the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
("Brady Act" or "Act). 5 An amendment to the Gun Control Act of
66 Camps, 117 S. Ct. at I6O2.
67 See Varat, supra note 44, at 490-93.
1 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see id. at 177 (invalidating a statutory provision that required states
either to develop waste disposal plans or to take title to low-level radioactive waste).
2 117 S. C. 2365 (1997).
3 Pub. L. No. 103-159, §§ ioi-io6, 107 Stat. 1536-44 (i993) (codified as amended at iS
U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3759 (I994)).
4 H.R. REP. No. 1o3-344, at 8 (i993).
S §§ ioi-io6, 107 Stat. at 1536-44, amended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, io8 Stat. 2074 (I994).
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1968,6 the Brady Act gave the Attorney General until November 30,
1998, to establish a national system through which handgun distribu-
tors would conduct instant criminal background checks on prospective
purchasers. 7 In the interim, distributors had to collect and forward in-
formation about each prospective purchaser to the chief law enforce-
ment officer in the area (CLEO).8
Under the statutory framework, the CLEO - a state or local offi-
cial - then had five business days within which "to make a reason-
able effort to ascertain" whether a prospective purchaser could law-
fully receive and possess a handgun.9 If the applicant passed the
background check, the CLEO had to destroy any record of his re-
search. 10 If the applicant failed the background check, the CLEO had
to provide a written explanation upon request.1 However, a CLEO
had no obligation to try to prevent a handgun transfer, even if he con-
cluded that the purchaser's receipt of the handgun would be illegal.12
Moreover, the Act immunized CLEOs from liability for reaching erro-
neous conclusions after conducting these background checks,' 3 and
6 Pub. L. No. 9o-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified in pertinent part as amended at i8 U.S.C
§§ 92I-928). The Gun Control Act "establishe[d] a detailed federal scheme governing the distri-
bution of firearms" to convicted felons, illegal immigrants, drug users, and other persons. Printz,
I17 S. CL at 2368.
7 See I8 U.S.C. § 922 note (establishing the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System).
8 See id. § 922(s)(i)(A)(i)I)-(IV). As the Printz Court explained:
Under the interim provisions, a firearms dealer who proposes to transfer a handgun must
first: (i) receive from the transferee a statement (the Brady Form), containing the name,
address and date of birth of the proposed transferee along with a sworn statement that the
transferee is not among any of the classes of prohibited purchasers; (2) verify the identity of
the transferee by examining an identification document; and (3) provide the "chief law en-
forcement officer" (CLEO) of the transferee's residence with notice of the contents (and a
copy) of the Brady Form. With some exceptions, the dealer must then wait five business
days before consummating the sale, unless the CLEO earlier notifies the dealer that he has
no reason to believe the transfer would be illegal.
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368-69 (citations omitted) (citing i8 U.S.C. § 9 22(s)(i)(A)(i)-(ii)).
The Act provided two significant alternatives to this scheme. "A dealer may sell a handgun
immediately if the purchaser possesses a state handgun permit issued after a background check,
or if state law provides for an instant background check." Id. at 2369 (citations omitted) (citing x8
U.S.C. § 922(s)(I)(C)-(D)).
9 i8 U.S.C. § 922(sX2). "[R]easonable effort" was defined to include "research in whatever
State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the
Attorney General." Id.
10 See id. § 9 22(s)(6)(B)(i).
11 See id. § 922(sX6XC).
12 See Brief for Respondent at 5-6, Printz (Nos. 95-1478, 95-I5o3), available in 1996 WL
595005.
13 See i8 U.S.C. § 922(s)(7). Although the Act states that any person who "knowingly violates
[the Brady Act] shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for no more than i year, or both," id.
§ 924(a)(5), the Justice Department has indicated that it would not apply this criminal sanction to
law enforcement officials. See Mack v. United States, 66 F3d 1025, 2033 (9th Cir. 1995).
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fully excused CLEOs from performing checks if local conditions made
them "impracticable." 14
Jay Printz and Richard Mack, the CLEOs for Ravalli County,
Montana, and Graham County, Arizona, respectively, each filed a de-
claratory judgment action seeking to invalidate these interim enforce-
ment measures on the ground that they impermissibly compelled state
officers to execute federal law.' s In each case, the federal district court
found that the mandated background check violated the Tenth
Amendment, 16 but also held that this requirement was severable from
the rest of the statute, "effectively leaving a voluntary background-
check system in place" until I998.17
The Ninth Circuit reversed both decisions in a consolidated ap-
peal.' 8 Writing for a divided panel, 19 Judge Canby explained that the
Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence does not proscribe
the federal government from enlisting the assistance of state govern-
ments in every respect.20 To the contrary, the court found that the
Tenth Amendment at most prevents the federal government from "co-
erc[ing] the States into legislating or regulating according to [its] dic-
tates."'2 ' Because the Brady Act's background check requirement did
not command CLEOs "to engage in the central sovereign processes of
enacting legislation or regulations," the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the statute imposed duties "not different from other minor obligations
that Congress has imposed on state officials"22 - duties that did not
conscript the states in their sovereign capacity, shackle the states with
political accountability for a federal regime, or impose anything more
than minimal burdens on state officers.23
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(I)(F).
Is See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States,
854 F. Supp. 1503, ISo"-11 (D. Mont. '994).
16 The Arizona District Court found that the Brady Act was void for vagueness insofar as it
threatened CLEOs with criminal sanctions based on an "imprecise and indefinite" background
check requirement. Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1381-82. The Arizona court further found that "in
enacting section i8 U.S.C. 922(s)(2), Congress exceeded its authority under Article i, section 8 of
the United States Constitution, thereby impermissibly encroaching upon the powers retained by
the states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 1383-84.
The Montana District Court held that the criminal sanctions did not apply to law enforcement
officers, but concluded that "fbly requiring the states to carry out an unfunded federal mandate,
Congress ha[d] substantially commandeered state executive officers and indirectly commandeered
the legislative processes of the states to administer a federal program," thereby exceeding its Arti-
cle I, Section 8 powers, and violating the Tenth Amendment. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519.
17 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369.
18 See Mack, 66 F.3d at 1034.
19 Judge Choy joined Judge Canby's opinion.
20 See Mack, 66 F.3d at io3o-3i.
21 Id. at io3o.
22 Id. at 1031.
23 See id. at 1031-32. Judge Fernandez dissented, accusing Congress of "dragoon[ing]" state
officials into enforcing a federal regulatory program. See id. at io35 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
Under the Brady Act, Judge Fernandez explained, state law enforcement officers would face bur-
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the circuits,24 and reversed in a 5-4 decision. Writing for the major-
ity,25 Justice Scalia began his opinion by rejecting the Government's
contention that even "the earliest Congresses enacted statutes that re-
quired the participation of state officials in the implementation of fed-
eral laws."26 In the Court's view, these early laws27 "establish[ed], at
most, that the Constitution was originally understood to permit [the]
imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescrip-
tions."28 Thus, the Court observed, although the Framers probably
adhered to "the natural assumption that the States would consent to
allowing their [executive] officials to assist the Federal Government,"
nothing in the original understanding of the Constitution would have
required that result.29
Justice Scalia then considered the Act in light of the federal struc-
ture mapped out by the Constitution. Under a system of dual sover-
eignty,30 the Court explained, the states retain "residuary and inviola-
ble"31 independence from federal control.3 2 To allow Congress to enlist
the assistance of state executive officers would erode this system by
distorting the division of power between the federal and state govern-
ments.33 Moreover, the Court emphasized, federal commandeering
would disrupt the separation of powers within the federal government
densome research and recordkeeping obligations, for which states would bear the full cost, unless
they adopted a local permit system to bypass the statute. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(s)(1)(C)
(I994)).
24 Unlike the Second and Ninth Circuits, see Frank v. United States, 78 F3d 815, 830 (2d Cir.
1996), vacated, 1I7 S. Ct. 2501 (i997) (mem.); Mack, 66 F.3d at 1033, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the challenged provisions of the Brady Act did violate the Tenth Amendment, see Koog v.
United States, 79 F.3d 452,462 (sth Cir. i996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 2507 (1997).
25 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice
Scalia's opinion.
26 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 8, Printz (Nos. 95-1478, 95-I503),
available in 1996 WL 595ooS) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27 For example, Justice Scalia referred to early congressional statutes that, collectively, re-
quired state courts to record applications for citizenship, transmit abstracts of those applications
to the Secretary of State, register aliens seeking naturalization, and issue certificates of registry.
See id.
28 Id. at 2371.
29 Id. at 2372. In fact, the Court noted, other than a few relatively recent federal statutes, his-
tory had recorded "almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice" of
conscripting state executive officers in the implementation of federal regulatory regimes, Id. at
2376.
30 See id. ("It is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty."'
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, SoI U.S. 452, 457 (I99i), and Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458
(I99o))).
31 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., ig6r))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
32 See id. at 2377 (citing New York v. United States, 5o5 U.S. i44, i61-66 (1992)).
33 See id. at 2378. The Court further noted that the Necessary and Proper Clause could do
little to validate the challenged provisions in the Brady Act because legislation violating state sov-
ereignty is not a "proper" means of executing the Commerce Clause. See id. at 2378-79.
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by enabling Congress to bypass the President in the execution of fed-
eral laws.3 4
Turning to its own jurisprudence, the Court also rejected the Gov-
ernment's narrow characterization of New York v. United States35 as
prohibiting only federal commandeering of state policymaking author-
ity3 6 Instead, the Court described its holding in New York as a broad
limitation on the ability of Congress to "compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program."37  The Court therefore in-
validated the Brady Act's background check requirement and made
clear both that "[i]t matters not whether policymaking is involved, and
[that] no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary"
when Congress commandeers state legislative or executive officials.38
Justice Stevens dissented.3 9 As a matter of constitutional interpre-
tation, Justice Stevens observed first that the Commerce Clause clearly
empowered Congress to regulate handguns, and second that the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause was "surely adequate to support the tempo-
rary enlistment of local police officers" in this regulatory regime.40
The Tenth Amendment raised no obstacle, Justice Stevens added, be-
cause it merely confirms that Congress has only those powers dele-
gated to it, and imposes no limitations on "the scope or the effective-
ness" of how Congress exercises its powers once delegated.41
34 See id. at 2378.
3S 5o5 U.S. 144 (1992).
36 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380-8i.
37 Id. at 2380 (emphasis added) (quoting New York, 5o5 U.S. at 188) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As Justice Scalia observed, the Government's proposed distinction between "policy-
making" and "implementation" resembled the line between constitutional and unconstitutional
congressional delegations of authority to the executive branch, with all of its attendant defini-
tional difficulties. See id. at 238o-8i (citing, inter alia, David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doc-
trine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. Rnv. 1223, 1233 (I985)).
38 Id. at 2384. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion and noted both that state and local
law enforcement officers remained free to follow the Brady Act voluntarily and that Congress was
free to amend its interim program "to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the
States." Id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor also emphasized that Printz did not decide "whether other purely ministe-
rial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its
Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid." Id. As an example of such ministerial duties,
Justice O'Connor pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (x994), which requires state and local law en-
forcement agencies to report missing children to the Department of Justice. See Printz, ix7 S. Ct.
at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion as well, writing separately to express his continuing
skepticism about whether the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate intrastate fire-
arms transfers at all. See Printz, i7 S. Ct. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)). In any event, Justice Thomas noted,
the Second Amendment might be read "to confer a personal right to 'keep and bear arms,' a col-
orable argument" that he hoped the Court eventually would consider. Id. at 2386 (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. UM.
39 Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens's opinion.
40 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2387-88.
Xo997 211
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Considering the historical evidence, Justice Stevens criticized the
Court for disregarding early statutes imposing "essentially executive
duties"42 on state judges and their clerks. To label these statutes ir-
relevant simply because "judges" were at issue, he declared, constituted
"empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order. '43 That some stat-
utes merely "requested" rather than "commanded" state action also
raised a distinction without a difference, according to Justice Stevens,
who described this language as diplomatically chosen but not constitu-
tionally required.44
From a structural perspective, Justice Stevens urged that federal
commandeering was unlikely to trample state sovereignty because
elected members of Congress presumably keep the sovereignty inter-
ests of their constituents in mind at all times.45 Recent legislation re-
stricting unfunded federal mandates demonstrated the effectiveness of
these political safeguards.46  Moreover, simply to prohibit all federal
commandeering would necessitate "vast national bureaucracies" 47 -
precisely what the Framers hoped to avoid.4
The Court's prior jurisprudence hardly warranted a different con-
clusion, Justice Stevens added. Although New York prohibited the
federal government from dictating state legislative choices, the Brady
Act did not force CLEOs to exercise "substantial policymaking discre-
tion on that essentially legislative scale."49 Instead, the case more
closely resembled Testa v. Katt, 0 in which the Court upheld a statute
requiring state judges to hear federal price control claims "regardless
of how otherwise crowded their dockets might be with state law mat-
ters."5 ' Thus, Justice Stevens concluded, the Brady Act reflected a
lawful policy judgment on the part of Congress designed to "serve the
interests of cooperative federalism."5 2
42 Id. at 2392.
43 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 See id. at 2393.
45 See id. at 2394.
46 See id. at 2395. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. ro4-4, io9 Stat.
48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (Supp. 1995 & Supp. II i996)), permits members of
Congress to raise procedural objections to unfunded federal mandates, after which the mandate
"may not then be enacted unless the Members make an explicit decision to proceed anyway."
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48 See id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., x961) ("The national legislature can make use of the system of each State within that State.");
id. No. 45, at 291 (James Madison) ("The State governments may be regarded as constituent and
essential parts of the federal government.. . .).
49 Printz, 1i7 S. Ct. at 2398 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5o 330 U.S. 386 (947).
S1 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 2401. Dissenting separately, Justice Souter argued that a straightforward reading of
the Federalist Papers provided ample support for the validity of the Brady Act. See id. at 2402
(Souter, J., dissenting). Alexander Hamilton had observed that "the legislatures, courts and magis-
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Printz purported to establish an absolute prohibition against fed-
eral commandeering of state legislative and executive officials. But
the Court's earlier decisions had invalidated only those federal enact-
ments that coerced state legislatures in their policymaking decisions, 3
overburdened state executive officials,54 or otherwise saddled the states
with political accountability for a federal regulatory regime.s5 By
largely abandoning this methodology, Printz obscured far more than it
clarified and unsettled over fifty years of Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence in favor of a bright-line rule, the parameters of which remain
unspecified.
Had the Court evaluated the Brady Act within the framework es-
tablished by its previous decisions,5 6 it could have found - as the
Ninth Circuit did - that the ministerial act of conducting a back-
ground check does not conscript state legislatures, overburden state of-
ficials, or upset political accountability.5 7 On its face, the statute does
not require any action on the part of state legislatures, thereby distin-
guishing it from the regime invalidated in New York.58 With respect to
burdens on state officials, the statute makes clear that a CLEO need
only make a "reasonable effort"5 9 to determine whether a proposed
handgun purchase is lawful, thereby affording the CLEO ample "dis-
cretion to tailor background checks to local conditions and re-
sources.Y60 Moreover, a CLEO need not conduct background checks
trates of the respective members [of the Republic would] be incorporated into the operations of
the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and [would] be
rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws." THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 177 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis omitted). In Justice Souter's view, this and other
historical evidence supported the conclusion that the Framers had intended the national govern-
ment to have the authority, "when exercising an otherwise legitimate power (the commerce power,
say), to require state 'auxiliaries' to take appropriate action." Printz, 117 S. CL at 2404 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissent, commenting that, as an empirical matter, other na-
tions had successfully required constituent states to implement national laws. See id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). In light of their experiences, Justice Breyer observed, there was "neither need nor
reason to find in the Constitution an absolute principle" against federal commandeering. Id. at
2405.
53 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-62, 174-77 (1992).
54 See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (indicating that a constitutional problem
would arise if federal legislation imposed a burden so severe as to threaten the states' "separate
and independent existence" (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Ss See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69, 174-77.
56 See Brief of Handgun Control, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5,
Printz (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503), available in 1996 WL 585868 (describing this framework).
57 See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1031-32 (gth Cir. 1995).
5s See id. at 1O31.
59 I8 U.S.C. § 922(S)(2) (I994).
60 Brief of Handgun Control, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at to,
Printz (Nos. 95-1478, 95-i5O3), available in 1996 WI 585868.
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at all if performance would be "impracticable," 61 and in any event, the
CLEO enjoys immunity from liability for background checks that he
does perform. 62 Taken as a whole, the statute seems to impose bur-
dens that are merely de minimis, and certainly not so extensive as to
threaten the states' "separate and independent existence." 63
In terms of accountability, the Court similarly could have con-
cluded - as the Ninth Circuit did - that the Brady Act does not
impermissibly saddle the states with political accountability, because it
does not force them to make policy decisions in furtherance of a fed-
eral regime. 64 Indeed, the Act does not require states to pass interme-
diate legislation or enabling regulations,65 the application that triggers
the background check is "unmistakably a federal form,"66 and CLEOs
can inform unsuccessful applicants that their rejection was based en-
tirely on federal law.67 That the Brady Act came about after a seven-
year debate "in full view of the public"68 only underscores the reality
that voters will blame Congress, and not CLEOs, for how the statute
operates. 69
On the other hand, the Court could have concluded that the Brady
Act was unconstitutional through the application of its established in-
quiry into burdensomeness and accountability. Under this analysis,
the Court could have held that the Act impermissibly burdens CLEOs
61 See i8 U.S.C. § 922(s)(I)(F). The Secretary of the Ieasury can certify that compliance
would be impracticable when:
(i) the ratio of the number of law enforcement officers of the State in which the transfer
is to occur to the number of square miles of land area of the State does not exceed o.o025;
(ii) the business premises of the transferor at which the transfer is to occur are extremely
remote in relation to the chief law enforcement officer; and
(iii) there is an absence of telecommunications facilities in the geographical area in which
the business premises are located.
Id. § 922(s)(I)(F)(i)-(iii).
62 See id. § 922(s)(7).
63 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 See Mack v. United States, 66 F3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 1995).
65 See Brief of Handgun Control, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 17,
Printz (Nos. 95-1478, 95-,5o3), available in i996 WL 585868 ("It is the Act - not a state law or
regulation - that requires a waiting period and a background check before purchasing a hand-
gun.").
66 Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. iooi, 1o64 n.241 (1995).
67 See id. at xo64.
68 Brief of Handgun Control, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at i8-ig,
Printz (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503), available in 1996 WL 585868 (quoting New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). New York explained that federal
preemption of state policies does not implicate accountability problems because "it is the Federal
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that
suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular." New York, 505
U.S. at 168.
69 See Brief of Handgun Control, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at
20-21, Printz (Nos. 95-1478, 95-15o3), available in r996 WL 585868.
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with the duty to engage in time-consuming and financially burden-
some background checks, 70 that it unconstitutionally forces states to
take the blame whenever a prospective purchaser is wrongfully denied
permission to buy a handgun, 71 or both. This approach would have
preserved the integrity of the Court's existing jurisprudence while fur-
thering the majority's conception of "dual sovereignty"72 over the dis-
sent's competing notion of "cooperative federalism."7 3
Whether the Court upheld or invalidated the statute, it should have
maintained the methodology that gave at least some coherence and
consistency to its earlier decisions. However, Printz largely rejected
this established approach, declaring that "no case-by-case weighing of
the burdens or benefits is necessary," and that "[ilt matters not whether
policymaking is involved."74  Instead, the Court concluded "categori-
cally"75 that, under New York v. United States, the federal government
simply cannot "compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program."76
If New York existed in isolation, the Court's bright-line rule might
raise relatively few concerns.77 But a long line of cases permits Con-
gress to enlist the aid of the states in any number of ways - by plac-
ing conditions on the grant of federal funds,78 by threatening federal
preemption in the absence of appropriate state regulation, 79 by re-
quiring consideration of prescribed federal standards in determining
state regulatory policies, 0 by demanding compliance with federal laws
of general applicability,8' and by ordering state judges to enforce fed-
eral law.8 2 An absolute prohibition against federal commandeering is
70 See Brief for Petitioner Printz at 4-6, Printz (No. 95-1478), available in I996 WL 464182.
71 See id. at 22 n.25. As the Court noted in its passing discussion of accountability, the fact
that CLEOs enjoy discretion to tailor the extent of their background checks could suggest that
they will be blamed for either overzealously or underzealously restricting handgun sales. See
Printz, X17 S. Ct. at 2382 ('Mt will be the CLEO and not some federal official who stands be-
tween the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun. And it will likely be the CLEO,
not some federal official, who will be blamed for any error ... that causes a purchaser to be mis-
takenly rejected.").
72 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 5oi U.S. 452, 457 (iggi), and Tafflin
v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (iggo)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73 Id. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
7S See id. at 2383 (emphasis added).
76 Id. (quoting New York v. United States, Sos U.S. 144, 188 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
77 Of course, as Justice Stevens observed, New York only involved legislative commandeering,
therefore the language in the opinion precluding executive commandeering could have been mere
dicta. See id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 2o6 (987).
79 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288-9o (I98I).
80 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982).
81 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 553-54 (1985).
82 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1947).
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conspicuously absent from these cases, none of which the Court pur-
ported to overrule in New York or in Printz.
The Court's attempt to create a strict anticommandeering rule also
fails even ignoring these earlier cases, in light of what Printz did not
decide. As Justice O'Connor was careful to point out in her concur-
rence, the Court did not decide the validity of "purely ministerial re-
porting requirements" 3 - such as those in a federal statute requiring
state and local law enforcement agencies to report missing children to
the Department of Justice. 4 If those "purely ministerial" requirements
remain constitutional simply because they do not "directly compel
state officials to administer a federal regulatory program,"8 5 then the
Court's bright-line rule becomes disturbingly murky, leaving Congress
and the courts with no real guidance in understanding the Tenth
Amendment.
Conversely, if Printz meant what it said - that the federal gov-
ernment is categorically precluded from requiring the help of state of-
ficials in every case - then the implications of the decision become
boundless, and far more unmanageable than the Court, much less the
Framers, reasonably could have intended. As Justice Stevens ob-
served, the fact that the Framers intended to preserve some degree of
sovereignty for the states does not necessarily mean that they intended
to prohibit the federal government from enlisting state officials in even
the most ministerial obligations - "such as registering young adults
for the draft, creating state emergency response commissions designed
to manage the release of hazardous substances, collecting and report-
ing data on... environmental hazard[s], and reporting traffic fatalities
[as well as] missing children. 87 The states clearly enjoy "residuary
and inviolable sovereignty,"88 but the scope of that autonomy is far
from obvious. Against the backdrop of the Court's existing Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence, Printz did little to resolve the uncertainty.
Suppose, for example, that Congress were to amend the interim
provisions in the Brady Act to require firearms dealers to forward
handgun applications directly to the federal Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms.8 9 The Bureau could conduct the required back-
83 Printz, 117 S. CL at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84 See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (1994)).
85 Id. (emphasis added).
86 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 ("We ... conclude categorically, as we concluded categorically
in New York: 'The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a fed-
eral regulatory program.'" (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992))).
87 Id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (x994) (re-
porting traffic fatalities); 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (1994) (reporting missing children); id. § 69gia (col-
lecting data on underground tank leaks); id. §§ 1oo, 11003 (creating response commissions for
hazardous waste).
88 THE FEDERALiST No. 39, at 254 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., ig6x).
89 The Bureau already has a statutory obligation to administer the interim provisions of the
Act. See Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 828 (2d Cir. i996).
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ground checks, destroy the paperwork for successful applicants, and
provide unsuccessful applicants with written explanations upon re-
quest. But if it were to require state assistance at all, even for the lim-
ited purpose of obtaining criminal history and mental health records,
then the amended statute would apparently still fall afoul of a bright-
line rule against federal commandeering.
Printz might have correctly concluded that the Brady Act exceeded
congressional authority under the Tenth Amendment. But if the Court
truly intended a blanket prohibition against all federal commandeering
- a return to the i 9th century view90 that it overruled in Puerto Rico
v. Branstad91 - then its announcement could hardly have been more
cloaked, both in light of what Printz left unaddressed and, especially,
when the decision is read together with the Court's prior fifty years of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Despite its invocation of a "cate-
gorical" rule, Printz raised more questions than it answered and bur-
dened Congress and the courts with the task of deciding what role, if
any, the notion of cooperative federalism can continue to play in the
constitutional structure.92
2. Separation of Powers - Congressional Standing. - After laying
the foundation for the doctrine of legislative standing nearly sixty
years ago,1 the Supreme Court maintained a conspicuous silence, de-
spite numerous opportunities to address the issue.2 Last Term, in
90 See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (i86) (holding that Congress "has no
power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it").
91 483 U.S. 219 (1987). "Kentucky v. Dennison is the product of another time. The conception
of the relation between the States and the Federal Government there announced is fundamentally
incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development.... We conclude that it
may stand no longer." Id. at 230.
92 Printz's announcement of a "categorical" rule is unlikely to make these constitutional ques-
tions disappear, given scores of recent statutes involving similar instances of federal comman-
deering. See, e.g., Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act of 199o, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 62o-62oj (1994) (requiring western states to reduce their'exports of unprocessed timber har-
vested from state lands); National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994) (requiring
states to take specific measures to facilitate easy voter registration in federal elections). For a de-
scription of other statutes that compel state action, see Caminker, cited above in note 66, at oo3
n.3.
1 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (i939). The doctrine of legislative standing, which
has developed in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, is both complex, see
Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as Counterweight?, 54 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 63, 73-103 (1992) (summarizing the doctrinal history), and contentious, see, e.g.,
Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41-71 (D.C. Cir. i985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as moot sub
nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733
F.2d 946, 956-6s (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
2 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986); McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025,
1025 (1981) (mem.), aff'g 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho ig8i); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996
(1979) (mem.), vacating 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 516-49 (1969) (addressing the justiciability of a congressional member's suit without dis-
cussing legislative standing). But cf. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028, 1029 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that the Court's summary affirmance "could rest as readily on
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Raines v. Byrd,3 the Court finally revisited legislative standing, and
held that a nondiscriminatory, official-capacity injury to legislators
confers standing only when legislators whose votes would have been
sufficient to defeat or enact a specific legislative act suffer complete
nullification of their votes.4 Because the Court in Raines failed to ex-
plain how this holding is consistent with the Court's additional hold-
ing that a government official cannot claim a personal stake in official
power, the law of legislative standing after Raines is a doctrine fraught
with analytical inconsistency and uncertain boundaries. If the Court
was reluctant either to reject or to endorse legislative standing cate-
gorically, the Court should have dismissed the case on the more limited
ground that the defendants did not cause the plaintiffs' alleged inju-
ries.
In 1996, Congress passed and the President signed into law the
Line Item Veto Act ("Act').s The Act gives the President authority, af-
ter signing a bill into law, to "cancel" selected spending and tax benefit
provisions. 6 One day after the Act went into effect, six members of the
Io4th Congress 7 filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and challenged the constitutionality of the Act8 in
their official capacities as members of Congress. 9 The defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on standing and ripeness grounds, and
both the plaintiffs and defendants moved for summary judgment.1'
our conclusion that appellant lacked standing ... as it could on agreement with the District
Court's resolution of the merits of the question").
3 117 S. CL 2312 (i997).
4 See id. at 2319.
5 Pub. L. No. 104-130, iio Stat. 1200 (codified in pertinent part at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 6g-6gie
(West 1997)).
6 The President exercises the cancellation authority by transmitting a "special message" to
Congress that identifies the dollar amount of the cancelled provisions. 2 U.S.C.A. § 691(a)(B).
The cancellation takes effect upon Congress's receipt of the special message. See id. § 691b(a).
But if Congress passes a separate "disapproval bill" that ultimately is enacted into law, pursuant
either to presidential signature or a congressional override of a conventional presidential veto, id.
§ 691d(b)(3), (c)(i), the original cancellation is rendered "null and void," id. § 6gxb(a).
7 The plaintiffs were Senators Robert C. Byrd, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Carl Levin, and
Mark 0. Hatfield, and Representatives David E. Skaggs and Henry A. Waxman. See Byrd v.
Raines, 956 F. Supp. 21, 27 n.i (D.D.C. 1997). The defendants were Franklin D. Raines, Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, and Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the reasury. See
id. at27.
8 The plaintiffs alleged that the Act unconstitutionally expanded the President's power and
violated the Constitution's Presentment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, because it gave the
President the unilateral authority to cancel, and thus to repeal, provisions of enacted federal laws,
see Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 27.
9 The plaintiffs sued under the provision of the Act that provides a cause of action for con-
gressional members and adversely affected individuals. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 692(a)(). The district
court found that this statutory grant prevented it from invoking its "equitable discretion" to dis-
miss the case because of separation of powers concerns. Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 33.
10 See Byrd, 956 .Supp. at 27.
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The district court denied the defendants' motions and granted the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.' Acknowledging that the
Supreme Court had never endorsed the D.C. Circuit's doctrine of leg-
islative standing,12 the court followed the circuit's rule that members
of Congress have "standing to challenge measures that affect their con-
stitutionally prescribed lawmaking powers."1 3  The court then held
that the plaintiffs' perception that their votes "mean something differ-
ent from what they meant before"' 4 was sufficient to confer standing,
irrespective of whether the President actually exercised his cancellation
authority.15 Finally, the court held that the Act violated the Present-
ment Clause and unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to
the President.' 6
The Supreme Court heard the defendants' statutorily granted di-
rect appeal on an expedited basis,' 7 held that the legislators had no
standing to sue, and vacated the district court's judgment.' 8 Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist' 9 began by reviewing the cen-
tral tenets of the Court's standing doctrine,20 noting in particular that
the plaintiff must have a "personal stake in the alleged dispute, and
that the alleged injury suffered must be particularized as to him."'2'
11 See id. at 38.
12 See id. at 31.
13 Id. at 30 (citing Michel v. Anderson, r4 F.3d 623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Moore v. United
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 950-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill, 699 F.2d ii66, 1168-71 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Because, in the court's view, the D.C. Circuit's
cases "unequivocally establish[ed] that Members have 'a personal interest ... in the exercise of
their governmental powers,'" the court ruled that an alleged injury to such powers is "sufficiently
personal to create a justiciable controversy," id. at 31 n.6 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F.
Supp. 1374, 1382 (D.D.C.), affid on other grounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986)).
14 Id. at 31. The court found that the Act injured the plaintiffs by diluting their Article I vot-
ing power and fundamentally altering the "dynamics of lawmaking." Id.
15 See id. The court also pointed to the ongoing nature of the plaintiffs' alleged harm in re-
jecting the defendants' ripeness challenge. See id. at 32.
16 See id. at 33-38.
17 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 692(b) (West 1997) (providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court); id.
§ 692(c) (requiring the Supreme Court to expedite members' suits challenging the Act's constitu-
tionality).
18 See Raines, I17 S. Ct. at 2322-23.
19 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion.
20 First, the Court emphasized that standing is an element of the "bedrock requirement" that
federal court jurisdiction extends only to a constitutional case or controversy. Raines, I17 S. Ct.
at 2317 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy this require-
ment, a plaintiff must allege an injury "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful con-
duct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the Court noted the need for an "es-
pecially rigorous," id., standing inquiry in cases that might compel the Court to determine the
constitutionality of a coordinate branch's act, see id. at 23 17-18.
21 Id. at 2317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Turning to the specific standing question presented in Raines,22 the
Court distinguished the plaintiffs' alleged injury from Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell's claim, in Powell v. McCormack,23 that the
House of Representatives had wrongly denied him his congressional
seat and salary.24 First, unlike Powell's claim of being "singled out for
specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members," the
Raines legislators' claim of diminished legislative power was an "insti-
tutional injury" that all members shared equally.25 Second, the plain-
tiffs alleged a loss of political power in their official capacities - not,
like Congressman Powell, a deprivation of something to which they
personally were entitled.2 6 The Court held that this kind of official-
capacity injury, which attaches to a member's seat, could not support
standing because a member holds that seat "as trustee for his constitu-
ents, not as a prerogative of personal power. '27
The Court next distinguished the plaintiffs' injuries from the inju-
ries alleged in Coleman v. Miller.28 In Coleman, a divided Court held
that twenty of Kansas's forty state senators had a "plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes"
against ratification of a federal constitutional amendment, and thus
had standing to sue.29  According to the Raines Court, Coleman
standing requires a complete nullification of legislative power that is
satisfied only in a suit brought by a group of legislators whose votes,
absent the challenged conduct, would have been sufficient to pass or
defeat a specific bill.3 0 Because the Raines legislators could still pass
or reject appropriations bills, vote to repeal the Act, or exempt any
appropriations bill from presidential cancellation, the Act did not nul-
lify their votes and thus did not inflict a judicially cognizable injury.31
The Court then reasoned that, if the Raines plaintiffs had standing
based on a claimed injury to official power, numerous government of-
ficials throughout American history would have had standing to sue in
"analogous confrontations" between Congress and the Executive
22 The Court addressed only the constitutional standing requirements because Congress's
statutory authorization of member suits eliminated prudential standing limitations on the Court's
jurisdiction. See id. at 23x8 n.3.
23 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
24 See id. at 496.
2s Raines, 117 S. CL at 2318.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 307 U.S. 433 (i939); see Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318-20.
29 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438. Importantly, the Coleman legislators' votes would have been de-
cisive but for the State Lieutenant Governor's allegedly unlawful tie-breaking vote. See id. at
44'.
30 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2319.
31 See id. at 2319-21. The Court therefore rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the dimin-
ished effectiveness of their votes resulting from the President's cancellation authority triggered
Coleman standing. See id.
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Branch.32 Yet, in the Court's view, history demonstrated that no such
official had ever contemplated such a suit, let alone filed one in a fed-
eral court.3 3 The Court interpreted the historical record as evidence of
a deep-rooted commitment to limit the role of Article Im courts.3 4 If,
on the other hand, courts were to entertain suits by government offi-
cials claiming personal injuries to official powers, courts would become
embroiled in a supervisory role over governmental operations that
would be incompatible with the American constitutional regime.35
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment of the Court but ques-
tioned much of the majority's analysis.3 6 First, Justice Souter argued
that the Court's standing precedents did not recognize as dispositive
the distinction between personal- and official-capacity injury.37  Sec-
ond, Justice Souter questioned whether the plaintiffs' alleged injuries
were insufficiently concrete, noting that an injury to all members of an
official body lies somewhere between an abstract injury shared by the
entire citizenry and a concrete injury resulting from Coleman nullifica-
tion.38 Instead, Justice Souter would have "resolve[d] doubts about
standing against the plaintiff~s]" and awaited a private litigant with
clear standing to sue.3 9
Justice Stevens dissented and recast the plaintiffs' alleged injury as
a claim of the complete denial of the "right to vote on the precise text
that will ultimately become law."40  In Justice Stevens's view, this
characterization of the plaintiffs' injury led to the twin conclusions
that the plaintiffs had standing and that the Act was unconstitu-
tional.41
Justice Breyer also dissented, narrowing the inquiry to whether the
plaintiffs' status as congressional members brought an otherwise justi-
ciable controversy outside the scope of Article 111.42 He concluded
that it did not, reasoning that the Constitution does not require a per-
sonal-capacity injury, and that, given the seriousness, pervasiveness,
32 Id. at 2321.
33 See id. at 2321-22.
34 See id. at 2322.
3S See id.
36 Justice Ginsburg concurred in Justice Souter's opinion.
37 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
38 See id. at 2323-24.
39 Id. at 2325. Justice Souter reasoned that such a suit would be preferable because a private
plaintiff would expose the Court to less risk of confrontation with political forces and because the
necessary delay in awaiting such a plaintiff would allow the political controversy to "subside[
from a full boil." Id.
40 Id. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41 See id. at 2326-27. Justice Stevens also argued that his view of the alleged injuries rendered
irrelevant the question whether Coleman applies only in cases of vote nullification. See id. at
2326.
42 See id. at 2327-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and immediacy of the alleged harm, Coleman mandated a finding of
justiciability.43
The principal conundrum of Raines, and one that lower courts un-
doubtedly will face, is whether future legislators have Coleman stand-
ig to claim official-capacity injury44 given that Raines also held that
democratic representatives only have standing to allege personal inju-
ries suffered in their personal capacities. 45 Conceding for the sake of
argument that the personal-capacity injury requirement is sound as a
matter of political theory,46 and moreover that it is a latent require-
ment of Article III standing,47 the requirement is facially incompatible
with Coleman standing in particular48 and with the doctrine of legisla-
tive standing in general. 49
43 See id. at 2328-29. Justice Breyer argued that the majority's distinction between vote nulli-
fication and vote dilution did not alter Coleman's authority because the plaintiffs' votes, when
cast as part of a majority in favor of a particular appropriation, were subject to threatened nullifi-
cation by presidential cancellation. See id.
44 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318-21.
45 See id. at 2318.
46 See id. (stating that the plaintiffs' injury "runs (in a sense) with the Member's seat, a seat
which the Member holds (it may quite arguably be said) as trustee for his constituents, not as a
prerogative of personal power"); see also E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a
Public Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a Fidu-
ciary Standard, 63 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1027-28 (1975) (noting Lockean principles of government as a
trust, which prevent officeholder-trustees from asserting private dominion over public power).
One possible objection to the Court's reference to representation as trusteeship, aside from the
Court's reliance on noncommittal parenthetical qualification, is that it adopts as settled principle
one of at least two competing models of democratic representation. See generally HANNA
FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144-67 (1967) (contrasting "mandate"
and "independence" theories of democratic representation). However, this objection loses force
upon recognition that neither model reasonably could justify an official's claim to a private stake
in public power. See R. Lawrence Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote is This,
Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 26 n.157 (1986).
47 The Court's interpretation of the personal injury requirement as a personal-capacity injury
appears relatively novel. Previously, the Court primarily had employed the personal injury re-
quirement to ensure that the alleged injury was particularized, and not to distinguish between
personal- and official-capacity injuries. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 39 (976). But see Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543-45
(1986) (holding that an official-capacity interest is an insufficient personal stake to confer stand-
ing).
48 See Raines, 117 S. CL at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2328 (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 469-7o (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Risser
v. Thompson, 93o F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir. i991).
49 The doctrine of legislative standing is premised on the idea that a legislator has a personal
interest in protecting official power. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 51i F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (D.D.C.), affd on other grounds sub nom. Bow-
sher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Yet it is just such a personal stake in public power that propo-
nents of the personal-capacity injury requirement reject. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 5o-5I
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361
(987); Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Dessem, supra note 46, at 25-26.
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However, a court might proffer at least three theories to support a
grant of official-capacity legislative standing under Coleman, notwith-
standing the seemingly contradictory personal-capacity injury re-
quirement. First, Raines's limitation of Coleman to cases involving a
complete nullification of official power may render Coleman standing a
narrow exception to the personal-capacity injury requirement based on
the concreteness of the alleged injury. Chief Justice Rehnquist pro-
vided the basis for such a theory when, in distinguishing Congressman
Powell's claim of a loss of personal entitlement 50 from the Raines
plaintiffs' claims of institutional injury, he noted that the former was
more suitable for judicial resolution because it was more concrete. 5' If
one thus interprets the personal-capacity injury requirement as a kind
of secondary safeguard for foreclosing the litigation of abstract inju-
ries,5 2 then one could perhaps carve out an exception for official-
capacity claims alleging the concrete injury of vote nullification -
arguably the only such claims still valid after Raines.5 3
Second, a court might find Coleman standing in the absence of a
personal-capacity injury by attaching significance to the Court's par-
enthetical suggestion that Coleman holds "(at most)" that complete vote
nullification is sufficient for legislative standing.54 As the Court ex-
plained in an important footnote, Coleman may in fact establish even
less, and may apply only in cases involving state legislators or in cases
originating in state court.55 If so, Coleman standing would function as
50 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 512-14 (1969); see also Boehner v. Anderson,
3o F-3d 156, 16o (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding standing for a member of Congress who claimed that his
salary was unconstitutionally increased).
51 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318. Although it is indisputable that deprivation of a personal
entitlement is more concrete than a diminution of official power, the mere fact that members of a
body share an injury with other members should not itself defeat standing. See Raines, I17 S. Ct.
at 2323-24 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Jus-
tice, 491 U.S. 44o, 449-So (i989). Moreover, a rule that would treat an injury shared by all mem-
bers of a body as too abstract for Article III standing purposes would be in tension with the
Court's requirements for associational standing, one of which is that the association has standing
to sue only if all of its members could sue as individuals. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
52 The primary safeguard is the requirement of a particularized and concrete injury. See Lu-
jan, 504 U.S. at 56o-6i & n.i; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 2o8,
226-27 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 4X8 U.S. i66, 177-78 (x974).
53 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318-21. However, as then-Judge Scalia forcefully argued, the
personal-capacity injury requirement protects separation of powers concerns that may be violated
regardless of an alleged injury's degree of concreteness. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 957-59 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Thus, recognizing an official-capacity injury based on a concrete-
ness exception would be unsatisfactory because the exception depends on principles that the rule,
properly understood, necessarily rejects.
54 Raines, ii 7 S. CL at 2319 (citation omitted).
s See id. at 232o n.8; id. at 2324 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); Barnes v. Kline,
759 F.2d 21, 5o-51 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v.
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The
Court explained that, because it distinguished Coleman as requiring vote nullification, it "need not
decide whether Coleman may also be distinguished in other ways." Raines, X17 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8.
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a kind of jurisdictional exception to the personal-capacity injury re-
quirement, justified on the ground that only cases in which federal of-
ficials file claims in federal court implicate the separation of powers
concerns that the personal-capacity injury requirement safeguards. 5 6
Finally, a court might reason that the personal-capacity injury re-
quirement presents no obstacle to Coleman standing because Coleman,
after Raines, supports official-capacity standing only in cases in which
all the members of the controlling bloc whose votes allegedly were
nullified sue jointly.5 7 If the Supreme Court were simply trying to
limit Coleman in order to reject standing in Raines, the requirement of
complete nullification, as applied to a handful of legislators, would
have been sufficient. The Court may have imposed this curious form
of legislator-specific compulsory party joinder as an additional re-
quirement on the ground that, when a controlling bloc of legislators
sue together, they sue in effect as representatives of their legislative
bodies.5 8 Because suits to protect legislative power brought by repre-
sentatives of Congress, or by Congress itself, do not seek to protect a
private stake in official power, upholding standing for such legislators
would be fully consistent with the personal-capacity injury require-
ment5 9 and would therefore appear permissible after Raines.
However, because the Court's failure fully to distinguish Coleman contributed to Raines's analyti-
cal discord, the Court seems to have misapplied the rule that a court should not decide constitu-
tional questions if the case can be decided on other grounds. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
S6 See Risser v. Thompson, 93o F.2d 549, 55I (7th Cir. 9ggx); Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 n.i
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). However, courts that choose to limit Coleman on this ba-
sis will have to confront a distinct set of objections. See Raines, 17 S. CL at 2329 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the differences between state and federal legislators are not determina-
tive in cases in which prudential standing requirements do not apply); Reply Brief for Appellees
at 7-8, Raines (No. 96-1671) (rejecting the argument that Coleman found standing because the
state supreme court had ruled on the federal questions involved), available in 1997 WL 269313.
57 See Raines, 1x7 S. CL at 2319 (holding that "Coleman stands (at most) for the proposition
that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative act
have standing" (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
58 See Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 640 (3d Cir. 2984) (Adams, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (construing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)); Brief for the Appellants
at 28 n.i5, Raines (No. 96-1671), available in 2997 WL 251415; Dessem, supra note 46, at 28
n.163. If this reading of Coleman is correct, then Raines implicitly rejected the D.C. Circuit's con-
trary interpretation. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430,434-36 (D.C. Cir. 2974).
S9 See Dessem, supra note 46, at 14-18, 26-3o; Note, Congressional Access to the Federal
Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. x632, 1648-49 (1977); c.f Dornan v. United States Secretary of Defense,
85i F.2d 450,451 (D.C. Cir. 2988) (distinguishing between claims brought by Congress as an insti-
tution and suits brought by a "modest fraction" of Congress). Moreover, under this controlling
bloc model, the fact that both congressional Houses actively opposed the Raines plaintiffs' suit
would take on more than some doctrinally unidentified "importance." See Raines, 227 S. CL at
2322. Indeed, Congress's explicit opposition would provide strong evidence that legislators suing
as a group were not the body's representatives. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475
U.S. 534, 544 (1986) ("Generally speaking, members of collegial bodies do not have standing to
perfect an appeal the body itself has declined to take."); Brief for the Appellants at 27, Raines
(No. 96-1671), available in 1997 WL 251415. But see RicHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER
& DAvID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
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Explaining the validity of official-capacity legislative standing after
Raines60 is no mere academic exercise, nor should courts shirk from
offering such supplemental arguments on the ground that Raines im-
plicitly found them unnecessary. In the absence of future Supreme
Court clarification, a court that fails to offer some such explanation
may well interpret into insignificance whichever prong of Raines's di-
vided holding that the court disfavors. For example, a court might
deny legislative standing outright on the theory that Article I re-
quires a personal-capacity injury, and that Raines's severe limitation
of Coleman effectively eviscerates the doctrine of legislative standing.61
Alternatively, a court might conclude that the personal-capacity re-
quirement is not dispositive and uphold standing on the ground that
Raines's refusal to overrule Coleman demonstrates the continuing, al-
beit circumscribed, validity of the legislative standing doctrine.62 Fi-
9-Io (4th ed. Supp. 1997) (questioning the Court's suggestion that Congress had not authorized
the Raines plaintiffs' suit given the Act's explicit authorization of member suits).
60 The Court also confused its personal-capacity injury requirement by suggesting that legisla-
tors "singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respec-
tive bodies" have standing to sue to redress official-capacity injuries. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318;
see id. at 232o n.7. Resolution of this contradiction, see id. at 2328 (Breyer, J., dissenting), begins
with the following observation: proponents of the personal-capacity injury requirement derive
that requirement from a constituent's supposed lack of standing to protect his or her representa-
tive's power, see Barnes, 759 F.2d at 5o (Bork, J., dissenting); Brief for the Appellants at 23-24,
Raines (No. 96-1671), available in 1997 WL 251415. If the constituent cannot bring a claim based
on a generalized interest in constitutional governance that the entire citizenry shares, the argu-
ment proceeds, courts cannot entertain suits brought by the representative either, because doing
so would invest the representative with a "separate private right, akin to a property interest, in
the powers of [his or her] office[]." Barnes, 759 F.2d at 5o (Bork, J., dissenting). However, this
reasoning is inapposite in cases of discriminatory injury to a representative's official power, be-
cause in such cases the entire citizenry does not share the constituent's interest See Michel v.
Anderson, X4 F.3d 623, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Therefore, standing for the representative would not
give the representative a greater stake in the office than the constituent, and thus would not be
contrary to the personal-capacity injury requirement. On the other hand, if one argues that con-
stituents whose representative suffers a nondiscriminatory official-capacity injury also would have
standing to sue, see id. (noting that the difference between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
injuries is one of degree, and not one of kind), or if one adopts a rationale for the personal-
capacity injury requirement that does not depend on the constituent's lack of standing, see Moore,
733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that a representative simply
has no claim of private right in public power), then this proposed reconciliation would unravel.
61 Indeed, the Court's argument that the mere possibility of a legislative remedy takes a legis-
lator's injury out of the requisite category of nullification, see Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2320, seems to
invalidate legislative standing in all cases in which a legislative act promotes interbranch contro-
versy. As several commentators have noted, it is always possible for members to seek some form
of legislative redress. See, e.g., Dessem, supra note 46, at io; Meyer, supra note i, at 69. The
Court in Raines appears to have adopted the idea of legislative redress from the D.C. Circuit's
"equitable discretion" doctrine. Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881-82 (D.C.
Cir. ig8i); see also Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv.
241, 261-67 (igi) (setting forth the equitable discretion doctrine that Riegle adopted). Impor-
tantly, however, the Court appears to have elevated this factor from an equitable guideline to a
constitutional requirement.
62 Moreover, even though the Court limited Coleman to cases of nullification, courts appear to
have some latitude in extending Coleman to cover cases of official-capacity injuries less concrete
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nally, even if a court does offer a theory that explains the validity of
official-capacity standing after Raines, its freedom to choose which
theory to invoke, and under which circumstances to invoke it, demon-
strates the broad range of decisional possibilities that Raines's facially
inconsistent holding may produce.63
Although this doctrinal uncertainty must be assessed relative to the
unchecked freedom that courts had in the doctrinal void following
Coleman, it seems particularly unfortunate given that Raines easily
could have been dismissed for lack of standing on the more limited,64
but far more persuasive, ground that the injuries alleged -were not
fairly traceable to the actions of the named defendants. 65 By arguing
that the President's mere possession of the line-item veto power in-
flicted injury on them, irrespective of whether the President actually
exercised that authority, the plaintiffs avoided a potential ripeness bar-
rier 66 only to confront the obvious objection that the Executive Branch
had not caused their injuries.67 Rather, those alleged injuries were
than Coleman but more concrete than Raines. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2320-21 (rejecting a
"drastic extension" of Coleman to cover diminished effectiveness, but not foreclosing lesser exten-
sions).
63 Judicial uncertainty in applying Raines will be most acute in the D.C. Circuit - the court
of appeals that most frequently hears legislators' suits. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 353i.i, at 34 (2d
ed. 1984). Raines appears to have disturbed, without explicitly addressing, that circuit's legisla-
tive standing doctrine in at least three respects. First, the personal-capacity injury requirement
that Raines endorsed conflicts directly with the D.C. Circuit's repeated statements that members
have standing to protect their official voting power. See, e.g., Michel, 14 F.3d at 625; Moore, 733
F.2d at 952-53; Kennedy, 5II F.2d at 436. Second, the Court's holding that Coleman requires
complete nullification implicitly repudiates the D.C. Circuit's rejection of the distinction between
vote nullification and dilution, see Riegle, 656 F.2d at 88o, as well as its subsequent holdings that
vote dilution is a sufficient injury for legislative standing, see, e.g., Skaggs v. Carle, io R3d 831,
834 (D.C. Cir. i997); Michel, 14 F.3d at 625. Third, by addressing the separation of powers con-
cerns implicated in legislators' suits as part of its standing analysis, the Court in Raines called
into question the validity of the circuit's "equitable discretion" doctrine, the primary justification
of which is that separation of powers considerations are best addressed outside the standing con-
text. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 877-82.
64 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, x995 Term - Foreword: Leaving Things Unde-
cided, io HARv. L. REV. 4, 16-18 (i996) (describing courts' interest in reducing decision and er-
ror costs as a component of judicial minimalism).
65 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56o (1992) (holding that the "injury has to
be fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th~e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court" (alterations in original) (quoting
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Raines, ii7 S. Ct. at 2322 n.ii (noting but not adopting this argument).
66 See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25,32 (D.D.C. 1997).
67 This objection is clearly distinct from the easily overcome objections that, because the Ex-
ecutive Branch had not yet taken any action when the plaintiffs filed suit, the claimed injury was
too conjectural, see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1001-02 (1982) (recognizing standing before
the threatened harm occurs); Dellmus v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147 (D.D.C. i9go) (same), or
that the claim was not sufficiently ripe for adjudication, see Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 5oi U.S. 252, 265 n.z3 (iggi) (rejecting a ripe-
ness challenge to an injury resulting from a threatened veto). In Raines, the plaintiffs' claimed
injury, by hypothesis, existed regardless whether the Executive Branch took any action at all.
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caused 68 by legislators who enacted the Line Item Veto Act - includ-
ing the plaintiffs in Raines who voted against the Act.6 9 If courts were
to recognize standing in such cases, they would effectively enable los-
ing legislators to replay political battles against their colleagues in the
federal courts, which is precisely what the separation of powers con-
cerns at the core of the Article 11I standing requirement 7° are meant to
interdict.71 Thus, the Court simply could have held that members'
self-inflicted injuries resulting from the mere enactment of a statute
cannot form the basis of a justiciable controversy against the Execu-
tive Branch.72 Accordingly, the Court could have deferred addressing,
and inadvertently confusing, important questions about the validity of
legislative standing until the Court was prepared to resolve those ques-
tions comprehensively.
3. Separation of Powers - Presidential Immunity. - When it
comes to separation of powers jurisprudence, hard cases involving the
presidency have historically made good law.' Because of his involve-
ment in the Watergate scandal, Richard Nixon was indirectly respon-
sible for two landmark Supreme Court decisions concerning presiden-
tial amenability to judicial process and the scope of executive
68 Admittedly, this causation analysis ultimately turns on the plaintiffs' characterization of
their alleged injuries, and thus might be criticized as a formalistic distinction that reveals the ma-
nipulable nature of the Court's causation doctrine. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Priva-
tization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1463-69 (x988). However, Professor Sunstein's
critique concerns the divergent standing outcomes that result from a plaintiff's ability to charac-
terize an injury in various ways, see id., and does not recommend that a court should recharac-
terize alleged injuries to assist plaintiffs in defeating standing challenges. But see Raines, ii7 S.
CL at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recasting plaintiffs' injuries in order to establish standing).
69 See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892) ("[Congress's] action is not the action of any
separate member or number of members, but the action of the body as a whole . ..").
70 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881 (1983). But
see Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1469-74 (questioning the Court's use of separation of powers prin-
ciples to deny standing).
71 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-60 Oinking the causation requirement with the idea of separation
of powers); Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (remarking that "courts should not cut short the political process by awarding a
judicial victory to a legislator who has lost.., in the political sphere"); Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting standing for a member of Congress because the al-
leged injury was "due to the contrary votes of her colleagues").
72 Such a causation rule would not invalidate standing in all cases in which members sue the
Executive Branch to redress injuries resulting from an allegedly unconstitutional act, provided
that the Executive Branch had some role in causing the claimed injuries. See, e.g., Pressler v.
Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302, 304-05 (D.D.C. 1976), affid mem. sub nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434
U.S. 1028 (1978); Meyer, supra note i, at 124-25. Moreover, such a rule would not turn on the
speculative nature of the chain of causation, see, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 759, but rather on the
threshold matter that one end of the chain (the defendant's actions) simply did not exist.
I Cf Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
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privilege. 2 Perhaps the most significant separation of powers decision
arising from Nixon's presidency, however, had nothing to do with Wa-
tergate. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,3 the Supreme Court held that Nixon
could not be sued by a discharged Air Force employee, on the ground
that the President had "absolute immunity from damages liability
predicated on his official acts."4
Last Term, in Clinton v. Jones,5 the Supreme Court properly re-
fused to extend the reasoning of Fitzgerald to cases in which a sitting
President is sued for damages arising from events that occurred before
he took office.6 However, the Court further ruled that the trial judge,
taking into account the "high respect" owed to the presidency, could
use her discretion to stay either discovery or trial proceedings. 7 In
doing so, the Court failed to provide the trial court with adequate
guidance on how to balance the complex interests of the plaintiff and
the President. In particular, the Court neglected to address a number
of factors that generally weigh against granting a lengthy stay in cases
involving the President, especially the case at bar.
The facts of the case are in ardent dispute. According to the com-
plaint, on May 8, 1991, Paula Corbin Jones, then an employee of the
Arkansas Industrial Development Commission (AIDC), and William
Jefferson Clinton, then governor of Arkansas, attended a conference in
an Arkansas hotel." While working at the conference registration
desk, Jones was approached by Danny Ferguson, a state trooper
working in Clinton's security detail.9 Ferguson told Jones that Clinton
wanted to meet her in an upstairs room.'0 Jones then followed
Ferguson to the room, where Clinton fondled her, undressed himself,
and asked her to perform a sexual act." Jones refused and left the
room. 1 2 She then suffered retaliation from her superiors at AIDC for
refusing to acquiesce to Clinton's advances. 13  After Clinton was
elected President of the United States in 1992, Ferguson and spokes-
men for Clinton denied that the incident had occurred.' 4
2 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (I977); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974).
3 457 U.S. 731 (x982).
4 Id. at 749.
s 117 S. Ct. 1636 (I997).
6 See id. at 1644.
7 Id. at 165o.
S See Complaint at 2-3, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-29o (E.D. Ark. filed May 6, 1994) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
9 See id. at 3.
10 See id.
11 Seeid. at 4-5.
12 See id. at 5.
13 See id. at 8-9.
14 See id. at 9-13. Following the Supreme Court's decision on the question of immunity, and
more than three years after Jones filed her complaint, Clinton filed an answer in which he denied
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On May 6, 1994, Jones filed suit in federal court in Arkansas, al-
leging deprivation of her constitutional rights under § 1983,'1 conspir-
acy to violate her constitutional rights under § 1985,16 and defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arkansas law.' 7
Clinton moved for permission to file a motion both to dismiss the suit
on the ground of presidential immunity and to defer all other plead-
ings or motions until the immunity issue was resolved.' 8 Reasoning
that the immunity issue could be addressed without reaching the mer-
its of the complaint,19 the district court granted his request.20 The dis-
trict court subsequently denied Clinton's motion to dismiss.2' The
court reasoned that historical evidence suggested that a President is
not absolutely immune from civil suit.22 However, it ruled that trial
proceedings, but not discovery, could be delayed until the end of the
President's term because of the necessity of avoiding litigation that
might hamper the President in the performance of his duties.23
A divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed the denial of the motion to
dismiss, but reversed the order staying trial proceedings.2 4 Writing for
the majority, Judge Bowman25 reasoned that the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Fitzgerald did not support presidential immunity from suits
arising from unofficial actions.26 He concluded that "judicial case
management sensitive to the burdens of the presidency and the de-
all of Jones's allegations. See Answer at 3-12, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. filed
July 3, 1997) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
16 Id. § I985.
17 See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1639-40. Clinton was named as a defendant on all four counts,
Ferguson on the conspiracy and defamation counts. See Complaint at I8-I9, Jones, No. LR-C-
94-29o. The trial court subsequently dismissed Jones's defamation claim against Clinton, but not
her analogous claim against Ferguson. See Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-29o (E.D. Ark. Aug.
22, 1997).
18 See Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902, 903 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
19 See id. at 9o5.
20 See id. at 9o6-o7.
21 See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 700 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
22 See id. at 692-98.
23 See id. at 698-99. The district court later granted Clinton's motion to stay all proceedings
pending resolution of the immunity issue on appeal. See Jones v. Clinton, 879 F. Supp. 86, 88
(E.D. Ark. 1995).
24 See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1363 (8th Cir. 1996). The panel also dismissed both
Jones's appeal of the district court's postjudgment order to stay proceedings and Clinton's juris-
dictional challenge to that appeal. See id. The Eighth Circuit, over Judge McMillian's dissent,
subsequently denied Clinton's suggestion for rehearing en banc. See Jones v. Clinton, 81 F.3d 78,
78 (8th Cir. 1996).
25 Judge Beam joined Judge Bowman's opinion and concurred specially to address three addi-
tional issues: the potential impact of a delay on Jones, the potential impact of proceeding on
Clinton, and the lack of a rationale for a delay in proceeding against Ferguson. See Jones, 72 F.3 d
at 1363-67 (Beam, J., concurring specially). Judge Ross dissented, reasoning that the "language,
logic and intent" of Fitzgerald suggested that the district court should stay both discovery and
trial until the President left office. Id. at 1367 (Ross, J., dissenting).
26 See Jones, 72 F.3d at 1359.
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mands of the President's schedule" would alleviate any separation of
powers concerns about judicial interference in executive operations.2 7
The Supreme Court affirmed. 28 Writing for a unanimous Court,29
Justice Stevens asserted that no precedent existed for the proposition
that a President has temporary immunity from civil damages litigation
arising from events occurring before he took office.30 Justice Stevens
noted that, although three previous Presidents had been subject to
suits of this type,3' each suit either had been dismissed before the
President in question took office, or was settled before it reached
trial.32 Regarding those cases in which the President was afforded
immunity for his official actions, Justice Stevens explained that their
rationale was "to avoid rendering the President 'unduly cautious in the
discharge of his official duties.' '33 Such a rationale, he continued,
provided no support for immunity for unofficial conduct.3 4
Justice Stevens then turned to Clinton's argument that the text and
structure of the Constitution supported a grant of temporary immu-
nity.35 He acknowledged that the presidency placed unparalleled de-
mands on the occupant of the office.36 However, according to Justice
Stevens, it did not follow that allowing an action for civil damages to
proceed would violate principles of separation of powers.3 Justice
Stevens noted that the doctrine of separation of powers was primarily
concerned with "the allocation of official power" between the branches
27 Id. at 1361.
28 See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1652.
29 The Court has voted unanimously in at least one other case involving the separation of
powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 716 (x974), perhaps out of concern for its insti-
tutional legitimacy, see BOB WOODwARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 308-47 (1979) (detailing the behind-the-scenes maneuvering to secure a unani-
mous vote in Nixon).
30 See Clinton, I17 S. Ct. at 1643.
31 See id. at 1643 & nn.15-i6 (citing People ex rel. Hurley v. Roosevelt, 71 N.E. 1137 (N.Y.
19o4) (mem.); DeVault v. Truman, i94 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1946); Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 757,200 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Oct. 27, ig6o); and Hills v. Kennedy, No. 757,201 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 27,
i96o)).
32 See id. at 1643.
33 Id. at 1644 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752 n.32 (1982)).
34 See id. In a brief aside, Justice Stevens rejected historical evidence, introduced by Clinton,
suggesting that the Founders believed that the President was immune from suit for unofficial
conduct. See id. at x644-45 (citing 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 168 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds.,
1988) (diary of William Maclay); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1563, at 418-19 (833) (quotation from Justice Story); and io THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 n.i (Paul Leicester Ford ed., i9o5) (letter of Thomas Jefferson)). He
argued that the evidence cited did not entirely support Clinton's position, see id. at 1645 n.23, and
noted that Jones had introduced contrary evidence, see id. at 1645 (citing 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT,
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed. 1836) (comment by James Wilson)).
35 See id.
36 See id. at 1646.
37 See id. at 1647.
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of the government,38 particularly "encroachment or aggrandizement of
one branch at the expense of the other." 9 According to Justice Ste-
vens,. a court hearing a suit against the President would not be engag-
ing in either encroachment or aggrandizement: rather than performing
an executive function itself, the court would merely be exercising its
explicit Article III power40 to decide cases and controversies.4 1
In the same vein, Justice Stevens rejected Clinton's argument that
court proceedings would hinder the President in performing his official
duties.4 2 Justice Stevens reasoned that historical evidence provided lit-
tie support for the proposition that a "deluge of such litigation" would
engulf the presidency.43 In any event, he asserted, merely burdening
the presidency would not rise to the level of constitutionally impermis-
sible impairment.4 4 Justice Stevens noted that the Court had histori-
cally been able to impose burdens on the President in two ways.45
First, the Court has long had the authority to review the constitution-
ality of the President's official actions: 46 in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer,47 for example, the Court ruled that Harry Truman ex-
ceeded his constitutional authority by seizing the nation's steel mills. 48
Second, courts could subject the President to judicial process:49 indeed,
sitting Presidents, including Clinton, had routinely responded to both
judicial orders and requests for testimony.50 According to Justice
Stevens, it would be less burdensome to determine the legality of the
President's unofficial conduct than to review his official actions.5'
Next, Justice Stevens considered the extent to which the district
court had the discretion to stay proceedings in order to accommodate
the President's schedule.5 2 Justice Stevens asserted that, although the
potential burdens on the President did not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional violation under the separation of powers,53 the trial court
could consider them in exercising its discretion to postpone proceed-
ings.54 Justice Stevens noted, however, that the district court's deci-
38 Id.
39 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam)).
40 See U.S. CONST. art. MS, § i.
41 See Clinton, I17 S. Ct. at 1647-48.
42 See id.
43 Id. at x648; see cases cited supra note 31.
44 See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1648.
45 See id. at 1649.
46 See id.
47 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
48 See Clinton, ii7 S. Ct. at 1649.
49 See id.
SO See id. at 1649-5o (citing United States v. Branscum, No. LRP-CR-96- 4 9 (E.D. Ark. June 7,
1996); and United States v. McDougal, 934 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1996)).
51 See id. at 165o.
52 See id.
S3 See id.
S4 See id.
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sion to stay trial proceedings until the President left office constituted
an abuse of discretion because the court failed to take into account
"the respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial." s In any event,
he reasoned, the trial court could not realistically rule on the post-
ponement of trial proceedings until the completion of discovery, when
the potential burdens on the President of a trial would be clearer.56
Justice Stevens concluded by summarily addressing two additional
issues discussed in the briefs: whether the Court's decision would lead
to an onslaught of frivolous litigation against the President and
whether the President might refuse to explain his reasons for seeking a
stay on national security grounds.57 On the first issue, Justice Stevens
noted that courts could readily terminate frivolous litigation by dis-
missal or summary judgment s and could further deter it by the impo-
sition of sanctions.59 On the second issue, Justice Stevens maintained
that courts had historically accommodated the President's needs, par-
ticularly on matters of national security.60
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.61 He agreed with the
Court's conclusion that the Constitution does not grant the President
automatic immunity from civil suits based on his unofficial conduct.6 2
However, he reasoned that the Constitution did bar a trial court from
interfering with the President's official duties. 63  Once the President
had demonstrated a conflict between the court proceedings and his of-
ficial duties, Justice Breyer continued, the trial court was obligated to
comply with this constitutional principle. 64
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Court's opinion in
Clinton was its brief discussion of the extent to which the district court
had the discretion to stay proceedings in order to accommodate the
President's schedule. Federal district courts indisputably have some
degree of discretion to stay proceedings generally: Rule 40 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly authorizes trial courts to estab-
lish their own scheduling rules,65 and the Supreme Court has long rec-
55 Id. at i65i.
56 See id.
S7 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id. at i651 & n.42 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994); FED. R. Civ. P. ii; and Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 5oi U.S.'32, 50 (I991)).
60 See id. at 1651-52.
61 See id. at 1652 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See FED. R. CIv. P. 40; see also FED. R. Crv. P 57 (authorizing courts to hear actions for de-
claratory judgment on an expedited schedule); FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (granting scheduling prece-
dence to motions for preliminary injunction). See generally 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2352, at 230-45 (2d ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing continuances under Rule 40).
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ognized that trial courts have an analogous equitable power.66 How-
ever, the Court has provided few guidelines on the exercise of this dis-
cretion. In Landis v. North American Co.,67 the Court ruled that dis-
trict courts should determine whether to issue a stay by balancing the
"competing interests" involved.68 However, the Court failed to define
the interests at stake, though it did suggest that a stay of two years or
more would be excessive. 69
In Clinton, the Court correctly suggested that the district court
should consider both the President's interest in not being burdened by
proceedings and the plaintiff's interest in expediting them. 0 Because
of the complexity of such balancing in cases involving the President,
though, the Court should have provided the trial court with more spe-
cific guidance. In particular, the Court did not address five issues that
the trial court should take into account in the balancing process: the
limited need for the President to be heavily involved in the proceeding,
the ability of the trial court to minimize the impact of the President's
involvement on the performance of his duties, the ability of the Presi-
dent to make time for the proceeding, the availability of appeal for
scheduling decisions, and the potential injury from a stay to both the
plaintiff and any other defendants. Although the trial court should
undoubtedly grant great deference to the President in evaluating any
request for a stay, each of these factors militates against a lengthy de-
lay in most cases, including the case at bar.
First, the President need not be very heavily involved in the pro-
ceeding. A civil defendant is not ordinarily obligated to attend pro-
ceedings. 71 Indeed, while the court is hearing preliminary motions re-
garding issues of law, the civil defendant has little or no interest in
becoming personally involved. 72 Although the President may find it
desirable or strategically advantageous to attend some or all of the
proceedings once the case goes to trial, he is no different from any
other busy defendant, except in degree, in having to balance his desire
to attend with other responsibilities.7 3 Indeed, in the case at bar, the
66 See, e.g., Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 381-82 (1935); Kansas City S. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 760, 763-64 (93i).
67 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
68 Id. at 254-55; cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974) (laying out a similar
balancing test, though in more specific circumstances, for determining whether evidence sought in
a criminal proceeding was protected by executive privilege).
69 See Landis, 299 U.S. at 256.
70 The party seeking a stay in proceedings bears the burden of proof. See id. at 255; cf. Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (holding that a federal official seeking absolute immunity
for unconstitutional conduct bears the burden of establishing a public need for such immunity).
71 See Elaine E. Bucklo, Can a Party Be Required To Attend Trial?, LITIG., Spring 1988, at 33,
34.
72 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Respondent at
20, Clinton (No. 95-1853), available in 1996 WL 517593.
73 See Brief for Respondent at 36, Clinton (No. 95-1853), available in 1996 WL 5og5oi.
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President may well decide that it is not worth his while to attend the
proceedings at all, despite the potential political fallout from an ad-
verse judgment, because of the relatively small amount at stake. 4
This may be especially true because, as a practical matter, the Presi-
dent could raise the money needed to pay for high-priced lawyers or to
cover any damage award against him.
75
Second, even if the President does need to become personally in-
volved in the proceeding, the trial court could minimize the impact on
his ability to carry out his official duties. Courts have held that the
President need only testify on matters for which no other source is
available. 76 Should the district court find it necessary to require the
President to testify, it could allow him to do so by videotape, as has
been the custom in recent proceedings involving sitting Presidents. 77
In the instant case, given the relatively limited scope of the factual is-
sues in dispute,78 it seems unlikely that the President's testimony
would be particularly time-consuming.79 If the President is compelled
to testify in person, he could still carry out some of his duties while at-
tending trial80 and delegate the remaining ones to other officials in the
executive branch.8'
74 Jones seeks compensatory damages of $75,ooo and punitive damages of $ioo,ooo per count
from Clinton and Ferguson, in addition to costs. See Complaint at i8-ig, Jones v. Clinton, No.
LR-C-94-29o (E.D. Ark. filed May 6, i994) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
75 Clinton and his wife established a legal defense fund in 1994 to cover their legal costs, both
from the instant case and from the Whitewater investigation. See David Johnston, Clintons Cre-
ate Fund To Accept Gifts To Pay Their Rising Legal Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1994, at Ax8.
Recent estimates put the amount of money raised for the fund at $1.5 million. See James Warren,
Charlie Trie Depicted as Novelty Item at Defense Fund, CM. TmRB., July 31, 1997, § I, at 3.
Clinton's lawyer in the case at bar, Robert S. Bennett, reportedly charges $475 per hour. See
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Her Case Against Clinton, AM. LAw., Nov. 1996, at 56, 62.
76 See United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.D.C. 1989); United States v.
Mitchell, 385 F. Supp. 1190, 1193 (D.D.C. 1974).
77 See United States v. Branscum, No. LRP-CR-96-49 (E.D. Ark. June 7, 1996) (Clinton);
United States v. McDougal, 934 F. Supp. 296, 298 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (Clinton); United States v.
Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, i6o (D.D.C. 199o) (Ronald Reagan); I RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.1(b), at 575 (2d ed. 1992) (Jimmy
Carter) (citing several instances); United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578, 583 (E.D. Cal. 1975)
(Gerald Ford).
78 See Brief for Respondent at 41, Clinton (No. 95-1853), available in 1996 WL 5og5oi ('[This]
case center[s] upon a short encounter between two people in a room.").
79 The President's testimony may be even more narrowly confined if the trial court adopts his
currently pending proposal to limit discovery to the "core issues" in the case. Reply Brief in Sup-
port of Phased Discovery Plan at 2, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-29o (E.D. Ark. filed Aug. 15,
1997) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
80 By way of analogy, Presidents have routinely made major decisions while on vacation:
Reagan, for instance, sent American troops to Lebanon while on vacation in California. See Lou
CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 399 (1991).
81 As head of the executive branch, the President commands nearly three million civilian em-
ployees and over one million military ones. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1996, at 345, 352 (1996). See generally CLINTON ROSSITER,
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 19-25 (2d ed. ig6o) (chronicling the President's responsibilities as
head of the executive branch).
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Third, to the extent that the President's presence at trial proceed-
ings is unavoidable, the President can make time for them. As the
Court acknowledged, the burdens of the presidency are "vast and im-
portant, 8 2 consuming a substantial amount of the President's time. 3
However, although the President is theoretically on call around the
clock,84 Presidents have always set aside time for recreation:8 5 in the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, the duties of the President are "not
unremitting" and do not "demand his whole time for national ob-jects."8 6 In addition, much of the President's time is consumed with
ceremonial or political functions:8 7 the President could arrange for an-
other official to stand in for him at such functions, reschedule them, or
forgo them altogether. Many of the President's official duties could
also be rearranged.88
Fourth, the President could appeal adverse scheduling decisions.
In his brief, Clinton expressed concern that allowing suits to proceed
against the President would essentially subject him to the whims of a
mere trial judge, who would be empowered to review the President's
priorities.8 9 However, the President is not entirely without recourse.
Although scheduling decisions are ordinarily not appealable under the
final judgment rule,90 the President can seek a writ of mandamus from
82 Clinton, IX7 S. Ct. at 1646.
83 See id. ('Of all the 1,886 nights I was President, there were not many when I got to sleep
before i or 2 a.m., and there were few mornings when I didn't wake up by 6 or 6:30." (quoting
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1963-
1969, at 425 (197i)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally RoSSITER, supra note 8I,
at 15-43 (cataloging the duties of the President).
84 See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The
Nixon and Clinton Cases, io8 HARV. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995) ("Constitutionally speaking, the
President never sleeps.").
85 See Tanscript of Oral Argument, Clinton (No. 95-1853), available in 1997 WL 9248, at *2o-
*2, (Jan. 13, 1997) (Scalia, J.) ("[W]e see Presidents riding horseback, chopping firewood, fishing
for stick fish ... playing golf and so forth and so on."); SHEPHERD CAMPBELL & PETER LANDAU,
PRESIDENTIAL LIES: THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF WHITE HOUSE GOLF 2 (1996) (noting that
all but three Presidents since William Howard Taft have been golfers).
86 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30,34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
87 See Oscar Dixon, Super Salute, USA TODAY, May 21, 1997, at 3C (detailing visit to White
House by Green Bay Packers); Valerie Lister, Bulls Pay Visit to White House, USA TODAY, Apr.
4, 1997, at IiC (reporting on visit to White House by Chicago Bulls).
88 See Bill Nichols, Clinton Home, but Schedule To Be in Flux, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 1997, at
IA (listing changes made in Clinton's schedule, including the cancellation of some events and the
rescheduling of others, after Clinton injured his knee during a golfing vacation). Of course, unlike
Clinton's knee injury, any trial proceedings would be foreseeable well in advance, thereby facili-
tating rescheduling.
89 See Brief for Petitioner at 30, Clinton (No. 95-1853), available in 1996 WL 448o96. This
concern is not a novel one: Thomas Jefferson once wondered if "the executive [would] be inde-
pendent of the judiciary ... if the several courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him
constantly trudging from north to south and east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his
constitutional duties." io THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 404 n.1.
90 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (i994).
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the appeals court 91 and can challenge a denial of the writ before the
appeals court en banc and ultimately before the Supreme Court.9 2
The availability of such review would minimize any risk that a trial
judge would make scheduling decisions adverse to the President out of
improper motives: a panel of three judges or nine Justices would pre-
sumably be less likely to manifest systematic political bias, and the
availability of review would deter a trial judge from unduly harassing
the President.93 The standard for granting mandamus review of stay
decisions is somewhat unclear,94 but it appears that the President could
obtain mandamus by showing that the trial court's decision constituted
an abuse of discretion.95 Although mandamus review for denial of
stays is relatively uncommon, a scheduling decision adverse to the
President might provide the "rare" circumstances necessary to obtain
such review.96 In addition, the President may be able to procure a
permissive interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b),97 though the standard
for such an appeal is somewhat higher than that for a writ of manda-
mus.98
Fifth, both the plaintiff and any other defendants could suffer ir-
reparable injury from a lengthy stay in proceedings. As the Court
noted, a lengthy stay could lead to a prejudicial loss of evidence, as
critical witnesses, including the defendant, understandably forget
about the relevant events through the passage of time. 99 Provided that
91 See id. § 165i(a).
92 See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 26o (1957) (affirming an appeals
court's grant of writs of mandamus).
93 In any event, there is no evidence to suggest that the trial judge in this case is pursuing a
vendetta against the President. Indeed, the judge, Susan Webber Wright, was a student of the
President's in law school. See Tom Squitieri, Judge in Suit, Clinton Have Crossed Paths, USA
TODAY, May 30, 1997, at 6A.
94 See generally 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3935.2, at 598-604 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the standard
for mandamus review of stay orders).
95 A plurality of the Supreme Court has suggested that a mandamus writ for a stay order, like
other types of writs, should be granted only on a showing of "clear and indisputable" right - a
somewhat higher standard than abuse of discretion. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655,
665-66 (1978) (plurality opinion). However, appeals courts have continued to apply the abuse of
discretion standard. See, e.g., Smith v. Pinell, 597 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979).
96 See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 94, § 3935.2, at 6o4.
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).
98 To obtain permissive interlocutory review, the President would have to obtain a certification
from the district court, stating that it believed that the appeal involved "a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and that the appeal "may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Id.
99 See Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at I65 . In addition, there is the risk that a witness could die during
the intervening period. Although safeguards do exist to allow a party in a stayed case to preserve
the testimony of a severely ill witness, see FED. R. Crv. P. 27(a), (c), no such protections could ob-
tain for the testimony of a witness who dies suddenly.
Another risk is that one of the parties could die during the stay period. At least one of the
plaintiff's claims would automatically be extinguished on the death of either of the parties. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § I6-62-IoI(b) (Michie 1987) (regarding defamation claim).
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proceedings against the President and any other defendants are stayed
simultaneously,100 the loss of evidence over time might also negatively
affect the other defendants' ability to raise a successful defense. 1 1 In
addition, a lengthy stay could prevent the plaintiff from receiving full
compensation for her alleged injury. Although the plaintiff could ob-
tain interest on her monetary damages as a result of any delay in pro-
ceedings, 0 2 the plaintiff arguably also has reputational interests at
stake.'0 3 To the extent that a stay would prevent her from vindicating
these interests, she would suffer harm analogous to that asserted by a
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief.'0 4
Ultimately, perhaps the strongest argument against granting the
President a lengthy stay lies in the longstanding notion that no indi-
vidual is above the law. 05 As one of Clinton's amici has noted, presi-
dents are no less subject to judicial action than are ordinary citizens.' 0 6
And there is something unsettling about the fact that the President has
already managed to delay for over three years a substantive hearing on
serious charges of sexual misconduct. 10 7 By granting the President a
further lengthy stay on discretionary grounds, the trial court would
undo the Supreme Court's good constitutional work. Hard cases in-
volving the presidency may yet make bad law.
C. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
x. Physician-Assisted Suicide. - In 1996, the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for the Second and Ninth Circuits held, on the basis of the Equal
Protection Clause' and the Due Process Clause2 respectively, that the
100 The district court stayed proceedings against the other defendant at the same time that it
stayed proceedings against the President, pending appeal of its decision on immunity, on the
ground that the claims against the two were "inextricably intertwined." Jones v. Clinton, 879 F.
Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Ark. '995).
101 The Court did not consider the potential effect of a stay on the other defendant, though
Judge Beam, concurring below, briefly alluded to it. See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F 3d 1354, 1366-67
(8th Cir. I996) (Beam, J., concurring specially).
102 Prejudgment interest may be available for both the plaintiff's federal and state claims. See
Winter v. Cerro Gordo County Conservation Bd., 925 F.2d io69, 1073 (8th Cir. igg) (federal
claims); Wooten v. McClendon, 612 S.W.2d io5, io6 (Ark. ig8x) (state claims).
103 See Complaint at i4, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-9 4 -29o (E.D. Ark. filed May 6, 1994) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
104 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Respondent at
ig, Clinton (No. 95-1853), available in 1996 WL 527593.
105 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to clalm the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury.").
106 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-15, at 278 (2d ed. 1988)
(criticizing commentators who concluded that "the President was beyond the pale of judicial di-
rection").
107 See supra note 14.
1 See Quill v. Vacco, 8o F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
2 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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Constitution provides some citizens with a right to a physician's assist-
ance in committing suicide.3 Although no state court or federal ap-
pellate court had ever so ruled 4 the Second and Ninth Circuits both
identified this right within a period of one month. Late last Term, in
Washington v. Glucksbergs and Vacco v. Quill,6 two unanimous deci-
sions issued on the same day, the Court reversed both courts of ap-
peals.' The Court held that, on its face, Washington's ban on assisted
suicides does not violate the Due Process Clause9 and that, on its face,
New York's similar ban'0 comports with the Equal Protection
Clause.' Despite the Court's foreclosure of a broadly articulated right
to physician-assisted suicide, a close reading of the controlling and
concurring opinions in both cases indicates that future litigators may
be able to convince the Court to recognize a more limited constitu-
tional liberty, such as the right not to suffer unmitigated physical pain
when facing imminent death.
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,12 the district court disposi-
tion of Glucksberg, the court analogized the "right to die" to the right
to have an abortion' 3 and concluded accordingly that substantive due
3 This Comment, like most of the relevant literature, defines assisted suicide to mean provid-
ing a patient with a prescribed, lethal drug overdose. See, e.g., Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out
Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 799, 799 n.2 (1994).
4 See Yale Kamisar, The "Right to Die": On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DuQ. L. REv.
481, 481 (i996).
S 117 S. Ct. 2258 (i997).
6 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
7 Both Glucksberg and Quill stemmed from facial constitutional challenges filed in federal
district courts by terminally ill patients and by physicians who treat terminally ill patients. See
Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85o F.
Supp. 1454, r456, 1459 (W.D. Wash. 1994). Compassion in Dying's plaintiff group sought both a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. See id. at 1456-58. The plaintiffs challenged Wash-
ington's physician-assisted suicide ban only "insofar as it bar[red] physicians from aiding in-
formed, mentally competent, terminally ill adults to commit suicide." Id. at 1459. Quill's plaintiff
group sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of New York's assisted suicide
ban. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 79-80.
8 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.o6o(I)-(2) (West 1988) (stating that a person who
"knowingly causes or aids another person[s']" suicide attempt is guilty of a felony).
9 See Glucksberg, 127 S. Ct. at 2268-75.
10 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 125.15(3) (McKinney 2987) (stating, respectively, that a
"person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally ... aids another person to
attempt suicide" and that a "person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when ... [h]e
intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide").
1 See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
12 850 F. Supp. 2454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
13 See id. at 1459-61. The court cited Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (992),
which affirmed that substantive due process protects a woman's right to choose an abortion, see
id. at 846-53. The court stated that, like abortion, assisted suicide implicates an individual's
"most intimate and personal choices." Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 146o (quoting Casey,
5o5 U.S. at 85 ).
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process protects physician-assisted suicide.14 In addition, the court
found the right to die to be constitutionally indistinct from the right to
refuse unwanted, life-sustaining medical treatment,' s and thus held
that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the right to die. 16 There-
fore, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.17
On appeal, a divided panel of Ninth Circuit judges reversed.' 8 The
Ninth Circuit then reheard the case en banc because of its "extraordi-
nary importance."' 9 Writing for eight members of the eleven-member
panel, Judge Reinhardt accepted the district court's due process de-
termination 20 and boldly asserted that a liberty interest properly classi-
fied as a "right to die" exists.2 1 He cited the Supreme Court's ninety-
year history of using balancing tests in liberty interest cases as evi-
dence that a state must satisfy a balancing test less restrictive than
strict scrutiny but more stringent than rational basis in order to justify
a significant impairment of this right.22
Judge Reinhardt catalogued five factors relevant to the balancing
test.23 Most notably, he emphasized the need to weigh the importance
of Washington's interests in proscribing assisted suicide.2 4 In particu-
lar, he deemed reduced, in the case of terminally ill individuals, the
14 See Compassion in Dying, 85o F. Supp. at 1459-6o. The district court applied Casey's un-
due burden test, see Casey, 5o5 U.S. at 878, to find that Washington's statute placed a "substantial
obstacle in the path" of patients who wanted to exercise their right to die. Compassion in Dying,
850 F. Supp. at 1464-66.
Is See Compassion in Dying, 85o F. Supp. at 1461-62 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (iggo)). The Cruzan Court "assumefd] that the United States Constitution
... grants] a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving hydration
and nutrition." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. The Court has not since repudiated this assumption.
16 See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
17 See id. at r467-68. The district court granted the physicians' summary judgment motion
only to the extent that the physicians argued that the Washington law prohibited their patients
from exercising their constitutional rights. See id.
18 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588 (gth Cir. 1995). Writing for the
majority, Judge Noonan chided the district court for making an analytical leap in relying on Ca-
sey to support its decision. See id. at 59 o . Judge Noonan also took issue with the district court's
failure to draw a principled distinction between assisted suicide and the refusal of life support, its
interpretation of historical tradition, its use of facial invalidation with regard to the Washington
statute, its consideration of Washington's interests in banning assisted suicide, and its imprecision
in recognizing a right for a vaguely defined group of terminally ill patients. See id. at 591-94.
19 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
20 See id. at 793-94. Because the en banc panel held the statute invalid under the Due Process
Clause, it did not address its validity under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 838.
21 Id. at 799.
22 See id. at 802-o5.
23 See id. at 816.
24 See id. at 816-32. In the other four parts of the balancing test, Judge Reinhardt evaluated
the means by which the state chose to serve its interests; reiterated that the presence of certain
conditions, such as terminal illness, suffering, and freedom from coercion, strengthens an individ-
ual's liberty interests; chronicled the results of the state's burden on patients' liberty interests; and
emphasized the important consequences involved in deciding the issue, regardless whether the
court found for the plaintiffs or for the State. See id. at 832-36.
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state's interests in preserving life,25 preventing suicide,26 and safe-
guarding the interests of third-party dependents of people contem-
plating suicide.2 7 He ultimately determined that none of the state's in-
terests were sufficient to justify the curtailment of the plaintiffs' liberty
interests, 28 and concluded that Washington's ban on assisted suicide
was "unconstitutional as applied to terminally ill competent adults
who wish to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their
physicians."29
In contrast, the district court in Quill v. Koppell3° narrowly inter-
preted Planned Parenthood v. Casey3' and Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health32 and referred to the nation's historical
disapproval of suicide and assisted suicide in order to reject the plain-
tiffs' contention that physician-assisted suicide constitutes a fundamen-
tal liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.33 The district court
then applied a rational basis test and dismissed the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that New York law violated the Equal Protection Clause insofar
as it criminalized the prescription of lethal doses of medication while
allowing competent patients to "refuse medical treatment, even [when]
the withdrawal of such treatment w[ould] result in death. '34
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's equal
protection holding.35 Discussing New York statutory law, Second Cir-
cuit precedent, and Cruzan, the court of appeals demonstrated that
New York unquestionably permits terminally ill patients "who are on
life-support systems ... to hasten their deaths by directing the removal
of such systems" even though, under the statutes at issue, "those who
are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-
sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-
administering prescribed drugs. '36 The court quoted Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Cruzan to support the conclusion that, in the absence of
the prohibition at issue, the cause of death for each type of patient
25 See id. at 816-2o.
26 See id. at 820-24.
27 See id. at 827.
28 See id. at 837.
29 Id.
30 87o F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. i994).
31 5o5 U.S. 833 (i992).
32 497 U.S. 261 (iggo).
33 See Quill, 87o F. Supp. at 82-84.
34 Id. at 84. In upholding the legal distinction, the court cited New York's interests in "pre-
serving life] and in protecting vulnerable persons." Id.
35 See Quill v. Vacco, 8o F.3d 716, 727-31 (2d Cir. 1996). The court also rejected the plaintiffs'
due process claim, stating that, because of the court's "position in the judicial hierarchy," it was
unwilling to take the expansive position necessary to support such a claim. Id. at 725. Judge
Calabresi's concurrence "explain[ed his] unwillingness to reach the ultimate Due Process and
Equal Protection questions," id. at 732 (Calabresi, J., concurring), and urged a "constitutional re-
mand" to provide New York with an opportunity to clearly assert its interests, id. at 738, 743.
36 Quill, 8o F.3d at 729.
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would be indistinguishable - "the suicide's conscious decision" to end
his or her life.3 7 Therefore, the court applied a rational basis test and
found no valid state concern to justify the denial of physician-assisted
suicide.38
In separate unanimous decisions, Chief Justice Rehnquist led the
Supreme Court in reversing both the Second and the Ninth Circuit de-
cisions.39 First, in Glucksberg, he articulated the question presented to
be "whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause
includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to as-
sistance in doing so."40 In answering this question, the Chief Justice
explained two primary features of the Court's substantive due process
analysis: the protection of fundamental rights that are firmly estab-
lished in the nation's history and tradition, and a precision in identi-
fying and articulating asserted substantive rights.41 Beginning his own
analysis with a sweeping examination of the "[n]ation's history, legal
traditions, and practices,"42 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the
American colonies progressed from the common law tradition of seiz-
ing a suicide's assets, to general condemnation of suicide, to the even-
tual outlaw of assisted suicide.43 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, he refused
to interpret either Cruzan to reflect more than a long tradition of rec-
ognizing forced medical treatment as a form of battery" or Casey to
recognize more than the fact that many due process rights and liberties
relate to personal autonomy.45
Chief Justice Rehnquist further departed from the Ninth Circuit's
analysis by applying a rational basis test to determine the constitution-
ality of the Washington statute.46 He accepted Washington's unquali-
fied interests in preserving life and preventing suicide,47 in upholding
medical ethics, 48 in protecting vulnerable groups from undue influ-
ence,49 prejudice, stereotypes, and indifference,50 and in avoiding a
37 Id. (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
38 See id. at 729-30. The court resisted New York's contention that physician-assisted suicide
eventually would be forced on the most vulnerable segments of the ill population. See id. at 730.
39 See Quill, i7 S. CL at 2297; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions without separate elaboration. Justice
O'Connor also joined in the opinions but filed a concurrence to explain her reasoning. Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer concurred only in the Court's judgments.
40 Glucksberg, 117 S. CL at 2269.
41 See id. at 2268.
42 Id. at 2262.
43 See id. at 2263-67.
44 See id. at 2270.
45 See id. at 2271.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 2272.
48 See id. at 2273.
49 See id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)).
5O See id.
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slippery slope toward euthanasia,-" and summarily labeled those inter-
ests sufficiently "important and legitimate" to reverse the en banc deci-
sion.52 However, in what promises to be a much-discussed footnote,
the Chief Justice emphasized that, although the Court's holding re-
jected the Ninth Circuit's decision with respect to the specific class of
"competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by
obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors, '53 the holding "does
not absolutely foreclose" the possibility that a plaintiff might mount a
successful challenge under circumstances different from those in
Glucksberg. 4
In Quill, the Chief Justice framed the question presented to be
whether New York's ban on assisted suicide violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in light of New York's allowance of patients' refusal of
life-saving medical treatment.55 After first establishing the appropri-
ateness of a rational basis test, 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the
Second Circuit's determination that withdrawal from life support is
"nothing more [or] less than assisted suicide."5' 7 In so doing, he differ-
entiated both between the causes of death58 and between the intentions
of the physician and the dying person in the two types of life-ending
decisions.59 These distinctions proved fatal to the plaintiffs' argu-
ment.60
Justice Souter wrote a separate concurring opinion in each case. 6'
In Glucksberg, his more substantial opinion, he framed the issue to be
"whether the [Washington] statute set[] up one of those 'arbitrary im-
positions' or 'purposeless restraints' at odds with the Due Process
51 See id. at 2274-75.
52 Id. at 2275.
53 Id. (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
54 Id. at 2275 n.24. Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated, however, that the rational basis test
would remain a major impediment to the success of such a claim. See id.
SS See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
56 See id. at 2297.
57 Id. at 2298 (quoting Quill v. Vacco, 8o F.3d 716, 729 (r996)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
58 See id. ([W]hen a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an under-
lying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physi-
cian, he is killed by that medication.").
59 See id. at 2298-99. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that a physician clearly intends a pa-
tient's death when assisting a suicide but may only intend to respect the patient's desires or to
ease pain and suffering when withdrawing or refraining from starting medical treatment. See id.
Similarly, "a patient who commits suicide with a doctor's aid necessarily has the specific intent to
end his or her own life, while a patient who refuses or discontinues treatment might not." Id. at
2299.
60 See id. at 2302.
61 See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2302 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); Glucksberg, 117 S. CL
at 2275 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Clause. '62 Although the physicians' argument that the statute prohib-
ited the exercise of their best judgment 63 led Justice Souter to apply
"careful scrutiny [to] the State's contrary claim," he found the state's
interest in "protecting terminally ill patients from involuntary suicide
and euthanasia, both voluntary and nonvoluntary," dispositive and re-
jected the physicians' argument.6 4
In a single opinion, Justice O'Connor explained that she joined in
the Court's opinions in both cases because she agreed "that there is no
generalized right to 'commit suicide. 1'' 65 However, she posited that the
respondents in both cases urged the Court to resolve a narrower ques-
tion: "whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great
suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the
circumstances of his or her imminent death." 66 She saw no need to an-
swer this question, because the claims in both cases involved facial
statutory challenges. 67 Because no party in either case claimed that
the Washington or New York laws prohibited terminally ill patients
experiencing great pain from obtaining medication to "alleviate [their]
suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening
death," Justice O'Connor agreed that the states' interests in protecting
patients who are not competent, not terminal, or not acting voluntarily
justified a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide.68
Joining in Justice O'Connor's opinion, except insofar as it joined
the majority, Justice Breyer wrote a single concurrence. 69 He charac-
terized the issue to be whether the nation's legal tradition provided
support for a broader right than the majority discussed - the "right to
die with dignity" - the core of which would provide "personal control
over the manner of death, professional medical assistance, and the
avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffering." '70 However,
62 Glucksberg, 1i7 S. Ct. at 2275 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (i96i) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
63 See id. at 2276.
64 Id. at 2290. Justice Souter cited conflicting accounts of the prevalence of involuntary
euthanasia in the Netherlands to bolster his conclusion that Washington could rationally fear that
physician-assisted suicide would create a slippery slope problem despite possible state regulations.
See id. at 2292. In his Quill concurrence, Justice Souter stated that the importance of the pa-
tients' and physicians' claims required the state to offer a "commensurate justification" for its
ban. Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2302 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). He then referred to his
concurrence in Glucksberg for an analysis of why New York's law would satisfy his conception of
the equal protection test. See id. Justice Souter also stated that "the Equal Protection Clause...
does essentially nothing in a case like this that the Due Process Clause cannot do on its own."
Glucksberg, 17 S. CL at 2277 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
65 Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2302, 2303 (i997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
66 Id. at 2303.
67 See id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).
70 Id. at 2311.
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like Justice O'Connor, Justice Breyer stated that it was unnecessary for
the Court to determine whether such a right was fundamental because
"the avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would
have to comprise an essential part" of any such claim, and neither New
York's nor Washington's laws had forced this pain on dying patients.7 1
Finally, Justice Stevens wrote separately "to make it clear that
there is ... room for further debate about the limits that the Constitu-
tion places on the power of the States to punish" assisted suicide.7 2 He
believed that the Court's holdings did "not foreclose the possibility that
some applications of the statute" might well be invalid.7 3 In particular,
Justice Stevens focused on the rights of those patients for whom pallia-
tive care "cannot alleviate all pain and suffering.174
Given that the Court in Glucksberg and Quill considered an un-
usual number of lower court opinions and a deluge of amicus briefs,75
and given that the decisions were unanimous in both cases, casual ob-
servers might conclude that the Court has completely resolved the is-
sue of a constitutional right to assisted suicide.76 However, in Glucks-
berg, the Court rejected only the specific arguments that Washington's
prohibition was facially invalid or invalid "as applied to competent,
terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining
medication prescribed by their doctors." 77 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments). Justice Stevens stated that,
"[a~lthough there is no absolute right to physician-assisted suicide, Cruzan makes it clear that
some individuals who ... are already on the threshold of death have a constitutionally protected
interest that may outweigh the State's interest in preserving life at all costs." Id. at 2307. Justice
Stevens also discussed the Court's reasoning in Quill. See id. at 23o9-io. Although he agreed
with the Court's equal protection conclusion, see id., he observed that "[tihe illusory character of
any differences in intent or causation" is revealed in the American Medical Association's en-
dorsement of terminal sedation, a practice of administering "sufficient dosages of pain-killing
medication to terminally ill patients to protect them from excruciating pain even when it is clear"
that the treatment will hasten death. Id. at 2310.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2308.
75 See, e.g., Brief of the American Medical Association et a. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Glucksberg (No. 96-iio), available in x996 WL 656263; Brief Amicus Curiae of the
American Hospital Association in Support of Petitioners, Glucksberg and Quill (Nos. 96-Ix0, 95-
1858), available in 1996 W'L 656278.
76 Such observers likely see support for their view in Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla.
1997), a post-Glucksberg and post-Quill case in which the Supreme Court of Florida upheld Flor-
ida's "assisting self-murder" statute against federal due process and equal protection and state
privacy challenges. See id. at ioo, 204.
77 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790,
838 (9 th Cir. 1996) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the Court's substantive due process analysis requires "precision" in identi-
fying and articulating substantive rights, see id. at 2268, the Justices' various descriptions of the
question presented indicate their imprecision in conveying a uniform characterization of the ap-
propriate right to be considered in the assisted suicide cases. Compare, e.g., id. at 2269 (charac-
terizing the appropriate question to be "whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Proc-
ess Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
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agreement with Justice Stevens, even acknowledged that the Court's
decision does not absolutely "foreclose the possibility that an individ-
ual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance
was sought, could prevail in a more particularized challenge."T7  This
admission, combined with the fact that five Justices wrote concur-
rences to clarify why they voted with the Court, indicates that a sig-
nificant number of Justices may be receptive to recognizing a constitu-
tional right to physician-assisted suicide in some circumstances.7 9
Although some commentators argue that these concurrences leave
open the possibility of a liberty interest only in the face of legal barri-
ers to obtaining palliative care,80 a close reading of the opinions sug-
gests at least one scenario in which the Court might recognize such a
right based on factual circumstances.
Four of the concurring opinions"' explicitly expressed concern
about a patient's ability to avoid physical pain in the face of imminent
death. This concern could justify a right to assisted suicide in situa-
tions in which no other means exist for a patient to avoid pain. 2 Most
directly and explicitly, Justice Stevens acknowledged that palliative
care cannot eliminate all patients' pain and that, aware of their limited
prospects for pain relief, some patients may rationally choose assisted
so"), with Glucksberg and Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (characterizing the
appropriate question to be "whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suf-
fering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her im-
minent death"). The manner in which the Justices articulate a right impacts their willingness to
find the right grounded in national history and traditions and, hence, their willingness to protect it
under substantive due process. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really
Said, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, at 40, 40-44 (contrasting Chief Justice Rehnquist's "his-
toricist understanding" of the Due Process Clause with Justices Stevens's, O'Connor's, Souter's,
Ginsburg's, and Breyer's "interpretive view" of the Clause).
78 Glucksberg, ii 7 S. Ct. at 2275 n.24 (quoting Glucksberg and Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2309 (Stev-
ens, J., concurring in the judgments)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79 See Dworkin, supra note 77, at 40 (arguing that the "unanimity of the vote was deceptive"
because five Justices did not reject the right to assisted suicide in principle); Cass R. Sunstein, Su-
preme Caution: Once Again, the High Court Takes Only Small Steps, WASH. POST, July 6, 1997, at
Ci (arguing that the five concurring opinions, especially Justice O'Connor's, signal the possible
existence of a right to physician-assisted suicide in compelling circumstances). But see Yale Ka-
misar, The Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases: What Did the Court Hold? What Questions Did It
Leave Open?, Remarks at U.S. Law Week's 1gth Annual Conference 3 (Sept. 5, x997) (transcript
available in the Harvard Law School Library) (positing that, in Glucksberg and Quill, the Su-
preme Court addressed and rejected "almost all" of the "arguments in favor of [physician-assisted
suicide]").
80 See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 79, at 17-18.
81 Because of Justice Ginsburg's substantial agreement with Justice O'Connor's opinion, see
Glucksberg and Quill, i7 S. Ct. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgments), this Com-
ment includes Justice Ginsburg's concurrence among the four opinions stating a concern for pa-
tients desiring to avoid physical pain.
82 The Court did not consider whether any patients suffered from unalleviated pain in either
Quill or Glucksberg, because the plaintiff patients died before the Court adjudicated the cases.
See Quill, 1i7 S. Ct. at 2296; Glucksberg, 117 S. CL at 2269. Given the lengthy time frame in-
volved in litigation, this pattern is likely to repeat itself in future cases.
1997]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
suicide.83 According to Justice Stevens, the weight of the state's coun-
tervailing interests is reduced in such cases.84
Justice O'Connor also alluded to this right with her observation
that "dying patients in Washington and New York [indisputably] can
obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their
deaths." s In light of this fact, Justice O'Connor saw "no need to ad-
dress the question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally
cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the suffering that they may
experience in the last days of their lives.18 6 Justice O'Connor therefore
seemed to leave open the possibility of allowing physician-assisted sui-
cide in cases in which the patient can show that she meets a reason-
able consensus definition of terminal illness, the state can provide as-
surances that it has accurately confirmed the voluntariness of the
patient's decision, and palliative care is unavailable or ineffective.8 7
Although he joined in much of Justice O'Connor's opinion, Justice
Breyer was more forthright in suggesting his willingness to find some
form of a constitutional right to die. He indicated his receptiveness to
a careful formulation of a "right to die with dignity"88 and stated that
"the avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would
have to comprise an essential part of any successful [constitutional]
claim."89 Justice Breyer acknowledged the view of medical experts
who argue that palliative care can relieve the pain of most individuals
and that most patients who do not receive adequate palliative care
have encountered institutional rather than legal barriers. 90 However,
he stated that the "Court might have to revisit its conclusions" in cases
in which the law would contribute to "serious and otherwise unavoid-
able physical pain (accompanying death)."91
In addition to the four Justices who directly alluded to a potential
right to avoid physical pain, Justice Souter arguably implied that he
might recognize the same right in appropriate circumstances. For Jus-
tice Souter, the possibility that the Dutch legalization of assisted sui-
cide has led to involuntary euthanasia in the Netherlands was "disposi-
tive of the due process claim" for the time being. 92 However, he also
83 See Glucksberg and Quill, I 17 S. Ct. at 23o8 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments).
84 See id. at 2308-09.
85 Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86 Id.
87 See id. These criteria would address the two concerns that convinced Justice O'Connor to
uphold the challenged statutes: "ft]he difficulty in defining terminal illness" and "the risk that a
dying patient's request for assistance in ending his or her life might not be truly voluntary." Id.
88 Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 Id.
90 See id. at 2311-12.
91 Id. at 2312. Justice Breyer provided as an example a situation in which a state law prohib-
ited palliative care. See id. The fact that he prefaced this illustration with "for example" indi-
cates his receptiveness to other circumstances in which he would recognize a right to assistance.
92 Glucksberg, ii7 S. Ct. at 2292 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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acknowledged that "[tlhe [plaintiff patients] sought not only an end to
pain ... but an end to their short remaining lives with a dignity that
they believed would be denied them by powerful pain medication. '93
Given a factual showing that, perhaps because of the adoption of pro-
cedural safeguards, recognizing a right to avoid physician-assisted sui-
cide would not lead to involuntary euthanasia, Justice Souter might be
amenable to such a right.
Although it seems possible, then, that a majority of the Court
would recognize a right to physician-assisted suicide if it were the only
way for a patient to avoid severe pain, 94 at least two considerations
render it difficult to imagine the factual circumstances that could give
rise to such a case. First, the number of instances in which a patient's
pain cannot be alleviated through use of analgesics is presumably
small.95 In its amicus brief in Glucksberg, the American Medical Asso-
ciation asserted that pain management, if properly administered, can
mitigate the physical suffering of nearly all patients.96 If so, fewer
people would seek assisted suicide.97 However, some experts state that
palliative care, no matter how well administered, cannot alleviate the
pain of all terminally ill patients.98 Justice Stevens cited this assertion
as fact;9 9 other Justices may follow suit if confronted with relevant
evidence.
Second, opponents of assisted suicide question whether courts can
accurately and objectively determine whether particular patients suffer
from severe pain.100 These commentators urge that the unverifiable
nature of pain and suffering claims would force courts either to accept
93 Id. at 2289.
94 A second circumstance under which the Court might recognize a right to physician-assisted
suicide, and one that seems easier to imagine occurring and reaching the Court, is a situation in
which the only way that a patient can avoid pain is through sedation. The gravity of a patient's
psychological suffering in such circumstances should not be underestimated. See, e.g., Timothy E.
Quill, Christine K. Cassel & Diane E. Meier, Care of the Hopelessly Ill - Proposed Clinical Crite-
ria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1383 (1992) ("[Tlhe most fright-
ening aspect of death for many is not physical pain, but the prospect of losing control and inde-
pendence and of dying in an undignified, unesthetic, absurd, and existentially unacceptable
condition.").
9S See, e.g., Marzen, supra note 3, at 819 & n.61.
96 See Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers at 6, Glucksberg (No. 96-1io), available in ig96 WL 656263.
97 See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The Constitutional Case Against Permit-
ting Physician-Assisted Suicide for Competent Adults with 'Terminal Conditions,' ii ISSUES IN L.
& MED. 239, 245 (x995); Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide and the Competent Terminally Ill: On
Ordinary Treatments and Extraordinary Policies, 74 OR. L. REv. 539, 575 (1995).
98 See, e.g., Brief of the Coalition of Hospice Professionals as Amici Curiae for Affirmance of
the Judgments Below at 6, Quill and Glucksberg (Nos. 95-1858, 96-11o), available in 1996 WL
709342; Quill, Cassel & Meier, supra note 94, at 1383. Even the most steadfast opponents of as-
sisted suicide acknowledge that some rare cases exist in which palliative care cannot alleviate
pain. See, e.g., Bopp & Coleson, supra note 97, at 245.
99 See Glucksberg and Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments).
100 See, e.g., Marzen, supra note 3, at 820.
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the subjective eV'aluations of the patients themselves101 or to draw arti-
ficial lines between indistinguishable cases. 0 2 In their opinion, courts
cannot recognize a right to assisted suicide to relieve one individual's
pain without extending the same right to all other individuals who
claim comparable suffering. 103 This objection may not pose as signifi-
cant an obstacle as opponents of assisted suicide suggest, however.
Based on their knowledge and expertise, doctors who deal with
chronic pain conditions sometimes deny requests for certain treatments
when they do not agree with the patients' assessments of their condi-
tions. °0 No reason exists to believe that a doctor's competence in this
regard would be any less in the realm of assisted suicide. To suggest
that a doctor should not be able to assist a patient whom he or she can
confidently diagnose merely because another case might not provide
the requisite degree of confidence runs counter to the realities of mod-
ern medicine.
Regardless of how long these or similar impediments keep a case
from arising in which a dying patient seeks assistance in committing
suicide because of intolerable physical pain, the Justices' varying per-
spectives led them in Glucksberg and Quill to issue opinions that did
not definitively resolve whether some patients have a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. As their concurring opinions dem-
onstrate, several Justices seem sufficiently troubled by the moral, ethi-
cal, legal, and religious implications of assisted suicide that they want
to avoid taking a definitive stance on all instances of assisted suicide.
Therefore, they avoided joining in an opinion that could be perceived
to foreclose the right in all instances. 05 To some, the Court's opinions
may seem unsatisfying precisely because of the questions left unan-
swered. To others, the Court took the most prudent course, because it
left patients, doctors, and lawyers with greater ability to relitigate this
important issue.
101 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide - Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 735, 744-45 (995). The contention that a right to assisted suicide based on un-
mitigated physical pain cannot, in practice or in principle, be separated from a right based on
psychological suffering also underlies this argument. See, e.g., id.; Marzen, supra note 3, at 82o.
102 See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note iOi, at 737.
103 See, e.g., id. at 745.
104 See Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers at 4, Glucksberg (No. 96-xio), available in 1996 WL 656263 ("If a patient may demand and
receive anything from a health care professional, individuals who practice the healing arts will
cease being professionals.").
105 Instead, they took a minimalist position. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, z9g95
Term - Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, zio HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (1996) (defining "deci-
sional minimalism" to be "saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as
much as possible undecided" (internal quotation marks omitted)). "[A] minimalist path usually...
makes sense when the Court is dealing with an issue of high complexity about which many people
feel deeply and on which the nation is in flux (moral or otherwise)." Id. at 8. As Sunstein has
observed, "there are complex moral issues and contested empirical questions [in the assisted sui-
cide debate] for which courts are unlikely to have clear answers." Id. at 94.
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a. Right to Appeal Termination of Parental Rights. - Among the
select rights and liberties the Supreme Court has ranked "fundamen-
tal" under the Fourteenth Amendment, a parent's interest in her rela-
tionship with her children' and an individual's interest in access to ju-
dicial processes 2 are familiar refrains. At the intersection of these
interests are individuals facing termination of their parental rights,
who have twice won special constitutional protections before the Su-
preme Court.3  Last Term, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 4 the Court insisted
again on the unique importance of termination cases and held that a
state may not bar a parent from appellate review of a termination or-
der solely because the parent is unable to pay required appellate fees.5
Concerned that its opinion not be construed as granting all indigent
civil litigants a broad right to state-funded appeals, 6 the Court took
pains to limit its holding by grounding it in an amalgam of Fourteenth
Amendment equality and fairness principles, ostensibly tailored to ap-
ply to termination cases alone.7  Yet in seeking to limit its holding's
doctrinal impact, the Court further muddled an already complex area
of jurisprudence, maintained a questionable distinction among court
proceedings affecting families, and ultimately devalued what it means
to possess an interest considered "fundamental."
Melissa Brooks's children were five and seven years old when
Brooks and her husband, S.L.J., divorced in 1992.8 Under the divorce
agreement, S.L.J. retained custody of the children.9 Within three
months of the divorce, Brooks's husband had remarried; the following
See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that due process and equal
protection require the state to provide a biological father a hearing on his parental fitness before
removing his children from his custody); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (labeling
"fundamental" the right to "establish a home and bring up children").
2 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that "due process does
prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals"
seeking a divorce); Griffin v. fIInois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (relying on both
equal protection and due process in overturning an Illinois rule requiring criminal defendants to
pay for a transcript of trial court proceedings before they could obtain full appellate review).
3 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that the Constitution requires
a "clear and convincing" standard of proof to establish grounds for terminating parental rights);
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (holding that in parental rights
termination cases of sufficient complexity, due process may require that indigent litigants be en-
titled to state-appointed counsel). As the Court has explained, proceedings terminating parental
rights "final[ly] and irrevocabI[y]" sever a child's legal ties to her parents, Santosky, 455 U.S. at
759, working a "unique kind of deprivation" that makes "parent[s'] interest in the accuracy and
justice of the decision ... commanding," Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
4 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996). Melissa Brooks revealed her name to the media in interviews re-
garding the case. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices Give Indigent Parents Greater Access to Civil
Appeals, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 996, at A2.
5 See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 564-65, 568.
6 See id. at 569.
7 See id. at 566-67.
8 See id. at 559-
9 See id.
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year, S.L.J. and ,his new wife, J.P.J., petitioned to adopt the two chil-
dren and to terminate Brooks's parental rights.10 The petition alleged
that "M.L.B. had not maintained reasonable visitation" and that she
had fallen behind on her child support payments.1 ' Counterclaiming,
Brooks asserted that S.L.J. had hindered her efforts to visit and re-
quested that she be granted primary custody of the children.' 2
After three days of testimony, spread over several months, a Missis-
sippi chancery court granted S.L.J.'s petition, approved the adoption,
and terminated Brooks's parental rights.' 3 Without providing any ex-
plicit reasoning or evidence, the Chancellor's order stated that there
existed "clear and convincing evidence" that the relationship between
Brooks and her children had "substantial[ly] ero[ded]," thereby satis-
fying Mississippi's statutory requirement for parental rights termina-
tion.14
In moving to appeal,' 5 Brooks paid the required $ioo filing fee but
was unable to prepay the additional $2352.36 the state required to de-
fray the costs of preparing the record for review.' 6 Brooks petitioned
the Mississippi Supreme Court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 17
The state high court denied Brooks's request, reiterating its prior
holdings that "[t]he right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases
exists only at the trial level."' 8
The Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi Supreme Court's deci-
sion and remanded the case for further proceedings. 19 Writing for the
10 See id. Under Mississippi law, a court may terminate parental rights when, inter alia,
"there is [a] substantial erosion of the relationship between the parent and child which was caused
at least in part by the parent's ... unreasonable failure to visit or communicate." MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-15-ro3(3)(e) (1094).
11 M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 559.
12 See id.
13 See Decree of Adoption 7, S.L.J. v. M.L.B., No. 93-A-oo6 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Dec. 14, 1996),
reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 11-12, M.L.B. (No. 95-853). As part of its de-
cree, the court ordered that J.P.J.'s name replace Brooks's on the children's birth certificates. See
id. 6, reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at i z, M.L.B. (No. 95-853).
14 Id. para. 5, reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 9, M.L.B. (No. 95-853).
Is Mississippi grants all civil litigants, including those contesting termination orders, the right
to appeal final judgments of lower courts. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-5 I-3 (Supp. 1994).
16 See M.LB., 117 S. CL at 56o.
17 See Motion for Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis, S.L.J. v. M.L.B., No. 93-A-006 (Miss.
Ch. Ct. July 24, 1995), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 17-18, M.LB. (No. 95-
853). Brooks's attorney suggested alternatively that the state set up a payment schedule or allow
Brooks to sign a promissory note in order to finance the costs of appeal. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, M.L.B. (No. 95-853), available in r996 WL 587663, at *4 (Oct. 7, i996). According to
Brooks, the Mississippi Supreme Court is alone among the states in refusing even to consider in
forma pauperis appeals in civil cases generally. See Brief for Petitioner at 26-27, M.LB. (No. 95-
853), available in i996 WL 291022.
18 Order, M.L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 95-TS-ooo52 (Miss. Aug. 15, 1995) (citing, inter alia, Nelson v.
Bank of Miss., 498 So. 2d 365 (Miss. I986)), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 3,
M.LB. (No. 95-853).
19 See M.LB., I17 S. Ct. at 570.
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Court,20  Justice Ginsburg concluded that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, Mississippi
could not "bolt the door to equal justice" to a parent whose economic
circumstances would prevent her from appealing an order legally ter-
minating her relationship with her children. 21
Seeking to cabin its holding, the opinion placed M.L.B. at the
"unique" locus of twin constitutional themes: the protected nature of
the parent-child relationship 22 and the fundamental importance of ac-
cess to "judicial processes. '23  Regarding the former interest, the ma-
jority noted a series of cases invalidating state requirements that
criminal defendants pay certain court costs to appeal.24  As extended
in later cases, this principle became a "flat prohibition against making
access to appellate processes ... depend upon the [convicted] defen-
dant's ability to pay."25  In contrast, the Court had required states to
waive court fees to ensure indigent civil litigants access to judicial
processes in only a few cases, each involving domestic relations.2 6
Most relevant to M.L.B. among these cases was Boddie v. Con-
necticut,27 in which the Court relied on the Due Process Clause to con-
clude that a state could not bar individuals, based on their inability to
pay court fees, from obtaining a divorce.28 Boddie thus involved what
this Comment describes as an "access-plus" set of interests, in which
the fundamental right of access to court, when joined with an addi-
20 Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion.
21 M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568 (quoting Griffin v. linois, 35' U.S. 12, 24 (i956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 See id. at 564-65.
23 Id. at 566. The opinion also invoked a third, arguably distinct theme involving the "age-old
problem of [piroviding equal justice for poor and rich ... alike." Id. at 56o (alteration in original)
(quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because
M.L.B. is grounded explicitly in the doctrine of family relations and access to court, this Comment
focuses on these aspects of the decision in particular.
24 See id. at 56o-62. Justice Ginsburg's discussion focused primarily on Griffin, 351 U.S. at
i8-ig (plurality opinion), and on Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (197i), which extended
the Griffin right to indigent defendants convicted of conduct merely "quasi criminal in nature"
and sentenced to fines, rather than imprisonment, id. at 196 (quoting Williams v. Oklahoma City,
395 U.S. 458, 459 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Seeing a deep unfairness in appel-
late cost assessments that effectively barred indigent criminal defendants from judicial review, the
Court stated that when a state has provided defendants a right to appeal, "it cannot by force of its
exactions draw a line which precludes convicted indigent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted,
from securing such review." M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 56i (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2S M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 56i (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mayer,
404 U.S. at 196-97) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26 See id. at 562-64.
27 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
28 See id. at 38o-8i. The Boddie Court reasoned that the marriage relationship was "basic" in
"this society's hierarchy of values" and that the state had "monopoliz[ed]... the means for legally
dissolving this relationship." Id. at 374.
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tional fundamental interest - in that case, the marriage relationship
- yielded a form of heightened scrutiny of the state's legal rules.29
In an extended discussion of the other constitutional theme at
stake, the Court made clear that it was this fundamental interest in
"marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children"30 that explained
the Court's previous cases involving parental rights termination. In
the decade before M.L.B., the Court had held that due process requires
clear and convincing evidence before parental rights can be termi-
nated,31 and in some cases entitles indigent litigants facing parental
rights termination to a state-funded attorney.32
On the basis of these dual fundamental interests - the "structural"
right of access to court plus the "substantive" interest in family rela-
tions33 - the Court adopted Griffin v. Illinois's hybrid theory of Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence, in which "[d]ue process and equal
protection principles converge. '34 The Court concluded that the sum
of these fundamental interests required balancing the strength of the
individual's constitutional interests against the state's justification for
its fee.3-
Applying this access-plus test to the facts at hand, the Court recog-
nized first that the stakes for Brooks were great: parental rights termi-
nation implicated an interest far greater than the "mere loss of money"
accompanying criminal fines at issue in Mayer.36 Moreover, the Court
29 See id. at 379-80. In this respect, as the M.LB. Court noted, Boddie differed from later
holdings rejecting civil litigants' requests that court fees be waived. See M.LB., 117 S. CL at 563
(citing Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 66i (1973) (per curiam) (rejecting indigent appellants'
claim that the state must waive court fees for judicial review of an administrative reduction of
welfare benefits), and United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (declining to require that a
state waive court fees for civil claimants seeking bankruptcy discharge because bankruptcy does
not involve a "fundamental interest")).
30 M.LB., 117 S. CL at 564.
31 See id. at 564-65 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982)).
32 See id. (citing Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981)).
33 See id. at 564 (listing substantive due process cases establishing marriage, procreation, and
child rearing as among fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus did
the Court's analysis touch virtually the entire Fourteenth Amendment landscape: equal protection
as well as both substantive and procedural aspects of due process.
34 Id. at 566 (alteration in original) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 66o, 665 (1983)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Like Griffn and its progeny then, M.L.B. implicated equal pro-
tection concerns - in that a class of litigants was denied access to appellate review solely because
of an inability to pay - and due process concerns - inasmuch as such a classification called into
question the "essential fairness" of the state law. Id. Like Boddie, M.LB. involved "state controls
or intrusions on family relationships" - a category of civil cases the Court had "consistently set
apart from the mine run" of other cases. Id. at 563-64.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion departed from the majority's approach on this point
alone, arguing that "due process is quite a sufficient basis" for the outcome in M.L.B.'s case. Id.
at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
35 See M.L.B., 117 S. CL at 566 (citing Bearden, 462 U.S. at 666-67).
36 Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 428, 424
(1979))) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Santosky Court had explained: "When the
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noted that the "risk of error" was "considerable," especially in a case,
such as M.L.B., in which the trial court's order was utterly devoid of
evidence or reasoning.37 In contrast, the state's purely financial inter-
est was minimal given the small number of termination cases actually
appealed. 38 Although insisting that it was not reforming the "general
rule" that state fees garner only rationality review, the Court deter-
mined that it would be "anomalous" to waive transcript costs for ap-
peals of mere misdemeanor convictions, but not for the "irretrievabljy]
destructi[ve]" termination of parental rights.39
Finally, the Court rejected the state's concern that a holding for
Brooks would lead to a flood of civil litigants seeking similar treat-
ment.40  Noting that it had repeatedly set parental status determina-
tions apart from all other civil cases, the Court reiterated that because
termination orders are a "unique kind of deprivation," they are
uniquely entitled to special constitutional protection.41
Justice Thomas issued a harsh dissent.42  Seeking to untangle due
process and equal protection theories from the majority's jumble of
Fourteenth Amendment principles, Justice Thomas argued that be-
cause neither clause alone could justify a free transcript right for
Melissa Brooks, no combination of the two clauses could do so. 43 Jus-
tice Thomas quickly dispensed with Brooks's due process claim. Re-
calling the well-settled rule that due process does not require states to
provide any right to appeal, Justice Thomas averred that Brooks had
State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe [a parent's]
fundamental liberty interest, but to end it." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
37 M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 566.
38 See id. at 566-67. Justice Ginsburg's analysis thus ultimately mirrored the familiar proce-
dural due process test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in which courts
determine the level of process required by balancing the private interests at stake, the public in-
terests promoted, and the risk of error in the procedures provided, see id. at 334-35. Indeed, this
was the test the Court applied in previous parental rights termination cases to determine whether
due process required state-appointed counsel, see Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 27-28 (I981), or the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof, see Santosky, 455 U.S. at
758-70.
39 M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 566-67 (alteration in original) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). That a party facing parental rights termination might be en-
titled to counsel under Lassiter, but not to state payment of transcript costs, struck the Court as
unacceptably inconsistent. See id. at 567.
40 See id. at 569-70.
41 Id. at 569 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court additionally considered the state's claim that Brooks sought aid to "alleviate the
consequences of differences in economic circumstances that existed apart from state action." Id.
In response, Justice Ginsburg distinguished M.L.B., in which Brooks sought defensively "to be
spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action," id. at 568, from cases in which the Court
had ruled against indigent parties seeking an "affirmative right to governmental aid," id. (quoting
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. i89, i96 (1989)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
42 Justice Thomas was joined by Justice Scalia in the entirety of his dissent and by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist in all but Part II. Chief Justice Rehnquist also filed a brief dissent.
43 See M.L.B., i17 S. Ct. at 570-71 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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procedural safeguards "above and beyond" what the Court's previous
termination decisions required.44 Regarding equal protection, Justice
Thomas rejected what he saw as the Court's attempt to make poverty
a suspect class.45 Such a reading of the Equal Protection Clause, Jus-
tice Thomas argued, would call into question every instance in which
a state imposed a "reasonable exaction ... for a service it provides. '46
A law limiting indigent parties' procedural options does not violate
equal protection, Justice Thomas contended, because the clause does
not require states affirmatively "to lift the handicaps flowing from dif-
ferences in economic circumstances. '47
Part I1 of the dissent departed more dramatically from the Griffin-
Mayer line of cases, which Justice Thomas made clear he would over-
turn given an opportunity.4 Warning that the M.L.B. right to tran-
script costs for indigent civil defendants could not be limited to this
case,49 Justice Thomas emphasized the longstanding distinction be-
tween civil and criminal law: although the Constitution expressly pro-
vides for various procedural protections for criminal defendants, such
protections are "not available to the typical civil litigant."50 The "fun-
damental" nature of the right at stake in parental status proceedings
did not persuade Justice Thomas that Mayer should be extended to the
civil realm.5' "If all that is required to trigger the right to a free ap-
pellate transcript is that the interest at stake appear... as fundamen-
tal as the interest of a convicted misdemeanant," 2 Justice Thomas
44 Id. at 571-72 (noting that Brooks had received "notice and a hearing before a neutral ...
decisionmaker ... [and] was represented by counsel - even though due process does not in every
case require" counsel).
4S See id. at 572-73.
46 Id. at 573.
47 Id. (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (I956) (Harlan, J., dissenting))) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Justice Thomas adhered to Mississippi's view of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
in which the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause provides a remedy only against "pur-
poseful discrimination." M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 573 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
Thomas sharply criticized .the majority's effort to distinguish Brooks's request for "state aid to
subsidize [a] privately initiated" appeal, id. at 574 (quoting M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 568) (internal
quotation marks omitted), from the requests of previous petitioners for government aid to support
"private" activities, see id. (finding no meaningful distinction between a "facially neutral rule that
serves in some cases to prevent persons from availing themselves of ... a state-funded abortion -
... which the State may, but is not required to, provide - and a facially neutral rule that pre-
vents a person from taking an appeal" available only at the state's discretion).
48 See M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 575 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49 See id. at 570.
'o Id. at 575.
51 See id at 575-76.
52 Id. at 576.
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posited, the variety of civil actions potentially commanding such a
right appeared all but limitless.5 3
In the face of such concerns, the majority sought to limit the reach
of its holding, both by denying that equal protection or due process
alone could provide Brooks relief, and by seeking to distinguish the
"tightly circumscribed category" of parental rights termination from all
other civil decisions.54 In the former aspect of its decision, M.L.B.
rests on unsteady Fourteenth Amendment ground;55 the decision un-
necessarily blurs conventional interpretations of both the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses. In the latter, the Court drew a line of
questionable significance, particularly given the reality of child place-
ment decisionmaking in family court. As a result of these efforts,
manifest in the Court's access-plus standard, the M.L.B. Court deval-
ued the jurisprudential and practical consequences of possessing a
"fundamental" right.
The Court's refusal to name a "precise rationale 5. 6 of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence underpinning M.L.B. flowed not only from
its attempt to counter the dissent's slippery slope warnings, but also
from its larger effort to constrain each clause's independent scope. On
one hand, basing its decision on standard equal protection doctrine
could have signaled a return to a Griffin-era notion of equal protection,
when it had appeared that the Court might recognize indigency as a
suspect classification.5 7 Alternatively, grounding its holding solely in
an equal protection "fundamental right" of access to court might have
required repudiating Ortwein and Kras, in which the Court had re-
jected the view that the access-to-court right alone could garner strict
scrutiny for civil litigants.58 On the other hand, the Court was con-
53 See id. at 576-77. Justice Thomas questioned how the Court could reasonably distinguish
the deprivation at stake in this case from other cases involving family matters, zoning, or home
foreclosures. See id.
54 M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 566-67, 569 (citing id. at 576-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and Brief for
Respondents at 27-28, M.LB. (No. 95-983), available in i996 WL 365897).
Ss As Justice Kennedy noted in concurrence, the Griffin judgment invoked both equal protec-
tion and due process ideals, but the lead opinion gained the support of just four Justices, with four
others dissenting both from the holding and from the relevance of due process doctrine at all, see
id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13 (1956) (plurality opinion);
id. at 26-2 7 (Burton & Minton, JJ., dissenting).
56 M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 566 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 6oo, 6o8 (1974)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
57 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969). In contrast to that
heady age, the post-i96os Court has limited the circumstances in which states are required to en-
sure the poor equal access to civil and criminal judicial processes. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-5i, at 1647 (2d ed. 1988); The Supreme Court, 1982
Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 70, 91 (1983).
58 These cases distinguished Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), largely by explaining
that divorce, unlike bankruptcy and welfare benefits, implicated a fundamental interest in family
relations in addition to the fundamental interest in access to court. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656, 658-59 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973). Boddie's other pur-
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strained in its due process thinking by the clear precedent that "due
process does not independently require that the State provide a right
to appeal,"59 and by Lassiter, which recognized only a limited due pro-
cess right to counsel in certain, sufficiently complex cases involving
termination of parental rights.60 The Court thus decided to split the
difference, conducting a due process-type balancing test under an
"equal protection framework." 61 Ironically then, the Court's effort to
limit the impact of its holding on Fourteenth Amendment doctrine
may have opened the door to the further blurring of due process and
equal protection paradigms that, apart from Griffin, had remained
more or less doctrinally intact.62
Despite the Court's reluctance to accept this conclusion, either
clause could have achieved the same result. As Justice Kennedy's brief
concurrence proposed, the traditional Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
test could support a holding for Brooks on due process grounds
alone.63 Alternatively, equal protection alone provides principled sup-
port for requiring a waiver of appellate costs for indigents; if getting to
court is truly "fundamental" to a democratic system - more like vot-
portedly distinguishing feature, the state's monopolizing the means for divorce but not for re-
solving debt or obtaining food and shelter, is not convincing in the context of such family law
matters as child custody, which requires a court's imprimatur for private bonds to become legally
meaningful. See The Supreme Court, 197o Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 40, 107 (1971).
At least one scholar has suggested that the Ortwein-Kras access-plus requirement is related to
the Court's fear of granting what might be seen as affirmative benefits to the poor. See Michael
KIarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 2x3, 289-90
(i99i). Klarman's view is consistent with Justice Ginsburg's efforts in M.LB. to distinguish an
"affirmative" right to government aid - which the Court had rejected in cases such as Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321-22, 326 (x98o) - from a "defensive" right to have the state pay an indi-
gent's court costs on appeal of an adverse state action. See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 568.
59 M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 566.
60 See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (ig8i).
61 M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 566 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 66o, 665 (1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
62 Although complex in application and much criticized, due process balancing under Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and equal protection tiered scrutiny review have become familiar
tests of constitutionality. See, e.g., WnLuAm B. LOcKHART, YALE KAMISAR, JESSE H. CHOPER
& STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 1221-1359
(7th ed. I991). The M.LB. Court's Grffon-type organic view of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
contrast, seems more akin to the Griswold Court's vision of the "penumbras" and "emanations" of
the Bill of Rights, which in Griswold "converged" to support a right to contraception. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
63 See M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy argued that the vagaries
of the Mississippi appellate system and the risk of error in such a cursory court proceeding, com-
bined with Brooks's strong interest in maintaining her relationship with her children, far out-
weighed the state's mere pecuniary interest in denying her appeal. See id. This balance of
Mathews factors mirrors the structure of the majority's own analysis, which the Court claimed
could not be reduced to an "easy slogano." M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 566 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S.
at 666) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ing rights64 than the amorphous set of "fundamental" interests cogni-
zable under substantive due process - then this interest alone should
support a right of equal access.65
The Court's second method of limiting its holding was to distin-
guish parental rights termination from all other forms of state inter-
vention in family life. 66 Indeed, termination appears on its face to be
the most severe step on a continuum of state intervention in the family.
Yet a child's ostensibly temporary placement - during post-divorce
custody disputes or after removal from a putatively abusive or neglect-
ful home - may play a pivotal role in determining the permanent out-
come of a protracted dispute.6 7 Thus, indigent parents' interest in ac-
curacy may be at least as strong, and the consequences potentially as
severe, in the proceedings excluded from the Court's ruling, which in-
cluded all intermediate questions of child custody.68
64 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (describing voting as
a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights" (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65 See TRIBE, supra note 57, § 16-I2, at 1463. Tribe explains that the interest in access to
court flows from the constitutional structure itself, which contemplates "equal participation in
governmental and societal decision-making," making the salient issue "whether the state has
evenly extended ... those rights it has chosen to grant." Id. § i6-io, at 146o. In this respect, ac-
cess to an initial court hearing and access to appellate review may be seen to implicate the same
fundamental interest.
66 See M.LB., 1i7 S. Ct. at 569-7o.
67 States' decisionmaking regarding children's "best interests" has been dramatically influ-
enced by dual principles of child development: that a child should be raised in a stable, perma-
nent environment, and that a child should develop a safe, steady relationship with a caregiver
considered that child's "psychological parent" JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 18-19, 31-33 (2d ed. i979). As one
scholar explains, "the longer a child... is separated from a parent of origin, the greater the likeli-
hood that the child will bond with another adult who fulfills the role of 'psychological parent.'
Thus ... placement decisions are in large part based on the length of time of this separation . .. 2
Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of Parental Rights Termination
Proceedings, 22 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397, 404 (1996) (citing GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT,
supra, at 40-42). Courts now widely rely on this philosophy in making placement decisions. See
Jennifer Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical Evaluation of the Length-
Of-Time-Out-Of-Custody Ground for Termination of Parental Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1251,
1256-61 (1996).
68 See M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 569-7o. For a child of divorce, a judgment relegating one parent
to limited visitation rights may have the same practical effect on the child's access to that parent
as does a court decree making the parent a legal "stranger" to the child forever. See, e.g., Karl
A.W. DeMarce, Stepparent Adoption and Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: When Peti-
tioners Come to Court with Unclean Hands, 61 Mo. L. REV. 995, Ioo4-o5 (1996) (describing the
frequency with which custodial parents block noncustodial parents' attempts to visit their chil-
dren and subsequently argue for involuntary termination based on noncustodial parents' "con-
tinuous neglect"); Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, CHILDREN & DIVORCE,
Spring 1994, at I2, 131 (citing studies suggesting that infrequent contact with a noncustodial
parent diminishes the parent's importance to the child). In this sense, if at all, it is only for the
parent, not for the child, that termination alone seems "irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]." M.LB., I17
S. Ct. at 566 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The access-pis limiting rationale - effectively requiring two
"fundamental" rights to gain any heightened attention - obscures
such awkward line-drawing,69 and begs the question what it means for
a right to be "fundamental." Although defining the scope of Court-
identified fundamental rights is a perpetual burden of constitutional
jurisprudence, once the Court has recognized a right as fundamental,
that right alone should be enough to merit balancing review.
The cursory order making Melissa Brooks a legal stranger to her
children illustrates perfectly why Mississippi deemed it important that
those subject to any civil order be allowed to petition for appeal. In
contrast to the valuable "error-reducing" function of appellate review,70
the "floodgates" interest limiting indigent litigants' ability to appeal is
primarily financial. 71 Yet many states already manage to provide for
in forma pauperis appeals in civil cases generally; most waive court
costs at least for indigent litigants facing parental rights termination.72
Even accepting the Court's access-plus constraint on realizing the fun-
damental interest in access to court, no principled way exists to limit
the Court's holding to termination cases alone. Only a small fraction
of all custody cases are ever litigated, let alone appealed. 73 The state's
financial stake in parent-child proceedings generally thus seems de
minimis, especially when held up against either one of Brooks's "fun-
damental" interests, even narrowly construed.
A principled response to the "floodgates" concern does not require
contorting Fourteenth Amendment doctrine or fashioning procrustean
limits on fundamental interests involving family, effectively declaring
some fundamental rights more "fundamental" than others. Instead,
the Court should be true to its admirable instinct that accuracy and
69 "Although overtly abstract concepts create the appearance of generality and universality,
their inability to make real world distinctions must be compensated for by extremely technical, ad
hoc exceptions. Those technical distinctions only highlight the degree to which the Court's juris-
prudence has lost touch with the underlying social reality." Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme
Court, 1992 - Foreword: The Constitution of Change and Legal Fundamentality Without Fun-
damentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 100 (1993).
70 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 776 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the "error-reducing" power
of such procedures as appellate review in termination cases).
71 See Brief for Respondent at 27-30, M.L.B. (No. 95-853), available in 1996 WL 365897.
72 See M.LB., 117 S. Ct. at 567 n.13 (citing state statutes). Mississippi law grants in forma
pauperis appeals in only one type of civil proceeding - civil commitment hearings. See MIss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-83, 41-21-85 (1994).
73 See, e.g., Stephen J. Bahr, Jerry D. Howe, Meggin Morrill Mann & Matthew S. Bahr, Trends
in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM.
L.Q. 247, 254 (i994) (reporting data that only 12% of divorcing couples between 1970-1993 in
Utah had formal conflicts over custody and citing studies finding similarly low ratios in other
states); Alison Richey McBurney, Note, Bitter Battles: The Use of Psychological Evaluations in
Child Custody Disputes in West Virginia, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 773, 774 (i995) (reporting estimates
that io% of children of divorce in West Virginia would be the subjects of custody disputes); see
also M.L.B., i7 S. Ct. at 567 (reporting the paucity of parental rights termination appeals in Mis-
sissippi) (citing Brief for Petitioner at 20, 25, M.L.B. (No. 95-853), available in 1996 WL 291022).
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fairness require granting indigent litigants access to the same proce-
dural safeguards as all other litigants, especially in family-related dis-
putes.
D. Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses
Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators. - Society
has long struggled with the dangers posed by sexual aggression and
predation. Last Term, in Kansas v. Hendricks,' the Supreme Court
upheld Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act against substantive
due process, ex post facto, and double jeopardy challenges. The
Court's analysis of the due process issue effectively lowered the consti-
tutional standard for involuntary civil commitment from "mental ill-
ness" to "mental abnormality"3 and paved the way for increased em-
ployment of involuntary commitment in conjunction with criminal
proceedings, blurring the relationship between the civil commitment
and criminal processes.
In 1994, the Kansas legislature enacted the Sexually Violent Preda-
tor Act. The Act provides for the involuntary civil commitment of
persons who have been convicted of, or charged with, a "sexually vio-
lent offense" and who suffer from a "mental abnormality" or "person-
ality disorder" that renders them "likely to engage in... predatory acts
of sexual violence."4 Kansas ostensibly passed the Act because extant
procedures for civil commitment of mentally ill individuals- were in-
adequate in that they did not provide for the long-term care and
treatment required by violent sexual predators, whose antisocial per-
sonality features render them highly likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence.6
1 117 S. Ct 2072 ('997).
2 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29aoI-I7 (994). The Kansas legislature amended the Act after
Leroy Hendricks's commitment in ways not relevant to the disposition of the case. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29ao-17 (Supp. i996). This Comment addresses the 1994 version of the stat-
ute, under which Hendricks was committed.
3 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079-8I. Prior to Hendricks, involuntary commitment proceedings
could satisfy due process only if they established two preconditions by clear and convincing evi-
dence: that the person is mentally ill, and that he poses a danger to himself or to others. See
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
4 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29ao2(a) (1994). Under the Act, a "mental abnormality" is a "con-
genital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the
person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the
health and safety of others." Id. § 59-29ao2(b). "Sexually violent offense[s]," for the purposes of
the Act, include: rape; indecent liberties with a child; criminal sodomy, indecent solicitation of a
child; sexual exploitation of a child; aggravated sexual battery; "an attempt, conspiracy, or crimi-
nal solicitation ... of a sexually violent offense;" and criminal acts that have been determined be-
yond a reasonable doubt to have been "sexually motivated." Id. § 59-29ao2(d)-(e).
S See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2901 (994).
6 See id. § 59-29aoi. The Act sets forth a sequence of procedures designed specifically for the
small but extremely dangerous population of sexually violent predators. See id. §§ 59-29ao3-I7.
Prior to release of a person who might meet the Act's criteria, the custodial agency is required to
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Almost ten years prior to passage of the Act, Leroy Hendricks pled
guilty to taking indecent liberties with two thirteen-year-old boys and
received a sentence of five to twenty years imprisonment.7 Just before
his scheduled release, the district attorney filed a petition to have Hen-
dricks committed under the Act.8 At trial, the state's physician testi-
fied that, although he did not believe that Hendricks was mentally ill
or that he had a personality disorder, Hendricks suffered from pedo-
philia, which the doctor characterized as a mental disorder under the
Act.9 Hendricks himself testified that he was and remains a pedophile
and is unable to control his urges to engage in sexual activity with
children when he gets "stressed out."'0 The jury unanimously con-
cluded that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator." Hendricks,
arguing that the Act violated constitutional prohibitions against double
jeopardy and ex post facto laws as well as procedural and substantive
due process, appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas.'2
A sharply divided Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the trial court on the ground that the Act violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 3 The court concluded that the
Act violated Hendricks's substantive due process rights because it
permits commitment of individuals who exhibit a mental abnormality
or personality disorder; such conditions do not meet the due process
notify the local prosecutor, who then has 45 days to file a petition in state court seeking the per-
son's involuntary civil commitment. See id. §§ 59-29ao3-o4. Upon the filing of such a petition, a
judge must determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the person is a sexually vio-
lent predator. See id. § 59-29ao5. If such a determination is made, the person is taken into cus-
tody and provided with notice and an opportunity to appear at a hearing to contest the probable
cause determination. See id. §§ 59-29ao5-o6. Once probable cause has been established, the per-
son undergoes a professional evaluation to determine whether he is a sexually violent predator.
See id. § 59-2gaoS. Following the evaluation, a trial is held at which the state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the individual is a sexually violent predator. See id. §§ 59-2gao6-o7. If
the court or a unanimous jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person
is "committed to the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control, care
and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so
changed that the person is safe to be at large." Id. § 59-29ao7.
7 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078; In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129,
130 (Kan. i996). Hendricks's conviction marked the end of a lengthy history of sexually abusing
children: in 1955, he pled guilty to indecent exposure for exposing his genitals to two young girls;
in 1957, he was convicted of lewd behavior involving a teenage girl; in ig6o, he was imprisoned
for molesting two young boys; in 1963, he was arrested for molesting a seven-year-old girl; in
1967, he was imprisoned for sexually assaulting a young boy and a young girl; after his 1972 re-
lease on parole, he sexually abused his stepchildren for approximately four years. See Hendricks,
117 S. Ct. at 2078-79; Hendricks, 912 P.2d at r43 (Larson, J., dissenting).
8 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
9 See Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.
10 Id.
11 See Hendricks, I17 S. Ct. at 2079.
12 See Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 133.
13 See id. at 138. The court did not address Hendricks's other claims, as it found his due pro-
cess arguments dispositive. See id.
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standard of mental illness traditionally required by the Supreme Court
in analyzing civil commitment statutes. 14
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Kansas Supreme Court's judgment, holding that the Sexually Violent
Predator Act comported with due process and did not offend double
jeopardy or ex post facto principles.'5 Writing for the majority, Justice
Thomas16 focused first on Hendricks's substantive due process claim. 17
He noted that commitment under the Act depends both on a finding
that a person poses a danger to society based on that individual's his-
tory of sexually violent behavior and on evidence of a current mental
condition that renders the individual likely to engage in future acts of
predatory violence.' Justice Thomas acknowledged, however, that a
finding of dangerousness is by itself ordinarily insufficient to justify
indefinite involuntary confinement; rather, he found that the Court's
precedents indicate that civil commitment statutes will be sustained
only when they couple proof of dangerousness with evidence of an ad-
ditional factor, such as mental illness or mental abnormality. 9 This
second requirement limits involuntary civil commitment to "those who
suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond
their control."20 Therefore, Justice Thomas found that the Kansas Act
clearly satisfied the analysis employed by the Court in the past, as the
Act requires a finding both of future dangerousness and of a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes it difficult or impossi-
ble for the individual to control his dangerous behavior.2 '
Justice Thomas thus rejected the argument that a finding of mental
illness is a prerequisite, under the rationales of Foucha v. Louisiana22
and Addington v. Texas,23 for civil commitment.2 4  He indicated that
the task of defining medical terms that have legal significance has tra-
ditionally been left to legislatures.25 Because Hendricks suffers from
14 See id. at 137-138. The court relied on Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (i992), and Ad-
dington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (i979), to define the applicable due process standard. See Hen-
dricks, 912 P.2d at 138. A brief concurrence clarified the majority's reasoning, indicating that due
process requires the state to "prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is both
mentally ill and dangerous." Id. at 139 (Lockett, J., concurring).
15 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
16 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Tho-
mas's opinion.
17 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2o8o-8i.
18 See id. at 2080.
19 See id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 5o9 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993); Allen v. fllinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366
(1986); and Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 271-72 (2940)).
20 Id.
21 See id.
22 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
23 44x U.S. 48 (i979).
24 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080 ("[T]he term 'mental illness' is devoid of any talismanic
significance.").
25 See id. at 2081 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983)).
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pedophilia, a mental abnormality under the Act, and because the state
is free to define the level of mental infirmity required for commitment
as long as the definition sufficiently limits the class of persons to whom
the Act applies, Hendricks's confinement under the Act comported
with due process. 26
After rejecting the due process claim, Justice Thomas undermined
the fulcrum of Hendricks's double jeopardy and ex post facto argu-
ments by holding that the proceeding contemplated by the Act was not
a criminal proceeding and that confinement pursuant to the Act did
not constitute punishment. 27 He noted that the Kansas legislature la-
beled the proceedings under the Act as "civil," and observed that
"[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests that the legislature sought
to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme designed to
protect the public from harm.128 In light of the professed legislative
intent, Justice Thomas indicated that the Court would "reject [a] leg-
islature's manifest intent only where a party challenging the statute
provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive ei-
ther in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention to deem it
civil., 29
In Justice Thomas's view, the Act does not implicate the two prin-
cipal objectives of criminal punishment: retribution and deterrence.30
Unlike a criminal statute, no finding of scienter is required for com-
mitment under the Act.31 The potentially infinite duration of the
commitment did not manifest a punitive purpose because no person
can be committed for more than a year without another judicial pro-
ceeding.32 Further, Kansas's use of procedural safeguards typically as-
sociated with criminal trials does not transform the proceedings from
civil to criminal. 33
Justice Thomas rejected the argument that the Act's failure to pro-
vide for any legitimate treatment made it punitive.34 Justice Thomas
detected a degree of ambiguity in the Kansas Supreme Court's resolu-
26 See id.
27 See id. at 2081-86.
28 Id. at 2o82.
29 Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (198o)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
30 See id. The Act is "not retributive because it does not seek to assign culpability for prior
conduct"; rather, the court considers such conduct strictly for evidentiary purposes. Id. Further-
more, the legislature did not intend that civil commitment under the Act function as a deterrent;
indeed, individuals suffering from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that prevents
them from controlling their dangerous behavior are "unlikely to be deterred by the threat of con-
finement." Id. Justice Thomas made no mention of rehabilitation as an objective of the criminal
justice system. See id. at 2076-86.
31 See id. at 2082.
32 See id. at 2o83 (citing KA.N. STAT. ANN. § 59-29ao8 (1994)).
33 See id.
34 See id.
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tion of Hendricks's treatment argument; therefore, he considered two
plausible interpretations of the Kansas Supreme Court's reasoning.
On the one hand, the court may have concluded that, absent a treat-
able mental illness, Hendricks could not be detained against his will.3 5
Justice Thomas countered that "incapacitation may be a legitimate end
of the civil law."36 Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court's finding that the
Act's "overriding concern" was the continued "segregation of sexually
violent offenders" was consistent with the Court's conclusion that the
Act establishes a civil proceeding.37 On the other hand, the Kansas
Supreme Court might have concluded that Hendricks's condition is
treatable, but that treatment was not the state's overriding concern
and that no treatment was being provided.3 8 Justice Thomas, citing
the language of the Act, countered that even if providing treatment
was not the primary purpose of the Act, it was an ancillary purpose.3 9
Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court's second possible interpretation
also did not require the conclusion that the Act was punitive.40
Putting together these arguments, Justice Thomas concluded that,
because the Act is civil in nature, commencement of commitment pro-
ceedings did not constitute a second prosecution. 4' Because commit-
ment under the Act is not punitive, involuntary confinement does not
constitute double jeopardy even when confinement follows a prison
term.42 Similarly, the Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause,
which "'forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a
crime already consummated,"' because the Act is not a punitive meas-
ure.
43
Justice Kennedy authored a brief concurrence, in which he warned
"against dangers inherent when a civil confinement law is used in con-
junction with the criminal process, whether or not the law is given ret-
roactive application."44 He observed that even the dissenting Justices
would validate the Act with respect to individuals who committed
violent sexual offenses after its enactment, and might even validate the
3S See id. at 2083-84.
36 Id. at 2084 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987), and Allen v. flli-
nois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986)).
37 Id. (quoting In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
38 See id. (citing Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136).
39 See id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29ao7(a) (1994)).
40 See id.
41 See id. at 2o86 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1984)).
42 See id. (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, X14 (1966), and Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
43 Id. (quoting California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995) (quoting
Lindsay v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (I937))) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further-
more, the Act does not have retroactive effect, as it requires for involuntary commitment a finding
that the person currently suffers a mental abnormality or personality disorder and is likely to pre-
sent a danger to the public. See id.
44 Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Act with respect to Hendricks if a higher level of treatment were pro-
vided. 45 Justice Kennedy noted that although incapacitation is a goal
common to the civil and criminal systems of confinement, retribution
and deterrence are purposes reserved exclusively for the criminal sys-
tem. If civil confinement functioned as a medium for retribution or
general deterrence, or if mental abnormality constituted too imprecise
a category to assure that civil detention was justified, Supreme Court
precedent would not validate it.46
In dissent, Justice Breyer47 argued that the Act embodied an effort
to inflict further punishment upon Hendricks.4 Therefore, he con-
cluded, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited application of the Act to
Hendricks because he committed his crimes prior to the statute's en-
actment.49 Nevertheless, he agreed with the majority's rejection of
Hendricks's due process arguments.50
Justice Breyer disputed the majority's conclusion that the Act was
not punitive for the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.51 He began
by pointing out the resemblance between the Act's ostensibly civil
commitment and traditional criminal punishments.52 He acknowl-
edged that those similarities cannot prove that the purportedly civil
commitment procedure was criminal, but he also argued that the label
"civil" cannot by itself prove the contrary.53 Because various "features
of the Act point]] in opposite directions,"54 Justice Breyer emphasized
the factor he believed most relevant in distinguishing a punitive from a
nonpunitive purpose - the law's concern for treatment.55
Justice Breyer's focus on treatment drew heavily from the Court's
reasoning in Allen v. Illinois.56 In Justice Breyer's view, the Allen de-
cision viewed treatment "as a kind of touchstone helping to distinguish
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 Justice Breyer's opinion was joined in full by Justices Stevens and Souter, and in part by
Justice Ginsburg.
48 See Hendricks, 117 S. CL at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49 See id.
50 See id. at 2087-88. In Part I of his opinion, which Justice Ginsburg did not join, Justice
Breyer indicated his agreement with the majority's conclusion that the Due Process Clause allows
Kansas to classify Hendricks as a "mentally ill and dangerous person" for the purposes of involun-
tary civil commitment. Id. at 2088.
51 See id. at 2090.
52 See id. at 2090-91. These similarities included the fact that "the Act's commitment
amounts to 'secure' confinement"; that "a basic objective of the Act is incapacitation"; that the
Act "imposes ... confinement... only upon an individual who has previously committed a crimi-
nal offense"; and that the Act accomplishes its commitment via persons, procedures, and stan-
dards "traditionally associated with ... criminal law." Id.
S3 See id. at 2091.
54 Id.
55 See id. at 2091-97.
56 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
'Vol. XI:M97
THE SUPREME COURT - LEADING CASES
civil from punitive purposes."57 He pointed to several treatment-
related factors considered by the Allen Court that suggested that the
Kansas Act had a punitive purpose.58 First, the Supreme Court of
Kansas "held that treatment is not a significant objective of the Act."59
Second, the Act, when applied to previously convicted persons, de-
layed commitment, confinement, and treatment until after those per-
sons had served their criminal sentences.60 Third, the statute did not
require the committing authority to consider less restrictive alterna-
tives.61 Fourth, comparable laws of other states accomplish Kansas's
civil commitment objectives without the statutory features at issue
that reveal a punitive purpose.6 2
Justice Breyer contended that the Act imposed punishment upon
Hendricks and thus violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.63 He took
care, however, to indicate the narrow scope of his analysis. To find a
violation in Hendricks's case would not prevent Kansas or any other
state from enacting sexual predator statutes that operate prospectively,
or from enacting retroactive statutes that do not operate punitively.64
However, according to Justice Breyer, Kansas's Act offended ex post
facto principles because the legislature failed to tailor the statute to fit
the nonpunitive civil goal of treatment.65
That the Court upheld Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act, and
that it did so by a slim 5-4 margin, was not unforeseeable in light of
57 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In contrast to the majority, Justice
Breyer understood the Kansas Supreme Court to find that Hendricks was treatable but untreated:
"when a State decides offenders can be treated and confines an offender to provide that treat-
ment, but then refuses to provide it, the refusal to treat while a person is fully incapacitated be-
gins to look punitive." Id. at 2096.
58 See id. at 2092-95.
59 Id. at 2092 (citing In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996)).
Indeed, the Kansas court found that, at the time of Hendricks's commitment, the state had not
provided funds for treatment, had not entered into treatment contracts, and had little qualified
treatment staff. See id. at 2093 (citing Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131, 136).
60 See id. at 2093. "Mt is difficult to see why rational legislators who seek treatment would
write the Act in this way - providing treatment years after the criminal act that indicated its
necessity." Id. at 2094.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 2095. Justice Breyer analyzed 17 state statutes seeking to protect the public from
mentally ill, sexually dangerous individuals via civil commitment or other mandatory treatment
regimes. See id. Ten statutes begin treatment of an offender soon after apprehension and arrest.
See id. Seven delay commitment and treatment until after the offender has served his criminal
sentence. See id. Six of these seven require consideration of less restrictive measures. See id.
The only state besides Kansas that delays commitment and does not require consideration of al-
ternatives avoids ex post facto problems by applying the statute only prospectively. See id. Jus-
tice Breyer also borrowed a seven-factor test developed in the Fifth and Sixth Amendment con-
texts to determine if a statute is primarily punitive, and applied it to buttress his conclusion that
the Act is punitive. See id. at 2098 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 244, 168-69
(2963)).
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
19971
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
the contentiousness of the Court's previous civil commitment pro-
nouncements.6 6 The decision is remarkable, however, because the ma-
jority extended the reach of its due process civil commitment jurispru-
dence without offering a cogent limiting principle, and three of the
four dissenters acquiesced in this extension with relatively little pro-
test.6 7 The Court's analysis may be sufficiently anchored to the pecu-
liar factual circumstances of Hendricks's case to permit lower courts to
construe its reasoning somewhat narrowly; however, because the
Court's rationale is framed in broad terms, it seems more likely that
they will find that the decision provides a plausible basis for deploy-
ment of civil commitment procedures in other contexts. The decision
will also further blur the relationship between the criminal and the
civil commitment processes.68 As the language defining the permissi-
ble standard for involuntary civil commitment stretches from "illness"
to "abnormality," the risk increases that a potentially lifelong depriva-
tion of liberty via the civil system will be imposed to serve goals tradi-
tionally and rightfully reserved for the criminal system - retribution
and deterrence.6 9
The Court accomplished its rollback of constitutional limitations on
involuntary civil commitment by sanctioning language in the Kansas
Act that represented a break with Supreme Court precedent. Prior to
Hendricks, involuntary commitment proceedings could satisfy due
process only if two preconditions were established by clear and con-
vincing evidence: that the person was mentally ill and that he posed a
danger to himself or to others.70 The Hendricks Court ratcheted down
the mental illness requirement - a concept already plagued by uncer-
tainty and debate in the psychiatric and legal literature 7' - to include
not only the mentally ill but also those, like Leroy Hendricks, who are
merely mentally abnormal. 72 The Court's approach to this aspect of
66 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83, 86, go, io2 (1992) (holding, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas dissenting, that a Louisiana civil commit-
ment statute violates due process); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 367-69, 375 (1986) (holding, with
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting, that proceedings under an Illinois
commitment statute are civil); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370, 371, 387 (2983) (holding,
with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting, that a District of Columbia
civil commitment statute comports with the Constitution); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 752, 755, 767 (2987) (holding, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissenting, that a
statute that provided for pretrial preventive detention did not violate due process).
67 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2o88-9o (Breyer, J., dissenting). Only Justice Ginsburg de-
clined to join the portion of the dissent that agreed with the majority's due process analysis.
68 Cf id. at 2o87 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the different goals of the criminal and civil
systems of confinement and the dangers of using one in conjunction with the other).
69 Cf. id. (cautioning against the use of civil confinement as a mechanism for retribution or
general deterrence).
70 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-76 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 48 (1979)).
71 See, e.g., Hendricks, 117 S. CL at 2o8o-8i (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 8x (ig8s)).
72 See id.; see also In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996)
(noting that a psychologist found Hendricks to be not "mentally ill" but "mentally abnormal').
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the due process analysis has shifted dramatically since Addington,
when the Court proceeded more cautiously with respect to due process
protection of liberty: "Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of
psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both
mentally ill and likely to be dangerous." 73
Although the rhetoric and the result of the Court's decision may be
appealing in the context of a recidivist child molester such as Leroy
Hendricks, the Court failed to offer a principle to cabin the potentially
broad application of its revamped civil commitment jurisprudence.
The Court's new standard of "mental abnormality" or "personality dis-
order" is too broad, vague, and manipulable to function meaningfully
in the civil commitment context; indeed, the diagnostic manual that
the Court cited to characterize pedophilia as a "serious mental disor-
der" 74 includes descriptions of "Caffeine-Induced Disorder," "Nicotine-
Induced Disorder," and "Male Erectile Disorder. 75  The Court's own
jurisprudence assumed that "illness" comprises a more restrictive cate-
gory than does "abnormality." In Addington, the Court stated:
At one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emo-
The concept of abnormality is both more encompassing and less defined than the concept of ill-
ness. See generally DAVID L. ROSENHAN & MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY
3-15 (3d ed. iggs) (discussing the meanings and elements of abnormality); LEE WILLERMAN &
DAVID B. COHEN, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 6 (iggo) (defining abnormality as deviation from popula-
tion averages plus some maladaption).
73 Addington, 44i U.S. at 429. The Court also treated several other civil commitment prece-
dents brusquely. For instance, the Hendricks Court upheld Kansas's statutory regime, which
provides for commitment of persons who suffer from a personality disorder that makes them
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29ao2(a) (i994).
In contrast, the Foucha Court explicitly refused to permit the continued confinement of an insan-
ity acquittee on the basis of his antisocial personality disorder when he was no longer mentally ill.
See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-83.
Similarly, the Court ventured beyond its reasoning in Allen by refusing to defer to state su-
preme courts' determinations of state legislative intent. In Allen, the Court affirmed the Supreme
Court of Illinois's holding that "the privilege against self-incrimination was not available in sexu-
ally-dangerous-person proceedings because they are essentially civil in nature, the aim of the stat-
ute being to provide treatment, not punishment." Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 367 (1986) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). The Allen Court itself focused upon the treatment aspects of the
statute at issue, noting that Illinois had "provided for the treatment of those it commits." Id. at
370. In Hendricks's case, however, the Supreme Court of Kansas "held that treatment is not a
significant objective of the Act." See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136). The Court, discarding the Allen approach once it became unavailing,
substituted its judgment for that of the Kansas Supreme Court despite ample support in the rec-
ord for the conclusion of that court. Cf. id. at 2092-93 (noting precedents deferring to lower court
findings regarding the purposes underlying state officials' actions).
74 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2o81.
75 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Kansas and Western Missouri,
the ACLU of Washington, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Wisconsin and the
ACLU of Northern California as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 13, Hendricks (Nos.
95-1649, 95-9075), available in 1996 WL 471020 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 2 12, 244, 502 (4th ed. 1994)).
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tional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is gen-
erally acceptable. Obviously, such behavior is no basis for compelled
treatment and surely none for confinement. 76
The only limiting principle offered by the Court pertains to the in-
dividual's inability to control his actions:
These added statutory requirements [of "mental illness" or "mental ab-
normality'] serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suf-
fer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control. The Kansas Act... requires a finding of future dangerousness,
and then links that finding to the existence of a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the per-
son to control his dangerous behavior .... [It narrows the class of per-
sons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their
dangerousness. 77
This principle, even when coupled with the dangerousness re-
quirement, is not a sufficient limit on the use of involuntary civil
commitment procedures to deprive individuals of their liberty indefi-
nitely. If taken literally, the Court's new standard would appear to
permit application of indefinite civil commitment to recidivists of
many stripes, such as drunk drivers and drug offenders. 78 The dis-
sent's reasons for upholding the statute provide, at bottom, a similar
set of rationales. 79
Only Justice Kennedy cautioned against the dangerous implications
of the Court's analysis:
If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State
makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not per-
forming its proper function.... [W]hile incapacitation is a goal common
to both the criminal and civil systems of confinement, retribution and gen-
eral deterrence are reserved for the criminal system alone.
On the record before us, the Kansas civil statute conforms to our prece-
dents. If, however, civil confinement were to become a mechanism for ret-
ribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental abnormality
is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil
detention is justified, our precedents would not suffice to validate it.80
The majority's expansion of the due process civil commitment
standard from mental illness to mental abnormality enables the mar-
riage of the criminal and the civil anticipated by Justice Kennedy. By
imposing an unclear constitutional limit on civil commitment, the
Court has given the states the authority to lock up indefinitely anyone
76 Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27.
77 Hendricks, I17 S. Ct. at 2o8o.
78 See Mark Hansen, Danger vs. Due Process: Deciding Who Is Mentally Abnormal Is Key to
Law, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 43; Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Civil Libertarian's Nightmare, LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at 19.
79 See Hendricks, I 17 S. Ct. at 2o88-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 2o87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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who is found to fall into the nearly boundless category of mentally ab-
normal - from the most profoundly insane to those who fall through
the cracks of the criminal justice system.8'
E. Eleventh Amendment
Ex parte Young Doctrine. - Since the time of Edward the First,
the common law has conferred immunity from suit on the sovereign.'
In contrast, officers and agents of the Crown were accountable in both
law and equity before the English courts.2  The Supreme Court has
long struggled to reconcile this heritage in attempting to balance the
principles of sovereign immunity and government official accountabil-
ity.3 Under the Court's Ex parte Young4 doctrine, federal courts may
exercise jurisdiction over a state official alleged to be acting in viola-
tion of federal law, on the theory that the official's conduct stripped
him "of his official or representative character and ... subjected [him]
in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct."5  The
81 Because the Act permits the commitment of people who do not meet Kansas's definition of
mentally ill for the purposes of its general civil commitment statute, the Act effectively reclassifies
criminals as mentally ill in order to justify their continued incarceration. See In re Care and
Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 140 (Kan. 1996) (Larson, J., dissenting) (citing In re Per-
sonal Restraint Petition of Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993), and State v. Carpenter, 54i N.W.2d
105 (Wis. i995)).
1 See United States v. Lee, io6 U.S. i96, 205 (1882); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 8i, at 487
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., ig6i) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not
to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."). See generally RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAvID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 995 (4 th ed. i996) [hereinafter HART AND WECHS-
LER].
2 See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note I, at 995-96; Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Govern-
ments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. i, 9 (1963).
3 In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907), Justice Holmes acknowledged the "logi-
cal and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends." Id. at 353. Notwithstanding this broad principle, holding gov-
ernment officials accountable at law is "necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States.'" Penn-
hurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, io5 (1984) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 16o (i908)).
4 209 U.S. 123 (iqo8).
s Id. at 16o. The Young doctrine is sometimes referred to as an "exception" to the Eleventh
Amendment, which reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI. One commentator argued recently that "sovereign immunity has become a rare exception to
the otherwise prevailing system of state governmental accountability in federal court." Henry
Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, pg6 Term - Comment: The Sovereign Immunity "Excep-
tion", iio HARv. L. REV. 202, 103 (i996); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and
State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 46 ("I see no strong basis to fear Young's de-
mise."). However, the Court stated last year in Seminole Tribe that "we have understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which
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Young doctrine has evolved into a grant of power to federal courts to
entertain actions seeking prospective injunctive relief against state of-
ficials who violate federal law.6 Last Term, in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe,7 the Supreme Court carved out a new exception to the Young
doctrine when it rejected the doctrine's application to a claim brought
by an Indian tribe for injunctive relief against continuing state regula-
tion of lands to which the tribe claimed title. The Court's severing of
an additional category of claims from Young's scope undermines the
purpose behind the Young doctrine and disregards the doctrine's com-
mon law roots. Moreover, the decision's narrowly drawn exception to
Young leaves lower courts without clear guidance concerning Young's
remaining scope and may signal continued evisceration of the doctrine.
In 1991, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and several of its members filed
suit in federal district court against the State of Idaho, various state
agencies, and several state officials, claiming title to all of the sub-
merged lands, banks, and waters within the 1873 boundaries of the
Coeur d'Alene reservation; seeking a declaratory judgment that the
property was reserved for the exclusive use of the tribe and that all
state laws regulating the area were invalid; and requesting an injunc-
tion forbidding state officials from further regulating the property.8
Upholding the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by the
tribe,9 the district court dismissed the tribe's claims against the state. 10
It also dismissed the tribe's Ex parte Young action against the state of-
ficials, because it found no ongoing violation of federal law."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part.' 2 Although it affirmed the district court's dismissal of the tribe's
it confirms [ - ] that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system." Seminole Tibe v.
Florida, I6 S. Ct. 1114, 2x22 (x996) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (upholding the prospective appli-
cation of a decree calling for the provision of remedial educational programs); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 664-67 (1974) (holding Young inapplicable to claims for retroactive or damages relief
against the state treasury and limiting the doctrine to actions for prospective relief).
7 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
8 See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1445 (D. Idaho 1992). The tribe's
claims stemmed from an Executive Order ratified by Congress in I8gi. See id. at 145L
9 The district court relied on Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (i99i),
which held that under the Eleventh Amendment an Indian tribe may not sue a state without the
state's consent. See id. at 782.
10 See Coeur d'Alene, 798 F. Supp. at 1446-48 (finding the tribe's claim to be in effect seeking
a damages award, a type of relief against states barred under the Eleventh Amendment); see also
id. at 2447 ("What makes the States' surrender of immunity from suit by sister States plausible is
the mutuality of that concession. There is no such mutuality with either foreign sovereigns or
Indian tribes." (quoting Blatchford, 5o U.S. at 782) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11 See id. at 1448-49. The district court held as a matter of law that the state possessed right-
ful title to the submerged lands in question under the "equal footing" doctrine, which applies to
lands underlying navigable waterways and treats states newly admitted to the Union on an "equal
footing" with the original states. See id. at 1449, i45r.
12 See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, r257 (9th Cir. 1994).
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actions against the state,13 the Ninth Circuit rejected the district
court's Young analysis.14 Applying the three-part test set forth in Flor-
ida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.'s to determine
whether an action against state officials is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment,' 6 the court of appeals initially noted that the tribe's claim
alleged a violation of federal law by state officials; thus, under Young,
the claim could not be considered to be directed against the state.'7
The court then observed that the tribe had satisfied the second prong
by alleging an ongoing violation of its federal right to the land.' Fi-
nally, it found that the claim for injunctive and declaratory relief was
prospective; therefore, the tribe's Young action could go forward.' 9
A sharply divided Supreme Court reversed, holding 5-4 that the
tribe's claim against the state officials did not fall under the rubric of
Ex parte Young.20 Writing for the Court,21 Justice Kennedy described
the Eleventh Amendment as a measure "enact[ing] a sovereign immu-
nity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the federal judici-
ary's subject-matter jurisdiction. '22 In denying the applicability of Ex
parte Young to the case at hand, Justice Kennedy emphasized: "[w]e do
not ... question the continuing validity of the Ex parte Young doc-
trine. '23 Justice Kennedy went on to assert, however, that permitting
Young to encompass all claims in which prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief is sought against state officials would "undermine the
principle, reaffirmed just last Term in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, that
13 See id. at 1248-5o. The court noted that an Idaho state court had ruled that quiet title ac-
tions were not claims against the sovereign and that the Idaho Constitution disclaimed "all right
and title" to Indian lands within its borders, but nevertheless found no waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity by the state. Id. at 1249 (citing Lyon v. State, 283 R2d iio5, xio6 (Idaho
r955), and quoting IDAHO CONST. art XXI, § i9).
14 See id. at 1254.
'S 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (plurality opinion).
16 The test inquires first whether the suit against the state officials is functionally a suit against
the state itself; second, whether the regulation at issue is an unconstitutional withholding of prop-
erty or merely a tortious interference with the plaintiff's property rights; and third, whether the
relief sought can be deemed prospective in nature. See id. at 69o.
17 See Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1251 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-6o (i9o8)).
18 See id.
19 See id. The Ninth Circuit found that the tribe had a "conceivable" claim to the submerged
lands that was sufficient to go forward. See id. at 1257.
20 See Coeurd'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2043.
21 Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined in full by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and joined in part
by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
22 Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2033. The Court noted that a state can waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See id.
23 Id. at 2034; see also id. C'Of course, questions will arise as to its proper scope and applica-
tion. In resolving these questions we must ensure that the doctrine of sovereign immunity re-
mains meaningful, while also giving recognition to the need to prevent violations of federal law.").
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Eleventh Amendment immunity represents a real limitation on a fed-
eral court's federal-question jurisdiction."24
Next, in a section of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy maintained that Ex parte Young grants
federal courts the discretion to decide whether to allow an action to
proceed.2 5  He asserted that there are only two instances in which
Young has been applied: first, when no available state forum existed;26
and second, when a claim turned on the interpretation of federal law.27
With respect to the former, Justice Kennedy remarked that Young
takes on "special significance" when there is no available state forum,28
but that when one exists, federal courts must recognize that "States
have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum in suits
brought against them."29  With respect to the latter, Justice Kennedy
cautioned against taking too expansive a view of the Young doctrine.
He emphasized that the Supremacy Clause controlled regardless of the
forum chosen and observed that "[a] doctrine based on the inherent in-
adequacy of state forums would run counter to basic principles of fed-
eralism."30 Although acknowledging that Young generally allows a
claim for prospective injunctive relief to proceed, Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that, in light of Seminole Tribe v. Florida,31 the decision
"[w]hether the presumption in favor of federal court jurisdiction in
[such] a case is controlling will depend upon the particular context"
and requires a "case-by-case approach. 32
Once more writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the tribe's suit was barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.33 Although acknowledging that the tribe's suit could be catego-
rized as one seeking prospective injunctive relief, the Court found its
claim to be the "functional equivalent of a quiet title action[,] which
implicates special sovereignty interests."34 Ultimately, the Court de-
24 Id.; see also id. ('The real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be sacri-
ficed to elementary mechanics of captions and pleading.").
25 See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2038-40 (plurality opinion).
26 See id. at 2035-36.
27 See id. at 2036-38.
28 Id. at 2035 (noting that no such forum existed in Young itself); see also id. at 2036 (noting
that the tribe had a state forum available to it).
29 Id. at 2036.
30 Id. at 2037.
31 116 S. CL 11I 4 (1996). In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress lacks authority un-
der the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at
1131.
32 Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. CL at 2038, 2039 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy cautioned
against the application of Young when it might disturb the balance of federal and state interests.
See id. at 2038-40 (noting that the "range of concerns" in such an inquiry is "broad" and includes
the importance of the federal right at stake).
33 See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2040.
34 Id. The Court distinguished Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S.
670 (1982) (plurality opinion), in which the Court affirmed an order calling for the return of prop-
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termined that "the dignity and status of its statehood allows Idaho to
rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon re-
sponding to these claims in its own courts."35
Justice O'Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judg-
ment.3 6 Although agreeing that the tribe's claim was the functional
equivalent of an action to quiet title to the submerged lands,37 Justice
O'Connor wrote separately to dispute Justice Kennedy's suggested
reformulation of the Young doctrine into a case-specific analysis.38 Her
opinion distinguished the Court's prior decisions in United States v.
Lee39 and Tindal v. Wesley,40 which both involved property disputes,
on the ground that "[iln both Lee and Tindal, the Court made clear
that the suits could proceed against the officials because no judgment
would bind the State" and "[ilt was possible ... to distinguish between
possession of the property and title to the property."41 In contrast, Jus-
tice O'Connor argued, a successful action by the tribe in the present
case would transfer title to the submerged lands, which are intimately
tied to state sovereignty.42
erty held by state officials, on the basis that there the state officials acted in violation of state law.
See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct at 2040. The majority further determined that any resolution in
favor of the tribe would result in "substantially all benefits of ownership and control [shifting]
from the State to the Tribe," id. at 2040, which was a result contrary to the historical conception
of "lands underlying navigable waters [as] sovereign lands," id. at 2041 (quoting Utah Div. of
State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (x987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court relied on English common law as the foundation for the "longstanding commitment" to this
principle. Id. at 2041-42.
35 Id. at 2043.
36 Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
37 See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct at 2043 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (agreeing that Young was inapplicable because it "simply [could not] be said" that
the tribe's action to strip the state of all regulatory authority over the submerged lands "[was] not
a suit against the State").
38 See id. at 2045 ('This approach unnecessarily recharacterizes and narrows much of our
Young jurisprudence. The parties have not briefed whether such a shift in the Young doctrine is
warranted. In my view, it is not."). Justice O'Connor disagreed as well with Justice Kennedy's
contention that prior cases had turned on the absence of a state forum. See id. (noting that the
Young decision relied on two cases in which a state forum was available). She asserted that the
availability of a claim for prospective injunctive relief under Young remains the general rule. See
id. at 2046. In addition, she disputed Justice Kennedy's contention that the applicability of Young
turns on an evaluation of the "importance of the federal right at stake." Id. at 2047.
39 io6 U.S. i96 (1882). Lee upheld federal jurisdiction over an action in ejectment brought
against federal officers. See id. at 22 1-22.
40 167 U.S. 204 (1897). Tindal sustained federal jurisdiction over an action in ejectment
brought against state officials. See id. at 222-23.
41 Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2044 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice O'Connor went on to assert that "[a] court could find that the officials had no
right to remain in possession, thus conveying all the incidents of ownership to the plaintiff, while
not formally divesting the State of its title." Id. She also emphasized the importance of the fact
that, in such a case, the state would retain its authority to regulate the land in question. See id.
42 See id. at 2044-45 (stressing "the importance of submerged lands to state sovereignty" and
asserting that "[c]ontrol of such lands is critical to a state's ability to regulate use of its navigable
waters'".
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Justice Souter dissented.43  Finding the tribe's claim to "fall
squarely within the Young doctrine," the dissent asserted that the ac-
tion was "no more (or less) against the State than any of the claims
brought in our prior cases applying Young.""4 The dissent also empha-
sized that the Court's reasoning, in conjunction with Seminole Tribe,
would deprive Indian tribes with "federally derived property rights" of
access to any federal forum.4 5  Noting that Young has been held to ap-
ply to cases that burden a state's treasury, the dissent also argued that
Treasure Salvors and Lee were indistinguishable from the case at hand
because both decisions implicated a governmental claim of title to
property.46 Ultimately, the dissent argued, federal question jurisdiction
must turn on "the responsibility of federal courts to vindicate what is
supposed to be controlling federal law. '47
Coming on the heels of Seminole Tribe, the Coeur d'Alene decision
constitutes further evidence of an effort by members of the current
Court to alter the balance between the doctrines of state sovereign
immunity and Ex parte Young.48 By shifting the balance in favor of
the principle of state sovereign immunity49 and circumscribing Young's
43 Justice Souter was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
44 Coeur d'Alene, i7 S. Ct. at 2048 (Souter, J., dissenting). In making this point, the dissent
emphasized that "a government's assumption of title to property is no different from its assump-
tion of any state authority that it may ultimately turn out not to have." Id. at 2049-5o. Thus, the
dissent argued that no significant distinction existed between a decision curtailing a state's regula-
tory power, such as Young itself, and the injunction sought by the tribe here. See id. at 2054.
4S Id. at 2048.
46 See id. at 2051-53 (noting that settling title outright would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment). Justice Souter also argued that "leaving an individual powerless to seek any federal
remedy for violation of a federal right[] would deplete the federal judicial power to a point the
Framers could not possibly have intended, given a history of officer liability riding tandem with
sovereign immunity extending back to the Middle Ages." Id. at 2053.
47 Id. at 2055.
48 Seminole Tribe held Young inapplicable both because Congress had provided for an alterna-
tive statutory remedial scheme for tribes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act - which en-
ables tribes to petition the Secretary of the Interior for alternative relief - and because it was not
clear that Congress intended Young to apply. See Seminole Thbe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,
1132-33 (1996) (deeming Young a "narrow" exception to the Eleventh Amendment). One com-
mentator has noted that "the Court's tortured reasoning in the Ex parte Young part of the [Semi-
nole Tribe] opinion showed its eagerness to take liberties to accomplish quick doctrinal change in
this area." Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 1o6 YALE LJ.
1683, 1717 (1997); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Trbe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the
Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 495, 535 (1997) (arguing that "the
most troubling implication of Seminole Tribe is its recasting of Ez parte Young as an almost
doubtful act of judicial usurpation"). But see Meltzer, supra note 5, at 46 (arguing that Young re-
mains alive and well).
49 Because the term "state sovereign immunity" is not mentioned in the Eleventh Amendment,
many commentators have argued that it is as much of a fiction as Young itself. See, e.g., John J.
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889, x8gi (1983) (calling the principle of state sovereign immunity the product
of"a hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually indefensible judge-made law"); David L. Shapiro,
The Supreme Court, z983 Term - Comment: Wrong 7rns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 68 (1984) (calling the doctrine of state sovereign immunity
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scope,50 the Court disregards the doctrine's common law roots.5 1 Fur-
ther, by depriving many parties with federal rights of access to the fed-
eral courts, the Court jeopardizes the vital role that the Young doctrine
plays in our federal structure of preserving state officer accountability
for violations of federal law.52
Moreover, Coeur d'Alene not only removes an entire category of
claims from Young's reach, but also sets the stage for additional evis-
ceration of the doctrine by lower courts. Justice Kennedy, writing for
himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, proposed limiting Young's appli-
cation to a case-by-case analysis,53 a completely new framework for the
Young doctrine that would offer little guidance to lower courts and in-
vite inconsistent results. Even though Justice O'Connor joined the
dissenters in rejecting Justice Kennedy's proposed doctrinal reformula-
tion and in asserting that the general force of Young remains un-
changed,54 she explicitly carved out a new exception to Young.55  Her
"a judicially developed 'constitutional' rule"); id. at 67 (noting that "[t]he language of the eleventh
amendment does not include the term 'sovereign immunity' or anything resembling it"). See gen-
erally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1192-93
(i988) (discussing the different schools of Eleventh Amendment interpretation).
SO Young's breadth has been curtailed several times in recent years. See, e.g., Green v. Man-
sour, 474 U.S. 64, 71-73 (I985) (holding that Young does not permit notice relief or declaratory
judgments that create state liability for damages relief); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89, 124-25 (x984) (holding that Young does not apply when a claim alleges that
state officials are acting in violation of state law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 65I, 678 (1974)
(holding that Young does not encompass claims for retroactive damages relief running against the
state treasury); cf. Jackson, supra note 48, at 512 ("In Pennhurst ... the Court began the modem
retrenchment from... Young .... ").
51 Although the King in England enjoyed immunity from suit, his officers did not share this
immunity. "[C]ommon-law courts, in applying the [sovereign immunity] doctrine, traditionally
distinguished between the King and his agents, on the theory that the King would never authorize
unlawful conduct, and that therefore the unlawful acts of the King's officers ought not to be
treated as acts of the sovereign." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 142 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing I
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *244); see also Jaffe, su-
pra note 2, at 9 (explaining that in the reign of Edward I, one could sue the King's officers to re-
cover damages and property). The Supreme Court incorporated this tradition into American ju-
risprudence in cases such as Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824),
which held that state officials may be made accountable in federal courts for traditional common
law tortious conduct. See id. at 743-44, 870.
52 See Seminole Tribe, ii6 S. Ct at 118o (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Young doc-
trine is "nothing short of indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the
rule of law" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53 See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2039 (plurality opinion). Never before has a case-by-case
inquiry been applied under Young; thus Justice Kennedy was unable to cite any authority to sup-
port his suggested doctrinal overhaul.
54 See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurringin
the judgment).
55 See id. at 2047; see also id. at 2048 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("While there is reason for great
satisfaction that Justice O'Connor's view is the controlling one, it is still true that the effect of the
two opinions is to redefine and reduce the substance of federal subject-matter jurisdiction to vin-
dicate federal rights.").
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controlling opinion,56 however, fails both to support her new exception
convincingly and to clarify its terms. In addition, by creating such a
precarious distinction, her opinion may lead to the continued eviscera-
tion of Young by lower courts.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence offered a far too cursory reading of
the Court's earlier Young cases involving property disputes. Until
Coeur d'Alene, the Young doctrine and the common law of officer li-
ability from which it emerged were thought to encompass a broad
range of suits affecting the use and enjoyment of property.57 Justice
O'Connor distinguished the Court's decisions in Lee, Tindal, and
Treasure Salvors by claiming that they merely involved the resolution
of possessory interests. But in all three cases, the Court not only adju-
dicated the merits of the plaintiff's claim of title to the disputed prop-
erty, but also effectively divested the government, through its officers,
of its authority to hold the property at issue5s - a result no different
from that sought by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.59  Thus, Justice
O'Connor's treatment of these cases lays a tenuous foundation for her
opinion that may well lead to a broader interpretation of her relatively
narrow holding by lower courts.60
56 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (establishing that the holding of a
fragmented Court is the narrowest ground supporting the judgment).
57 See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 67o, 696-97 (2982) (plu-
rality opinion); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (I897); United States v. Lee, xo6 U.S. 196 (x882); see
also Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (3 Pet.) 498, 516-17 (1839) (ordering a federal officer to turn over
a fort that the United States had occupied for thirty years); Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 858-59 (1824) (ordering the return of funds claimed by the State of Ohio to
be part of its public funds); Meigs v. McClung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) i1, i8 (1815) (allowing
a suit to proceed against federal officers and holding that the plaintiff, who had title to land occu-
pied by the United States military, was entitled to just compensation).
S8 In Tindal, the Court affirmed an order removing the Secretary of State of South Carolina,
who asserted that the state held title to the disputed property, from the plaintiff's land, finding
that the land "belong[ed] absolutely to [the plaintiff]." Tindal, x67 U.S. at 222. In reasure Sal-
vors, the Court affirmed an order directing state officials to return artifacts claimed to be held
under state title. See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 697; see also Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-02 (949) (holding that an "action of an officer of the sover-
eign (be it holding, taking or otherwise legally affecting the plaintiff's property)" is not an act of
the sovereign if it is beyond the officer's authority).
59 Although the Court probably could not have bound the State of Idaho to any resolution in
Coeur d'Alene without its consent, the same circumstances existed in Lee and Tindal, in which the
federal government (in Lee) and the state government (in Tindal) enjoyed immunity from suit.
See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 697; Tindal, 167 U.S. at 223 ("The State not being a party to the
suit, the judgment will not conclude it."); Lee, io6 U.S. at 222. Indeed, the Court "has consistently
held that a public officer's assertion of property title in the name of a government immune to suit
cannot defeat federal jurisdiction over an individual's suit to be rid of interference with the prop-
erty rights he claims." Coeur d'Alene, nX7 S. Ct. at 2052 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, the
question whether a state may be bound by judgments in some circumstances raises many complex
issues. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note i, at 2O83, 1287 n.8, r481 n.2.
60 It remains to be seen whether this new exception will be interpreted to apply to only sub-
merged lands, to actions deemed to be the functional equivalent of quiet title actions, or to prop-
erty disputes particularly implicating state sovereignty.
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The Court said much more in Lee than Justice O'Connor chose to
acknowledge in her concurrence. She argued that Lee (and Tindal)
depended on several factors: first, that "no judgment would bind the
State"; second, that "[a] court could find that the officials had no right
to remain in possession, thus conveying all the incidents of ownership
to the plaintiff, while not formally divesting the State of its title"; and
third, that the state would "retainfl its authority to regulate uses of the
land."161 Lee affirmed a lower court's order removing federal officers
from the Lee family's Arlington property; the officers were asserting
possession over the property for taxes allegedly due on the land.62 The
questions posed by the Lee Court included whether "the prima facie
title of the plaintiff [was] divested by the tax sale" at which the United
States acquired a certificate of sale,63 and the Court went on to rule on
the validity of the government's alleged title to the property.64 Lee
also acknowledged that "[w]hen [a person] has established his right to
property, there is no reason why deference to any person, natural or
artificial, not even the United States, should prevent him from using
the means which the law gives him for the protection and enforcement
of that right."65
Similarly, in Tindal, the Court asked: "if the court finds, upon due
inquiry, that the plaintiff is entitled to possession, and that the asser-
tion by the defendants of right of possession and title in the State is
without legal foundation, may it not... adjudge that the plaintiff re-
cover possession?"66  In answering affirmatively and restoring the
plaintiff's title to the land at issue, the Court held that the plaintiff's
claim could not be deemed to be one brought against the state.67
In reading Lee and Tindal to dispose merely of the government's
possessory interest in the disputed property, Justice O'Connor over-
looked the Court's clear language. Ultimately, the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe's claim can be factually distinguished from those brought in Lee
and Tindal only because the disputed property involved submerged
61 Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2044 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
62 See Lee, io6 U.S. at 196-99, 222-23.
63 Id. at 199.
64 See id. at I99-2o4; see also id. at 204 ('[W]e do not see ... any reason to doubt that the jury
were justified in finding that the United States acquired no title under the tax-sale proceedings.").
6S Id. at 208-09.
66 Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 212 (1882).
67 See id. at 213-I9, 224 ("[A]s the record before us shows that the plaintiff owns the premises
and is entitled to possession as against the defendants, the judgment must be affirmed."); see also
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 67o, 688 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("ffllt
will be open to the State to bring any action that may be appropriate to establish and protect
whatever claim it has to the premises in dispute." (quoting Tindal, 167 U.S. at 223) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
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lands and the tribe's suit threatened the general regulatory authority of
the state.68 This distinction, however, lacks a principled basis.
Justice O'Connor's heavy reliance on one of these aspects of the
tribe's claim to differentiate it from the Court's precedents - the im-
portant link between submerged lands and state sovereignty under the
equal footing doctrine - is simply untenable. It is difficult to under-
stand how submerged lands implicate state sovereign power any more
than the economic regulatory authority that was at issue in Young,69 or
the federal officials' right to occupy the Arlington National Cemetery,
some of our nation's most cherished public property, which was in dis-
pute in Lee. Because the reasoning underlying Justice O'Connor's
narrowly carved exception to Young can be easily extended to any
number of circumstances, future courts may well apply her logic to a
broad range of actions involving the use and enjoyment of property.
Admittedly, the equal footing doctrine is limited to lands underlying
navigable waterways; however, its premise - that such lands are in-
timately tied to statehood - could easily be extended to encompass a
whole range of property held by states for the public benefit, such as
parks, rivers, and historical landmarks. 70
The Court's decision in Coeur d'Alene carved a new and very nar-
row exception to Young for submerged lands.7 1 However, the opinions
of Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor both signal that Young's
continuing vitality may be in question and provide lower courts with
ample precedent to further diminish Young's reach. The outcome of
Coeur d'Alene demonstrates why the Young doctrine plays such an im-
portant role in our federal system. Now, to vindicate a contestable
federally derived claim to ancient tribal lands, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
(and others after them) must either pursue their claim in state court, in
which state law doctrines of state sovereign immunity may bar any re-
covery,72 or petition the United States to sue the state on their behalf.7 3
68 However, Young itself ruled that the Attorney General of Minnesota could not assert his
regulatory authority to enforce a state railroad rate statute due to its unconstitutionality. See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, i59-6o (19o8).
69 This argument was advanced by Justice Souter in his dissent. See Coeur d'Alene, 127 S. Ct.
at 2049-50, 2054 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70 But see United States v. Lee, io6 U.S. 196, 217 (1882) (rejecting this argument).
71 See Coeurd'Alene, 117 S. CL at 2043 ("Under these particular and special circumstances, we
find the Young exception inapplicable.").
72 It is not clear "whether state courts must entertain certain suits against states that are
barred from federal court by the Eleventh Amendment." Jackson, supra note 48, at 504; see also
Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2057-59 (Souter, J., dissenting); Jackson, supra note 48, at 505 (noting
possible differences between state and federal court treatment of such cases). But see General Oil
Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-27 (xgo8) (holding that a state court may be constitutionally re-
quired to provide injunctive relief necessary to uphold federal constitutional rights).
73 The United States may bring a "parens patriae" suit on behalf of an Indian tribe. See
United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. i8i, 194 (1926) ('Of course the immunity of the State is sub-
ject to the constitutional qualification that she may be sued in this Court by the United States
.... " (citation omitted)); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 549 (ig8i) (holding the
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Moreover, if Young's scope is further curtailed, the federal courts will
be divested of jurisdiction over vital questions of federal law.7 4 How
much the Court will restrict Young by shifting the Eleventh Amend-
ment balance in favor of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity re-
mains to be seen.75 But to follow this path is to pursue a course "at
war with the principle that government must be accountable to the
people through the courts."76
F Establishment Clause
Public Funding of Special Education in Parochial Schools. - De-
cisions under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment' re-
flect the Supreme Court's failure to transform the Clause's underlying
principles into the stuff of manageable standards, and thus are notori-
ously inconsistent.2 Last Term, the Court added another layer of con-
fusion to its Establishment Clause jurisprudence and seriously weak-
ened the First Amendment's prohibition of governmental support for
religion. In Agostini v. Felton,3 the Supreme Court reversed a twelve-
year-old decision that enjoined the use of federal funds to provide edu-
cational services to parochial students on the premises of parochial
schools. 4 Under the Court's new jurisprudence, a federally funded
program providing services on parochial school campuses does not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause as long as instruction is supplemen-
tal to regularly provided services, the award of funding is based on
neutral criteria, and the program imposes adequate safeguards to en-
sure that the instruction is secular.5 This unprincipled reversal dem-
onstrates the need for the Court to bring order to the doctrine and to
same). In fact, the United States has filed suit on behalf of the tribe for title to approximately
one-third of the disputed land. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2033 (citing United States v.
Idaho, No. 94-0328 (D. Idaho filed July 21, 1994)). However, this power can only be exercised by
the federal government on behalf of tribes in a limited number of cases each year.
74 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("[T]he availability of prospective relief of
the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause."); see also Florida Dep't
of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 67o, 697 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("If the Constitution
provided no protection against such unbridled [state officer] authority, all property rights would
exist only at the whim of the sovereign [state].").
75 Cf. Fallon, supra note 49, at 1198 ([T]he emerging doctrinal lines [of Young] are both blurry
and potentially unstable.").
76 Shapiro, supra note 49, at 62; cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425, 1520 (1987) ("'Our Federalism' perverts a structure designed to assure full reme-
dies for constitutional wrongs into a system that regularly frustrates the remedial imperative.").
I The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion," U.S. CONST. amend. I, and it applies to the states by means of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948).
2 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Reli-
gion Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 323, 323.
3 117 S. Ct. 1997 (i997).
4 See id. at 2003.
5 See id. at 2oi6.
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establish a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable state sup-
port for parochial schools. Although the Court could have conven-
iently drawn the line at the parochial schoolhouse gate, as Justice
Souter would have done,6 a line capable of relatively consistent appli-
cation that better resonates with the principles of the Establishment
Clause would distinguish between general welfare programs and edu-
cational assistance. 7
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of I965"
provides federal funds to local educational agencies for remedial edu-
cation and guidance/job counseling for students who reside in low-
income areas and who have difficulty achieving state "student per-
formance standards."9  The funds are available for both public and
private school students.10 After unsuccessfully providing such services
to private school students on public school premises after school hours,
the Board of Education of the City of New York (Board) moved its
programs to private school campuses and eventually ran them during
school hours." To ensure that the nature of the programs remained
secular, the Board imposed safeguards, which included making Title I
teachers "accountable only to ... public school supervisors," limiting
the teachers' cooperation with private school teachers to consultations
regarding students' performance, banning religious symbols from the
classrooms, and monitoring the teachers' classes at least once a
month.12
Twelve years ago, in Aguilar v. Felton,13 the Supreme Court struck
down New York's program on the ground that it required an "exces-
sive entanglement of church and state in the administration of [Title I]
6 See id. at 2019 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7 Justice Marshall and Justice Black proposed such a line years ago. See, e.g., Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 259-60 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Board of Educ. v. Alien, 392 U.S. 236, 252-54 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's fa-
mous examples of general welfare measures include programs to pay for the costs of transporta-
tion to and from school, the provision of school lunches, and "general laws to provide police and
fire protection for... churches and church school buildings." Id. at 252. In contrast, educational
assistance would include, for example, funding for textbooks and instructional materials, teachers'
salaries, and field trips.
8 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (i994).
9 Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003-04.
10 See id. at 2004. The federal government has placed certain restrictions on the use of Title I
funds for private school students. See id. These restrictions include the prohibition of the use of
funds for services that are not "secular, neutral, and nonideological," id. (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 632I(a)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and for services that duplicate and thus replace
programs already in place, see id. (quoting 34 CER. § 200.12(a) (1996)). The federal government
has further required that the relevant local educational agency maintain control over the funds
and over the title to any materials used and that "public employees or other persons independent
of the private school and any religious institution" provide the instruction. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 632 I(c)(I)-(2)).
I See id.
12 Id. at 2004-05.
13 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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benefits."'14 The Court remanded the case for the issuance of a perma-
nent injunction prohibiting the use of Title I funds for teaching or
counseling services on sectarian school premises.' 5 As a result, the
Board shifted its use of Title I funds for private school students back
to off-campus sites.' 6
In 1995, the Board and parents of parochial school students sought
to lift the injunction.' 7 They argued that, because case law since
Aguilar had undermined its holding - in particular, five Justices had
stated their interest in overruling Aguilar' - relief under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 6o(b)(5) 19 was appropriate.20 The district
court dismissed the motion, because the Supreme Court had not yet
overruled Aguilar.21 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed.22
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the
district court to vacate the injunction.2 3 In an opinion by Justice
O'Connor,24 the Court found that subsequent decisions "ha[d] so un-
dermined Aguilar that it [was] no longer good law,"25 and held that the
Establishment Clause does not prohibit the use of federal funds to
provide remedial education on sectarian school campuses as long as
the educational agency employs adequate safeguards, as it did here.26
To determine whether the Board's program "ha[d] the effect of ad-
vancing religion," the Court employed a tripartite analysis that exam-
ined whether the aid led to governmental indoctrination, defined its
beneficiaries in terms of religion, or led to excessive entanglement of
religion and the state.27
1 14 Agostini, I17 S. Ct. at 2005 (alteration in original) (quoting Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 2006.
18 See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717-18 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 731 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
750 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
19 Rule 6o(b)(5) allows a court to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing [when] a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
[when] it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." FED. R
Civ. P. 6o(b)(5).
20 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006.
21 See id.
22 See Felton v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Educ., ioi F.3d 1394 (2d Cir. i996) (mem.).
23 See Agostini, 117 S. CL at 2019.
24 Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.
25 Agostini, I17 S. CL at 2007; see id. at 2017.
26 See id. at 26.
27 Id. The Court rejected the petitioners' arguments that changes in factual conditions and
the statements of five Justices in Board of Education v. Grumet calling for the revisiting of Agui-
lar warranted relief under Rule 6o(b)(5). See id. at 2007. Justice O'Connor noted that the addi-
tional costs of complying with Aguilar did not constitute a significant change warranting relief
19971
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
With regard to the first and seemingly most important prong, the
Court noted that it had changed its analysis of state indoctrination in
two ways since Aguilar. First, it had "abandoned the presumption
erected in Meek [v. Pittenger]28 and [School District v.] Bal 29 that the
placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably
results in state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic un-
ion between government and religion."30 For example, in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District,31 the Court upheld the state's pro-
vision of a sign-language interpreter for a parochial high school stu-
dent, because the interpreter's signing did not constitute government
indoctrination as long as she did not inject her own religious ideas into
her translations. 3 2 Justice O'Connor characterized Zobrest as a deci-
sion that rejected the presumptions that a public employee at a private
school would inculcate religion and that his or her presence would
impermissibly link the state and religion. 3
Second, the Court stated that it no longer found that "all govern-
ment aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools
is invalid."3 4  For example, in Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind,35 the Court upheld a blind student's use of a
state tuition grant to attend a sectarian college.3 6 The Witters Court's
decision turned on the facts that the criteria for receiving a grant did
not distinguish between public and private institutions and that the
state gave grants to students rather than directly to institutions.3 7 Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that, as in Zobrest, the state aid in Witters really
took the form of aid to a student who merely chose to use it at a sec-
tarian school.38
Justice O'Connor then turned to the related question whether the
Title I program "impermissibly finance[d] religious indoctrination,"
because the petitioners and the Court foresaw the costs at the time of the Aguilar decision. See id.
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor noted that statements by Justices cannot in and of themselves
overrule a decision and, thus, change the law. See id.
28 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
29 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Ball, the companion case to Aguilar, invalidated the Shared Time pro-
gram, which was very similar to the Title I program, see Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2oo8, and held
that the program impermissibly advanced religion because it presented the danger of "state-
sponsored indoctrination," id. (quoting Ball, 473 U.S. at 391) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010. In Meek, the Court invalidated a state's provision of "instruc-
tional material and equipment," Meek, 421 U.S. at 363, and "auxiliary-services" like guidance
counseling and remedial instruction to parochial schools, see id. at 372.
31 509 U.S. I (I993).
32 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010-11 (citingZobrest, 5og U.S. at 12-13).
33 See id. at 2011.
34 Id.
35 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
36 See id. at 483, 489.
37 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011.
38 See id. at 2011-12.
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and decided that it did not.39 First, the Court could not meaningfully
distinguish the program from the provision of the sign-language inter-
preter upheld in Zobrest.40 Second, and more importantly, any subsidy
of religion resulting from Title I occurs whether instruction is supplied
on or off the parochial school premises, and Aguilar did not question
the constitutionality of providing off-campus instruction.4 1  Justice
O'Connor concluded that these changes in the Court's jurisprudence
required the finding that the Board's program and the program in Ball
did not "as a matter of law" result in impermissible indoctrination.
42
With regard to the third prong,43 Justice O'Connor treated the
question of entanglement "as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's
effect" and rejected Aguilar's holding that the Title I program exces-
sively entangled religion and the state.4" She noted that the Court no
longer deemed the need for administrative cooperation between the lo-
cal educational agency and the school or the threat of "political divi-
siveness" to constitute excessive entanglement because these factors are
present regardless of the location where the state provides Title I
services.45 Likewise, "pervasive monitoring"46 of teachers to ensure the
secular nature of their instruction did not support a finding of entan-
glement because, by "abandon[ing] the assumption that properly in-
structed public employees will fall to discharge their duties faithfully,"
the Court no longer needed to require such monitoring.
4 7
Justice Souter dissented.48  He argued that the Court in Aguilar
emphasized the issue of excessive entanglement at the expense of two
39 Id. at 2012.
40 See id. Both programs awarded aid without regard to the school that a student planned to
attend, and Justice O'Connor deemed insignificant the fact that signers aid single students
whereas Title I instructors aid groups of students. See id. at 2013. Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor noted that Title I aid, like aid from a signer, supplements, rather than replaces, regular
courses. See id.
41 See id.
42 Id. at 2014.
43 With regard to the second prong of the Court's analysis, an issue not addressed in Aguilar or
Ball, Justice O'Connor briefly opined that the criteria used in allocating Title I funds did not
impermissibly create incentives for students to change their religious beliefs because the criteria
"neither favorfed] nor disfavor[ed] religion" and thus were less apt to advance religion. Id.
44 Id. at 20X5.
45 Id. (quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 Id. (quoting Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 Id. at 2016. In a cursory fashion, the majority then concluded that the Title I program did
not endorse religion for the same reasons that it did not impermissibly advance religion. See id.
The Court also found that the principle of stare decisis did not require it to uphold Aguilar and
Ball. See id. The Court stated that, because the case law had changed significantly since Ball
and Aguilar, "[its] decision to overturn those cases rest[ed] on far more than 'a present doctrinal
disposition to come out differently from the Court of [I985].'" Id. at 2017 (alteration in original)
(quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 5o5 U.S. 833, 864 (1992)). Finally, the Court found that
the change in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence since Aguilar warranted relief under Rule
6o(b)(s). See id.
48 Justice Souter was joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Justice Breyer joined in part.
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founding principles of Establishment Clause jurisprudence: that the
"State is forbidden to subsidize religion directly and [that it] is just as
surely forbidden to act in any way that could reasonably be viewed as
religious endorsement."49 The programs in Aguilar and Ball contra-
dicted these two principles in a number of ways.50 Justice Souter
noted that "[w]hat was so remarkable was that the [programs] in issue
assumed a teaching responsibility indistinguishable from the responsi-
bility of the schools themselves."51 In rejecting the programs' charac-
terization as "supplemental" education, Justice Souter argued that it
would be impossible to draw a line between the supplemental educa-
tion that public funds could constitutionally provide and the general
education left to the sectarian schools.52 Justice Souter would instead
have left intact the on/off-campus rule set forth in Aguilar and Ball as
"a sensible one capable of principled adherence.". 3
Justice Souter then criticized the majority's interpretation of recent
Establishment Clause case law. First, Justice Souter noted the major-
ity's failure to recognize the Zobrest decision's limited context. Ac-
cording to Justice Souter, the Zobrest Court's conclusion that no ab-
solute rule exists against the use of public employees in parochial
schools rested "expressly on the nature of the employee's job ... and
the circumscribed role of the signer."5 4 Thus, in marked contrast to
the Agostini majority's claim, Justice Souter concluded that the ma-
jority's rejection of "Ball's assertion that a publicly employed teacher
working in a sectarian school is apt to reinforce the pervasive inculca-
tion of religious beliefs ... is fresh law."5
Second, Justice Souter rejected the majority's contention that Ball
held that all direct aid to religious schools violates the Establishment
Clause. Rather, the Ball Court looked to whether "the effect of the
proffered aid was 'direct and substantial' (and, so, unconstitutional) or
merely 'indirect and incidental,' (and, so, permissible). 5 6 Justice
Souter opined that the cases cited by the majority, Witters and Zobrest,
did not upset this principle. Instead, the Court in those cases recog-
nized the narrowness of the grants, which "aid[ed] isolated individuals
49 Agostini, 1i7 S. Ct. at 2020 (Souter, J., dissenting).
so See id. at 2021. For example, Justice Souter noted that the programs gave public employees
broad discretion in conducting themselves and provided direct aid to parochial schools instead of
aid to parents. See id.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 2021-22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 Id. at 2022.
54 Id. at 2023. To support his interpretation, Justice Souter pointed to the Zobrest Court's ex-
plicit statement that a signer's duties are distinct from those of a teacher or guidance counselor in
that a signer is simply a translator. See id. (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 5o9
U.S. I, 13 (I993)).
S5 Id.
56 Id. at 2024 (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985)).
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within a school system."57 In contrast, Justice Souter contended that
the Tifle I program served numerous students in "core subjects" and
thus "necessarily relieved a religious school of 'an expense that it oth-
erwise would have assumed,' and freed its funds for other, and sectar-
ian .uses."58
Neither the approach of the majority nor that of Justice Souter
adequately safeguards the important values that the Establishment
Clause protects.5 9 The Court has traditionally applied the Lemon
test 6o to determine whether a particular program violates the Clause, 61
and although the Court has not explicitly renounced it, this standard
has fallen into disrepute. 62 The answer to the confusion that has
plagued this area of constitutional law is not to reformulate further
this vague and meaningless standard, but rather to replace the con-
fused case law on public aid to parochial schools with one clear rule
that better ensures a principled separation of church and state. The
result of the Court's current malleable jurisprudence is that Justices
quibble over distinctions between sign-language interpreters and
teachers, between aid directed at parents of parochial school students
and aid given directly to schools. If Agostini signifies any trend, it is a
smooth descent down the slippery slope of establishment.
57 Id.
S8 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Zobrest, 5o9 U.S. at 12). Justice Souter further disagreed
with the majority's decision to overrule its precedent in light of the fact that neither the law nor
the facts of Aguilar had changed significantly since the time of Aguilar's decision. See id. at 2025.
Although he sympathized with the need to reform the administration of Title I funds, Justice
Souter recognized that "constitutional lines have to be drawn." Id. at 2026.
Justice Ginsburg also dissented and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Jus-
tice Ginsburg argued that the Court had violated its own rules, which allow for a case to be re-
heard in a limited number of circumstances not present in this case. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). According to Justice Ginsburg, the district court was required to apply Aguilar, because
the Supreme Court had yet to overrule it, and therefore the district court could not have abused
its discretion in rejecting the petitioners' motion. See id. at 2027. Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg
argued, appellate review of a denied Rule 6o(b) motion "does not bring up the underlying judg-
ment for review." Id. (quoting Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7
(1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Ginsburg therefore concluded that, instead of
taking this opportunity to overrule Aguilar, the majority should have waited until an appropriate
case came before the Court. See id. at 2028.
59 For a fuller description of some of these values, see Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. I68o, 1684-86 (z969).
60 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 4o3 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (outlining a three-part test invalidat-
ing laws that lack a secular purpose, have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or
excessively entangle the state and religion).
61 See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485 (I986);
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-83 (i985).
62 See Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 359-60 (noting the current justices' dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test on the ground that it provides for either too much or too little separation of church
and state in particular cases). In Agostini, neither the majority nor the dissent applied Lemon
directly. However, in reexamining decisions in which it had applied Lemon, the Court implicitly
applied the test's tenets.
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The Court's approach is problematic because it fails to place
meaningful constraints on public funding for parochial education. The
Court opened the door to unprecedented public aid to parochial
schools by departing from Establishment Clause precedent in two sig-
nificant ways. First,. the Court rejected the presumption that a public
teacher on a parochial campus would inculcate religion.63 Chief Jus-
tice Burger first articulated this presumption in Lemon, in which he
distinguished teachers from books. He wrote that, "[i]n terms of po-
tential for involving some aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects,
a textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a sub-
ject is not. '64 Agostini's relaxation of this presumption effectively lim-
its violations of the Clause in parochial education cases to instances in
which courts make actual findings that teachers have inculcated reli-
gion. This departure from precedent does not bode well for enforce-
ment of the Establishment Clause, because parents of parochial school
children have few incentives to report inappropriate inculcation of re-
ligion in the teaching of secular subjects.65
Second, the Court rejected the long-held rule that "all government
aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools is
invalid. '66 This change threatens the separation of church and state
even more seriously than does the first. The rule that direct aid to pa-
rochial education is per se invalid is rooted in the Court's landmark
1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education.6 7 The problem with
Agostini's forsaking this presumption is that "[s]ubstantial aid to the
educational function of [sectarian] schools ... necessarily results in aid
to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole. '68 Because the Agostini
Court offered no way to separate the religious and the secular func-
tions of a parochial school - a task the Court has previously refused
to perform69 - the Court in effect constitutionalized direct aid to re-
ligious enterprises.
Justice Souter's approach, in contrast, renders no further damage to
the Establishment Clause and serves as a convenient yardstick for de-
termining the permissible use of Title I funds. However, it does little
6 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
64 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
65 See Ball, 473 U.S. at 388-89.
66 Agostini, 17 S. Ct. at 2011.
67 330 U.S. 1 (i947). Everson upheld the reimbursement of parents of children attending pub-
lic and private schools for the costs of bus transportation to and from school. See id. at 18.
68 Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
69 In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (x973), the
Court refused to uphold a state law providing for the reimbursement of up to 5o% of the total
parochial school tuition paid. See id. at 78o. The Court noted that "[its] cases make clear that a
mere statistical judgment will not suffice as a guarantee that state funds will not be used to fi-
nance religious education." Id. at 778; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (x977) (noting
"the impossibility of separating the secular education function from the sectarian" function of in-
structional materials and equipment).
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to provide a workable rule for other instances of state support for pa-
rochial education. Justice Souter fell back on the physical distinction
between services provided on and off the parochial school campus.70
This line, however, does not account for Board of Education v. Allen 7'
or for Zobrest, which upheld respectively the loan of textbooks to and
the provision of a sign-language interpreter for parochial school stu-
dents. In both of these cases, the books and the interpreter were used
on the parochial campuses, and Justice Souter's dissent, in which he
implied that he would not bar "all state aid to religious schools for
teaching standard subjects,"72 seems to indicate that he would be un-
willing to overrule either case.
Rather than taking the path of the majority or of Justice Souter, the
Court should have adopted Justice Marshall's approach in Wolman v.
Walter.7 3 Justice Marshall argued that a "line ... should be placed be-
tween [acceptable] general welfare programs that serve children in sec-
tarian schools because the schools happen to be a convenient place to
reach the programs' target populations and [unacceptable] programs of
educational assistance."74 This rule would prohibit, as directly related
to the educational function of parochial schools, state-supported in-
structional materials and teachers;75 voucher programs, scholarships,
and tax subsidies for tuition costs; 76 and remedial instruction and
guidance counseling like that provided in Agostini.77 However, this
rule would not prohibit state-funded diagnostic or health services pro-
vided on parochial school campuses, because these services are neces-
70 "[Ilf a line is to be drawn short of barring all state aid to religious schools for teaching stan-
dard subjects, the Aguilar-Ball line was a sensible one capable of principled adherence." Agostini,
117 S. Ct. at 2022 (Souter, J., dissenting).
71 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
72 Agostini, 117 S. CL at 2022 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73 433 U.S. 229, 256-60 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74 Id. at 259. Justice Black would have imposed the same line in Allen. See Allen, 392 U.S. at
252-54 (Black, J., dissenting).
75 The Court invalidated the subsidy of parochial school teacher salaries in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (i971), and the provision of instructional materials in Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 366 (975).
76 The Court upheld the provision of a state tax deduction for school fees and transportation
in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-9r (2983), in part because the deduction was available to
parents of public and parochial school students alike, see id. at 398. The rule that this Comment
endorses would require the reversal of Mueller and possibly of Witters v. Washington Department
of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), in which the Court upheld a student's use of a
state-provided scholarship at a religious college, see id. at 489. The Court, however, has exercised
less scrutiny over public support of sectarian institutions of higher learning. See, e.g., Tilton v.
Richardson, 4o3 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (noting differences in the impressionability of primary
and secondary school students and college students and differences in the schools' purposes).
77 Unlike physical or psychological testing or treatment, "[t]hese ... [services] are clearly in-
tended to aid the sectarian schools to improve the performance of their students in the classroom."
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sary for the general welfare of children and are unrelated to the educa-
tional function of the schools. 78
Of course, it is possible to define virtually any aspect of education
or of student well-being as beneficial to the general welfare. For ex-
ample, Zobrest arguably should be affirmed, because a state-provided
sign-language interpreter provides aid to a physically disabled child.
Instead, however, the appropriate, narrower inquiry is whether the
service also constitutes educational assistance. Under this view, a sign-
language interpreter, though a sort of treatment for a physical ailment,
becomes the medium of education itself and thus falls on the imper-
missible side of the line.
The strongest objection to adopting Justice Marshall's rule is that it
requires overturning long-established precedent.7 9 However, the Agos-
tini Court felt no such hesitancy in overturning the twelve-year-old in-
junction issued in Aguilar.8° Furthermore, Justice Marshall's ap-
proach would bring needed consistency to this area of the law. The
Court's decisions in Meek and Wolman have required the reversal of
Allen for some time. In both decisions, the Court overturned the state
provision of instructional materials and equipment, because their use
for religious purposes could not be separated from their use for secular
purposes. The textbook loans upheld in Allen cannot be distinguished
from the materials at issue in Meek and Wolman. Nor does Allen sur-
vive on the basis that parents and students rather than schools re-
ceived the textbooks, for in Wolman, the Court refused to distinguish a
program on the basis of the recipient.8 ' Characterizing Allen as the
primary factor in "reducing the 'high and impregnable' wall between
church and state erected by the First Amendment ... to 'a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier,'8 2 Justice Marshall warned that "It]he
tension between Allen and Meek indicates that we must soon either
remove the platform [to greater aid] or take the plunge into new
realms of state assistance to sectarian institutions."8 3
78 The Court presumed as much in Meek. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 371 n.21. Similarly, state-
funded standardized tests would still be permissible, because the state has an interest in ensuring
that parochial schools meet state competency standards. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 24o. However,
such funding would be impermissible if a test's sole purpose was to help a parochial school assess
its own performance. See id. at 261-62 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79 For example, textbook loan programs obviously constitute educational assistance rather
than general welfare programs and thus would not survive Justice Marshall's analysis. This re-
sult would require overruling Allen and portions of Meek and Woiman.
80 As the Agostini majority noted, the rationale for stare decisis "is at its weakest when we in-
terpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amend-
ment or by overruling our prior decisions." Agostini, 117 S. CL at 2o16.
81 See Wohnan, 433 U.S. at 250 (noting that, "[d]espite the technical change in legal bailee, the
program in substance is the same as before").
82 Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. x, 18 (1947), and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
83 Id. at 259 n.3.
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The time has come to remove this platform.' The benefits of
adopting the general welfare/educational assistance rule are many:
relative consistency of result, applicability to a broad range of issues,
and strong protection against public support of religious education.
The Agostini Court failed to render this area of the law clearer by
adopting a bright-line rule. Compounding this error, the Court paved
the way for public employees to assume the educational functions of
religious schools, leaving the schools with more resources to devote to
religious instruction. Accordingly, the Court has done a disservice to
the proud and unique tradition of the separation of church and state in
America. "The realm of religion ... is where knowledge leaves off,
and where faith begins, and it never has needed the arm of the State
for support, and wherever it has received it, it has harmed both the
public and the religion that it would pretend to serve. 8 4
G. Fourth Amendment
x. Suspicionless Drug Testing. - The Fourth Amendment gener-
ally prohibits government officials from conducting a search without
individualized suspicion.' However, the Supreme Court has carved
out certain exceptions to this general rule.2 In recent years, a variety
of government drug testing programs lacking individualized suspicion
requirements have survived Fourth Amendment challenges.3 In those
cases, the Court relied on the "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements and evaluated
the reasonableness of the programs by balancing the governmental and
privacy interests involved.4
84 Id. at 264 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Transcript of Oral
Argument at 7, Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1298 (i997); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
2 Some examples of these exceptions include routine stops at fixed Border Patrol checkpoints,
see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976), or at sobriety checkpoints, see
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (igo), and administrative searches
in highly regulated businesses, see New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987).
3 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 11S S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995) (sustaining random drug
testing of high school athletes); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
664 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of customs officials seeking promotion or transfer
to safety-sensitive positions); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634 (upholding drug testing of all railway em-
ployees involved in major train accidents).
4 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391-96; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-77; Skinner, 489 U.S. at
619-33. The "special needs" exception, as presented in Von Raab, provides that, "where a Fourth
Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Govern-
ment's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of indi-
vidualized suspicion in the particular context." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 (citing Skinner, 489
U.S. at 61-2o).
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Last Term, in Chandler v. Miller s the Supreme Court held that a
Georgia statute requiring candidates for state office to pass a drug test
did not serve a special need and therefore did not effect a constitution-
ally permissible suspicionless search.6 Although the Court reached the
correct result, it misapplied the special needs inquiry by conflating the
initial identification of a special need with the ultimate balancing test.
The Court thus left unclear the criteria for determining whether the
special needs exception is appropriate, and may guide lower courts to
dispense too readily with the Fourth Amendment's traditional re-
quirements in favor of ad hoc balancing. Instead, the Court should
have articulated a more substantial threshold test that would limit the
circumstances in which courts employ the special needs balancing test.
In i99o, the Georgia General Assembly enacted a law requiring all
candidates for high state office to pass a urinalysis drug test in order to
qualify for nomination or election.7 Section 21-2-140 of the Georgia
Code required each candidate to file a certificate demonstrating that
he or she had tested negative for illegal drug use within thirty days
prior to qualification for nomination or election.8
In 1994, three Libertarian Party nominees for state offices subject
to § 21-2-140 filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia. 9 Alleging, among other things, that the
drug test requirement of § 21-2-140 violated their constitutional rights
under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the plaintiffs
requested both declaratory and injunctive relief.10 The district court
determined that the law involved "special governmental needs" that
were "beyond the normal need for law enforcement"" and accordingly
applied the balancing test set out in Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n' 2 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.13
Emphasizing the importance of Georgia's interest in having drug-free
elected officials and the relative unintrusiveness of the certification
procedure, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary in-
S 117 S. Ct 1295 (1997).
6 See id. at 1298, r3o3.
7 See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-140 (1993). The offices covered by § 21-2-140 included, among
others, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the state judici-
ary and legislature. See id. § 2 1-2-140(a)(4).
8 See id. § 2I-2-40(c).
9 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1299.
10 See id.; Chandler v. Miller, 952 F. Supp. 804, 805 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
11 Chandler, 952 F. Supp. at 8o6 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (z989) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
619-2o (1989))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
13 489 U.S. 656 (1989). The Skinner-Von Raab balancing test requires weighing the govern-
ment's interests in the search against the individual's privacy expectations. See Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 665 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20).
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junction. 14 The district court later entered final judgment for the de-
fendants.' 5
A divided Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed.' 6 Agreeing with the
district court that the Georgia law involved "[s]pecial needs,' 7 the
Eleventh Circuit conducted its own balancing analysis under the
Skinner-Von Raab framework and, like the district court, found that
Georgia's interests in electing drug-free officials outweighed the intru-
sion upon the candidates' privacy interests.18 The panel thus held that
§ 21-2-140, as applied to the plaintiffs, did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.' 9 Writing in dissent, Judge Barkett reasoned that, under
Von Raab, no special need existed to justify departing from the war-
rant and probable cause requirements, and that, even if a special need
did exist, the candidates' privacy interests outweighed Georgia's gov-
ernmental interests.20
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the
majority, Justice Ginsburg2' held that the drug tests required by the
Georgia law "[did] not fit within the closely guarded category of consti-
tutionally permissible suspicionless searches."22 The Court began the
constitutional analysis by noting the undisputed premise that a uri-
nalysis drug test constitutes a search under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.2 3 Although a search generally requires individualized
suspicion to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, the Court ex-
plained, certain exceptions to this rule may be justified by "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 24 Invoking the
Skinner-Von Raab test, the Court agreed with the courts below that,
when "special needs - concerns other than crime detection -" are in-
volved, courts must carry out a "context-specific inquiry," balancing
the government's interests against the individual's privacy expecta-
tions, to determine whether the search is reasonable. 25
The Court then discussed the three most directly applicable prece-
dents - Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia School District 4 7J v. Ac-
14 See Chandler, 952 F. Supp. at 8o6-o8.
Is See Chandler, I17 S. Ct. at 1299.
16 See Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1544 (uth Cir. i996).
17 Id. at 1545.
18 See id. at 1547. The court also noted that the state's sovereign interest in determining
qualifications for state office warranted extra deference to the state's characterization of its own
interests. See id. at 1545. /
19 See id. at 1547. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection and First
Amendment arguments. See id. at 1547-49.
20 See id. at 1549 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
21 Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer joined Justice
Ginsburg's opinion.
22 Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1298.
23 See id. at x3oo (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617
(1989)).
24 Id. at 1301 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 61g) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25 Id.
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ton 26 - in which the Court had upheld suspicionless drug testing
schemes. 27 The Court emphasized the impracticability of the indi-
vidualized suspicion requirement in each case and the gravity of the
governmental purpose in having the drug tests. 28 With these cases as
its guides, 29 the Court began its examination of Georgia's statute by
noting that the drug testing method required by § 2 1-2-140 was "rela-
tively noninvasive."30 Turning next to the "core issue [whether] the
certification requirement [was] warranted by a special need,"31 the
Court declared that Georgia had failed to show a special need that was
"substantial - important enough to override the individual's ac-
knowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion. '3 2 The
Court pointed out the absence of any evidence of a "concrete danger"
or a history of drug abuse by Georgia officials that might justify an ex-
ception to the general presumption requiring individualized suspi-
cion.33 Although conceding that a documented drug abuse problem
among Georgia officeholders was not absolutely necessary to the va-
lidity of the statute, the Court maintained that such evidence would
help to specify the precise dangers involved and thereby support the
assertion of special need.34
The Court then set out to distinguish Von Raab, in which it had
upheld a suspicionless drug test despite the absence of any demon-
strated drug problem. Describing the case as "[h]ardly a decision
opening broad vistas for suspicionless searches," the Court first argued
that Von Raab involved the "unique context" of front-line drug inter-
diction, in which customs employees were exposed to drug-related or-
ganized crime, valuable contraband, and bribery.35  Moreover, the,
26 115 S. Ct. 2386 (995).
27 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at I3OI-O2; cases cited supra note 3.
28 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1301-02.
29 Before evaluating Georgia's statute in light of these precedents, the Court rejected the ar-
gument that the special needs analysis must be conducted deferentially because § 21-2-140 in-
volved Georgia's sovereign power under the Tenth Amendment to establish qualifications for
candidates seeking state offices. See id. at 1302-03. A state's power to fix qualifications for state
office, the Court ruled, does not abate the Fourth Amendment's constraints on state action. See
id. at 13o3.
30 Id. The Court found that the intrusiveness of the drug test was limited because the statute
allowed a candidate both to elect to produce the urine specimen at the office of his or her personal
physician, and to maintain control over the disclosure of the test results. See id. The Court also
pointed out that the statute invoked the same federal drug testing guidelines that applied to the
programs upheld in Skinner and Von Raab. See id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. The Court suggested that the statute guarded against merely hypothetical dangers and
that the statute's primary defense rested on the mere incompatibility of illegal drug use with
holding state office. See id.
34 See id. (citing the history of drug and alcohol use by railway workers in Skinner and the
dramatic rise in unlawful drug use by students in Vernonia).
35 Id. at 1304.
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Court argued, unlike customs officials, political candidates experience
day-to-day scrutiny that should enable Georgia to satisfy the individu-
alized suspicion requirement 36
The Court also evaluated the efficacy of Georgia's drug testing
program and criticized the program for its inability either to identify
candidates who use drugs or to deter drug users from running for of-
fice.3 7 The Court pointed out the ability of a drug user to escape de-
tection simply by abstaining for a certain period before the test.38 And
users who are too addicted to abstain, the Court reasoned, would still
be caught through ordinary law enforcement once they appeared in the
public limelight.3 9
The actual benefit of § 21-2-140, the Court maintained, was that it
demonstrated Georgia's commitment to the war on drugs.40 The
Court noted that no evidence suggested a drug problem among Geor-
gia's elected officials, their positions did not involve high-risk or
safety-sensitive work, and the drug test did not aid in any drug inter-
diction effort.41 In short, the Court concluded, the need addressed by
the Georgia statute was symbolic, not "special."42 Georgia's desire to
set a good example through its political candidates, the Court declared,
was not sufficient to overcome their privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment. 43
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.44 The Chief Justice took issue
with the majority's assertion that the hazards addressed by the Geor-
gia law were merely hypothetical, and argued that Georgia should not
have to wait for a drug abuser to run for office before initiating a pro-
phylactic drug testing program.4 The Chief Justice went on to criti-
cize the majority for interpreting "special needs" in a way that was in-
consistent with the Court's precedents. In Skinner and Von Raab, he
argued, a special need did not have to be a purpose of "especially great
'importan[ce],' '4 6 but could be any "proper governmental purpose
other than law enforcement. '47 The Chief Justice concluded that the
privacy intrusions occasioned by § 21-2-140 were minimal and that
36 See id.
37 See id. at 1303-04.
38 See id. at 1304.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 1305.
42 See id.
43 See id. The Court cautioned that it did not intend to address the constitutionality of candi-
date medical examinations, candidate financial disclosures, or private sector drug testing. See id.
44 See id. at 1305 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4S See id. at 13o6.
46 Id. (quoting Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303).
47 Id.
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some of the government interests described in Von Raab as "compel-
ling" were also present in the case at hand.48
Despite reaching the correct result in Chandler, the Court failed to
provide a much-needed clarification and fortification of the special
needs framework. The Court's method of analysis, which represents a
departure from the Court's previous applications of the special needs
doctrine, demonstrates this need for clarification. The Court's prece-
dents make clear that the special needs exception requires a two-step
analysis.49 In the first step, a court must determine whether there ex-
ists a special need, apart from the ordinary needs of law enforcement.50
Identification of such a need then triggers the second step, in which
the court must balance the governmental interests against the individ-
ual privacy interests to determine whether the search is reasonable.5
However, in applying the special needs framework in Chandler, the
Court blended the two steps of the inquiry by confusing the identifica-
tion of a special need with the weighing of Georgia's governmental in-
terests.5 2 Before determining whether a special need existed, the Court
48 See id. at 1307. These interests include protecting "sensitive information" from individuals
who might compromise the confidentiality of the information and preventing off-duty drug use by
officials who are potential targets of bribery or blackmail. Id. (quoting National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab, 486 U.S. 656, 677 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Chief Justice also warned that, although the Court claimed not to rule on the constitu-
tionality of general medical examinations of candidates, the Court's reasoning in Chandler sug-
gested that it would also require individualized suspicion in that context. See id.
49 In New Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), Justice Blackmun introduced the two-step
'special needs" framework: "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."
Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The purpose of Justice Blackmun's concurrence was to
articulate a distinction between the ultimate balancing of interests, which occurs whenever the
Court grants an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements, and the "crucial step"
of identifying a special need that necessitates departing from the traditional requirements of the
Fourth Amendment in the first place. Id.
6o See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, II5 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995) (identifying "special
needs" in the public school context to preserve the "swift and informal disciplinary procedures"
that help "maintain order in the schools" (quoting TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340-4)); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (describing the special need both to deter
illegal drug use by customs officials seeking safety-sensitive positions and to prevent drug users
from obtaining such positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620
(1989) (identifying a special need to regulate the conduct of railroad workers in order to promote
safety).
S1 See, e.g., Vernonia, ii5 S. Ct. at 2392-96; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-77; Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 624-33. In her dissenting opinion in the court below, Judge Barkett clearly articulated the two-
stage structure of the special needs framework: "Before balancing the candidates' privacy expec-
tations against the government's interests in conducting suspicionless drug-screening, the court
must first ascertain whether this case presents a special governmental need beyond the normal
need for law enforcement." Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1549 (rith Cir. x996) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting).
52 Cf. Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception
Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 564 n.* (1997)
I'Rather than justifying its departure from the warrant and probable cause standards by first
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began evaluating the intrusiveness of the drug test 53 - a consideration
that normally would weigh in the ultimate balancing test as one factor
determining the privacy interests at stake.54 The Court then ventured
that "the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial -
important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy
interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement of individualized suspicion."-5  In doing so, the Court
must have intended to describe not the characteristics of a special
need, but rather the weight of the governmental interest necessary to
justify a suspicionless search once the Court has reached the balancing
test.
The subsequent paragraphs of the opinion confirm the Court's
meaning: to illustrate why Georgia had "failed to show ... a special
need," the Court demonstrated how minimal the state's governmental
interest in the drug test was.56 Toward this end, the Court focused
both on the absence of any prior problem with illegal drug use by
Georgia officeholders and on the relative ineffectiveness of the drug
testing scheme57 - two factors that determine the magnitude of the
government's interest in the drug test.58 Furthermore, in describing
Georgia's need as ultimately "symbolic, not 'special,"'5' 9 the Court did
not truly address whether the need was normal or special, but instead
essentially submitted that the weight of the government's interest was
light, not heavy.
Arguably, the Court paid inadequate attention to the first step of
the special needs framework because it knew that the statute would
identifying a 'special need,' the (Chandler] Court moved directly to a balancing test to determine
reasonableness.. ").
53 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
S4 Dissenting in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), Justice Blackmun criticized the Court
for making precisely this mistake: "Although the plurality mentions the 'special need' step, it
turns immediately to a balancing test to formulate its standard of reasonableness. This error is
significant because ... no 'special need' exists here to justify dispensing with the warrant and
probable-cause requirements." Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Ss Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
S6 Id.
57 See id. at 1303-04.
58 Dissenting below, Judge Barkett warned against this mistaken mode of analysis:
The first question for the court is not whether the state's interest is great enough and its
chosen method effective enough to outweigh the privacy interests involved. Rather, it is
whether, under Von Raab, the circumstances in this case give rise to a special governmental
need beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement in the first place.
Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1550 (11th Cir. 1996) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
The Chief Justice made a similar point when he chided the Court for falling to distinguish be-
tween the special need and the governmental interest, and asserted that the Court used the term
"special need" in a "quite different sense" from its use in Skinner and Von Raab. Chandler, 117 S.
CL at 23o6 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In those cases, he maintained, "special need" referred to
any "proper governmental purpose other than law enforcement," id., and did not require "espe-
cially great 'importan[ce],'" id. (quoting Chandler, I7 S. Ct. at 1303).
59 Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at i3o5.
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fail the balancing test anyway. However, by effectively passing over
the threshold inquiry and moving directly to the balancing analysis,
the Chandler Court left unclear the criteria that should be used to
identify a special need in the first place. Admittedly, the Court de-
cided Chandler against a backdrop of case law that provided few
guiding principles to aid courts in the identification of a special need.60
Although the precedents have stated consistently that a special need
must be "beyond the normal need for law enforcement," 61 they have
provided little else in the way of an explicit definition. 6 Yet there
must be more to a special need than just a purpose apart from law en-
forcement, for if "beyond the normal need for law enforcement" is in-
terpreted as an exclusive definition - rather than a mere description
- of a special need, then a special need can hardly be considered "ex-
ceptional. '63  In the prior cases, the Court has emphasized the impor-
tance of other factors in determining the existence of a special need.64
However, those factors have yet to be articulated clearly as elements of
a special need, nor has the Court fully explained how courts should
weigh those factors. Facing this doctrinal void, the Chandler Court
had the opportunity to bring clarity and consistency to the principles
60 See, e.g., Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth
Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 89, 98 (1992) (arguing that the special needs doc-
trine "[l]ack[s] an objective framework defining a special need"); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MIcH. L.
REV. 2466, 2498 (x996) (pointing out the "haziness of the concept of 'special needs beyond the
normal need for law enforcement'" and asking "[w]hat, after all, constitutes the 'normal' need for
law enforcement?").
61 E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, ii5 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
873 (987) (quoting TLO., 489 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring))) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 6o2, 6xg (1989) (quoting Griffin,
483 U.S. at 873 (quoting TLO., 489 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring))) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This phrase has come to mean any purpose other than criminal prosecution or
crime detection. See Chandler, r17 S. Ct. at 13o; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989).
62 See Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal Justice: An
Evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3
GEo. MASON U. Crv. RTS. LJ. 203, 216 (993) (maintaining that the special needs exception is "a
legal doctrine that is bereft of a definitional conceptual framework for lower courts to follow");
sources cited supra note 6o.
63 Cf TL.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (asserting that special needs justifying
departure from the warrant and probable cause requirements arise only in "exceptional circum-
stances"). Indeed, a wide variety of imaginable government searches can be said to serve some
need other than law enforcement, such as ensuring the safety or morals of the community. The
Chief Justice, however, argued against a narrower understanding of special needs. See Chandler,
117 S. Ct. at 13o6 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
64 Focusing on the practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements, the Court has
historically stressed whether those requirements frustrated the government's objective in con-
ducting the search, see, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623; O'Connor v. Ortega, 48o U.S. 709, 724
(987); TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340, and whether the requirements were unsuited to the context in
which the search took place, see, e.g., Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (public school system); Griffin,
483 U.S. at 873-74 (probation system); TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (public school system).
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used by lower courts to identify special needs. Instead, the Court con-
fused matters further by discussing a hodgepodge of factors that be-
longed in the balancing test.
Besides failing to articulate any guiding principles for the identifi-
cation of special needs, the Court trivialized the first step of the special
needs inquiry. By neglecting both to acknowledge and consciously to
clear this threshold hurdle, the Court's opinion may serve to lower or
even to eliminate that hurdle. To that extent, lower courts may feel
encouraged to dispense more readily with the Fourth Amendment's
traditional warrant and probable cause requirements in order to reach
the balancing test.65 Many commentators warn that this result is dan-
gerous because the "free-wheeling 66 balancing test is too pliable to
preserve adequately the fundamental protections of the Fourth
Amendment.6 7 Lower courts have already used the special needs ra-
tionale to replace the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements with ad hoc balancing analyses in a variety of con-
texts.68 Too lenient a threshold test may contribute to the uncontrolled
expansion of the special needs exception, as courts continue to apply
the balancing test to an ever-increasing number of circumstances.69
To eliminate the confusion in the special needs doctrine and to re-
verse the erosion of the threshold special needs inquiry, the Court must
articulate specific and substantial criteria to determine whether a spe-
cial need exists. Commentators have attempted to glean from the
Court's opinions certain principles and factors that define a special
need. 70 Previous cases, however, have found special needs in such a
6S This weakening of the threshold test may lead to liberal use of the special needs balancing
analysis beyond the "exceptional circumstances" originally envisioned by the Court. TL.O., 469
U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Buffaloe, supra note 52, at 564 n.* (arguing that
the Chandler Court, by using a balancing test without first identifying a special need, reinforced
the concern that balancing tests are increasingly replacing the Fourth Amendment's traditional
requirements of a warrant and probable cause).
66 See Steiker, supra note 60, at 2498. In TL.O., Justice Brennan described the balancing test
as "Rohrschach-like." See TLO., 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
67 See, e.g., Nuger, supra note 6o, at oo; Vaughn & del Carmen, supra note 62, at 221; Buffa-
loe, supra note 52, at 55i; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (bemoan-
ing the Court's use of "a manipulable balancing inquiry under which, upon the mere assertion of
a 'special need,' even the deepest dignitary and privacy interests become vulnerable to govern-
mental incursion").
68 See, e.g., Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, ioi6-2o (ioth Cir. 1995) (searches of visitors to
prisons); Bluestein v. Skinner, 9o8 F.2d 451, 454-57 (9th Cir. i9go) (random drug testing of airline
employees); see also Vaughn & del Carmen, supra note 62, at 223-24 (chronicling the lower courts'
expansive application of the special needs exception); Buffaloe, supra note 52, at 541-42 (detailing
the numerous new contexts in which courts have found special needs).
69 Cf. Steiker, supra note 60, at 2498 ("The sheer number of circumstances in which the Court
has found the existence of 'special needs' is in tension with the goal of the Warren Court that ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement be 'few.'").
70 See, e.g., id. at 2499 (suggesting that a possible "limiting principle" implicit in the Court's
precedents is that special needs exist "when the government is acting to achieve some regulatory
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variety of contexts that ascertaining general principles is a difficult
task.7 1 In addition to the principle that the need must be something
other than the need to gather evidence to prosecute a crime,72 an im-
portant characteristic common to the most applicable precedents is an
element of exigency or difficulty in establishing individualized suspi-
cion. 73 Only such cases involving the urgent press of time or the prac-
tical inability to obtain individualized suspicion give rise to a genuine
need to dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements.
If the Court were to require a special need to include exigency, or
some practical difficulty in establishing individualized suspicion, it
would help limit the special needs exception to circumstances that
truly justify deviation from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.
Such deviation makes the most sense in circumstances in which stop-
ping to procure a warrant, or waiting to obtain individual suspicion,
would frustrate the objective of the government action.74 In each of
the three precedents involving suspicionless drug testing, the Court
emphasized the existence of some such exigency.75
Although courts have recently included this exigency criterion im-
plicitly in the special needs determination, the Court should explicitly
incorporate it at the first opportunity. This requirement would render
the initial special needs test substantial enough that only those cases
that truly justify departure from the individualized suspicion require-
goal separate and distinct from its goal of enforcing the criminal laws and when it does so through
governmental actors separate and distinct from criminal law enforcement personnel'); Buffaloe,
supra note 52, at 544 (asserting that the Court has found special needs when some combination of
these four qualities is present: the searchers are not police officers, requiring the searchers to learn
the warrant and probable cause procedures would unduly disrupt the workplace, the search is not
being conducted for the purpose of prosecution, and the government need is "more important"
than the ordinary needs of law enforcement).
71 The Court has found special governmental needs in contexts as diverse as maintaining dis-
cipline in the public schools, see TL.O., 469 U.S. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring), operating
government agencies efficiently, see O'Connor v. Ortega, 48o U.S. 709, 722 (1987), preserving the
deterrent effect of probation, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987), and regulating
railway safety, see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
72 See cases cited supra note 61.
73 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7J v. Acton, iiS S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995) (noting the time-sensitive
nature of informal disciplinary procedures); National reasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989) (explaining the difficulty in detecting drug use in the customs officials'
work environment); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623 ("[T]he delay necessary to procure a warrant ...
may result in the destruction of valuable evidence.").
74 See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("For the
most part, special governmental needs sufficient to override the warrant requirement flow from
'exigency' - that is, from the press of time that makes obtaining a warrant either impossible or
hopelessly infeasible."); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623 ("[T]he government's interest in dis-
pensing with the warrant requirement is at its strongest when ... 'the burden of obtaining a war-
rant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.'" (quoting Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (2967))); Buffaloe, supra note 52, at 563-64 (arguing that "it is
absolutely necessary to limit the language of special needs to those contexts in which the warrant
and probable cause requirements destroy the goal of the search").
7S See cases cited supra note 73.
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ment would advance to the balancing stage. Also, by clearly articu-
lating the threshold test's requirements, the Court would help lower
courts understand that the initial inquiry is a substantial hurdle meant
to weed out the vast majority of cases.
Under the exigency criterion, the Court in Chandler was right to
strike down Georgia's drug testing statute because the state demon-
strated no urgency or other reason that the individualized suspicion
requirement would frustrate its purpose.7 6 In reaching its decision,
however, the Court should have done more to clarify the special needs
doctrine in order to help lower courts confine the special needs analy-
sis to the most compelling of situations and to help ensure that the tra-
ditional protections of the Fourth Amendment remain intact.
2. Traffic Stops. - Twenty years ago, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,'
the Supreme Court held that a police officer may, as a matter of
course, order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. 2
The Court reasoned that concern for the officer's safety outweighed
the incremental imposition on the driver, who was already detained
with probable cause. 3 Last Term, in Maryland v. Wilson,4 the Court
held that an officer's prerogative to order people out of vehicles during
traffic stops extends to passengers as well as to drivers, without re-
quiring either probable cause or reasonable suspicion with respect to
the passenger.- By permitting seizure of a passenger absent either par-
ticularized suspicion or administrative guidelines to constrain police
discretion, the Court has once more diminished the protection that the
Fourth Amendment traditionally has afforded against arbitrary gov-
ernmental interference. 6
Wilson arose out of an ordinary traffic stop. On June 8, 1994,
Maryland State Trooper David Hughes followed a car that was trav-
eling at approximately sixty-four miles per hour in a fifty-five miles
per hour zone. 7 Hughes activated his patrol car's lights and siren, but
the car continued for another mile and a half, during which its two
passengers repeatedly turned to look at Hughes and ducked below his
sight level.8 After the car pulled over, its driver appeared nervous as
76 See Chandler, 117 S. Ct at 1304-O5.
1 434 U.S. io6 (977).
2 See id. at i i i.
3 See id.
4 117 S. Ct. 882 (997).
S See id. at 886.
6 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 5I (979) (stating that "the Fourth Amendment requires
that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate inter-
ests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursu-
ant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers").
7 See State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. z995).
8 See Wilson, I7 S. Ct. at 884.
I
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he met Hughes between the two vehicles.9 Upon Hughes's instruction,
the driver returned to his car to retrieve his rental agreement.10
Hughes then decided to question the front-seat passenger, Jerry Lee
Wilson, who also appeared nervous." Hughes ordered Wilson out of
the car; as Wilson exited, a bag containing crack cocaine fell to the
ground in plain view.12  Hughes arrested Wilson, who was subse-
quently charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 13
In a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, Wilson argued that
Hughes's order to exit the car was an unreasonable seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.14 The Circuit Court for Baltimore County
ruled in Wilson's favor's The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed, rejecting the State's contention that an officer's automatic
right under Mimms to order a driver out of the car during a traffic
stop extends to passengers as well.16
By a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court reversed. In a brief opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist,17 the majority undertook a balancing test
that, as in Mimms, purported to weigh the public interest in officer
safety against the individual's interest in freedom from arbitrary police
interference.18 With regard to officer safety, the majority found the
public interest to be the same whether the occupant is a driver or a
passenger.19 Although the majority had no empirical data concerning
assaults by passengers during traffic stops, it reasoned that the pres-
ence of passengers increases the possible sources of harm to the offi-
cer.20
With regard to personal liberty, the majority conceded that a traffic
violation does not provide probable cause to detain a passenger, as it
does for a driver.21 However, noting that the passenger is already
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See id. Trooper Hughes testified that his purpose was that he "wanted each one out at a
time to speak to each individual." Wilson, 664 A.2d at 3.
12 See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
13 See id.
14 See id.
Is See id.
16 See Wilson, 664 A.2d at io. The Opinion for the Court of Special Appeals was written by
Judge Charles Moylan, a distinguished jurist and Fourth Amendment scholar. See Brief for Re-
spondent at 5 n.2, Wilson (No. 95-1268), available in 1996 WL 525546 (listing publications).
17 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in the opinion.
18 See Wilson, I17 S. Ct. at 885-86.
19 See id. at 885.
20 The majority relied on an FBI report that 5762 officers were assaulted and ixi were killed
during traffic pursuits and stops in 1994. See id. No statistics were available to show how many
of these attacks involved passengers. The majority characterized the sparsity of empirical data as
"regrettable." See id. at 885 n.2.
21 See id. at 886. The majority did not address the threshold question whether an order to exit
a car constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. The question might turn on whether
the purpose of the order is to secure access to the vehicle or to control the location of the passen-
ger. For example, ordering occupants to vacate a vehicle in order to search or impound it would
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stopped "as a practical matter," the majority concluded that the addi-
tional intrusion from making the passenger wait outside the vehicle is
minimal22 and so held that "an officer making a traffic stop may order
passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop."23
In a dissenting opinion that echoed his dissent in Mimms, Justice
Stevens criticized the majority's reliance on undifferentiated safety sta-
tistics and argued that "the statistics are as consistent with the hy-
pothesis that ordering passengers to get out of a vehicle increases the
danger of assault as with the hypothesis that it reduces that risk."24
Justice Stevens also argued that any safety advantage would be limited
to stops involving assaults by passengers and that in the "overwhelm-
ing majority" of those cases the officer would have grounds to suspect
danger and could therefore issue an exit order without the majority's
per se rule.25
On the other side of the balance, Justice Stevens observed that ar-
bitrary official commands may offend, embarrass, and provoke.2 6 He
concluded that, even though the burden of an exit order may be mini-
mal in individual cases,27 "the aggregation of thousands upon thou-
sands of petty indignities has [a substantial] impact on freedom ...
which... clearly outweighs the evanescent safety concerns pressed by
the majority."28  Finally, Justice Stevens expressed concern that the
Court's "unprecedented step of authorizing seizures [without] indi-
not amount to a seizure of the occupants. However, the issue was not contested in Wilson, be-
cause Maryland conceded that "[a] police officer's command that a passenger alight from a vehi-
cle, if complied with ..., is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment" Brief for Petitioner at 9 n.3,
Wilson (No. 95-1268), available in i996 WL 435917. The exit order may constitute a search as
well when its purpose is to displace persons or effects in order to bring them into an officer's view.
22 Wilson, 17 S. Ct. at 886.
23 Id. The Court declined to address whether an officer may forcibly detain a passenger for
the duration of the stop. See id. at 886 n.3.
24 Id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, Maryland acknowledged at oral argument in
Wilson that the usual practice to control the risk in traffic stops is to keep occupants in the car.
See 6o Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3114 (Dec. 18, 1996).
2S Wilson, I17 S. Ct. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Making conservative assumptions, Justice
Stevens calculated that "only about one out of every twenty thousand traffic stops in which there
is a passenger" involves an assault by the passenger. Id. Justice Stevens did not account for the
possibility that some assaults were avoided by officers who, like 'rooper Hughes, ordered passen-
gers to exit before the Court authorized the practice.
26 See id.
27 As Justice Stevens noted, the burden may not be minimal in every individual case: a pas-
senger could be "harmed by exposure to inclement weather" or by improper enforcement of "an
ill-advised command." Id. at 888 n.6; see also id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("When an offi-
cer commands passengers innocent of any violation to leave the vehicle and stand by the side of
the road in full view of the public, the seizure is serious, not trivial.").
28 Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vidualized suspicion"29 may portend a further erosion of constitutional
protection of individual liberty.30
The Wilson Court's conclusion that a few cases of enhanced safety
outweigh many instances of mere inconvenience is hard to fault on its
own terms; however, the majority's comparison placed the wrong fac-
tors into the balance.3 1 In order to reach a proper accommodation of
the competing interests, the Court should have weighed the benefits to
safety and the costs to liberty, attendant not on the exit order but on
the Court's grant of potentially unbounded discretion, against the
benefits and costs of alternatives limiting such discretion by requiring
reasonable suspicion or compliance with objective standards.
The state's interest in enhanced safety does not extend to unneces-
sary or improper police encounters with citizens.32 In most traffic stop
cases, the legitimate governmental interest is limited to the safe com-
pletion of a citation.33  Thus, the factor to weigh on the state's side is
not the danger to the officer from a traffic stop, as the majority indi-
cated, or even the additional risk to the officer from encountering pas-
sengers inside the car. The appropriate factor is the extent to which
ordering a passenger out will facilitate safe completion of the stop.34
29 Justice Stevens traced the progressive relaxation of standards for searches, from a strict
warrant requirement to probable cause, and then to reasonable suspicion based on specific and
articulable facts. See id. at 889 & nn.io-1 i.
30 Id. at 89o. Justice Kennedy joined in Justice Stevens's opinion and also wrote separately to
emphasize the importance of requiring a reasoned explanation for official intrusion. According to
Justice Kennedy, the "insistence on principled, accountable decisionmaking in individual cases"
that distinguishes our criminal justice system "can be accommodated even where officers must
make immediate decisions to insure their own safety." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
31 See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales
Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1194-1207 (r988). Pro-
fessor Strossen argues that the Court's search and seizure balancing consistently understates costs
by neglecting collective intrusion and the social interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, see
id. at 1195-96, and overstates benefits by viewing the state's interest at a higher level of abstrac-
tion and assuming that the state's action will be uniquely effective in promoting that interest, see
id. at 1200-02; see also, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 720 (x985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (stating that the Court conducts Fourth Amendment balancing with "the judicial thumb
... planted firmly on the law enforcement side of the scales").
32 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("(I]f the frisk is justified in
order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitu-
tional grounds to insist on an encounter. .. ").
33 Maryland conceded that "the sole justification for the [exit] order is tied to ... the safe com-
pletion of a lawful traffic stop." Brief for Petitioner at x6, Wilson (No. 95-1268), available in 1996
WL 435917. Nevertheless, traffic stops have increasingly come to be used as a tool for enforcing
non-traffic laws, especially laws proscribing possession of drugs and firearms. See, e.g., Ohio v.
Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The Court has held that the pres-
ence of such an ulterior motive does not render an otherwise valid traffic stop unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). However, al-
though an investigative purpose does not invalidate the stop, the quest for evidence without
ground for suspicion is not itself a proper governmental end.
34 See Strossen, supra note 31, at 12o5-o6 (arguing that an accurate balancing test must assess
marginal, rather than total, costs and benefits of investigative measures); cf. Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE LJ. 464, 467 (ig6g) ("A scale which puts in one pan
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Completion of a traffic citation necessarily involves an encounter
between the officer and the driver, but it does not generally require
any interaction with passengers.35 The facts in Wilson illustrate the
point: Hughes safely encountered the driver outside the car and had no
need to approach the car or speak with the passengers.36 His desire to
question them was, at best, purely collateral to his proper objective.37
The nonessential nature of an officer's encounter with a passenger
is significant, as it is that encounter, and not the passenger's mere
presence, that is the source of danger to the officer under the reasoning
of both Mimms and Wilson.38 Thus, by questioning or confronting
passengers in the hope of uncovering evidence, an officer may well be
amplifying the danger attendant on the stop.3 9 A proper Fourth
Amendment balancing would discount any such additional risk attrib-
utable to an officer's gratuitous encounter with a passenger.
On the individual liberty side of the balance, the passenger's inter-
est is not only avoidance of mere inconvenience, but also freedom from
the arbitrary exercise of governmental power. Neither the necessity of
waiting for the officer to finish with the driver nor the assertedly
minimal nature of the added intrusion occasioned by the exit order
diminishes this latter interest.40 Even when the inconvenience is
the public interest in some legitimate end of government... rather than the interest in a particu-
lar means to that end will rarely tip in favor of competing values.").
35 See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.5 (3d ed. Supp. forthcoming 1997) (observing that "[i]n most instances, the offi-
cer's legitimate business is only with the driver of the stopped vehicle").
36 Cf. State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d I, ii (Md. CL Spec. App. 1995) ("[The potential danger to po-
lice engaged in traffic enforcement could be adequately met if the police allowed passengers to
remain in the stopped vehicle and instead had the driver accompany them to the police vehicle
while the citation is prepared." (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.4(a) (2d ed. 1987))).
37 Maryland asserted that the exit order had no investigative purpose, but it offered no expla-
nation of how questioning a passenger would either enhance the officer's safety or further the
completion of a speeding citation. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Wilson (No. 95-1268), available
in 1996 WL 435917.
38 See Wilson, 117 S. CL at 886 (observing that "the possibility of a violent encounter stems...
from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered"); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. IO6, 1o (1977) (premising its rule on "the inordinate risk confronting an officer
as he approaches a person seated in an automobile" (emphasis added)).
39 See LAFAVE, supra note 35 (arguing that keeping passengers in the vehicle "reduces the
likelihood that a passenger involved in some greater criminality will conclude he must mount an
attack before that fact is discovered by the officer").
40 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 n.12 (1969) (rejecting the notion that, "simply
because some interference with an individual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully
taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 26
(1968) (stating that permissible intrusion on a citizen's liberty is "strictly circumscribed by the exi-
gencies which justify its initiation"). Indeed, Maryland conceded that "[e]ven a minimally intru-
sive seizure would be unreasonable if not done to further an important governmental interest"
Brief for Petitioner at x6, Wilson (No. 95-1268), available in 1996 WL 435917.
1997]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
slight, a passenger has a strong liberty interest in it not being arbitrar-
ily or discriminatorily imposed. 41
Both sides of the correct balancing test - the expected contribu-
tion of an exit order toward the safe completion of a traffic stop and
the consequent nonarbitrariness of the order - depend on the reasons
for encountering the passenger in each particular case. The Court's
substitution of the generic factors of safety and convenience is part
and parcel of its adoption of a categorical bright-line test that fore-
closes a case-by-case assessment of reasonableness. It is the Court's
eagerness 42 to embrace a permissive categorical test,43 rather than its
faulty performance of the balancing, that constitutes the most serious
shortcoming of the Wilson decision.
In Ohio v. Robinette,44 decided during the same Term as Wilson,
the Court emphasized the disfavored status of categorical rules in the
Fourth Amendment context: "Reasonableness ... [under the Fourth
Amendment] is measured in objective terms by examining the totality
of the circumstances. In applying this test we have consistently es-
chewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature
of the reasonableness inquiry."45 The Wilson majority acknowledged
this principle but said that the Court had not always avoided bright-
line rules, and tendered Mimms as an example. 46 It offered no expla-
nation of what considerations govern its selection of a contextual or
41 The Court has repeatedly held that protection against arbitrary government action is the
central purpose of the Fourth Amendment. See i WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.4 (3d ed. Supp. forthcoming '997); cf- United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (noting that motorists may find searches "especially offen-
sive" when they are "singled out" and most others are not searched). But see Nadine Strossen,
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 285, 289-90 (iggi) (criticizing the overemphasis on for-
ma equality at the expense of substantive freedom).
42 The Court permitted Maryland to frame the issue so as to preclude a narrower decision
based on particular circumstances that may have justified the exit order. But cf. Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that the Court
would not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than the precise facts required).
43 Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REv.
227, 242 (1984) (distinguishing between bright-line rules that restrict police authority and those
that expand police authority).
44 117 S. Ct. 417 (r996).
4S Id. at 421. The Court's traditional unwillingness to impose per se rules in Fourth Amend-
ment cases essentially comprised the entire stated justification for the Robinette decision. See id.
46 See Wilson, I17 S. Ct. at 884-85.
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categorical rule in general,47 or of why a per se rule is appropriate for
exit orders in particular.4
Commentators have disagreed about the relative merits of bright-
line categorical rules vis-h-vis ad hoc balancing tests.4 9 Rules are
thought to provide guidance to the police at the expense of precise con-
formity to the underlying rationales, and a reasonableness test is
thought to assure full consideration of the varying circumstances at the
expense of predictability. By combining the approaches to create a
permissive categorical rule through a generalized reasonableness bal-
ancing test, the Wilson Court managed to retain only the worst fea-
tures of both alternatives: its rule not only falls to take account of dif-
fering circumstances, but also fails to guide the police.50
More importantly, the adoption of a permissive categorical rule
based on generalized (or idealized) circumstances invites problems as-
sociated with the grant of unreviewable discretion. Because the police
will conform their conduct to the per se rule, rather than to its ration-
ale, the unfettered discretion afforded by a permissive bright-line rule
will sometimes be abused.5' Hence, the Wilson rule will allow
searches or seizures that, on their separate merits, would be deemed
unreasonable and thus unconstitutional.5 2 Few would consider it rea-
47 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Draw-
ing 'Bright Lines' and 'Good Faith', 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 325-26 (1982) (explaining that the
appropriateness of a bright-line rule depends on whether it has clear boundaries, its results ap-
proximate application of the underlying principle, case-by-case determination has proved un-
workable, and the rule is not subject to manipulation and abuse).
48 One very plausible explanation for the Court's rejection of a per se rule restricting the police
in Robinette and its acceptance of a rule that expands police discretion in Wilson is the Court's
"preference for law enforcement over individual privacy interests." Bruce A. Green, "Power, Not
Reason". Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court's r99o
Term, 7o N.C. L. REv. 373, 395 (i992); see also Alschuler, supra note 43, at 242 ("It may not be
entirely coincidental that most of the Supreme Court's current bright line rules tell police officers,
'Yes, you may search,' rather than, 'No, you may not.'").
49 Compare, e.g., Strossen, supra note 31, at 1184-94 (favoring the certainty afforded by cate-
gorical rules over manipulable ad hoc balancing), with, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 43, at 242 (ar-
guing that categorical rules create injustice in individual cases without providing certainty in ap-
plication).
50 Rather than prescribing appropriate conduct, the rule merely insulates a category of police
decisions from review. Telling the police that they may do as they please does not provide them
with guidance.
51 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. x6o, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (cautioning that police "will push to the limit" of
any Fourth Amendment line drawn).
52 With respect to other permissive bright-line Fourth Amendment rules, one commentator has
observed that the Court has "recognized" that such "prophylactic" rules "are likely to yield injus-
tice in particular situations." Alschuler, supra note 43, at 229; see also, e.g., New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 46o (I98i) (predicating a blanket rule on a "generalization" that the Court acknowl-
edged was "not inevitably" true).
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sonable for an officer, in the absence of any realistic threat, to order a
mother and her baby out of a car into driving rain or snow.53
The potential for unreasonable seizures is exacerbated by the
Court's recent holding in Whren v. United States5 4 that an officer's
subjective intent cannot invalidate an objectively permissible stop.s5
Combining Wilson with Whren leads to the disquieting prospect that
exit orders may be upheld even though they are issued for an improper
purpose, such as to harass a passenger because of her race or to coerce
a driver or passenger into consenting to a search.5 6
The concern about police abuse of discretionary authority is, unfor-
tunately, not merely theoretical. A growing body of empirical data
suggests that race is frequently the determining factor in police deci-
sions to make traffic stops and exit orders and to question vehicle oc-
cupants. 57 The Wilson rule validates such abuse and perpetuates it by
53 Justice O'Connor posed this example during oral argument in Wilson, observing that the
automatic right to order passengers out of cars "can be carried to extremes." Steve Lash, Control,
Safety Require That Police Be Able to Order Passengers from Vehicles During Traffic Stops, Reno
Tells Court, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7102o8.
54 116 S. Ct. 1769 (i996).
55 See id. at 1774.
S6 As one commentator explained, when combined with Whren's rejection of a pretextual traf-
fic stop defense, Wilson "creates a powerful tool for an officer intent on abusing his or her author-
ity," because it allows an officer to "watch for a minor traffic violation, pull a vehicle over and
order all occupants out of the car to 'expand' his or her plain view in hopes of discovering con-
traband or of developing an increased level of suspicion to justify a further intrusion." Edwin J.
Butterfoss, In the U.S. Supreme Court: Do Police Have Automatic Right to Order Passengers from
Vehicles Stopped for Routine Traffic Violations?, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. ii, x996, available
in 1996 WL 707978; see also, e.g., Wilson, X17 S. Ct. at 89o (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("When
Whren is coupled with today's holding, the Court puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of
arbitrary control by the police.").
Whren's rationale does not appear to preclude a "pretextual exit order" defense, because unlike
an initial stop, an exit order lacks the probable cause that the Whren Court relied upon "to ensure
that police discretion is sufficiently constrained." Whren, 1x6 S. Ct. at 1776; see also LAFAVE,
supra note 43, § 1.4 ("[I]t would seem that certain pretext-type claims are still viable when ... the
case 'involves police intrusion without the probable cause that is its traditional justification."'
(quoting Whren, 1x6 S. Ct. at 1776)). However, in Robinette, the Court applied Whren to an exit
order under Mimms, reasoning that "in light of the admitted probable cause to stop (the driver]
for speeding, [the officer] was objectively justified in asking [the driver] to get out of the car, sub-
jective thoughts notwithstanding." Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996). It offered no
explanation as to why probable cause for the antecedent stop provides "objective justification"
that constrains a subsequent discretionary decision to order the driver from the car. In view of
the present Court's apparent antipathy toward Fourth Amendment privacy interests, it may yet
conjoin the facile analyses of Robinette and Wilson to conclude that probable cause to stop a
driver provides objective justification for a separate decision to make the passenger leave the car.
57 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 n.i (9gi) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing race-based selection of passengers for questioning in bus sweeps and noting that "the basis of
the decision to single out particular passengers ... is less likely to be inarticulable than unspeak-
able"); David A. Harris, Whren v. United States: "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Of-
fenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRim. L. 544, 56o-69 (1997) (citing
and discussing studies and examples). The Wilson Court failed to consider these data even as it
relied uncritically upon "sparse" (and largely inapposite) safety data. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885
n.2.
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creating another area in which police decisions are shielded from re-
view.58
In view of the potential for the Wilson rule to allow unreasonable
searches and seizures, and thus to burden constitutionally protected
liberty interests, adherence to constitutional principles requires that its
adoption be justified by some important reason. The Court's fashion-
ing of a categorical rule that will govern police conduct and citizen
rights in millions of traffic stops amounts to lawmaking. Accordingly,
this rule should be held to the same standard as any other law that in-
trudes on fundamental rights: it should be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.59
The Wilson rule's compliance with this criterion may be measured
by comparing the costs and benefits of unfettered police discretion
with two alternatives that each impose a lesser burden on the right to
be free from arbitrary police action: the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals' rule requiring reasonable, particularized suspicion as a pre-
requisite to an exit order,60 and a rule requiring compliance with a
predetermined administrative policy prescribing circumstances under
which exit orders will be issued.61 The more intrusive Wilson rule is
58 Cf. Bostick, 5o U.S. at 450 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Insisting that police officers ex-
plain their decision to single out a particular passenger for questioning would help prevent their
reliance on impermissible criteria such as race.").
59 Cf. Strossen, supra note 31, at 12o8-53 (arguing that Fourth Amendment privacy interests
are entitled to the same strict scrutiny that protects other fundamental constitutional rights). But
cf Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that generally applicable laws
that incidentally burden religion need not be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmen-
tal interest). Unlike the criminal statute at issue in Smith, the Wilson rule is decidedly not gener-
ally applicable, and the burden on individual rights is not incidental. On the contrary, the burden
results directly from the discretion that is the rule's central feature.
Professor Strossen calls for incorporation of a least intrusive alternative requirement into
Fourth Amendment balancing to determine the reasonableness of searches and seizures. See
Strossen, supra note 31, at 1208-53. The suggestion here is somewhat different, however.
Whether or not the availability of a less intrusive alternative renders a particular search unrea-
sonable, the Court, in selecting a categorical approach that trades off fundamental rights against
other interests, should hold itself to the standard of a reasonable decisionmaker by considering
alternatives that may secure desired benefits while avoiding or minimizing costs.
60 Judge Moylan emphasized that the suspicion required for an exit order need only rise to the
"relatively low threshold" supporting "heightened caution." State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 13 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
61 At oral argument, Wilson's counsel proposed an administrative guideline requirement simi-
lar to that imposed on vehicle inventory searches in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (I99o). See 6o
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3N16 (Dec. 18, 1996). A simple guideline could take the form of a uniform
practice, such as that followed by the police officer in Mimms. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. at io6, 1o9-10 (1977). Although this might increase the aggregate inconvenience, it would
eliminate the problem of arbitrary, selective exit orders. Cf. Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank
About the Fourth: On Allen "Process of 'Factualization' in the Search and Seizure Cases," 85
MIcH. L. REV. 427, 453 (1986) (arguing that imposing a "standardized procedures" requirement
for incidental searches and seizures would result in "a more meaningful accommodation of law
enforcement and privacy interests").
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justified only if the alternatives are substantially less effective in pro-
moting the governmental interest at stake.
The Wilson majority's scant discussion gave no indication of what
governmental interest a bright-line rule might serve. One possible jus-
tification for such a rule is its ease of application in the field. 62 Indeed,
Maryland advanced this reason in arguing that "officers confronting
the inherent dangers of traffic stops should not be forced to pause and
ponder the legal subtleties associated with a quantum of proof analy-
sis."63 However, the Court had already rejected the very same argu-
ment by the same party in Maryland v. Buie,64 wherein it explained
that the "reasonable suspicion" standard is "one of the relatively simple
concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment."65
It is difficult to reconcile Wilson with Buie. In Buie, the Court de-
clined Maryland's request for a per se rule permitting police to "con-
duct a protective sweep whenever they make an in-home arrest for a
violent crime, 66 and held instead that such authority "is decidedly not
'automatic,' but may be conducted only when justified by a reason-
able, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing
a danger to those on the arrest scene." 67  The Court recognized the
dangerous nature of a felony arrest but observed that, "despite the
danger that inheres in on-the-street encounters and the need for police
to act quickly for their own safety, the Court in Terry v. Ohio68 did not
adopt a brightline rule authorizing frisks for weapons in all confronta-
tional encounters."69 The Buie Court concluded that, whether on the
street or in a house, "the reasonable suspicion standard ... strikes the
proper balance between officer safety and citizen privacy. '70
62 A per se rule is also easier to apply in the courtroom and might eliminate some evidentiary
challenges, but the economy afforded by eliminating judicial oversight of constitutional issues can
hardly be said to justify the loss of liberty entailed thereby. Moreover, it is not clear that the Wil-
son rule will forestall court challenges so long as the viability of a pretextual exit order defense
remains unresolved. See supra note 56.
63 Brief for Petitioner at 21, Wilson (No. 95-1268), available in 1996 WL 435917. This argu-
ment echoes the Court's concerns in cases emphasizing the need for rules to guide police. See,
e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (finding rules "essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise" to balance state and individual interests); id. at
219-20 (White, J., concurring) (stating that balancing "must in large part be done on a categorical
basis - not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers").
64 494 U.S. 325 (199o).
65 Id. at 334 n.2 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (I989)).
66 Id. at 330.
67 Id. at 336.
68 392 U.S. r (1968).
69 Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 n.2.
70 Id. at 335 n.2. It is possible to distinguish Terry and Buie based on the "special latitude
[that] is given to the police in effecting searches and seizures involving vehicles and their occu-
pants." Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 89o (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But cf Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
91 (1979) ("The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy' of persons, not places."); Delaware v. Prouse, 44o U.S. 648, 662-63 (x979) ("Were the indi-
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A second, somewhat related, possible justification for a permissive
bright-line rule is the belief that an officer can more reliably protect
his own safety by determining whether to order passengers out of cars
based on subtle, inarticulable factors than by following a predeter-
mined policy. However, the Wilson Court did not express such a be-
lief, and it is far from obvious that all officers can better determine
how to protect themselves by relying on instinct 7' rather than on ob-
jective circumstances and established practices.7 2 Moreover, even if all
officers had expertise in assessing the safest location for passengers, it
cannot be presumed that they will always make their decision based
on safety. A zealous officer vested with unfettered discretion might
choose to encounter greater danger by ordering a passenger from a car
when it would be more prudent to have him remain inside. Thus, the
Court had no reason to expect that the Wilson rule will maximize po-
lice safety.
Nevertheless, the Court reached its result in Wilson by employing a
balancing test that presumed the superior efficacy of discretionary con-
trol over less intrusive alternatives and that disregarded the costs to
liberty from the inevitable abuse of the unreviewable discretion
granted to police. This flawed balancing was a byproduct of the
Court's adoption of a permissive categorical rule that neither protects
citizens nor guides police. Absent a clear showing that unbounded
discretion is more conducive to police safety in all cases, the Court
should have retained the traditional safeguard of conditioning the right
to undertake a seizure on particularized suspicion or compliance with
a predetermined policy.
H. Freedom of Speech and Association Clauses
i. Associational Rights of Political Parties. - The American elec-
toral system presents many barriers to effective third-party participa-
tion.' Although not precluding the rise of a viable third party,2 such
vidual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the se-
curity guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.").
71 Cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (cautioning that failure to require particularized suspicion or objec-
tive standards "would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches"), quoted in Prouse, 44o U.S. at 661.
72 Cf. Strossen, supra note 31, at 1201-02 (criticizing the Court's tendency to assume that the
challenged search or seizure will "effectively promote the law enforcement goal at issue" and "will
do so to a substantially greater degree than alternative law enforcement methods" rather than to
"insistl] on evidence of the comparative effectiveness").
1 See John B. Anderson & Jeffrey L. Freeman, Taking the First Steps Towards a Multiparty
System in the United States, 2 2 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 73, 78-81 (1997).
2 Despite the existence of first-past-the-post voting and single-member districts, Britain's
third party, the Liberal Democrats, received 17.2% of the vote in the 1997 elections. See Philip
Webster, It's Time for Action, Says Blair, TMES (London), May 3, 1997, at i. However, the Lib-
eral Democrats won only 46 seats (7%). See id. "The 'first-past-the-post' electoral system can
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structural features as first-past-the-post voting3 and single-member
districts4 effectively reinforce the two-party system.s One tool that
third parties can use to overcome these impediments is the so-called
"fusion" candidacy, in which the same candidate appears on the ballot
as a nominee of more than one party.6 Although fusion can increase
the political strength of smaller parties,7 the vast majority of states
have banned it.8 Last Term, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party,9 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of fusion bans
against a First Amendment challenge. Although it reached the correct
result, the Court, in applying its previously developed analysis re-
garding the associational rights of political parties, exposed the inabil-
ity of that analysis to explain persuasively the constitutionality of laws
structuring the electoral system, such as first-past-the-post voting and
single-member districts.
In April 1994, the Twin Cities Area New Party, classified as a mi-
nor political party under Minnesota law, chose incumbent state repre-
sentative Andy Dawkins as its candidate for the November 1994 elec-
tion.' 0 Although Dawkins was already the nominee of the Democratic-
Farmer-Labor Party (DFL),11 neither Dawkins nor the DFL objected
produce bizarre results when more than two parties get significant shares of the vote, especially if
some of them have supporters scattered throughout the country while others have solid regional
strongholds." Canada's Election Landslide, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1993, at 17. For example, in the
1993 Canadian elections, the Progressive Conservative Party received roughly the same propor-
tion of the vote (i6%) as the regionally concentrated Reform Party (ig%) and Bloc Qudblcois
(14%), but the latter two parties took 52 and 54 seats, respectively, while the Conservatives took
only two. See The New Face of Canada, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 27, 1993, at A3.
3 In a first-past-the-post, or plurality, voting system, the candidate who receives the most
votes wins the election, regardless whether that candidate receives a majority of the votes. See
DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 25-28 (rev. ed. 1971).
4 In single-member districts, voters elect one person from the field of candidates. In
multimember districts, candidates run for two or more open slots. See id. at ig.
5 See id. at 93-96.
6 See Note, Fusion Candidacies, Disaggregation, and Freedom of Association, 1o9 HARV. L.
REV. 1302, 1303 (r996). A multiple nomination can be indicated in two ways: either a candidate
can have multiple party designations after his name, or his name can appear on separate ballot
lines, one for each party. See id. at 1305 & nn.17-18, 1333-34. The latter method allows for "fu-
sion with disaggregation," through which voters can register support both for the candidate and
for one of the parties represented. For simplicity, this Comment uses a dual nomination by a ma-
jor and a minor party as the paradigmatic example of fusion.
7 See William R. Kirschner, Note, Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Political
Parties, 95 COLUm. L. REv. 683, 683-85 (i995).
8 See Note, supra note 6, at 1303. Forty-three states ban fusion, whether directly, indirectly,
or through laws "that could be reasonably construed as a ban." Id. at 13o3 n.14. Of the seven
other states, fusion candidacies play a significant role only in New York. See Edward Felsenthal,
Supreme Court Upholds Limits on Minor Parties' Bids for Ballot, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1997, at
B6.
9 ir S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
10 See id. at 1367-68 & n.4.
11 See id. at 1367. The DFL, the product of a 1944 merger between Minnesota's Democratic
and Farmer-Labor parties, is classed as a major political party under Minnesota law. See id. at
1367 n.2.
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to the New Party's nomination. However, because Minnesota law
prohibited fusion candidacies,' 2 local election officials refused to accept
the New Party's nominating petition.' 3 The New Party filed suit in
Minnesota federal court and claimed that the fusion ban infringed its
associational rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 14
Applying the associational-rights test from Anderson v. Cele-
brezze,'5 the district court rejected the New Party's claim.' 6 The An-
derson test balances the "character and magnitude" of an election
law's burden on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the
state's "precise interests" justifying that burden. 7 Only when the bur-
den imposed is severe must the restriction be "narrowly drawn to ad-
vance a state interest of compelling importance.""' The district court
found the burden on political association to be minor and the state in-
terests to be compelling.' 9 The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that
the burden on the New Party was severe and that the law was not
narrowly tailored, regardless of the importance of the state interests.20
This holding conflicted with an earlier Seventh Circuit decision up-
holding Wisconsin's "similar" fusion ban.2 1
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court,22 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist began by recognizing the conflict between the right of
parties to associate for political purposes and the interest of the state in
maintaining "fair and honest and ... order[ly]" elections.23 Next, ap-
plying the Anderson analysis, the Chief Justice noted that "[1lesser
burdens ... trigger less exacting review, and a State's important regu-
latory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondis-
criminatory restrictions. '24  Under the burden prong of the Anderson
12 See MINN. STAT. § 204 B.04(I) (1994) (prohibiting major-party/major-party fusion); id.
§ 204B.04(2) (prohibiting major-party/minor-party fusion); id. § 204B.06(i)(b) (requiring candi-
dates to affirm that they have filed no other affidavit of candidacy in the same primary or ensuing
general election).
13 See Timmons, I17 S. Ct. at 1368.
14 See id.
iS 46o U.S. 780 (1983).
16 See Tkin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 863 F. Supp. 988, 99o-9i (D. Minn. 1994).
17 Anderson, 46o U.S. at 789.
18 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992).
19 See Twin Cities, 863 F. Supp. at 992-93.
20 See Tvin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F3d 196, 198-99 (8th Cir. 1996).
21 See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1368 (citing Swamp v. Kennedy, 95o F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir.
iggi)). The Seventh Circuit revisited Swamp in Stewart v. Taylor, 104 F.3d 965-(7th Cir. 1997),
upholding Indiana's fusion ban. The court described Swamp as "the law in this circuit on invol-
untary fusion" and distinguished it from McKenna and the Third Circuit's decision in Patriot
Party v. Allegheny County Department of Elections, 95 E3d 253 (3d Cir. 1996), both of which
"concerned voluntary, not involuntary, fusion." Stewart, 104 F.3d at 971-72.
22 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined the Chief Justice's opinion.
23 Timmons, 17 S. Ct. at 1369 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (I97))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Id. at 1370 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
788 (1983))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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analysis, the Court reasoned that a fusion ban, like eligibility require-
ments and simple individual unwillingness, might lead to "a particular
individual ... not appear[ing] on the ballot as a particular party's
candidate," but maintained that such a failure to appear would not
"severely burden that party's association rights."25 The New Party, the
Chief Justice noted, was still free to convince Dawkins to be its candi-
date, or to support Dawkins even though he would appear on the bal-
lot only as the DFL candidate.2 6 Moreover, Minnesota's ballot access
laws did not "directly preclude[ minor political parties from develop-
ing and organizing" or exclude certain political parties from partici-
pating in elections. 27
The Court found that fusion bans may impose two burdens on
candidates, but ruled that each was insufficiently burdensome to in-
validate fusion bans. First, even if fusion were essential to the creation
of thriving third parties,28 "the Constitution does not require States to
permit fusion any more than it requires them to move to proportional-
representation elections or public financing of campaigns." 29 Second,
because ballots "serve primarily to elect candidates, not as fora for po-
litical expression," the Court rejected the New Party's assertion that it
had a right to use the ballot in order to send a message both to its can-
didate and to the voters.30 Consequently, the Court held that the bur-
dens imposed on the New Party were not severe and that Minnesota
therefore did not need either to tailor its fusion ban law narrowly or to
justify it with a compelling state interest.31
Turning to the state-interest prong of the Anderson analysis, the
Court found three state interests that justified the minimal burdens
imposed on the New Party. First, the Court concluded that Minnesota
legitimately could fear a proliferation of single issue parties, such as
the "No New Taxes" or the "Healthy Planet" parties, that would trans-
form the ballot "from a means of choosing candidates to a billboard for
political advertising. '32 Second, the Court accepted Minnesota's as-
serted interest in ensuring that minor parties do not "bootstrap their
way to major-party status" by attaching their labels to popular major-
party candidates. 33 Finally, the Court noted that Minnesota had a
valid interest in the stability of its political system that warranted en-
25 Id.
26 See id. at 1370-71.
27 Id. at 1371.
28 "This is a predictive judgment which is by no means self-evident." Id. The Chief Justice
pointed to Minnesota's Farmer-Labor Party, which prospered during the 193oS despite the exis-
tence of a fusion ban. See id. at 1369 & n.5, I37i n.g.
29 Id. at 1371.
30 Id. at 1372 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992), and id. at 44S (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
31 See id.
32 Id. at 1373.
33 Id.
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acting "reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the
traditional two-party system. '34
Justice Stevens dissented.35 First, Justice Stevens argued that the
fusion ban severely burdened the New Party's associational rights be-
cause "the right to be on the election ballot is precisely what separates
a political party from any other interest group. '36  Second, Justice
Stevens contended that, even if the burden were minor, Minnesota had
"failed to explain how the ban actually serves [its] asserted interests. '37
Justice Stevens described the possibility of single-issue parties turning
the ballot into a billboard as "fantastical,"38 and concluded that, "once
the State has established a standard for achieving party status, forbid-
ding an acknowledged party from putting on the ballot its chosen can-
didate clearly frustrates core associational rights."39 Finally, Justice
Stevens rejected the comparison of fusion bans to first-past-the-post
voting and single-member districts. Justice Stevens contended that the
latter two do not impinge directly on associational rights and are more
closely related to the acceptable goal of political stability.40
All election regulations inhibit the association of political parties to
some extent,41 either by prohibiting certain modes of association or by
structuring the electoral system in a manner that makes some modes of
association less likely to be successful. However, all elections require
rules.42  The Court has attempted to discern which of these rules "im-
pose constitutionally suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or
to choose among candidates."43 In Anderson, the Court recognized
34 Id. at 1374. In separate dissents, Justices Stevens and Souter argued that the Court could
not consider this rationale because Minnesota did not present this argument in its briefs and ex-
pressly rejected it at oral argument. See id. at 1379 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1381-82
(Souter, J., dissenting). But see Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1374 n.ao (disagreeing with Justices Ste-
vens and Souter). When asked whether he was arguing that states have an interest in preserving
the two-party system, petitioner's counsel said, "I didn't make that point, and in honesty I don't
make that point strongly." ranscript of Oral Argument, Timmons (No. 95-i6o8), available in
1996 WL 709359, at *26 (Dec. 4, r996).
35 Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens's dissent in full. Justice Souter joined Justice Ste-
vens's dissent in part, but wrote separately to state his unwillingness to follow Justice Stevens in
rejecting "the majority's 'preservation of the two-party system' rationale." Timmons, I17 S. Ct. at
1382 (Souter, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 1377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 1377-78.
38 See id. at 1378 n.3.
39 Id. at 1378-79.
40 See id. at 138o (noting that, although first-past-the-post voting may make it more difficult
for third parties to win, it "does not deprive them of the right to try," and that single-member dis-
tricts protect against the factionalism normally associated with proportional representation).
41 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
42 See id. (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
43 Id. The Anderson Court stated that no "litmus-paper test" would differentiate valid from
invalid restrictions, and that the analysis would require "hard judgments." Id. at 789-90 (quoting
Storer, 415 U.S. at 730) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, as the Court correctly
noted in Timmons, an analysis of the constitutional validity of fusion bans does not require an
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two categories of rules: substantially burdensome regulations, which
receive strict scrutiny, and minimally burdensome regulations, which
trigger a "less exacting review."44 Accordingly, to uphold an election
regulation under Anderson, a court must find either that the state's in-
terests are compelling and that the regulation is narrowly tailored, or
that the burden is minimal. In Timmons, however, neither of the first
category's two criteria was satisfied. Therefore, for Minnesota's fusion
ban to pass constitutional muster, it had to fall within the minimal
burden category. However, Minnesota's fusion ban, like any other, ef-
fectively denies minor parties the opportunity to have the full measure
of their support officially counted through ballot laws that permit fu-
sion with disaggregation - a burden that is anything but minimal.4s
More broadly, the Anderson analysis neglects a third possible cate-
gory of rules: substantially burdensome regulations that are not subject
to strict scrutiny. Had the Court allowed for this possibility in Ander-
son, it could have accepted in Timmons that fusion bans impose severe
burdens on third parties and held that they are constitutional, without
treating the interests that Minnesota asserted as compelling or the law
as narrowly tailored. Further, fusion bans would not be the first type
of severely burdensome restriction to receive less exacting scrutiny.
Single-member districts and first-past-the-post voting burden political
association in systematic ways, because political association must take
shape in light of those rules.46 However, the Court subjects neither
first-past-the-post voting nor single-member districts to strict scru-
tiny,47 and a fusion ban, as Justice Breyer noted, "doesn't go nearly as
assessment of the "policy-based arguments concerning the wisdom of fusion." Timmons, I17 S.
Ct. at 1375.
44 Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1370.
45 Admittedly, the burden that fusion bans impose differs from the burdens imposed by laws
struck down in prior Supreme Court cases addressing the associational rights of political parties.
See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 217 (i989) (re-
garding a California law that prohibited the governing bodies of political parties from endorsing
candidates during primary elections); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 2o-ii (I986)
(regarding a Connecticut law that prevented voters affiliated with no party from voting in the
Republican primary despite the Republican Party's willingness to allow them to vote); Anderson,
460 U.S. at 782-83 (regarding an Ohio law that barred independent candidates for President from
appearing on the ballot if they failed to file a nominating petition by March 20 of the election
year). Fusion bans, however, do significantly alter the manner in which political parties can asso-
ciate. For example, fusion bans force two parties that wish to be affiliated to choose between a
formal merger and an informal alliance. The parties are thus denied the opportunity to form
temporary, but formal, alliances through which each party could be credited with official regis-
tered support.
46 Justices Scalia and Breyer made similar points at oral argument. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, Timmons (No. 95-i6o8), available in i996 WL 709359, at *39-*40 (Dec. 4, i996); see
also RAE, supra note 3, at 93-96 (concluding that the combination of first-past-the-post elections
and single-member districts is most conducive to a two-party system).
47 See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, i59-6o (97r). Given the variety of voting and
districting systems used in stable democracies throughout the world, see Arend Lijphart & Ber-
nard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES
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far as the single member district .... [or] first past the post" in im-
posing limitations on the effective political association of third par-
ties.48
Moreover, an examination of fusion demonstrates that the three
regulations structure the electoral system in similar ways.49 A right to
fusion "must rely on the argument that endorsement alone is simply
insufficient to effectuate a party's right to associate with a candidate;
actually listing the party's support on the ballot must make the consti-
tutional difference." 0 The strongest argument for the constitutional
significance of listing a party's support of a candidate on the ballot
proceeds from the benefits of disaggregation, because fusion without
disaggregation is nearly worthless to minor parties and their support-
ers.5 ' Without disaggregation, minor parties receive no credit toward
achieving major-party status for votes cast on behalf of the fusion can-
didate they endorse,5 2 or even for providing the margin of victory for
the major-party candidate.5 3 Similarly, without disaggregation, minor-
party voters are disadvantaged because, by voting for a minor party's
fusion candidate with a chance of victory, they ensure that their sup-
port for their party is not officially counted.
Fusion with disaggregation removes these difficulties for minor
parties and their supporters. Contrary to the Court's suggestion,5 4
however, fusion does not allow a minor party to bootstrap its way to
major-party status. Fusion with disaggregation should actually pro-
AND ALTERNATIVES 3, 4-8 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984), it is far from obvious
that any particular system could be characterized as advancing compelling state interests or as
being narrowly tailored.
48 Transcript of Oral Argument, Timmons (No. 95-i6o8), available in 1996 WL 709359, at *46-
*47 (Dec. 4, i996).
49 But see Timmons, i17 S. Ct. at 138o (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with this argu-
ment).
50 Note, supra note 6, at 1316. Although political speech and association are at the core of the
First Amendment, see Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, ii6 S. Ct. 2309, 2316
(1996) (plurality opinion), individuals' rights to express their political views in the context of an
election are limited, see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992) (upholding Hawaii's
ban on write-in voting against a First Amendment challenge). As political parties are collections
of citizens and possess associational rights only insofar as their members possess them, see, e.g.,
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214-15
(1986); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. i89, 193 (1986), parties' constitutional rights of
association similarly end at verbal endorsement of candidates.
S1 See Brief for Respondent at 26-30, Timmons (No. 95-i6o8), available in 1996 WL 501955.
For a definition of fusion with disaggregation, see note 6, above.
S2 After the Eighth Circuit's decision in McKenna, Minnesota passed a law allowing fusion.
See Act of Apr. 2, 1996, ch. 419, x996 Minn. Laws 979 (codified in pertinent part at MiNN. STAT.
§§ 200.02, 204B (1996), unless and until McKenna is reversed, in which case the amendments ex-
pire). Under this law, however, votes for a fusion candidate would not have been credited to the
minor party in "determining whether a minor political party should become a major political
party." MRfIN. STAT. § 200.02(7)(2) (expired Apr. 28, i997).
53 Cf. Kirschner, supra note 7, at 683 (listing several famous major-party candidates who won
important elections with the minor-party support they received as fusion candidates).
54 See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1373.
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vide a more reliable indicator of a minor party's support because it
eliminates the wasted vote dilemma, which leads some voters to sup-
port major-party candidates in order to influence the outcome of the
election, rather than voting for a preferable minor-party candidate who
has no chance of winning.5s Therefore, fusion with disaggregation al-
lows voters both to express their true party preference officially and to
influence the outcome of the election.
Yet premising the right to fusion on the ability of disaggregation to
alleviate the wasted vote problem proves too much. Many other elec-
toral reforms, such as proportional voting or multimember districts,
would also alleviate the wasted vote problem and thereby benefit third
parties. Fusion cannot be distinguished from these reforms on associa-
tional grounds, because whatever burdens one could claim a fusion
ban imposes on parties are also imposed on individual voters by first-
past-the-post voting and single-member districts. In a system gov-
erned by these rules, both parties and voters face the choice of sup-
porting either their second-choice candidate or the candidate that they
prefer, but at the cost of not nominating anyone or wasting their vote,
respectively.
Moreover, minor parties cannot claim a right to nonconsensual fu-
sion.5 6 Thus, a fusion ban prevents only those combinations that a
major party also desires. Should the major parties find the long-term
benefits of fusion - or multimember districts or proportional repre-
sentation, for that matter - to outweigh any destabilization that could
occur as a result of those reforms, then the state, that is, the major par-
ties at any given time,57 will enact those reforms.58 Although it may
seem strange that the major parties in a two-party system are constitu-
tionally permitted to prefer a two-party democracy to a multiparty
democracy,5 9 to believe otherwise calls into question the long-accepted
structure of the American electoral system. 60 Therefore, all three
regulations substantially affect political association, because each pro-
55 See Note, Parties, PACs, and Campaign Finance, iio HARv. L. REV. '573, 1586-87 & n.75
(x997).
S6 The right of an individual to decline a party nomination should render bans of nonconsen-
sual fusion wholly uncontroversial. See Stewart v. Taylor, 104 F3d 965, 972 (7th Cir. '997).
57 State legislation, of course, "is enacted by men and women who have been elected to office
as Republicans or Democrats." Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Association Rights of Major Political
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1741, 1756 (1993). There is, therefore, an obvious
"conflict of interest inherent in providing politicians the power to create the electoral laws by
which they are elected." Benjamin D. Black, Note, Developments in the State Regulation of Ma-
jor and Minor Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1O9, io9 (1996). Yet a multiparty democ-
racy is no less vulnerable to this problem, because the election rules in all political systems ulti-
mately must be enacted by those people previously elected.
5S8 See Lowenstein, supra note 57, at x79o; see also Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1375 ('It may well
be that, as support for new political parties increases, these [pro-fusion] arguments will carry the
day in some States' legislatures.").
59 See Timmons, I17 S. Ct. at 1374.
60 See id. at 1371.
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vides a strong incentive for political association to occur through two
major parties. Yet each regulation also plays an integral part in the
necessary process of ordering the conduct of elections.
The foregoing argument demonstrates an analytical limitation of
the Anderson test and advances a modification to that test that would
enable the Court to acknowledge the serious burdens imposed by fu-
sion bans - and by first-past-the-post voting and single-member dis-
tricts - without subjecting them to strict scrutiny.61 However, three
arguments against fusion bans, grounded in other areas of the Court's
jurisprudence, remain.
First, a critic could argue that fusion bans result in the unconstitu-
tional denial of voting cues.6 2 In Rosen v. Brown,63 the Sixth Circuit
struck down a law that allowed Democratic and Republican candi-
dates to be identified as such on the ballot, but prohibited placement
of the designation "Independent" under a non-party-affiliated candi-
date's name.64 Thus, major-party voters received a "cue" in the voting
booth, but minor-party voters did not. Similarly, in Lubin v. Panish,65
the Supreme Court suggested that allowing indigent candidates to run
only as write-ins would not constitute a "reasonable alternative means
of ballot access '66 because the write-in candidate "would be forced to
rest his chances solely upon those voters who would remember his
name and take the affirmative step of writing it on the ballot. '67
The argument that fusion bans deny minor-party voters voting
cues, however, misreads the constitutional interests at stake in Lubin
and Rosen.6s Fusion bans neither prohibit parties from securing a la-
beled place, nor prevent their preferred candidates from appearing, on
the ballot. Instead, they simply limit each candidate to one political
61 A critic might respond that this argument merely shifts the terms of the debate from sub-
stantial-minimal to structural-nonstructural, without altering the nature of that debate. Although
the line between structural and nonstructural regulations is unclear, it does exist. If first-past-the-
post voting is taken as the paradigmatic example of a structural regulation, then a decision to ban
the Communist Party can be seen as an equally paradigmatic example of a substantially burden-
some nonstructural regulation.
62 See Note, supra note 6, at 1316-i9. For example, voting cues allow "a voter affiliated with
the Democratic Party [who] walks into a voting booth [to] look for the Democratic candidate, and
pull the lever." Id. at i36-I7. The cue eliminates the need for voters to remember a candidate's
name when voting.
63 970 F.2d i69 (6th Cir. 1992).
64 See id. at 174, 177-78.
65 415 U.S. 709 (x974).
66 Id. at 718. Lubin involved a California law that prevented potential candidates who could
not pay the filing fee from appearing on the ballot or running as write-in candidates. See id.
67 Id. at 719 n.5.
68 In Lubin, the Court criticized California's decision to choose "means which can operate to
exclude some potentially serious candidates from the ballot without providing them with any al-
ternative means of coming before the voters." Id. at 718. In Rosen, the Sixth Circuit focused on
the fact that the lack of any party designation would impair the ability to vote meaningfully,
making it "virtually impossible for Independent candidates to prevail in the general election."
Rosen, 970 F.2d at 176.
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label - the candidate must choose the voting cue he prefers. 69 Al-
though candidates who wish to be elected will usually choose the ma-
jor-party cue, a popular candidate, such as Colin Powell or Ross Perot,
might prefer a third-party candidacy to maintain his independence
from the established parties.70 Accordingly, fusion bans deny voting
cues to minor-party voters only to the extent that candidates willing to
represent both a major and a minor party prefer to appear on the bal-
lot next to the major party's label when forced to choose between
them.71
Second, a critic could point to the historical purposes underlying
the enactment of fusion bans72 and argue that fusion bans are among
the "unreasonably exclusionary restrictions" that states may not use to
support the two-party system. 73 The difficulty with this argument,
even conceding that states enacted fusion bans to entrench one party
in power,74 is that the Court has upheld far more burdensome laws. 75
Third, a critic could claim that fusion bans are unconstitutional pa-
ternalistic protections of "political parties from the consequences of
their own internal disagreements." 76 However, fusion bans are more
properly viewed as a solution to the problem of "time inconsistency of
preference," which is found when behavior that "is desirable ex post
may be undesirable ex ante - a recognition implicit in Ulysses' deci-
sion to have himself tied to the mast of his ship to avoid being tempted
69 Depending on the fusion ban statute, the candidate must choose his preferred party label
either before accepting one nomination or after accepting both. Compare, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2-137 (1993) (requiring a candidate to run under the label of the first party to file a notice of
candidacy), MINN. STAT. § 2o4B.o6(I)(b) (r994) (same), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-xoI(f)(5)
(Supp. igg) (same), with IOWA CODE § 49.39 (I997) (allowing multiple nominations of a candi-
date but requiring the candidate to choose one party label to appear on the ballot), Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 118.335 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (same), and Mo. REV. STAT. § II5.35I (1994) (same).
70 See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, It Time for a Third Party. But We Won't Get One, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1995, at A23; Paul Tsongas, The Center Holds Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1o, 1995,
§ 4, at 13.
71 Considerations of electoral viability and ideological compatibility can influence both the
desire for fusion, if fusion is permitted, and the choice of the major-party label, if fusion is barred.
A would-be fusion candidate, for example, could feel more ideologically compatible with the ma-jor party and choose its label for that reason. Conversely, an opportunistic major-party candidate
may desire fusion to get elected, but not feel any ideological connection to the minor party.
72 See Peter H. Argersinger, "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85
AM. HIsT. REV. 287, 295-98 (xg8o) (arguing that the purpose of antifusion statutes was to protect
Republican candidates against alliances between Democratic candidates and minor parties).
73 Timmons, 17 S. Ct. at 1374.
74 But see id. at 1368-69 (describing the history of the enactment of fusion bans as a part of
the "election-related reforms" following the fraud-plagued 1888 presidential election).
75 See id. at 1375 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)). Storer precluded "any person
affiliated with a party at any time during the year leading up to the primary election ... from
appearing on the ballot as an independent or as the candidate of another party." Id.
76 Id. at 1374 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 227
(1989), and Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 2o8, 224 (1986)).
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by the Sirens' song."77 Major parties have a long-term interest in ban-
ning fusion, because third-party candidates tend to draw votes from
their ideologically nearest competitors.7 8 Therefore, even if fusion with
an ideologically similar party is in a major party's short-term interest
in any given election, strengthening that minor party will harm the
major party more in the long term. With fusion bans, thus, the major
parties are "tied to the mast" and are prevented from giving in to their
short-term interest in winning the present election.7 9
The Court reached the correct result in Timmons by permitting
more than forty states to maintain their fusion bans. However, the
Court's analysis in Anderson hindered its analysis in Timmons, not
only leading the Court erroneously to describe fusion bans as negligi-
bly burdening political parties' associational rights, but also leading it
to overstate the importance of some specious state interests.80 A more
nuanced variation of Anderson would reject any direct relationship be-
tween the amount of burden imposed and the level of scrutiny applied
and instead recognize that the rules that structure the system of elec-
tions and political parties can be among the most burdensome restric-
tions of political association - and the most necessary.
2. Commercial Speech - Compelled Advertising. - Disagreements
regarding content-neutrality' and the appropriate degree of protection
for commercial speech 2 are noteworthy instances of the Supreme Court
dividing over how much First Amendment protection should be given
to a particular form of expression. In recent years, the Court has
rarely split over whether an activity falls within the ambit of the First
Amendment.3 Last Term, however, in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
77 Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modi-
fication, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 210 (1997).
78 See Note, supra note 55, at 1587 & n.76.
79 If a major party decides that fusion is in, or at least that fusion is not clearly against, its
long-term interest, it can always change the law. See Lowenstein, supra note 57, at 1790.
80 See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1373 (accepting the arguments that single-issue parties might
turn the ballot into a billboard and that fusion with disaggregation allows minor parties to boot-
strap themselves to major-party status).
The Court, however, did not rely on the voter-confusion argument that Minnesota raised at
oral argument, see id. at 1375 n.13. This argument is dubious given New York's considerable
experience with fusion, see supra note 8, unless one accepts Justice Scalia's "facetious" suggestion
that "New Yorkers are smarter," IYanscript of Oral Argument, Timmons (No. 95-i6o8), available
in 1996 WL 709359, at *7-*23 (Dec. 4, i996).
1 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658-59, 676, 681 (1994) (revealing
strong disagreement among the Justices regarding whether the "must-carry" provision of the 1992
Cable Act was a content-based restriction requiring strict scrutiny or merely a content-neutral
measure calling for intermediate scrutiny).
2 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 1i6 S. Ct. 1495, ISI5-20 (I996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
3 But see Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 8o6 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (disputing the Court's application of First Amendment analysis to a statute regulating
professional fundraisers).
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Elliott, Inc.,4 the Court held that a program requiring California fruit
growers, handlers, and processors to pay for collective generic adver-
tising did not implicate the First Amendment.5 In order to justify
placing the advertising outside the protections of the First Amend-
ment, the majority relied on three previously unseen distinctions that
are in significant tension with the Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence. Although which, if any, of these three doctrinal distinctions
takes hold will depend on lower court interpretations of the Glickman
decision, the Court's insertion of these new tests leaves room for lower
courts to restrict unduly the extent of First Amendment protection.
In 1987, California peach and nectarine handlers filed a petition
challenging regulations contained in the marketing orders promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937.6 The regulations authorized collective adver-
tising that required contributions from each handler of certain Califor-
nia fruits. 7 The handlers challenged the regulations as compelled
speech in violation of the First Amendment.8 After an adverse ad-
ministrative ruling, the handlers sought review in a federal district
court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of
Agriculture. 9 The handlers, along with growers and processors of
California fruits, appealed. 10
The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and remanded," holding that
the forced assessments for generic advertising violated the First
Amendment. 12 The Ninth Circuit relied principally on Cal-Almond,
Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture,13 which was circuit
precedent that interpreted Abood v. Detroit Board of Education14 to
establish that the First Amendment "includes a right not to be com-
pelled to render financial support for others' speech."' s Applying the
test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,'6 the court concluded that the forced advertising did not
4 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
S See id. at 2142.
6 See Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 E3d 1367, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing, inter
alia, 7 U.S.C. §§ 602(I), 6og(c)(6)-(7) (1994), and 7 C.I.R §§ 916.45, 917.39).
7 See id. at 1372.
8 See id.
9 See id. at 1374.
10 See id. at 1372.
" See id. at 1386.
12 See id. at 138o. The Ninth Circuit rejected the appellants' claims that the advertising pro-
gram violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See id. at 1376-77.
13 14 F.3d 429 (gth Cir. 1993), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
14 431 U.S. 209 (1977). In Abood, the Court struck down a union's use of contributions for
political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining. See id. at 235-36.
Is Wileman Bros., 58 F3d at 1377 (citing Cal-Almond, 14 F.3d at 435). Although the speech at
issue in Abood was political, see Abood, 432 U.S. at 229-30, the Ninth Circuit held that "[tihis is
also true when commercial speech is at issue," Wileman Bros., 58 E3d at 1377.16 447 U.S. 557 (i98o).
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directly advance the government's interest and was not narrowly tai-
lored.17
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.18
Writing for the Court, 19 Justice Stevens held that the regulations did
not call for First Amendment scrutiny.20 The Court began by de-
scribing the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,21 which
created a regime premised on collective action within several agricul-
tural markets.2 2 The Court noted that the marketing orders providing
for collective advertising had to be approved by either two-thirds of
the affected producers or by producers who market at least two-thirds
of the total volume of the product. Therefore, the Court presumed
that the advertising served the fruit producers' and handlers' "com-
mon interest. 23
The Court then stated that three characteristics of the case demon-
strated that the dispute was "simply a question of economic policy for
Congress and the Executive to resolve."24 First, the Court held that
the marketing orders did not limit the ability of producers to commu-
nicate any message they desired through individualized advertising. 25
Second, the Court proclaimed that the program did not compel any ac-
tual or symbolic speech.2 6 Third, the regulations did not force the
producers to sponsor any ideological or political viewpoints.2 7 Further,
the Court assumed - over the respondents' objections - that the
handlers agreed with the "central message" of the advertising.28 Char-
acterizing the objections to the advertisements as vague, meritless, and
trivial,29 the Court determined that the complaints had "no bearing on
the validity of the entire program."30 Therefore, the Court maintained,
there was no support in its First Amendment jurisprudence for apply-
ing a different level of scrutiny to the advertising regulations than that
17 See Wileman Bros., 58 F.3d at 1380.
18 See Glickman, I17 S. Ct. at 2142.
19 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the majority opinion.
20 See Glickman, I17 S. Ct. at 2137.
21 7 U.S.C. §§ 6oi-659 (1994).
22 See Glickman, I17 S. Ct. at 2134.
23 Id. at 2135.
24 Id. at 2138.
25 See id. The Court pointed out that, in the present case, the government did not ban any
speech as it did in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557 (ig8o), and subsequent commercial speech cases. See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2138 n.I2.
26 See Glickman, xx7 S. Ct. at 2138. The Court stated that this element distinguished the case
from its compelled speech precedents such as Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (977), and West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (943). See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2138
n.13.
27 See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2138.
28 Id.
29 See id. at 2137-39 & nn.io-Ii.
30 Id. at 2137.
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applicable to the other components of the anticompetitive regulatory
regime governing the fruit industry.31
The Court chided the Ninth Circuit for relying on compelled
speech precedent, because the regulations at issue "merely required
[the respondents] to make contributions for advertising." 32 However,
the Court did acknowledge that "[a]lthough this regulatory scheme
may not compel speech as recognized by our case law," Abood was
relevant because the regulations mandated financial contributions for
advertising.33 Yet the Court refused to read Abood to "announce a
broad First Amendment right not to be compelled to provide financial
support for any organization that conducts expressive activities."34
"Rather, Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not
being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive ac-
tivities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief,"' which was not present
in the instant case.35 The Court asserted that Abood required the
Ninth Circuit to question only whether the compelled advertising was
germane to the purposes of the marketing orders. 36
The Court also argued that the program's requirement that the ma-
jority of the producers in each market had to approve the program en-
sured that the program furthered the producers' interests.37
"[D]ecisions that are made by the majority," the Court stated, "if ac-
ceptable for other regulatory programs, should be equally so for pro-
motional advertising."3 8
Justice Souter dissented.39 He objected both to the Court's treat-
ment of the program as bereft of a "discernible element of speech" and
to its application of a germaneness test.4 0 Justice Souter distinguished
the components of the program involving "undoubtedly valid, non-
speech elements," which were subject only to rational basis review,
from the component requiring the subsidization of speech, which was
31 See id. at 2138. In addition, the Court quickly disposed of the respondents' argument that
the assessments for collective advertising violated the First Amendment by limiting their ability to
engage in individualized advertising. Such an argument, the Court noted, would equally apply to
virtually any regulation. See id. at 2138-39. "The fact that an economic regulation may indi-
rectly lead to a reduction in a handler's individual advertising budget," the Court explained, "does
not itself amount to a restriction on speech." Id. at 2 139.
32 Id. The Court noted that the advertising was attributed only to the collective association,
and not to the individual dissenting growers, handlers, and producers. See id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 2140.
37 See id. at 2141-42.
38 Id. at 2142.
39 See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice
Souter's dissent. See id. Justice Thomas joined Justice Souter's dissent except with respect to
Justice Souter's application of the Central Hudson test. See id. at 2x55 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent. See id.
40 Id. at 2142 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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subject to First Amendment scrutiny.41 Refusing .to accept a test for
compelled commercial speech different from that used for government
restrictions on commercial speech, Justice Souter would have required
that the assessments be "reasonably necessary" to the implementation
of the government program.42
At the outset, Justice Souter set forth two "basic principles of First
Amendment law."43 First, all speech is subject to some level of First
Amendment protection unless it is within an unprotected category of
speech, such as obscenity." Second, "compelling cognizable speech of-
ficially is just as suspect as suppressing it, and is typically subject to
the same level of scrutiny."4 Further, he stated that advertising is not
merely a tool to "provide objective information about a product's
availability or price."46 Rather, as Justice Souter explained, the chal-
lenged advertising was expressive and "exploit[ed] all the symbolic and
emotional techniques ... with messages often far removed from simple
proposals to sell fruit."47
Justice Souter then took issue with the majority's reading of
Abood.45  He contended that the majority erroneously extracted a ger-
maneness test from Abood, which is "not nearly so permissive." 49 Jus-
tice Souter argued that the Abood Court upheld the use of compelled.
fees for nonideological union activities only because the fees were rea-
sonably necessary to the government's important objective of main-
taining the opportunity for a union shop.50 However, Justice Souter
asserted, Abood did not imply that if "government neither forbids
speech nor attributes it to an objector," it may compel subsidization for
nonideological speech.5 ' In addition, Justice Souter disputed the
Court's finding that the respondents did not actually disagree with the
challenged advertising, an assumption that he labeled as "doubtful"
and "beside the point even if true."5 2
Turning to the governmental interests involved, Justice Souter
maintained that if the Court had applied the Central Hudson test, it
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2143.
44 See id.
4s Id. at 2144. Justice Souter noted the previous statements of the Court that the "difference
between compelled speech and compelled silence ... is without constitutional significance," Riley
v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (x988), and that "involuntary affirma-
tion c[an] be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence," West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (943). See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2144
(Souter, J., dissenting).
46 Glickman, 117 S. CL at 2144 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47 Id.
48 See id. at 2345.
49 Id.
SO See id. at 2145-46.
sl Id. at 2147.
52 Id. at 2147-48 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 339 U.S. 624, 635 (1943)).
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would have been forced to strike down the advertising program.53 He
asserted that the history of the regulations showed that the advertising
was not a response to an apparent need in particular markets, but was
instead the product of interest group lobbying.,54 Justice Souter de-
scribed the Act's authorization of advertising for twenty-five com-
modities as "so random and so randomly implemented ... as to unset-
lie any inference that the Government's asserted interest is either
substantial or even real."55 Although responding to interest groups
might generally be permissible, Justice Souter asserted that "when
speech is at stake, the government fails to carry its burden of showing
a substantial interest when it does nothing more than refer to a 'con-
sensus' within a limited interest group that wants the regulation. 5 6
The Glickman majority and dissent reflect two distinct approaches
to First Amendment coverage. Justice Stevens's majority opinion fo-
cused on avoiding the Court's precedent by relying on factual distinc-
tions.5 7 In contrast, Justice Souter started with the assumption that
the First Amendment protects all speech unless there are persuasive
reasons for locating it within one of the narrow categories of unpro-
tected speech.58 The preferable approach to deciding First Amend-
ment coverage, which resembles Justice Souter's, is to presume that
"all communication is covered by the first amendment and exclude a
subcategory of commercial advertising only if it could be shown to be
unrelated to the purposes of a principle of freedom of speech," thus
avoiding the dangers of underinclusiveness.5 9 Unfortunately, rather
than adopting this approach, Glickman may signal a newly restrictive
approach to First Amendment coverage.
Glickman's result is startling because in the 1995 Term the Court
appeared to be leaning toward increasing constitutional protection for
commercial speech. 60 Conversely, Glickman widens the gap between
the relative protections afforded political and commercial speech, fur-
53 See id. at 2149-53.
54 Seeid. at 2151.
55 Id. at 2150.
56 Id. at 2152. Even if the government could satisfy Central Hudson's requirement of a sub-
stantial government interest, Justice Souter found no evidence in the record to suggest that the
advertising program directly advanced the government's interest and suggested that voluntary
advertising might be just as effective. See id. at 2153-54.
S7 See Glickman, 117 S. Ct at 2138 & nn.12-i4 (distinguishing the relevant cases).
58 See id. at 2 143 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reciting "basic principles of First Amendment law").
59 Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 265, 281 (ig98). This approach requires a definition of communication. Certainly a literal
interpretation of communication would be too expansive, including many acts often assumed to
be beyond the scope of the First Amendment. See id. at 270.
60 See Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 553, 56o (1997) (stating that
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, x16 S. Ct. 1495 (x996), four Justices "explicitly adopted
the view that the protection given commercial speech, in most cases, would approach the stringent
level of protection afforded traditional categories of expression") (footnote omitted).
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ther subordinating the latter.61 Although compelled speech has always
been understood to be equivalent to speech restriction,62 the Court has
departed from this symmetry in the commercial speech context. Simi-
larly, although Buckley v. Valeo 63 established that paying for political
advertisements is a form of protected speech,64 Glickman announced
that paying for commercial advertising is not speech at all.65 The
Court made no attempt to explain these disjunctions. 66  It seems
anomalous for the Court to protect advertising when government tries
to restrict it, but abandon it as nonspeech when government compels
it.67
To justify its decision not to apply First Amendment scrutiny, the
Court introduced three new tests. 68 First, the Court suggested an ac-
tual disagreement test that may prove to be impractical in application.
Until Glickman, the Court had unquestioningly accepted objecting
parties' claims that they disagreed with particular speech. 69  The
Glickman Court failed to recognize that belief and disagreement are
inherently internal matters and that judges possess a limited ability to
61 Commercial speech has generally been subject to "second-class" protection. See R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
62 See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2144 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, S15 U.S. 557 (1995); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc.,
487 U.S. 781 (1988); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (977); and West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
63 424 U.S. 1(976) (per curiam).
64 The Buckley Court stated that "this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or
to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." Id. at 16 (citing Bigelow v.
Virginia, 422 U.S. 8og, 820 (1975)). Further, the Court held that both the contribution and the
expenditure limits at issue in Buckley "implicate[d] fundamental First Amendment interests." Id.
at 23.
65 See Glickman, 117 S. CL at 2139.
66 A theoretical basis is a "necessary precondition to the conclusion that any category of
speech, including commercial speech, is not at the core of the First Amendment." Frederick
Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv.
i18i, x185 (x988). Glickman's lack of a clear theoretical underpinning is consistent with the
Court's usual disposition of commercial speech cases. See Redish, supra note 6o, at 554.
67 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrruToNAL LAW § 12-15, at 893 & n.21 (2d
ed. 2988) (stating that just as Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977), held that the government could not ban "For Sale" signs (a form of commercial speech),
"[p]resumably, the township could not compel homeowners to show such signs" (citing Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (I977))).
68 A close examination of Justice Stevens's writings indicates that he may not have intended
these distinctions to constitute new rules of First Amendment jurisprudence, but rather intended
to dispose of Glickman based on its facts. See John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 202
YALE L.J. 1293, 1307 (2993) (eschewing "black-letter or bright-line rules of First Amendment law"
because they only "obfuscatfe] the specific facts at issue and interests at stake in a given case").
However, it is far from certain that lower courts will be either familiar with or faithful to Justice
Stevens's approach.
69 See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2148 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he requirement of disagreement
finds no legal warrant in our compelled-speech cases.") (citing Riley v. National Fed'n of the
Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797-78 (1988)).
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assess them. Such an understanding has led courts to tread lightly in
assessing the sincerity of religious beliefs when adjudicating First
Amendment free exercise claims. 70 Courts should be similarly wary
about second-guessing parties' claims of disagreement in the free
speech context. 71
Second, in language more definite than that contained in its discus-
sion of actual disagreement, the Court stated that compelled speech
must be political or ideological to warrant First Amendment protec-
tion.72  This test represents another departure from precedent. Al-
though the Justices have at times suggested that political speech is the
epitome of protected speech, 73 the Court had never previously identi-
fied political or ideological expression as the boundary of the First
Amendment. Indeed, the Court has consistently expanded the scope of
the First Amendment to embrace nonpolitical speech and expressive
activities once thought to be beyond its coverage. 74  In contrast to
Glickman's restriction of protection to only political or ideological ex-
pression, Abood stated that "[n]othing in the First Amendment or our
cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective
'political' can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitu-
tional inquiry."7 5
Another objection to Glickman's political or ideological test is that
the line between political and commercial speech lacks clarity.76 Many
70 See TRIBE, supra note 67, § 14-12, at 1245 (referring to courts' inquiries into the sincerity of
the beliefs of religious objectors as "extraordinarily dangerous").
71 Admittedly, courts assess state of mind when they inquire into intent or motive, but they
often do so by referring to objective standards.
72 See Glickman, 117 S. CL at 2139.
73 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[Political speech occupies the highest, most protected position."); Jef I. Richards,
Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1147, 1162 (X996) ("Although the First
Amendment makes no explicit distinction between one form of speech and another, the Court has
created a hierarchy in the protection afforded different types of speech.").
74 See Glickman, 117 S. CL at 2156 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the First Amend-
ment protects symbolic speech, including public sleeping and nude dancing); Abood v. Detroit Ed.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) ("[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about philo-
sophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters - to take a nonexhaustive list of
labels - is not entitled to full First Amendment protection."). The Court has suggested that
commercial advertising in particular possesses an expressive component that qualifies for First
Amendment protection. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1504
(1996) (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history
.... Indeed, commercial messages played such a central role ... [before] the Founding that Ben-
jamin Franklin authored his early defense of a free press in support of his decision to print, of all
things, an advertisement for voyages to Barbados.") (citation omitted); City of Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,422 n.17 (1993).
75 Abood, 431 U.S. at 232.
76 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 6o, at 558 (referring to "the artificiality of the commercial
speech distinction"). But see Schauer, supra note 66, at 1189 (arguing that "the lack of a clear
line" between categories does not "render[] a distinction incoherent"). Despite the difficulty of
drawing the distinction, the Court has often suggested that doing so is facile. See, e.g., United
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advertisements subtly incorporate political or ideological messages 77
that may not be readily apparent to courts. Glickman would allow
courts to prohibit government from compelling obviously political ad-
vertising. 78 In some instances, however, courts could allow compelled
advertising because of the Glickman Court's unwillingness to look be-
yond the surface of "commercial" advertising and see the elements of
objectionable expression interwoven with the commercial message. In
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group,79 Justice
Souter wrote that "a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional pro-
tection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit
their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter
of the speech."80 Lower courts could plausibly interpret the Glickman
opinion to imply that all advertising that has a commercial "central
message" lacks the requisite political or ideological content to trigger
First Amendment protection. Certainly, all categories require the
Court to draw lines that are indubitably vague. But the danger pro-
duced by an indeterminate line between commercial and political
speech is greater when the commercial label is used not to reduce the
level of First Amendment scrutiny, but to foreclose First Amendment
protection altogether.
Moreover, lower courts could read Glickman to foreclose First
Amendment protection of nonpolitical or nonideological advertising
even when there is actual disagreement about the advertising's con-
tent."' Increasingly advertisers are utilizing controversial, eye-catching
imagery8 2 that - although not overtly political - may be equally ob-
jectionable. But if Justice Souter's interpretation of the majority's
analysis - that the critical requirement is that speech must be politi-
cal or ideological, regardless whether there is actual disagreement8 3 -
States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (referring to the "common sense" distinction
between commercial and political speech).
77 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L.
REv. 697, 711-12 (1993) (discussing advertising's coopting of patriotic sentiment and political im-
agery from the women's movement and the black power movement); see also id. at 715 (describ-
ing ads using religious imagery).
78 However, Glickman may not ensure the prohibition of all compelled political advertising
because the Court implied that in addition to being political in nature, the speech must not be
germane to an otherwise legitimate program in order to be protected. See Glickman, i17 S. CL at
2145 & n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79 515 U.S. 557 (i995).
80 Id. at 569-70.
81 Because of the complexity of assessing personal disagreement, courts may synthesize the
actual disagreement and political or ideological tests into a per se rule that certain types of speech
are too neutral to be objectionable.
82 See Collins & Skover, supra note 77, at 738-39 (describing advertisements featuring a
woman unzipping a man's pants and a man raising his middle finger in an obscene gesture).
83 See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2147 (Souter, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority's rule that
government "may compel subsidization for any objectionable message that is not political or
ideological").
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is correct, then government may be constitutionally able to compel
nonpolitical but clearly objectionable speech.
Third, in concluding that the compelled advertising was constitu-
tional, the Court looked to the fact that the respondents were com-
pelled to fund advertising "as part of a broader collective enterprise in
which their freedom to act independently is already constrained by the
regulatory scheme."84 Thus, the Court implied that the fact that a ma-
jority of the members of a heavily regulated industry approves of a
challenged regulation may factor into the decision whether to apply
the First Amendment. This conflation of speech with regulatory issues
conflicts with the Court's precedents. In Abood and subsequent union
shop cases, the Court excised the speech component by upholding
regulations requiring all union employees to pay for union services re-
lated to collective bargaining, but striking down compelled contribu-
tions for objectionable expressive activities.85 The Court has previ-
ously considered pervasive regulation to be indicative of a lessened
expectation of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context;86 Glickman
appears to import this reasoning into First Amendment analysis.8 7
The preferable interpretation of the Court's references to the con-
sensus within the industry is that the Glickman Court relied on that
consensus solely to demonstrate that the regulations passed rational
basis review. However, as Justice Souter recognized,88 the Court was
imprecise about this point.8 9 The respondents argued that the major-
ity approval requirement permitted the most powerful producers to
shape the content of the advertising in a manner that promoted their
individual interests to the detriment of the interests of the minority.90
In fact, because the respondents' fruit was distinct from the generic
fruit touted by the collective advertising, the program forced them to
fund additional advertisements to counteract the messages of the col-
84 Glickman, 117 S. Ct at 2138.
85 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13-15 (iggo) (upholding the use of required contri-
butions for "regulating the legal profession," but striking down their use for political or ideological
lobbying); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232, 235 (977) (upholding regulations
requiring contributions for collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjust-
ment purposes, but striking down the use of contributions for political or ideological expression).
86 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (987).
87 The Court has alluded cryptically to the existence of regulation as a rationale for affording
reduced constitutional protection to commercial speech. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad.
Co., 5o9 U.S. 418, 426 (993) (defining commercial speech as speech "occurting] in an area tradi-
tionally subject to government regulation").
88 Justice Souter asserted that "[c]ontrary to what the majority implies, however, the mere vote
of a majority is never enough to compel dissenters to pay for privatf or quasi-private speech
whose message they do not wish to foster; otherwise, the First Amendment would place no limita-
tion on majoritarian action." Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2152 n.ii (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
89 In fact, the majority opinion never uses the words "rational basis."
90 See Brief for Respondents Gerawan Farming, Inc., Nilmeier Farms, and George Hufert
Farms at 7, Glickman (No. 95-1184), available in r996 WL 554427.
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lective ads.9 ' Concerns about drowning out the voices of divergent,
less powerful groups - regardless of how overwhelming the majority
- reflect the essence of the First Amendment. 92  For instance, in
Wooley v. Maynard,93 the Court opined: "[T]hat most individuals agree
with the thrust of New Hampshire's motto is not the test .... The
First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of
view different from the majority .... "94 Yet lower courts could inter-
pret Glickman's ambiguous references to consensus to evince a princi-
ple that the protection of counter-majoritarian factions is an inapposite
concern in the context of heavily regulated industries.
Ultimately, the danger of the Court's decision in Glickman is that it
suggests that government may have "free rein"95 to "force payment for
a whole variety of expressive conduct that it could not restrict."96 The
danger is that instead of taking responsibility for messages that it
wishes to foster - and being held accountable by the public for using
tax dollars to do so - government can surreptitiously communicate its
messages through the pocketbooks of private speakers.
3. Indecent Speech - Communications Decency Act. - The rapid
growth of the Internet over the last several years' has not been with-
out its constitutional growing pains. For example, many observers
have expressed concern about the effects of allowing children to access
the Internet's more sexually explicit content.2 Some scholars have ar-
gued that speech on the Internet deserves full First Amendment pro-
tection;3 others have contended that the Internet merits no more First
Amendment protection than the broadcast media.4 Certainly, the
question of how much First Amendment protection the Supreme Court
91 See id. at ii. This aspect distinguished the compelled advertising from other regulations
incidentally reducing a fruit handler's advertising budget. See Glickman, 117 S. Ct at 2139; su-
pra note 31. Unlike other regulations, the generic advertising directly impacted the respondents'
advertising decisions by promoting messages to which they felt compelled to respond.
92 See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 36o U.S. 684, 689 (x959) (stating
that First Amendment protection is "not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional
or shared by a majority").93 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
94 Id. at 715.
95 Glickman, I17 S. Ct. at 2147 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 2 i56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. i996) (noting that the Internet has
grown from more than one million computers in 1993 to over 9.4 million computers in 1996).
2 See, e.g., Suzanne Fields, Kids Have Easy Access to Cyberporn, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
June ig, 1995, at iiA.
3 See, e.g., E. Walter Van Valkenburg, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 75 OR. L. REv.
319, 323 (i996).
4 See, e.g., Robert W. Peters, There is a Need to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 363, 376 (997). Generally, broadcast media have received less pro-
tection than more traditional forms of speech, such as the print media or the soapbox orator. See,
e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (978) (upholding the power of the FCC to im-
pose sanctions on radio broadcasters for monologues that are indecent but not obscene).
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would afford the Internet was open to debate before last Term, given
the Court's historical tendency to create new First Amendment rules
for different communications media.5 Last Term, in Reno v. ACLU,6
the Supreme Court seemed to put this issue to rest, at least in part, by
holding that a federal statute criminalizing certain "indecent" speech
on the Internet violated the First Amendment. Although the ruling
appears to extend the fullest possible First Amendment protection to
the Internet, advances in technology, coupled with the further growth
of the Internet, could cause the Court to reconsider the appropriate
level of scrutiny.
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecommunica-
tions Act of I9967 into law.8 The part of the law at issue in Reno, the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),9 was inserted into the
bill through a Senate amendment that was the subject of little de-
bate.' 0 Following the enactment of the law, twenty plaintiffs filed suit
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Attorney General
and the U.S. Department of Justice, asking both that they be enjoined
from enforcing the law's "indecent transmission" and "patently offen-
sive display" provisions" and that these provisions be declared uncon-
stitutional.12  Finding that these provisions were unconstitutionally
vague, Judge Ronald Buckwalter granted a limited temporary re-
straining order on February 15, 1996.13 The CDA contained a provi-
sion mandating that any challenges to its constitutionality be brought
before a three-judge district court,' 4 and therefore Chief Judge Dolores
Sloviter of the Third Circuit convened such a court in Philadelphia. s
5 See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 5o (1981) (plurality opinion)
("Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself' and that law must reflect the 'dif-
fering natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method." (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 97 (i949) (Jackson, J., concurring))).
6 117 S. CL 2329 (1997).
7 Pub. L. No. 104-104, liO Stat. 56.
8 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. x996).
9 Pub. L. No. io4-io4, tit. V, io Stat. 56, I33-43.
10 See Reno, 117 S. CL at 2338 & n.24.
11 Id. at 2338. These provisions criminalized the "knowing transmission of obscene or inde-
cent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age" and "the knowing sending or displaying of
patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age," re-
spectively. Id. The majority and Justice O'Connor disagreed as to whether the second provision
was actually one provision or two. Compare id. at 2338 n.25 ("[W]e follow the convention of both
parties below, as well the District Court's order and opinion, in describing § 223(d)(i) as one pro-
vision."), with id. at 2352 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("What the Court classifies as a single 'patently offensive display' provision ... is in reality
two separate provisions." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
12 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827. An additional 27 plaintiffs subsequently filed a second suit,
which was consolidated with the first. See id. at 827-28.
13 See id. at 827.
14 See id.
's See id. Chief Judge Sloviter appointed Judge Stewart Dalzell to serve on the panel with
Judge Buckwalter and herself. See id.
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After hearing testimony and making extensive findings of fact, 16 the
court, finding that the provisions at issue were likely to be unconstitu-
tional, granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against enforce-
ment of the CDA.17 Although the judges were unanimous in their
judgment, they used distinct analyses to explain their conclusions. 18
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction 19 and affirmed the
judgment of the district court.20
Writing for a 7-2 majority,21 Justice Stevens first explored the na-
ture of the Internet and the problems associated with attempting to
verify the age of its users. 22 He then rejected the government's at-
tempts to liken the CDA to other acts that the Court had previously
upheld.23 First, he distinguished the case at bar in four crucial re-
spects from Ginsberg v. New York, 24 in which the Court upheld a New
York statute prohibiting the sale of material that was obscene with re-
spect to minors even if it was not obscene with respect to adults.25
Second, he distinguished the case from FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,26
in which the Court allowed the FCC to issue an administrative sanc-
tion for broadcasting a profanity-laden monologue during the after-
noon, in part because that case involved an order that came from the
FCC, an agency that had been regulating radio and television for dec-
ades.27 Finally, he refused to liken the case to the adult theater zoning
law upheld in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 28 because the "zon-
ing" that was undertaken by the CDA encompassed all of cyberspace,
rather than just small, discrete areas.29 More broadly, he noted that,
although other types of broadcast media had been denied full First
16 One hundred twenty-three of them, in fact. See id. at 830-49.
17 See id. at 849.
18 See Reno, 117 S. Ct at 2340 (describing the opinions of all three judges).
19 See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
20 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 235.
21 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.
22 See Reno, I7 S. Ct. at 2334-37.
23 See id. at 2341-43.
24 390 U.S. 629 (I968).
25 The Court reasoned that the statute in Ginsberg enabled children to continue to access the
material if their parents wished to allow them to do so, that the statute applied only to commer-
cial transactions, that the statute defined the banned material more narrowly, and that the statute
applied to ages 16 and under, whereas the CDA applies to ages I7 and under. See Reno, 117 S.
CL at 2341.
26 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
27 In addition to Congress's lack of experience with regulation of the Internet, the case at bar
differed from Pacifica because the order in Pacifica was not punitive and because the Internet
had not historically been subject to the same sort of pervasive regulation as broadcast media. See
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
28 475 U.S. 41 (z986).
29 Moreover, the CDA focused on the primary effects of the speech itself, whereas the statute
upheld in Renton looked to the secondary effects of adult expression, such as crime and declining
property values. See Reno, I17 S. Ct at 2342.
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Amendment protection, they had either historically been subject to
broad government regulation, suffered from scarcity, or been seen as
invasive.3 0  Justice Stevens found the Internet to have none of these
preconditions to regulation.3 '
Turning to the interpretation of the statute, the Court refused to
consider whether the CDA was so vague that it violated the Fifth
Amendment.3 2 Instead, it held that, because of the CDA's potential
chilling of free expression, "a content-based regulation of speech,"3 3 the
statute ran afoul of the First Amendment.34 Although the Court ac-
knowledged the importance of protecting children from inappropriate
material, it reemphasized its past holdings that such a goal does not
justify limiting the adult population to seeing only material fit for the
eyes of children.35 Further, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the
CDA created problems that are inherent in "judg[ing]" material "by the
standards of the community most likely to be offended by the mes-
sage. '3 6  Because of these concerns, the Court held that "the CDA is
not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all."31
After ruling that the CDA was facially overbroad and thus pre-
sumptively invalid, the Court turned to the government's assertion
that the statute could be saved through other means.38 The Court re-
jected three narrowing principles offered by the government.3 9 The
Court also refused to hold that the defenses provided in the CDA itself
saved the statute.40  Finally, the Court mostly rejected the govern-
30 See id. at 2343.
31 See id. at 2343-44.
32 See id. at 2341. The possibility of a Fifth Amendment violation arose because the CDA
imposed criminal sanctions. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 859 (E.D. Pa. x996) (opinion of
Buckwalter, J.).
33 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
34 See id. at 2346. This conclusion was based on the premise that the indecent speech regu-
lated by the CDA is protected by the First Amendment. See id. (quoting Sable Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). Further, because of textual differences in provisions of the
CDA, it was unclear exactly what indecent speech the statute prohibited. See id. at 2344.
35 See id. at 2346 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S.
Ct. 2374, 2393 (1996)).
36 Id. at 2347. This difficulty arises because a nationwide audience can access virtually any
information posted on the Internet. See id.
37 Id. at 2348.
38 See id.
39 The government suggested that alternative channels of communication were available after
the CDA ban on indecent speech, see id. at 2348-49; that the knowledge requirements of the stat-
ute saved it from overbreadth, a contention rejected by the Court on the ground that it would
effectively give a heckler's veto to anyone who had a child with them when they entered a chat
room, see id. at 2349; and that most of the material banned had no serious redeeming social value
in any event, see id.
40 See id. at 2349-5o. The Court rejected a provision excepting those who took good faith
actions to prevent minors from viewing the material, because it required that such actions be "ef-
fective," something that the government acknowledged was impossible given the current state of
technology. See id. at 2349. The other defenses involved using credit card verification or adult
identification. See id. In holding these defenses insufficient to save the statute's constitutionality,
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ment's invitation to use the statute's severability clause to modify the
statute and cure its constitutional infirmity.41 The Court noted that,
by interpreting such an "open-ended" statute in a manner that ren-
dered it constitutional, the Court might give Congress an incentive to
pass overbroad statutes with the expectation that the courts would re-
duce them to their proper constitutional size later.42
Justice O'Connor43 concurred in the judgment in part, but dis-
sented in part.44 She rejected the majority's parsing of the statute in
favor of the government's contention that § 223(d)(i) contained two
separable provisions: one that criminalized displaying patently offen-
sive or indecent material where minors could see it, and another that
criminalized sending such material to a specific person known to be a
minor.45 Further, she viewed the CDA as merely an attempt to "zone"
cyberspace into areas where adults could communicate freely in the
absence of minors.46 Because a transmission addressed only to minors
does not implicate any adult interest in being able to receive indecent
speech, she would have upheld the CDA in all situations in which the
right of an adult to receive indecent speech was not at issue, such as
where it was known that only minors were on the receiving end of an
indecent transmission. 47  Additionally, she would have reached an is-
sue that the majority avoided and decided that the CDA's ban on in-
decent or patently offensive speech was not an overbroad intrusion
into the First Amendment rights of minors.48
The Court correctly decided to strike.down the CDA. The Act
could not achieve its stated purpose49 because of its overbreadth and
the Court noted the irony that this defense would be more likely to protect commercial pornogra-
phers than noncommercial entities. See id. at 2349 n.47.
41 See id. at 2350-5i. The Court severed the phrase "or indecent" from § 223(a), so that the
law's prohibition on obscenity stood. It justified this action by reasoning that obscenity lies out-
side the protections of the First Amendment. See id. at 2350.
42 The Court averred that it was necessary to discourage this practice in order to avoid serious
separation of powers questions. See id. at 2351 n.49.
43 Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
44 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2352 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 2355-56. However, in all cases in which more than one adult was party to a con-
versation or transmission, Justice O'Connor felt that the CDA could not constitutionally be ap-
plied because it would infringe on the right of adults to receive indecent speech. See id.
48 See id. at 2356. Justice O'Connor emphasized that there was no substantial overbreadth in
denying minors access to speech that was indecent or patently offensive, yet not "harmful to mi-
nors." Id.
49 Senator James Exon, one of the principal architects of the Act, often stated that it was de-
signed primarily to protect children from material available on the Internet. See, e.g., 141 CONG.
REc. S8o88 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon) ("The fundamental purpose of the
Communications Decency Act is to provide much-needed protection for children.").
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underinclusiveness. 50 More generally, the Court's refusal to craft new
First Amendment rules for the Internet represented a welcome depar-
ture from the Court's previous treatment of new media: the Court's
decision evinces both a deep respect for the democratic promise of the
Internet and an unwillingness to allow the sort of extensive regulation
that has burdened the early days of other forms of new media. How-
ever, claims of victory by opponents of Internet regulation may be
premature, because the Court left open the possibility that it could
later reassess whether additional burdens can be placed on the Internet
in the face of technological advances and the Internet's continued
growth.
The Reno Court extended the full protection of the First Amend-
ment to the Internet.5' However, the Court explicitly based its conclu-
sion on the district court's "findings [that] provide[d] the underpin-
nings for the legal issues. 5 2  Further, at least one Justice in the
majority wondered during oral argument whether the CDA might be
unconstitutional at the present time, yet become constitutional at some
point in the future.5 3 In her opinion, Justice O'Connor was even more
explicit in suggesting that the ruling was bound by the current state of
the Internet.5 4 Although the Court is unlikely to revisit its rulings on
50 On one hand, the CDA was fatally underinclusive, most simply because of the facts that "as
much as thirty percent of the sexually explicit material currently available on the Internet origi-
nates in foreign countries," Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 931
(S.D.N.Y. i996), and that the CDA contains no provision for extraterritorial prosecution of its
violators, cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("[L]egislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States." (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (x949)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). On the other hand, the Act was overbroad in that literal terms of the CDA al-
lowed the criminalization of material that would likely do little damage to children. See, e.g.,
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348 (suggesting that parents could be prosecuted for sending information on
contraception by electronic mall to their minor children in a town that considered such informa-
tion to be "indecent" or "patently offensive"); Brief for Appellees at 9, Reno (No. 96-5xx), available
in 1997 WL 74378 (noting that the government's own witness testified that the cover of Vanity
Fair that featured a nude and pregnant Demi Moore could be considered indecent in some com-
munities). The existence of indecent material on the Internet that is worthy of First Amendment
protection may best be illustrated, however, by Internet sites that reprint the Appendix to the Su-
preme Court's Pacifica opinion. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Appendix to Opinion (vis-
ited Sept. 26, 1997) <http://homepage.interaccess.com/-driscoll/fcc-2ahtml>. Because the Appen-
dix contains a verbatim transcript of the monologue found by the FCC to be indecent,
presumably the Appendix would be subject to prosecution under the Act. Yet it seems strange to
criminalize the dissemination of the opinions of the Supreme Court via the Internet, even if the
opinions contain profane language.
51 See Reno, I17 S. Ct. at 2344.
52 Id. at 2334.
53 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Reno (No. 96-51i), available in 1997 WL 136253, at *48-
*49 (Mar. 1g, 1997).
54 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2353 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part) (noting that her opinion dealt with issues "[a]s applied to the Internet as it exists in
1997").
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scarcity and the history of regulation, it may eventually determine that
its ruling on "invasiveness" is obsolete.
In granting the Internet unqualified First Amendment protection,
the Court abandoned its traditionally cautious approach when con-
fronted with new forms of media. In 1915, when the motion-picture
industry was in its infancy, the Court brushed aside the argument that
film should be entitled to First Amendment protection.5 5 The Court
did not reconsider this position for nearly four decades.5 6 Even though
movies are now within the ambit of the First Amendment, they are
still subject to greater prior restraint of their distribution than are the
print media,-7 although the Court has never "articulat[ed] why movies
are different from books in any important respect."ss
Similarly, courts were reluctant to extend the full protections of the
First Amendment to radio.5 9 In 1932, a federal appellate court held
that refusing to renew the license of a controversial radio broadcaster
was "neither censorship nor previous restraint," and that the broad-
caster "may continue to indulge his strictures upon the characters of
men in public office[,] ... but he may not, as we think, demand, of
right, the continued use of an instrumentality of commerce for such
purposes... except in subordination to all reasonable rules and regu-
lations Congress ... may prescribe. '60 Thus, the court affirmed a de-
cision to allocate a broadcasting license on the basis of political crite-
ria. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed other restrictions on
broadcasting under the "scarcity" rationale.61 The Court eventually
55 See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915) ("We immedi-
ately feel that the argument is wrong ... which seeks to bring motion pictures and other specta-
cles into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion."), overruled in part by
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Although the Court's opinion in Mutual
Film also seemed to deny First Amendment protection to older forms of expression, such as thea-
ter, it is likely that the ease of censoring movies, which can be viewed in final form before public
display is permitted, made them an easier medium to censor. Further, the Court seemed to draw
a distinction between motion pictures and other media. See id. at 244 (referring to motion pic-
tures' greater capacity for evil "because of their ... manner of exhibition").
56 See Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502.
S7 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 6o-6i (i965) (sustaining against First Amendment
challenge the requirement that a film be submitted to a censor before distribution, and noting
that, although such a scheme might not be acceptable for books, it would be for films because
"films differ from other forms of expression").
S8 Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (976).
S9 See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the Cycle of
Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 267-68 (1994).
60 Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 85o, 853 (D.C. Cir.
1932).
61 The classic statement of this rationale for the validity of restrictions on radio broadcasting
under the First Amendment is set forth in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 226 (1943).
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decided that broadcasting was protected under the First Amendment,
but "at a lower level than... 'traditional' media."62
The Court's decision in Reno marks a welcome departure from this
practice. One scholar has aptly described the problem with early deci-
sions determining the rules that apply to a new technology: "Technical
laymen, such as judges, perceive the new technology in that early,
clumsy form, which then becomes their image of its nature, possibili-
ties, and use. This perception is an incubus on later understanding."63
Justice Souter recently articulated a similar concern. 64  Because the
Internet is rapidly changing, the need to prevent the ossification of the
rules that will control its use in the future is even stronger: indeed, the
"facts" found by the district court in 1996 might not accurately reflect
the nature of the Internet today or tomorrow.65
Several already ongoing technological developments may affect the
Court's conclusions regarding whether the Internet can be constitu-
tionally regulated. The Internet is increasingly becoming more akin to
radio and television. 66 For example, through the development of
"push" technology, it can now carry "television-like channels to broad-
cast news, software and corporate information directly to users' com-
puters."67 In addition, the Internet is rapidly becoming the venue for a
convergence of different types of media. 68 The beginnings of this con-
vergence can be seen in the use of "streaming" technology to broadcast
live audio and video over the Internet.69 The resulting transformation
of the Internet "into a real broadcast medium like television"70 might
lead to greater regulation of the Internet being seen as necessary. Per-
haps because of developments like these, the Court has left itself space
to allow the government to impose the sorts of regulations normally
62 Corn-Revere, supra note 59, at 267 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (i969),
and National Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 192).
63 ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 7 (1983).
64 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 16 S. Ct. 2374, 2402 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring) ("In my own ignorance I have to accept the real possibility that 'if we had
to decide today ... just what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace, ... we would get
it fundamentally wrong.'" (quoting Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE LJ. 1743,
1745 (1995))).
65 See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 904
(1996); Charles Nesson & David Marglin, The Day the Internet Met the First Amendment: Time
and the Communications Decency Act, io HARv. J.L. & TECH. 113, 120-21 (1996).
66 This concern is likely only to be aggravated by the use of television sets to surf the Internet
through digital technology. See David Bank & Dean Takahashi, Microsoft Plans Big Digital-TV
Push, Stressing Hardware and Programming, WALL ST.J., Apr. 16, 2997, at B2.
67 David Bank, Microsoft Moves To Standardize Creation of Internet Channels To Broadcast
News, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1997, atB7.
68 Professor de Sola Pool predicted this many years ago, presciently noting that "[a] single
physical means ... may carry services that in the past were provided in separate ways." DE SOLA
POOL, supra note 63, at 23.
69 See Denise Caruso, The Puzzle of Making the Internet into a Competitive Broadcast Me-
dium, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 10, 1997, at Ds.
70 Id.
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applied to broadcast stations on a "radio station" or "television station"
that "broadcasts" solely over the Internet7 through "push" or
"streaming" technology, even though it does not broadcast over the
airwaves.7 2 By suggesting that speech restrictions would be upheld
under strict scrutiny if no equally effective alternatives to legislation
such as the CDA existed,73 and by referring to "regulating some por-
tions of the Internet... differently than others" as being a less restric-
tive alternative to the CDA, the Court renders differential regulations
of various forms of communication on the Internet more plausible. 74
This concern is exacerbated by the Court's indeterminate jurispru-
dence of "pervasiveness" and "invasiveness," which originated in
Pacifica.7 - In Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, which limited
Pacifica's reach, the Court noted Pacifica's use of the term "perva-
sive," but instead focused on the lack of "invasiveness" of dial-a-
porn.76 Seven years later, although the Court had rejected the "scar-
city" rationale as a justification for content-based regulation of cable
broadcasting, 77 a plurality of the Court relied partly on the "perva-
siveness" of cable broadcasting to uphold a content-based statutory
provision.78 Finally, in striking down the CDA, the Reno Court did
not broach the question whether the Internet was "pervasive," instead
noting merely that it was "not as 'invasive' as radio or television."7 9
The Court has yet to indicate whether there is a legal (or real) differ-
ence between, a medium's "invasiveness" and its "pervasiveness," but
the constitutional acceptability of content-based regulation of the me-
dia appears to rest heavily on this question. Although the "pervasive-
ness" of a medium might not be the best inquiry to determine whether
or not it is regulable, 0 the Court seems to take it into account in its
71 Cf. Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. x996) (noting
that the plaintiff was "editor, publisher, and part-owner of a newspaper distributed exclusively
through electronic means").
72 Cf. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (upholding FCC
regulation of cable television to the extent "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting").
73 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing,
1997 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming).
74 Reno, 117 S. CL at 2348.
75 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (978) ('The broadcast media have estab-
lished a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.").
76 See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) ("Unlike an unexpected
outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one who places a call to dial-a-porn serv-
ices is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure
to it.").
77 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1994).
78 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, z16 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (1996) (plu-
rality opinion) ("Cable television systems, including access channels, 'have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.'" (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748)).
79 Reno, 117 S. CL at 2343.
80 See DE SOLA POOL, supra note 63, at 134 ("This aberrant approach could be used to justify
quite radical censorship.").
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constitutional calculus. Given the rapidly changing nature of the
Internet, it is possible that the Internet could eventually become "per-
vasive" enough to be constitutionally regulable.8 '
Another key factor in the Court's decision to grant full First
Amendment protection to the Internet may have been its perception
that the Internet is a tool for democracy, rather than a playground for
media giants.8 2 Many scholars would agree that providing full First
Amendment protection to a medium that allows many to speak, rather
than providing information offered only by a few well-financed
sources, serves First Amendment "values. 8 3 As long as the Internet
continues to provide an outlet for the speech of the masses, as well as
for that of large corporations, public debate will flourish, and the state
need not intervene in the speech market.8 4
Finally, the Internet has the potential to be subject to democratic
ordering principles. Currently, the world of cyberspace is being trans-
formed "from a relatively unzoned place to a universe that is extraor-
dinarily well zoned."85 The development of protocols like the Platform
for Internet Content Selection8 6 will allow different organizations to
rate Internet sites: if such protocols are made available on standard
browser software, as seems likely, the problem of exposing children to
indecency would be eliminated. Further, the development of effective
software filters for new technologies could counter any problems aris-
ing from new technologies such as "push": if no indecency can be
81 Although the Court has not given a test for determining when either of the two is true, one
might assume that "pervasiveness" regards the number of people who use the Internet, and "inva-
siveness" regards the capability or likelihood that the medium will broadcast content that is unde-
sired by the user. The rapid growth of the Internet could increase its pervasiveness; the develop-
ment of technologies like "push," its invasiveness. However, it remains unclear why only certain
types of media can be invasive or pervasive; the Court has never hinted that a newspaper or other
printed publication could fall into this category, or explained why the relevant inquiry should not
focus on the availability of indecent material to children who seek it out.
82 See Reno, 117 S. CL at 2344 ("[A]ny person ... can become a town crier ... [or] a pam-
phleteer."). In contrast, the Court has upheld restrictions on First Amendment rights to commu-
nicate indecent speech in the context of areas dominated by large corporations, like cable pro-
gramming, see Denver Area, 1I6 S. Ct. at 2385-86, or radio broadcasters, see FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (r976).
83 For a description of the benefits that flow from the public's having greater control over
speech and information, see Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE LJ.
1805, 1833-43 (I995). Although participation by the general public may seem to be a beneficial
feature of the Internet, the government appeared to disagree in its brief. See Brief for Appellants
at 29, Reno (No. 96-511), available in 1997 WL 32931 ("Because millions of people disseminate
information on the Internet without the intervention of editors, network censors, or market disin-
centives, the indecency problem on the Internet is much more pronounced than it is on broadcast
stations.").
84 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 73 (iggi) ("[Tihe public stands at the
top and broadcasters at the bottom. The state, in the middle, executes the will of the people to
insure that broadcasters provide adequate service to the realm of public debate ...
85 Lessig, supra note 65, at 888-89.
86 See Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Nesson
& Marglin, supra note 65, at 124.
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"pushed" to a computer because of effective filtering, the media would
be no more invasive or pervasive than it was before the development
of "push" technology. Such a reordering could settle the problem of
Internet indecency without requiring government intervention. 7
Although it might be true, as some have claimed, that the Court's
decision in Reno represents the "legal birth certificate for the Inter-
net,"8 8 the Internet's continued vitality may in some ways depend on
whether it retains its unique nature.89 In noting that the Internet was
not as "invasive" as radio or television, the Court emphasized the
finding of the district court that "communications over the Internet do
not... appear on one's computer screen unbidden."90 However, even
if the dominant form of communication over the Internet changes, the
Internet should still be granted the same level of First Amendment
protection. If it has the chance to clarify the issue, the Court should
finally discard the "invasive/pervasive" test for. the acceptability of
governmental regulation of speech on the ground that it is irreconcil-
able with First Amendment tradition.
4. Speech Restrictions - Floating Buffer Zones. - In recent
years, abortion protestors have chosen increasingly forceful and violent
methods for expressing their opposition to abortion, methods that have
extended well beyond traditional demonstrating, picketing, and lob-
bying.' The escalating violence of anti-abortion protests has forced
abortion rights advocates to turn to Congress and to the courts for pro-
tection. 2 However, government responses to these requests for protec-
87 The government suggested that this could be a possible solution, but that the industry could
be prodded into developing such technology faster if the CDA were left standing. See Brief for
Appellants at 38, Reno (No. 96-5i), available in 1997 WL 32931. The district court rejected this
suggestion explicitly, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Sloviter,
C.J.) ("I can imagine few arguments less likely to persuade a court to uphold a criminal statute
than one that depends on future technology to cabin the reach of the statute within constitutional
bounds."), and the Supreme Court rejected it implicitly. Ironically, it has been suggested that the
use of such protocols could support the creation of a constitutional version of the CDA. See Les-
sig, supra note 65, at 893-94.
88 Steven Levy with Karen Breslau, On the Net, Anything Goes, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1997, at
28, 28 (quoting Bruce Ennis) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 Cf. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 876 n.ig (opinion of Dazell, J.) ("Ihe assaultive nature of televi-
sion is quite absent in Internet use.... [S]exually explicit content [may be] a few clicks of a mouse
away from the user, but there is an immense legal significance to those few clicks." (citation omit-
ted)).
90 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 844) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
I See H.R. REP. No. I03-306, at 700-07 (1994) (describing the "dramatically escalating vio-
lence" directed at women's health clinics in a "nationwide campaign of blockades, invasions, van-
dalism, threats and other violence"); Kevin Johnson & Lori Sham, Abortion War Still Explosive,
USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 1997, at Ai (stating that, since x982, 183 abortion clinics have been bombed
or burned in the United States).
2 See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) of 1994, i8 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)
(providing civil and criminal penalties for the use of force or the threat of force to injure, intimi-
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tion raise concerns about the First Amendment rights of abortion pro-
testors, especially with regard to court-ordered injunctions.
Last Term, in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,3 the Supreme Court
again reviewed a lower court injunction against anti-abortion demon-
strators and revisited its recent decision in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc.4 Applying Madsen, the Court upheld the use of fifteen-
foot "fixed" buffer zones, which ensure access to abortion clinics, and a
"cease and desist" provision, which protects patients and staff from
harassment by so-called "sidewalk counselors."' However, the Court
struck down the use of "floating" buffer zones, which surround indi-
viduals as they enter and exit clinics, because of the risk that such
zones might burden more speech than necessary for the purposes of an
injunction.6 The Court deserves credit for clarifying the nature of the
review of injunctions obtained under Madsen, and for striking the
proper balance between the need to protect access to abortion services
and the free speech rights of protestors; however, the Court ultimately
failed to articulate explicitly a clear First Amendment principle to
support its conclusion and to guide lower courts in issuing injunctions
in situations in which harassing, abusive conduct may alter First
Amendment rights.
In September of 1990, Pro-Choice Network of Western New York
and several other parties filed a complaint against fifty individuals and
three anti-abortion organizations in the Western District of New York.7
The complaint asserted seven causes of action against the defendants
for obstructionist protest activities and requested a preliminary injunc-
tion." After several months of hearings, the district court granted the
injunction.9 The district court found that the defendants' methods of
protest increased the health risks to patients entering the clinic by
causing severe distress, anxiety, and delays in medical care.'0 Further,
date, or interfere with persons seeking or providing reproductive health services); United States v.
Scott, 958 F. Supp. 761, 782 (D. Conn. 1997) (upholding the constitutionality of FACE and grant-
ing an injunction against anti-abortion protestors).
3 17 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
4 512 U.S. 753 (1994). Interestingly, the Court granted certiorari in Schenck in the absence of
any circuit conflict, as Schenck was the first circuit decision to apply Madsen. See Deborah A.
Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu, Of Buffer Zones and Broken Bones: Balancing Access to Abortion and
Anti-Abortion Protestors' First Amendment Rights in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 547, 551 (1996).
S Schenck, I17 S. CL at 868-70.
6 See id. at 866-68.
7 See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 417, 1421-22 (W.D.N.Y.
1992).
8 See id. at 1422. The first cause of action alleged that the defendants had violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) by conspiring "to deny women seeking abortion or family planning services the equal
protection of the laws and the equal privileges and immunities of national citizenship." Id. The
remaining six causes of action rested on New York law. See id.
9 See id. at I44o.
10 See id. at 1427-28.
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the court determined that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on their
allegation that the defendants had conspired to deprive women of their
constitutional rights to travel and to choose to have an abortion." The
district court's injunction prohibited "demonstrating within fifteen feet
from ... doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances,
driveways and driveway entrances ... , or within fifteen feet of any
person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving" the medical facilities.12
However, the court permitted two anti-abortion "sidewalk counselors"
to position themselves within the fifteen-foot boundaries, but only for
"conversation[s] of a nonthreatening nature," and only if the counselors
agreed to "cease and desist" when the person to be counseled wished to
walk away.13 In an effort to ensure that the injunction would not
violate the First Amendment rights of the protestors, the district court
reviewed the provisions under the conventional time, place, and man-
ner standard and found that the injunction was constitutional. 14
While the case was on appeal to the Second Circuit,'5 the Supreme
Court decided Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., which created a
new standard of First Amendment scrutiny for content-neutral injunc-
tions that restrict expressive ctivity.16 Under Madsen, this new, more
rigorous test for upholding a content-neutral injunction is "whether the
challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest."' 7  Applying
Madsen, a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed the district
11 See id. at 1429-31. The court based its assessment on New York State National Organiza-
tion for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. x989), which held that women seeking abortions
constitute a protected class for § 1985(3) purposes. See Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1429.
12 Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1440.
13 Id.
14 See id. at 1432-37. Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of expression must be con-
tent-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and must leave open
ample alternative channels for communication. See id. at 1432 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474,481 (1988), and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
15 During the pendency of an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court decided Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), which held that women seeking abortions did not
constitute a protected class under § 1985(3), and thus overturned Terry. See id. at 269. Project
Rescue then stipulated to a dismissal of the appeal from the preliminary injunction and moved to
have the district court dismiss the complaint and vacate the injunction. See Pro-Choice Network
v. Project Rescue IV. N.Y., 828 F. Supp. 1o8, 1020 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). The district court dismissed
Pro-Choice Network's § 1985(3) complaint with leave to amend but denied Project Rescue's mo-
tion to vacate the preliminary injunction. See id. Project Rescue then appealed again from the
district court's denial of the motion to vacate. See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359,
366 (2d Cir. 1994).
16 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (I994).
17 Id. at 765. The Court's concern that the traditional time, place, and manner analysis was
"not sufficiently rigorous" for analyzing content-neutral injunctions stemmed primarily from its
belief that "[i]njunctions ... carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than
do general ordinances." Id. at 764-65.
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court's decision."' The Second Circuit later reheard the case en banc
and affirmed the district court's decision in two separate opinions. 19
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.2 0  In an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist,21 the Court applied the Madsen test and found that
the combined interests in ensuring public safety, promoting the free
flow of traffic, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman's
right to seek pregnancy-related services were "certainly significant
enough to justify an appropriately tailored injunction."22  With these
interests in mind, the Court struck down the floating buffer zones
around individuals and vehicles, but upheld the injunction's fifteen-
foot fixed buffer zones around clinic entrances and driveways and the
cease and desist provision governing those zones.23
With regard to the floating buffer zones, the Court recognized that
the record displayed a history of "physically abusive conduct" by the
protestors, but it also emphasized that the floating zones around indi-
viduals prevented leafleting and normal conversation on public side-
walks, forms of communication and a location for communication that
"lie at the heart of the First Amendment."24  The Court further
stressed that the floating nature of the buffer zone produced a "lack of
certainty" that "[led] to a substantial risk that much more speech
[would] be burdened than the injunction by its terms prohibit[ed]."25
Declining to decide whether any situation would ever justify a zone of
separation between protestors and individuals entering clinics, the
Court maintained that, "because this broad prohibition on speech
'float[ed],' it [could not] be sustained on this record. '26
18 See Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 374.
19 See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. '995) (en banc). The Second Cir-
cuit, en banc, considered only whether the is-foot buffer zones and the cease and desist provision
impermissibly infringed the anti-abortion activists' right to freedom of speech. See id. at 386.
Judge Oakes argued that the two provisions burdened no more speech than necessary to protect
significant government interests. See id. at 387. Judge Winter, concurring, emphasized the
broader principle that "coercive or obstructionist conduct is not protected by the First Amend-
ment in any forum and regardless of the nature of the audience." Id. at 397 (Winter, J., concur-
ring).
20 See Schenck, ii7 S. Ct. at 871.
21 The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
in upholding the fixed buffer zones and the cease and desist provision. Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, ScaUa, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined the Chief Justice in striking
down the floating buffer zones.
22 Schenck, 1'7 S. CL at 866.
23 See id. at 859.
24 Id. at 867.
25 Id.
26 Id. The Court also struck down floating buffer zones around vehicles, on the ground that
nothing in the record supported the notion that a less restrictive injunction would be insufficient.
See id. at 868.
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The Court upheld the fixed buffer zones, however, on the ground
that such zones were necessary to allow patients and staff to access the
clinics.27  In making its assessment, the Court underscored that this
need for protection stemmed from the demonstrators' obstructionist
protest methods, which figured prominently in the record.28 The
Court further noted that the protestors' harassment of the police pre-
vented local officials from providing adequate protection to clinic pa-
tients and staff.29
Finally, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the cease and
desist provision. 30 The majority rejected the district court's rationale
for the provision - that it was intended "to protect the right of the
people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone."31 The
Court emphasized that there exists no generalized right "to be left
alone" on public streets.32 However, the Court explained that the dis-
trict court had created the exception for two "sidewalk counselors" in
order to enhance the protestors' speech rights, and therefore decided to
analyze the provision in that light.33 The Court held that the provi-
sion was content-neutral and appropriate under the circumstances, as
the cease and desist condition was "the result of [the protestors'] own
previous harassment and intimidation of patients. '34
As in Madsen, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, filed a sharply worded opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part.3 5 Justice Scalia claimed that the Court's reasoning
made "a destructive inroad upon First Amendment law" and "a de-
structive inroad upon the separation of powers. '36 First, Justice Scalia
denounced the Court for upholding the fixed buffer zones and the
cease and desist provision.3 7  Analyzing the language of the district
court's opinion and the text of the injunction, Justice Scalia argued
that the district court had clearly granted these protections based on a
27 See id.
28 See id. at 868-69. The Court described the aggressive techniques used by the protestors,
techniques that included "follow[ing] and crowd[ing] people right up to the doorways of clinics
(and sometimes beyond) and then tend[ing] to stay in the doorways, shouting at the individuals
who had managed to get inside." Id. at 868.
29 See id. at 868-69.
30 See id. at 870.
31 Id. (quoting Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1435
(W.D.N.Y. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32 Id.
33 See id. The Court stated that, because the district court could have banned all protestors
from the protected zone based on the record, the court's "extra effort to enhance defendants'
speech rights by allowing an exception to the fixed buffer zone should not redound to the detri-
ment of respondents." Id. at 869 n.ii.
34 Id. at 870.
35 See id. at 871-75 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36 Id. at 875.
37 See id. at 871-72.
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nonexistent "right to be left alone." 38 He criticized the Court for ig-
noring this underlying rationale, which would have made both protec-
tions invalid, and for offering its own speculation regarding what the
district court might have considered.39 He also questioned the "rele-
vance" of the Court's assertion that allowing two "sidewalk counsel-
ors" within the buffer zone was an attempt by the district court to en-
hance the protestors' speech rights and attacked the idea that the cease
and desist provision should be evaluated "in that light."40 Justice
Scalia emphasized that, "[if our First Amendment jurisprudence has
stood for anything, it is that courts have an obligation 'to enhance
speech rights,' and a duty to 'bend over backwards to 'accommodate'
speech rights."' 41
Second, Justice Scalia claimed that the Court had raised separation
of powers concerns by relying on a "public safety" rationale; he argued
that public safety judgments belong only to the Executive Branch, not
to the courts.42 Disagreeing with the Court's assertion that public or-
der, even when not an explicit concern of the plaintiffs, is a sufficient
interest to uphold an injunction restricting speech, Justice Scalia de-
clared that to follow this line of reasoning would mean that "[e]very
private suit [would make] the district judge a sort of one-man Com-
mittee of Public Safety."43
Although the Court clarified certain issues that Madsen left open,
and struck the correct balance between the interests of women seeking
pregnancy-related medical care and the interests of anti-abortion pro-
testors, the Court bypassed an opportunity to establish explicitly a
broader underlying First Amendment principle to support its result.
On the positive side, the Schenck Court resolved some questions re-
garding the review of injunctions obtained under Madsen. The
Court's statement in Madsen that the failure of a prior, narrower in-
junction to protect clinic access should be considered in evaluating the
constitutionality of the broader injunction being challenged 44 led some
courts and commentators to believe that an earlier non-speech-
38 Id. at 872-73.
39 See id.
40 Id. at 873.
41 Id. (quoting Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 868-69 n.iz).
42 See id. at 875.
43 Id. at 874-75. Justice Breyer, in a sole dissent from the Court's rejection of floating buffer
zones, claimed that it was not necessary to decide "the law of 'floating bubbles'" because it was
unclear how that aspect of the injunction would actually apply. Id. at 878 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). In reviewing the lower court decisions and oral arguments, Justice
Breyer found that neither the district court nor the Second Circuit panel had ever properly ad-
dressed the issue of a "floating" buffer zone. See id. at 875-77. He argued that the Court should
have followed ordinary principles of judicial administration by first allowing the district court to
determine the practical implementation and the constitutionality of floating bubbles on a case-by-
case basis. See id. at 878.
44 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994).
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restrictive injunction was a requirement for the constitutionality of a
broader injunction.4 5  The Schenck Court quickly dismissed this con-
tention by stating that prior injunctions are merely an additional "con-
sideration," not a necessity under the Madsen standard.46 The Court's
analysis also emphasized the fact-based nature of the Madsen inquiry
and the importance of evaluating the factual record.4 7
In addition to clarifying these factual points, the Court in Schenck
also struck a sensible balance between the rights of protestors and the
rights of women seeking abortion services. The unique difficulty with
implementing buffer zones is that their nature as a "prophylactic
measure"48 precludes both protected and unprotected speech within
the zone.49 The Court admirably dealt with this problematic issue by
allowing the use of preventive measures only when they are proven to
be factually necessary °50 As the Court recognized,5' the types of tactics
that anti-abortion protestors employ often render traditional legal
remedies moot.5 2  Post-injury remedies are frequently an ineffective
and inadequate measure of protection, especially in light of the physi-
cal harm that can result to clinic patients from protestors' tactics.5 3 In
Schenck, the repeated acts of obstruction and the inability of law en-
forcement to create safe access to the clinics without the buffer zones
45 See, e.g., Ellis & Wu, supra note 4, at 574; Mathew D. Stayer, Injunctive Relief and the
Madsen Test, 14 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 465, 492 (i995).
46 See Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 869.
47 See id. at 868-69 (rejecting the petitioners' arguments at several points because the argu-
ments "ignore[d] the record in this case").
48 Id. at 869.
49 See James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial Viewpoint
Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 533 (1996). Weinstein discusses a city ordinance that
created bubble zones around health care facilities. He predicts that this type of ordinance "will
effectively curb those anti-abortion protestors who want to get close to women entering abortion
clinics to shout epithets at them." Id. However, the "problem is that it will also impede anti-
abortion activists who want to engage in quiet, civil conversation." Id.
50 See Schenck, 117 S. CL at 868-69.
51 The Court repeatedly referred to the protestors' violent and intimidating methods, such as
"getting very close to women entering the clinics and shouting in their faces; surrounding, crowd-
ing, and yelling at women entering the clinics; [and] jostling, grabbing, pushing, and shoving
women as they attempted to enter the clinics." Id. at 860. The Court also emphasized that the
protestors would not allow the patients or staff to avoid the unwanted speech and conduct, and
noted that, during the so-called sidewalk counseling, "if the women continued toward the clinics
and did not respond positively to the counselors .... peaceful efforts at persuasion often devolved
into 'in your face' yelling, and sometimes into pushing, shoving, and grabbing." Id.
52 See H.RP REP. No. IO3-306, at 707 (1994) (describing the failure of existing legal remedies to
provide adequate protection to patients and staff); Note, Too Close for Comfort: Protesting Out-
side Medical Facilities, ioi HARv. L. REv. 1856, 1872 (1988) (stating that, "even under trespass,
assault, or blocking ordinances, protesters legally could chase patients down sidewalks and into
the streets, shouting within inches of their ears").
53 See H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 703-07 (r994); Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for
Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-
abortion Protests - Section 11, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1163, 1192-95 (x996).
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made "a prophylactic measure ... even more appropriate." 54 Because
prior history ruled out more specifically tailored remedies, the Court
correctly concluded that fixed buffer zones were necessary to provide
adequate protection to clinic patients and staff.
The Court's rejection of floating buffer zones was also consistent
with the principle of restricting the use of prophylactic remedies to in-
stances in which they are demonstrably necessary. The Court ex-
pressed concern that, although floating zones would prevent the estab-
lished pattern of abusive conduct, too much protected speech would
also be lost.55 Arguably, the fixed buffer zones preclude as much pro-
tected and unprotected speech as the floating buffers do within the
zone. However, the difference with the floating buffers in this case
was that "there may well [have been] other ways" to provide the re-
quired protection without creating uncertainty regarding the limits of
the zone.5 6 In other words, the floating buffers were likely more re-
strictive than necessary based on the record, and therefore not a per-
missible prophylactic measure.5 7 By underscoring the requirement
that zones of separation be proven necessary, the Court sensibly bal-
anced the right of demonstrators to communicate their message peace-
fully and the right of women to safe access to abortion services.
However, the fact-specific nature of the Court's inquiry leaves un-
clear how narrowly or broadly it will construe "necessity" when lower
courts grant prophylactic measures in future cases. Although case-by-
case, fact-based analysis may be the best method for judging content-
neutral speech-restrictive injunctions, a clear underlying principle is
still necessary to provide guidance to lower courts and to place some
limits on judicial interpretation. Neither Madsen nor Schenck specify
explicitly what guiding First Amendment principle lower courts should
apply when deciding whether to grant speech-restrictive injunctions.5 "
Although it emphasized the importance of facts, the Schenck Court
provided little direction to lower courts about how to interpret facts,5 9
54 Schenck, 117 S. CL at 869. Citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), the Court em-
phasized the need for a blanket measure. See Schenck, I17 S. Ct. at 869. Burson upheld zoo-foot
"no campaign" zones around polling places because "[intimidation and interference laws ... 'deal
with only the most blatant and specific attempts' to impede elections." Burson, 504 U.S. at 206-
07 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 28 (2976)).
55 See Schenck, I17 S. CL at 867.
56 Id. at 867-68.
57 See id. The Court's rejection of Justice Breyer's argument concerning the appropriateness
of ruling on the constitutionality of the floating buffer zones suggests that the Court is unwilling
to wait for a prophylactic measure to be proven unnecessary before rejecting the measure.
Rather, the proponents of the injunctive measure bear the burden of establishing its necessity in
the first instance.
58 Cf. Tacy S. Craige, Note, Abortion Protest: Lawless Conspiracy or Protected Free Speech?,
72 DENV. U. L. REv. 445, 473-74 (i995) (stating that Madsen provides no guiding principle for
lower courts).
59 See Schenck, i17 S. CL at 869 (stating that the defendants' conduct "was indeed extraordi-
nary" based on the record, but providing no specific comparisons to the record in Madsen).
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and therefore created the risk that courts will grant either too much or
too little protection to women seeking reproductive health services.60
In contrast, the en banc Court of Appeals' concurring opinion stated
expressly the broader underlying principle that the "First Amendment
does not, in any context, protect coercive or obstructionist conduct that
intimidates or physically prevents individuals from going about ordi-
nary affairs. '61 That language removes anything "that cannot be fairly
described as an attempt at peaceful persuasion '62 from First Amend-
ment protection altogether.63
In Schenck, the Court only implicitly expressed a similar idea, al-
though one not as broad in scope. In its brief- discussion of the cease
and desist provision, the Court suggested that the use of "harassment
and intimidation," even in a traditional public forum and even without
the captive audience doctrine, may not receive full First Amendment
protection.64  Normally, forcing proximity in order to convey a mes-
sage - placing oneself physically close to an unwilling audience -
could be considered protected expression.65 For example, the abortion
protestors' "sidewalk counseling" could be described as expressive
conduct, because their forceful methods are related to the fervor of
their message.66 However, the Court held that, because of the protes-
tors' "previous harassment and intimidation of patients," the protestors
lost their right to condition-free expression within the fifteen-foot
zone.67 Implicitly then, physical harassment and intimidation as
means of political expression can be subjected to a limited amount of
state regulation.
This underlying idea in Schenck - that physical harassment and
intimidation may not receive full First Amendment protection - is
not in itself a "destructive inroad upon First Amendment law. '68  In
general, the First Amendment does protect the right of citizens to
communicate even to unwilling listeners,69 especially in such tradi-
60 Cf. Weinstein, supra note 49, at 485 (stating that "cases involving anti-abortion protests are
prime candidates for judicial viewpoint discrimination").
61 Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 394 (2d Cir. i995) (en banc). Similarly, in
Madsen, Justice Stevens argued that the First Amendment does not grant "an unqualified consti-
tutional right to follow and harass an unwilling listener, especially one on her way to receive
medical services." Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 781 (994) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62 Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 396.
63 See Ellis & Wu, supra note 4, at 570.
64 Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 87o. The Court noted in a footnote that it need not decide whether
the captive audience doctrine was implicated here because that doctrine only applied to patients
inside the clinic. See id. at 866 n.8.
6S See Note, supra note 52, at 1859-62.
66 See id.
67 Schenck, I17 S. Ct. at 870.
68 Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (stating that "in public debate ... citizens
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate 'breathing
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tional public fora as streets and sidewalks.70 However, the Court has
also recognized that, when listeners' interests in privacy and autonomy
are particularly salient, the rights of these listeners must also be con-
sidered. For example, the Court grants special protection to the home
environment 7' and to "captive audiences, ' 72 situations in which indi-
viduals cannot easily walk away or merely "avert[] their eyes."73 Fur-
thermore, the Court has previously upheld carefully tailored speech-
restrictive injunctions when a showing was made of repeated acts of
violence and threats of future violence or obstruction associated with
the expression. 74 In fact, conduct that is intended to, and that actually
does, prevent access to buildings receives no First Amendment protec-
tion.75 Just as obscene or threatening expression can categorically be
governmentally regulated, 76 precise regulation of protests that pass a
certain threshold of abusive conduct is consistent with First Amend-
ment law.77 The Court could have expressly formulated a guiding
principle for lower courts based on these precedents.
space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment'" (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988))).
70 See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. I47, 163 (1939) (stating that "the streets are
natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion").
71 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-88 (1988) (upholding restrictions on picketing
targeted at an individual's home); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (stating that
an "individual's right to be left alone [within the home] plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder"); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (up-
holding individuals' ability to restrict unwanted mailings to the home).
72 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (holding that pa-
tients inside a medical clinic are a captive audience); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 304 (1974) (holding that persons in a streetcar are a captive audience).
73 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971).
74 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 9r6 (1982) (striking down a broad injunction
against labor protestors but noting that the First Amendment does not protect violence or threats
of violence, and requiring "precision of regulation" when unprotected and protected expression
occur together (quoting NAACP v. Button, 372 U.S. 415, 438 (x963))); Milk Wagon Drivers Union
Local 753 v. MeadoWmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941) (upholding an injunction against
labor picketing "only so long as it counteracts a continuing intimidation"); cf. Boos, 485 U.S. at
324-27 (discussing with approval i8 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2), which criminalizes "willful acts or at-
tempts to 'intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign official ... or obstruct a foreign official
in the performance of his duties'" (quoting i8 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2) (1988))).
75 See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 6ii, 621-22 (2968) (upholding a statute that prohib-
ited demonstrations that prevent access to buildings); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S 536, 554-55
(2965) (stating that the First Amendment does not encompass a right to prevent access to build-
ings).
76 See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 (stating that fighting words and threats are proscribable);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. I5, 23 (2973) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect
obscenity); cf Frederick Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U.
L. REV. 562, 562-63 (1989) (discussing examples of categories of speech that lie outside First
Amendment coverage).
77 See Joanne Neilson, Note, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc- Protection Against
Anti-Abortionist Terrorism, i6 PACE L. REV. 325, 333-35 (2996); cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free
Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REv. 203, 2o6-07 (2994) (stating that a distinction between expressive
action that only offends the mind and expressive action that injures the body "is inscribed deeply
in modern First Amendment law").
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Although the Court declined to state explicitly the broader First
Amendment principle implicit in its opinion, the Court at least at-
tempted to clarify several questions that Madsen had left unanswered,
and to establish the circumstances under which prophylactic measures
are acceptable. However, the uncertainty caused by the fact-intensive
nature of the Court's analysis will likely provoke more constitutional
questions as lower courts continue to grant speech-restrictive injunc-
tions. In addition to future court-ordered injunctions, the Court may
also have to consider the constitutionality of the much-litigated Free-
dom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994.78 The Court would
then have to address directly how harassment and abusive contact al-
ter First Amendment rights.79 Furthermore, lower courts' ability to
extend Madsen and Schenck to other contexts, such as labor picketing,
also remains uncertain.80 The unique nature of decisions that impli-
cate abortion rights,8 ' as well as the severity and concreteness of the
harm that overzealous anti-abortion demonstrators produce, suggest
that buffer zones might be restricted to abortion protests, or at least to
cases involving medical privacy and health risks.8 2 At some point, the
Court will have to establish a clearer standard for determining the
permissible extent of speech-restrictive injunctions.
"I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. Class Actions
Certification Requirements. - In the last few decades, courts have
seen an enormous increase in the number of "mass tort" cases, in
which a large number of victims have been injured by the products or
78 18 U.S.C. § 248 (I994). The "FACE" Act has been litigated extensively. See Alan E.
Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech,
and Protected Expression in Anti-abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 553, 571-84 (I996)
(analyzing several cases adjudicating the constitutionality of FACE); Linda Greenhouse, High
Court Upholds rs-Foot Buffer Zone at Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TMEms, Feb. 20, 1997, at Ai.
79 The Court might also have to address the difficult problem of defining proscribable harass-
ment. See Brownstein, supra note 53, at 1164-66.
80 See Joan Biskupic, High Court to Hear Abortion Protesters' Appeal of 'Buffer Zone' Order,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1996, at A8 (stating that the ruling in Schenck "could ultimately affect un-
ion picketers, civil rights demonstrators and advocates in numerous other controversies").
81 Cf. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that the Court's abortion decisions have created an "ad hoc nullification machine").
82 Madsen and several earlier cases emphasize that courts must carefully consider the context
in which restrictions on speech apply. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 772; see also NLRB v. Baptist
Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 783-84 n.12 (1979) (noting the importance of maintaining a restful at-
mosphere at hospitals); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 1i6 (1972) (stating that "the
nature of a place [and] 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations ...
that are reasonable'" (quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 1027, 1042 (x969))).
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actions of a defendant or defendants.' As one commentator has recog-
nized, although mass tort suits may be outnumbered by more "mun-
dane" tort suits such as those concerning car accidents, 2 they nonethe-
less present special problems because they are concentrated in a few
jurisdictions3 and involve complicated issues of causation and liabil-
ity.4 Therefore, lawyers and courts alike have searched for solutions to
what many scholars have described as the "crisis" of mass tort litiga-
tion. 5 In this search, however, the desire for innovative solutions has
often collided with the limits of courts' authority to craft them. Last
Term, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,6 the Supreme Court
made clear that courts do not have the power to certify a "settlement
class" that fails to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23. Although the Court was wise to restrict courts' authority in
this instance, it left a void that Congress, as the branch of government
most directly accountable to the polity, should step in to fill.
In Amchem, the Court struck down what may have been the larg-
est class action settlement in history.7 Twenty former asbestos manu-
facturers, acting through the Center for Claims Resolution ("CCR'),8
proposed to settle with a class consisting of persons who had not pre-
viously filed suit against a CCR defendant and who had been exposed,
occupationally or through the occupational exposure of a spouse or
family member, to asbestos attributable to a CCR defendant, or had a
spouse or family member who had been so exposed.9 This class could
have numbered in the hundreds of thousands, even the millions.' 0
On January 15, 1993, representatives of the plaintiffs and CCR de-
fendants presented a complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement, and
ajoint motion for conditional class certification to the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania." The settlement proposal
was an "exhaustive document exceeding ioo pages," which outlined in
detail payment schedules, definitions of exposure and medical re-
1 See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 563 n.9 (1987).
2 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1343, 135o n.23 (1995).
3 See id. Coffee writes that mass torts such as asbestos have "a capacity to place logistical
pressure on individual courts that is simply unequalled by any other form of civil litigation." Id.
at 1359.
4 See Rosenberg, supra note i, at 563.
5 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 1347.
6 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
7 See id. at 2250.
8 "The assets of the CCR companies, together with their insurance coverage, represent a sig-
nificant portion of the funds that will ever be available to pay asbestos-related claims." Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 61o, 617 n.i (3d Cir. 1996).
9 See Amchem, 117 S. Ct at 2239.
10 See id. at 2237.
1 See id. at 2239.
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quirements, provisions for "exceptional" claims, and other matters. 12
The document specified the range of damages that the plan could
award for four qualifying categories of compensable diseases. 13 The
settlement would also have imposed "case flow maximums," limiting
the number of claims payable each year.14 Further, the settlement
would not have fully compensated for loss of consortium of family
members exposed to asbestos,' 5 nor for the increased risk of cancer, the
fear of injury, or other problems faced by "exposure-only" plaintiffs,
even though the law of some states may have recognized such claims. 16
In general, members of the plaintiff class would have been bound by
the settlement in perpetuity, but CCR defendants could have with-
drawn after ten years.' 7 A small number of class members could have
rejected the settlement each year and taken their claims to court but
could not have asserted claims for punitive damages or for increased
risk of cancer.' 8
Judge Reed held that the settlement terms were fair.' 9 He also held
that adequate notice had been given 20 and that class certification un-
der Rule 23(b)(3) 2 ' was appropriate. 22 The district court found that
the requirements of numerosity, commonality, and preponderance were
satisfied.23 Although objectors claimed that conflicts of interest pre-
vented class counsel and representatives from adequately representing
claimants without manifest injuries, the court found that subclasses
were unnecessary 24 and preliminarily enjoined class members from
bringing suit against any CCR defendant in federal or state court.25
12 Id. at 2240.
13 See id. Although the settlement would have allowed for some exceptional claims and ex-
traordinary damages, payments for these claims were also capped. See id.
14 Id.
Is The district court noted that loss of consortium claims, when awarded, were included in the
settlement averages used to determine proper payments under the settlement proposal. See
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.RKD. 246, 278 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
16 See Amchem, I27 S. Ct. at 2240.
17 See id. at 2241.
18 See id.
19 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 325.
20 See id. at 332-34.
21 Rule 2 3 (b)(3 ) allows maintenance of a class action if "the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy," as long as the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met.
These requirements include that
(i) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
22 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 315.
23 See id. at316.
24 See id. at318-19.
2S See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 76, 726-27 (E.D. Pa. gg5).
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The Third Circuit rejected the class certification.26 The court re-
ferred to its own precedent, In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation,27 in holding that a class
formed solely for the purpose of settlement must satisfy the require-
ments of Rule 23(b)(3) as if the case were going to be litigated. 28 The
court found that common questions did not predominate because the
claimants had different levels of asbestos exposure, had different
severities and types of diseases, and came from states whose laws var-
ied widely on several critical issues.29 In short, the court found that
the "number of uncommon issues in this humongous class action" out-
weighed the common issues.30 The court also found that "serious in-
tra-class conflicts preclude this class from meeting the adequacy of
representation requirement."31 The most important of these conflicts
was between "exposure-only" plaintiffs and plaintiffs with manifest in-
juries.32 The conflict problems were such that no group of representa-
tives could be typical.33 The Third Circuit ordered decertification of
the class and vacated the injunction on suits against the CCR defen-
dants.34
In a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.35 The Court de-
clined to reach the objectors' first two challenges - that the settle-
ment proceeding was not a justiciable case or controversy 36 and that
the exposure-only claimants lacked standing to sue in the federal
courts3 7 - because it viewed the class certification issues as disposi-
tive.38
26 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 61o, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1996). The court held
that it need not consider other objections, including challenges to justiciability, subject matter ju-
risdiction, and adequacy of notice. See id. at 623.
27 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
28 See Georgine, 83 F.3 d at 625. In re General Motors held that "[t]here is no language in the
rule that can be read to authorize separate, liberalized criteria for settlement classes." See In re
General Motors, 55 .d at 799.
29 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626-30. The critical issues on which the relevant states' laws var-
ied included the viability of claims for future harm; the availability of causes of action for medical
monitoring and increased cancer risk; the required standards of proof; the limitations period; and
the availability of joint and several liability. See id. at 627.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 630.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 632.
34 See id. at 635.
3S See Amchem, 117 S. CtL at 2237.
36 The objectors claimed that the proceeding was not justiciable because it was non-
adversarial and imposed an "administrative compensation regime" on individuals who may never
manifest injury. Id. at 2244. In essence, the Court's failure to reach this claim left open the ques-
tion whether a so-called settlement class action could ever be certified.
37 See id.
38 See id.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg39 introduced the Court's
main holding by reviewing the characteristics of class actions provided
for by the Federal Rules. 40 She observed that, "[w]hile the text of Rule
23(b)(3) does not exclude from certification cases in which individual
damages run high, the Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind
vindication of 'the rights of groups of people who individually would
be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at
all.' 41 However, she acknowledged that "class action practice has be-
come ever more 'adventuresome' in reaction to "concerns about the
efficient use of court resources and the conservation of funds to com-
pensate claimants who do not line up early in a litigation queue.142
Justice Ginsburg, addressing the circuit split regarding the impact of a
proposed settlement on class certification,4 3 overturned the Third Cir-
cuit's holding that settlement was irrelevant to the appropriateness of
certification. 44 However, the Court's holding was extremely limited.
Although a district court considering certification need not consider
whether a "settlement class" would present "intractable management
problems" at trial, it must pay "undiluted, even heightened, attention"
to the other requirements of the Rule.45 In part because the court of
appeals had actually "homed in on settlement terms in explaining why
it found the absentees' interests inadequately represented," the Court
held that the rejection of class certification would stand.46
Justice Ginsburg warned that courts must be mindful that they
must enforce the requirements as they are currently written in the
Rules: they may not determine that the fairness of a settlement super-
sedes the need to conform with Rule 23's certification requirements.47
The standards protecting absent class members prevent certifications
made on the "court's gestalt judgment."48 In addition, if class certifi-
cation were allowed despite the impossibility of litigation, class counsel
would be deprived of perhaps its biggest bargaining weapon - the
threat of litigation - and the quality of settlements would suffer.49 In
this case, the Court found that the class did not meet the requirements
39 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice
Ginsburg's opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which Justice Stevens joined. Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
40 See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
41 Id. at 2246 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, io B.C. INDUs. & COM. L. REv.
497, 497 (I969)).
42 Id. at 2247.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 2248.
45 Id. (citation omitted).
46 Id.
47 See id. at 2248-49.
48 Id. at 2248.
49 See id. at 2248-49.
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of predominance s° and adequacy of representation. The disparate
questions highlighted by the Third Circuit opinion undermined class
cohesion and made a finding of predominance impossible.,' Similarly,
representation could not be adequate because the currently injured
and the exposure-only plaintiffs were included in one class.5 2 As Jus-
tice Ginsburg pointed out, the currently injured are interested in "gen-
erous immediate payments"; exposure-only plaintiffs, in "ensuring an
ample, inflation-protected fund for the future. '5 3 In conclusion, the
Court noted that a "nationwide administrative claims processing re-
gime" may be the "most secure, fair, and efficient means of compen-
sating victims of asbestos exposure."54 However, a court could not
create such a structure under the current Rule 23 . 55
Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
that settlement is relevant to class certification,5 6 but argued that more
weight should be given to settlement-related issues in determining pre-
dominance.5 7 Because the Court's holding that settlement was rele-
vant to certification meant that the Third Circuit had operated under
a legal standard that was no longer correct, Justice Breyer argued that
the case should have been remanded for consideration under the
proper standard.58 He also criticized the Court for understating the
importance of settling the asbestos claims, 9 and for implying that the
settlement was unfair.60 Finally, Justice Breyer noted his reluctance
"to set aside the District Court's findings without more assurance than
I have that they are wrong."61
The Amchem Court was justified in refusing to certify the class, be-
cause the class never could have met the requirements of Rule 23. The
plaintiffs' one shared trait - exposure to asbestos - was outweighed
by the great disparities in their situations. Thus, the class could not
meet the "predominance" requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). In addition,
the class never would have been able to satisfy the "representativeness"
50 Specifically, the district court's consideration, as an element of predominance, of the com-
mon "interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation for their claims, while minimizing the
risks and transaction costs inherent in the asbestos litigation process as it occurs presently in the
tort system," Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., I57 F.R.D. 246, 316 (E.D. Pa. '994), was errone-
ous, although the Court noted that this interest was "fit for legislative consideration." Amchem,
117 S. Ct at 2249.
51 See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250.
52 See id. at 2250-5.
53 Id. at 2251. The proposed settlement was not adjusted for inflation, but it did provide for
payment levels to be adjusted by renegotiation after io years. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 277.
54 Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2252.
55 See id.
56 See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57 See id. at 2253.
S8 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id. at 2252.
61 Id. at 2254.
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requirement of Rule 23(a). Although the named plaintiffs included ex-
posure-only plaintiffs, there remained an inherent conflict of interest
between the exposure-only and currently injured plaintiffs. 62
The courts are not qualified to, and should not, create a new type
of class action.63  Nor should courts allow class action settlements
based only on determinations that they are "fair." Certifying classes on
this basis would undermine the rule of law and reduce certainty in fu-
ture suits.6 4 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated
after an extensive deliberative process, involving numerous reviewers
from both the legislative and judicial branches to protect all parties. 6
Courts are neither qualified nor empowered to presume that they can
improve on such rules.
In addition, the Supreme Court should not, as some have sug-
gested, respond to the problem of mass torts by amending Rule 23 to
allow settlement classes explicitly.66 As Justice Ginsburg noted, the
threat of litigation may be the strongest tool plaintiffs have in settle-
ment negotiations.67  In situations in which "sweetheart settlements"
are already a danger because of the lack of true monitoring by plain-
tiffs who may not yet be injured or who may be prone to freeriding,68
it would be especially problematic to allow defendants to deal with
disarmed plaintiff classes.69  Other problems inherent in settlement
class actions stem from the lack of available information from closed
negotiations. It would be difficult for courts to tell whether the parties
had improperly manipulated the scope of the class to attain settle-
ment,70 and lawyers for other potential plaintiffs would be denied the
necessary information to assess the settlement. 71  Finally, if certifica-
62 See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2251.
63 See id. at 2248.
64 The plaintiffs in this case (or at least their representatives) were willing to bargain away a
chance at a more generous verdict for more certain, albeit possibly lower, payment under the set-
tlement. Although it may bring certainty to the plaintiffs involved, bending the rules today would
provide less future certainty and predictability.
65 See Amchem, I17 S. CL at 2248.
66 See Proposed Amendment to FED. R. CIrV. P. 23, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 559 (1996).
67 See Amchem, I17 S. Ct. at 2248.
65 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1351, 1352 n.25; Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEo. LJ. 295, 321 (1996). Courts may also be more willing to approve
settlements that are disadvantageous to "hypothetical" plaintiffs, while providing plaintiffs cur-
rently before the court with more protection. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 2362.
69 Another danger is that defendants may be able to "shop" for the plaintiffs' lawyer willing to
settle for the lowest amount. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 2354; Nagareda, supra note 68, at 321
(suggesting that settlement classes may exacerbate the competition between plaintiffs' lawyers for
a position as class counsel); see also General Motors Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d iio6, 1125 (7th
Cir. 1979) (noting that, when there is "the danger of 'attorney-shopping,'" plaintiffs' attorneys
"negotiate from a position of weakness").
70 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
787 (3d Cir. 1995).
71 See id. at 788 (citing General Motors, 594 F.2d at 1125).
1997]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
tion and settlement were to occur simultaneously, there is the risk that
the settlement would look like a fait accompli to class members7 2
Admittedly, courts must judge the fairness of class action settle-
ments.73 However, judges may not have the proper incentives to pro-
tect plaintiffs in these situations. Judges have a strong motivation to
approve the settlement of cases that threaten to consume hundreds or
thousands of hours of their time,74 and one study has shown that
judges are willing to approve most settlements without extensive
hearings. 75
The asbestos litigation illustrates many problems that defy easy
resolution by the courts. One of the most serious may be inconsistent,
even arbitrary, verdicts. As one Philadelphia judge observed, "[tihe
asbestos litigation often resembles the casinos 6o miles east of Phila-
delphia, more than a courtroom procedure."7 6  Reasonably, plaintiffs
and potential plaintiffs want some certainty of result, even if it re-
quires settling for a less generous amount. However, the court system,
with the inconsistencies of individualized verdicts and the variances in
state law, is unlikely to be able to provide the certainty that class ac-
tion plaintiffs desire.
In addition, asbestos plaintiffs would prefer less costly payments
than courts provide. Currently, less than 40% of money paid by asbes-
tos defendants goes to victims. 77  With its individualized, and, thus
costly, system of justice, the court system is unlikely to offer a solution
to this problem. Although some have argued that less expensive litiga-
tion for defendants will not necessarily translate into more compensa-
tion per plaintiff,78 it likely would actually translate into compensation
for a greater number of plaintiffs in the asbestos litigation because of
the "fixed pie" nature of the available funds.7 9 In addition, reducing
72 See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 68o-8I (7th
Cir. 1987).
73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d).
74 As Coffee notes:
Some judges have come perilously close to admitting that the mass tort litigation crisis is
primarily a crisis of mind-numbing boredom, which requires appellate courts to approve
the certification of mass tort class actions in order to relieve trial judges of "litigation 're-
runs' for those who face a series of identical pending cases."
Coffee, supra note 2, at 135o n.23 (quoting Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Go-
ing, Gone?, 98 F.RD. 323, 328 (x983)).
75 A study of two federal district courts found that over 85% of settlements were approved
without changes and that the median length of a fairness hearing was around 40 minutes. See
Coffee, supra note 2, at 1348 n.14.
76 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., IS7 F.R.D. 246, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (quoting School Dist.
v. Lake Asbestos Ltd., 789 F.2d 996, iooi (3d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77 See id.
78 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 296, 325-26 (1996).
79 More than a dozen asbestos manufacturers had declared bankruptcy by iggx, see Georgine,
157 F.R.D. at 263 (citing In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 420
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the waste generated by the repetitious nature of asbestos litigation 0 is
in the interest of society as a whole.
Such considerations suggest that, although the court system is ca-
pable of handling most classes of cases, the asbestos litigation should
be handled outside the current system. Removing this exceptional
class of cases would not only solve the instant problems, but also leave
behind a healthier system. 1 If the asbestos litigation gives rise to
more than a million claims, as has been suggested,8 2 the best solution
is an administrative one. A congressionally prescribed remedy would
protect future claimants more than one negotiated by plaintiffs' law-
yers. 3 Elected legislators have a duty to protect all their constituents,
unlike plaintiffs' lawyers, who are more likely to protect currently in-
jured plaintiffs at the cost of those with future injuries.
One possible model for an administrative claims structure is the
black lung disease legislation, which determines the liability of coal
mine operators to their former employees suffering from pneumoconio-
sis caused by their employment.8 4 Although the black lung claims
processing structure has been far from perfect, 5 it has provided a
workable middle path between traditional tort law (with its individu-
alized causation requirement) and a blanket payment system. The
(J.P.M.L. iggi)), and there are "hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions" of claimants waiting in
the wings. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2237.
80 See Asbestos Products, 771 F. Supp. at 419 ("[T]he same issues are litigated over and over;
transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by nearly two to one.") (quoting Report of the Judi-
cial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 1-3 (Mar. iggi)). The total legal cost
of asbestos litigation is estimated to be over $I billion. See David Rosenberg, The Dusting of
America: A Story of Asbestos - Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1693, 1694
(1986) (reviewing PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL (1985)).
81 Removing asbestos claims from the court system will allow the courts to consider other
types of claims more quickly. By x9go, the backlog of asbestos cases numbered more than 70,000,
and 6% of all civil cases filed in the federal courts in that year were asbestos-related. See
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 264-65.
82 See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2237.
83 Cf. Nagareda, supra note 68, at 322-23 (suggesting that one solution to the mass tort prob-
lem would be to combine the initiative of plaintiffs' lawyers with an administrative system). Al-
though Congress may also be more susceptible to the claims of already injured plaintiffs than to
the claims of the less sympathetic exposure-only plaintiffs, it should be less biased than plaintiffs'
lawyers. Cf. id. at 323 (CT]he wholesale perspective characteristic of regulatory agencies com-
plements the demands for collective resolution presented by mass tort claims - even those of fu-
ture claimants."). In fact, several commentators claim that the lawyers in the proposed asbestos
settlement traded future claims for settlement of pending ones. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feast-
ing While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Arnchem Products, Inc., 8o CORNELL L. REv. 1o45,
1078-86 (1995); cf. Amchem, x7 S. Ct. at 2238-39 (outlining the negotiations that took place be-
tween the asbestos defendants and plaintiffs and the resulting settlement of the future claims).
84 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 9oI-950 (1994); see also Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Asbestos Litigation 42 (Mar. iggi) (comments of Judge Hogan) (suggesting "passage by
Congress of an administrative claims procedure similar to the Black Lung legislation").
85 See Rita A. Massie, Modiflcation of Benefits for Claimants Under the Federal Black Lung
Benefits Program, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 1023, 1052 (1995).
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black lung legislation is not a direct analogue, yet it suggests that leg-
islative action can provide sensible solutions to a mass tort problem.
Several congressional solutions to the asbestos problem have been
proposed. 6 Three plans have been introduced as bills. The Senate
bill, introduced in i981, would have forced existing workers' compen-
sation programs to reimburse workers for asbestos-related diseases.8 7
The first House bill, introduced in the same year, would have insti-
tuted a fund to which manufacturers and importers of asbestos, as well
as the tobacco industry, would contribute.88 The second House bill,
which followed in 1983, would have created a somewhat similar Toxic
Substance Employee Compensation Insurance Pool, funded both by
employers of injured workers and by enterprises involved in the pro-
duction of asbestos.8 9 Other proposals, such as the creation of new
federal common law for asbestos9o or a new mass tort procedure act,91
have never made it to Congress.
Proposed congressional solutions have failed for several reasons.
The 1981 Senate bill was seen as a bailout of the asbestos industry and
thus rejected.92 Although it is not exactly clear why the House bills
failed, it may have been partly that both sides hoped it would all be
worked out in court, or irrationally believed that the crisis would
somehow fade away.93 Neither of these things is likely to happen in
the near future.
The best plan would be one somewhat like the 1983 House pro-
posal, which required that contributions be determined by estimated
liability.94 This process would ensure fair allocations of liability with-
out imposing the unrealistic requirement that victims identify the
manufacturers directly liable for their diseases. However, the proposal
needs to be modified in a few ways. Litigation history should be
eliminated from the determination of liability: only the asbestos con-
86 See, e.g., H.R. 3175, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 5524, 97th Cong. (i98i); S. 1643, 97th Cong.
(I98i). For a more complete summary of the three bills, see Louis rlreiger, Comment, Relief for
Asbestos Victims: A Legislative Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 179, 186-9 (1983).
87 See S. 1643, § 1o(a); Gideon Mark, Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS
LJ. 871, 903-o4 (1983).
88 See H.R. 5524, § 203.
89 See H.R- 3175, § i; Mark, supra note 87, at 9o4-o5.
90 See Patricia Zimand, Note, National Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Problems Must Be
Solved, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 899, 917-20 (i991).
91 See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Proce-
dure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. io39, 1o88-9o (1986).
92 See Suits That Are Searing Asbestos, Bus. Wy., Apr. 13, ig8i, at i69, 169 ("[The bill] has
little chance of success because it is viewed as an industry bailout.").
93 At least one commentator has suggested that each party involved had its own reasons for
blocking the bills: "The Reagan administration is not interested in any legislation calling for more
federal spending in this area, labor is not interested in abridging its tort rights[,] and the insurance
industry is not interested in 'federalization' of its business." Floyd H. Knowlton, Asbestos Litiga-
tion: Which Way Out?, THE BRIEF, Aug. 1983, at 4, 4.
94 See H.R. 3175, § II(c)(3)(B).
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tent of the products of the manufacturers, the relative risk posed by
the type of asbestos included in products, and the amount of exposure
related to each product should be taken into account.95 Litigation his-
tory should be irrelevant because it causes apportionment to depend
both on variable state law (thus advantaging manufacturers whose
products were used in states with defendant-friendly rules) and possi-
bly on the speed with which workers became ill because of certain
manufacturers' products. Also, to the greatest extent possible, pay-
ments from the fund should be determined by clear guidelines. Plain-
tiffs with the same diseases and levels of disability should receive the
same payments, regardless of other factors, such as the states in which
the workers reside.96 The 1983 House proposal also included the most
sensible means of determining entitlements to compensation - a com-
bination of irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions based on the type
of disease and history of exposure. 97 Although presumptions may lead
to the payment of workers whose diseases were not caused by asbestos,
the cost savings from settling the issue of eligibility would likely more
than make up for any losses in the accuracy of liability determinations.
Rejecting the use of presumptions would reopen the causation issue
and possibly make the process almost as expensive as litigation itself.
Overall, such a program would capitalize on the efficiency possibilities
of the administrative structure, while providing compensation for the
injured and fulfilling the deterrence goals of the tort system. 98
Although previous congressional proposals have failed, the Court's
recent move has made the need for a congressional solution more ur-
gent. The Court's reasoning in Amchem makes it unlikely that any
class that includes asbestos-exposed plaintiffs who have not yet devel-
oped a disease will be certified. Therefore, to provide the certainty
needed by future plaintiffs and defendants, Congress should intervene.
Rather than "bailing out" the industry,99 Congress should provide a
considered apportionment of liability that compensates the injured
while ensuring that the injurers face the consequences of their actions.
95 See id.
96 The only other factors that should be taken into account are factors that could have caused
or contributed to the plaintiff's disease, such as smoking. Payments should not necessarily be de-
nied if these factors are present, but should be discounted to account for the fact that the contrib-
uting factor might have caused the disease. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 859
(1984).
97 See H.R. 3175, § 6.
98 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF AccIDENTs 68-94 (1970) (discussing the issue of
"general deterrence" in lowering the cost to society of accidents).
99 Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 80, at 1701-o2 (criticizing the Senate bill as "designed to bail out
the asbestos industry").
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B. Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 403 - Unfair Prejudice. - The Supreme Court has seldom
scrutinized Federal Rule of Evidence 403,' which allows exclusion of
relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice,"2 despite the rule's position as "the cor-
nerstone" of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 While commentators
have debated Rule 403's impact on the common law of evidence,4 the
constitutional presumption of innocence,- and the structure of trials, 6
the Court has avoided providing detailed guidance as to the proper
application of the rule.7 Last Term, in Old Chief v. United States,8 the
Court addressed one outstanding issue under Rule 403, ruling that a
trial court abuses its discretion when, in a prosecution for possession of
a handgun by a felon, it admits evidence of the name or nature of the
defendant's prior conviction despite the defendant's offer to stipulate
to his or her felon status. In holding that the risk of unfair prejudice
from such evidence outweighs its probative value, the Court correctly
resolved one aspect of the "most frequently litigated issue under Rule
403"9 and provided a useful framework for analyzing other applica-
tions of the rule. Yet the Court's broad reaffirmation of the prosecu-
tion's right to narrative integrity muddied the Court's ruling.
After Johnny Lynn Old Chief took part in an altercation involving
a gunshot, federal prosecutors charged him with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(I), which makes it a crime for a person "who has been con-
victed in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
1 Nine Supreme Court opinions have mentioned Rule 403 since the Federal Rules of Evidence
came into effect in 1975. Search of Westlaw, SCT Database (Aug. 21, 1997).
2 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 403.
3 Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 497 (1983) (quoting Herbert Peterfreund, Relevancy
and Its Limits in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts: Article
IV, 25 REc. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 80, 83 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41
VAND. L. REV. 879, 883-84 (1988).
5 See D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Teatment of
Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 332-43 (989).
6 See David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1155,
1170, 1205-09 (1992); J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-Choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial
Evidence, 64 IND. LJ. 831, 831, 834-40 (1989).
7 The Court's statements regarding Rule 403 have generally emphasized the rule's grant of
discretion to trial judges. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (I984).
8 117 S. Ct. 644 (z997).
9 Gold, supra note 3, at 524 (citing 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 525 (1978)). Lower courts had long been divided
on the right, vel non, of a defendant to stipulate to the fact of a prior conviction in a felon-in-
possession case. See Old Chief, z17 S. Ct. at 649 (listing circuit court decisions).
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exceeding one year" to "possess in or affecting commercef any firearm
... or to receive any firearm ... which has been shipped or trans-
ported in interstate or foreign commerce."10 This "felon-in-possession"
charge stemmed from Old Chief's prior conviction for assault causing
serious bodily injury."
Prior to trial, Old Chief moved for an order preventing the prose-
cution from mentioning, "offering into evidence[,] or soliciting any tes-
timony from any witness regarding the prior criminal convictions of
the Defendant, except to state that the Defendant has been convicted
of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (i) year."12 Old
Chief argued that his willingness to stipulate to the fact of a previous
conviction made the name and details of the prior crime inadmissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 4o3.13 The district court ruled that
the prosecution was not required to accept Old Chief's stipulation and
permitted the prosecution to present the jury with details of Old
Chief's prior conviction.' 4  Old Chief was subsequently convicted of
all three charged counts.' s
In a terse opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 16 Relying on circuit
precedent,' 7 the court stated that "the government is entitled to prove
a prior felony offense through introduction of probative evidence."',
The court refused to inquire into the possible prejudicial effect on ju-
rors that introduction of the nature of a prior conviction may produce,
declaring that "[u]nder Ninth Circuit law, a stipulation is not proof,
and, thus, it has no place in the FRE 403 balancing process."'19
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. 20  Writing for the
Court, Justice Souter 21 first rejected Old Chief's claim that the name
of his prior offense was irrelevant and thus inadmissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 402.22 He noted that a record of Old Chief's convic-
tion would make his status as a felon "more probable than it would
have been without the evidence," and thus was relevant.23
10 x8 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994); see Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647.
1 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647.
12 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 See id.
14 See id.
Is See id.
16 See United States v. Old Chief, No. 94-30277, i995 WL 325745, at *i (9th Cir. May 31,
2995).
17 See United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1993).
18 Old Chief, 1995 WL 325745, at *i (citing Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 69o).
19 Id. (citing Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 691-92).
20 See Old Chief, I17 S. Ct. at 649.
21 Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Souter's opinion.
22 See Old Chief, I17 S. Ct. at 649. Rule 402 states that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible." FED. R Evm. 402. Rule 4oI defines relevant evidence to be "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the ac-
tion more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
23 Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649.
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Having established the pivotal issue to be whether admission of the
name of Old Chief's prior conviction had been unfairly prejudicial
under Rule 403, Justice Souter entered into a four-step analysis. First,
he established that the prejudicial effect at issue in a felon-in-
possession case - "generalizing a defendant's earlier bad act into bad
character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad
act now charged" - clearly was one that Rule 403 is designed to pre-
vent.24 He noted that evidence of prior wrongdoing is rejected not be-
cause such evidence is irrelevant, but rather because such evidence is
excessively persuasive; admitting such evidence might lead the jury "to
prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportu-
nity to defend against a particular charge."25
Second, Justice Souter outlined two possible methods for weighing
unfair prejudice against probative value: evidence may be viewed "as
an island,"26 or in "the full evidentiary context of the case as the court
understands it when the ruling must be made."27 Rejecting the former
method because it would admit unfairly prejudicial evidence,28 Justice
Souter declared that the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 403 makes
clear that "when Rule 403 confers discretion by providing that evi-
dence 'may' be excluded, the discretionary judgment may be informed
not only by assessing an evidentiary item's twin tendencies," but also
by comparing those tendencies with "evidentiary alternatives."2 9
Third, the majority examined the probative value and possible
prejudicial effect of evidence of "the name or nature of the prior of-
fense" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I). 30  Justice Souter stated that such
evidence risks being unfairly prejudicial "whenever the official record
offered by the government would be arresting enough to lure a jturor
into a sequence of bad character reasoning."31 Exclusion of the evi-
dence was particularly appropriate in Old Chief's case, because Old
Chief's proffered stipulation presented the district court "with alterna-
24 Id.
2S Id. at 65o-5i (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Justice Souter noted that Rule of Evidence 404(b) explicitly bars the
admission of evidence of past wrongs or crimes to prove character. See id. at 65 x.
26 Id. When viewed as an island, the probative value and unfair prejudice of a piece of evi-
dence are "the sole reference points in deciding whether the danger substantially outweighs the
value" of the evidence. Id.
27 Id.
28 See id. at 651-52. Justice Souter argued that a party might be enticed to offer prejudicial
evidence because "[t]he worst [a party offering such evidence] would have to fear would be a rul-
ing sustaining a Rule 403 objection, and if that occurred, he could simply fall back to offering
substitute evidence." Id. at 652.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. Justice Souter noted that the risk "would be especially obvious" when the "prior convic-
tion was for a gun crime." Id.
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live, relevant, admissible evidence" of a prior conviction that was "not
merely relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence" of the charge. 32
Fourth, the Court considered and rejected the government's argu-
ment that the prosecution's right to prove its case as it sees fit means
that a defendant cannot compel the prosecution to accept a stipulation
to felon status. Justice Souter acknowledged that evidence may have
"force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning" and that a detailed nar-
rative may build its persuasiveness not only on facts, but also on the
intricate relationship between those facts.33  Moreover, a stipulation
may not meet the jury's expectations. The jury, Justice Souter noted,
expects stories and not syllogisms, and the introduction of a stipulation
when jurors expect narrative detail may not just fail to advance the
prosecution's case; it may even undermine its case by provoking the
jury's distrust.34 Thus, in general, "the prosecution is entitled to prove
its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence
away."35 Yet Justice Souter found this general rule inapplicable to de-
terminations of a defendant's legal status: "Proving status without
telling exactly why that status was imposed leaves no gap in the story
of a defendant's subsequent criminality" and does not "confuse or of-
fend or provoke reproach. '36 The only functional difference between
Old Chief's offered stipulation and the prior conviction record the
prosecution entered into evidence was "the [prejudicial] risk inherent
in the one and wholly absent from the other."37  Therefore, Justice
Souter concluded, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
the name and nature of Old Chief's prior conviction.38
In a sharply worded opinion, Justice O'Connor dissented.39 Criti-
cizing the majority for both pronouncing "a rule that misapplies [Rule]
403" and upsetting "longstanding precedent regarding criminal prose-
cutions," Justice O'Connor noted that the mere fact that evidence
harms a defendant does not automatically make such evidence unfairly
prejudicial under Rule 403.40 Justice O'Connor argued that
§ 922(g)(I)'s structure demonstrates that Congress intended that jurors
32 Id. at 653.
33 Id.
34 See id. at 654.
3S Id.
36 Id. at 655. The Court acknowledged that evidence of prior acts might be admissible under
Rule 404(b) if used "to prove 'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.'" Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
37 Id.
38 See id. Justice Souter noted that the holding did not affect cases not involving proof of
status: "the prosecutor's choice [of evidence] will generally survive a Rule 4o3 analysis when a
defendant seeks to force the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a coherent narra-
tive of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offense for which he is being tried." Id. at 656.
39 The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's dissent.
40 Old Chief, Iz1 S. Ct. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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learn the name and nature of a defendant's prior conviction.41 Relying
on § 922(g)(i)'s exclusion of "certain business crimes and state misde-
meanors,"42 the dissent claimed that "[w]ithin the meaning of
§ 922(g)(I) ... 'a crime' is not an abstract or metaphysical concept"; a
defendant's prior conviction "connotes not only that he is a prior felon,
but also that he has engaged in specific past criminal conduct.143
Justice O'Connor continued by critiquing the majority's analysis of
Rule 404(b). Although Rule 404(b) excludes character evidence, it "ex-
pressly contemplates the admission of evidence of prior crimes for
other purposes."44 Introducing evidence of prior crimes directed at es-
tablishing a necessary element of the crime charged is one such pur-
pose. 45  The majority's conclusion to the opposite effect, Justice
O'Connor opined, "defies common sense."46
The dissent also took issue with Justice Souter's discussion of the
prosecution's right to present its case in the manner that it sees fit.
Justice O'Connor noted that "[a] jury is as likely to be puzzled by the
'missing chapter' resulting from a defendant's stipulation ... as it
would be by the defendant's conceding any other element of the
crime."47 Moreover, Justice O'Connor maintained that the constitu-
tional requirement that the prosecution prove all elements of a charged
crime beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily implies the government's
prerogative to reject a defendant's offer to stipulate to an element of
the charged crime.48 "[A] defendant's stipulation to an element of an
offense does not remove that element from the jury's consideration....
[T]he defendant's strategic decision to 'agree' that the Government
need not prove an element cannot relieve the Government of its bur-
den" to provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt.49
Old Chief serves as an important reminder that principles of fair-
ness lie at the heart of the American criminal justice system. The
Court was right to recognize that evidence of the name or nature of
past crimes in § 922(g)(I) prosecutions unfairly prejudices juries
41 See id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 656-57. Justice O'Connor added that it is fundamental to "our system of justice (that]
a person is not simply convicted of 'a crime' or 'a felony,'" but rather is convicted "of a specified
offense." Id. at 657.
4Id.
45 See id.
46 Id. at 658. The dissent contended that a limiting jury instruction could be used to mitigate
any prejudice that resulted from the introduction of evidence of prior crimes. See id.
47 Id. at 659.
48 See id.
49 Id. (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69-70 (iggi)). The dissent also noted that to
permit a defendant to compel the government to accept a stipulation "runs afoul" of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 23(a), which states that a defendant may not waive her right to a jury trial
absent government agreement. Id. at 66o.
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against defendants.5 o  Additionally, the Court's decision provides
needed guidance to lower courts applying Rule 403 both within and
beyond the context of felon-in-possession cases. Despite these positive
steps, however, Old Chief eventually may be remembered more for its
broad statements regarding the prosecution's right to prove its case as
it sees fit. This broad language threatens not only to obscure the clar-
ity offered by the Court's Rule 403 analysis, but also to increase trial
courts' willingness to admit unfairly prejudicial evidence.
The decision in Old Chief, although limited to cases involving proof
of felon status,51 significantly clarifies Rule 403 jurisprudence. 52 The
Court explicitly stated that the probative value of evidence under Rule
403 may "be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives. 5 3  Al-
though the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 403 likewise suggests
that a proper inquiry into probative value requires consideration of
evidentiary alternatives,54 prior to Old Chief lower courts had at times
failed even to conduct the Rule 403 balancing test,5 5 much less to
compare evidentiary alternatives. The Court's mandate that lower
courts weigh the probative and prejudicial values of evidentiary alter-
natives along with the evidence in question should add structure to
trial court decisionmaking and facilitate review of such decisions.56
Old Chief also furthers evidence jurisprudence by using a Rule 403
balancing test to create a rule barring admission of the name of a past
crime in most felon-in-possession cases,57 thus erecting concrete limits
to trial court discretion. Justice Souter declared that refusing to admit
the name of a prior conviction "will be the general rule when proof of
50 Empirical evidence demonstrates that evidence of prior crimes is likely to bias jurors against
a defendant. See Tanford, supra note 6, at 838. As the court in United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d
i (ist Cir. 1994), recognized, evidence of the nature of a past crime serves little purpose other than
prejudicing the jury against a defendant: "there exists no reason, other than the government's de-
sire to color the jury's perception of the defendant's character, for revealing the nature of the de-
fendant's prior felony." Id. at 5.
51 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 n.7.
52 Cf. Gold, supra note 3, at 498 (noting that "the courts have generally reacted to claims of
unfair prejudice on an ad hoc basis" and that "[tihe search for unfairly prejudicial evidence has
thus been reduced to the often tried but seldom very true approach: 'I know it when I see it'").
53 Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652.
54 See FED. R. EvID. 4o3 advisory committee's note.
55 See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 59, 61-62 & nn.7-8 (1984); Tanford, supra note 6, at 862.
56 Cf. Robert H. Aronson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Model for Improved Evidentiary
Decisionmaking in Washington, 54 WASH. L. REv. 31, 42 (1978) ("[The] tension between the de-
sirability of formal and nonformal evidentiary rules ... manifests itself on at least two levels: a
code versus case-by-case determination by appellate courts, and strictly defined rules ... versus
loosely defined guidelines and greater trial court discretion, reviewable only for abuse thereof.");
Gold, supra note 3, at 5oo ("Unbridled judicial discretion leads to unpredictability, inequality of
treatment and elevation of individual whim over principles validated by experience as well as by
the popular will.").
57 Evidence of the nature of the prior crime may still be admissible under Rule 404(b). See
Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
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convict status is at issue."58 Justice Souter's use of a Rule 403 balanc-
ing test to arrive at a rule that effectively eliminates trial court discre-
tion in felon-in-possession cases establishes that there are limits to the
discretion Rule 403 grants to trial judges, and also that Rule 403 itself
may be used to construct such limits. Such a formulation marks a de-
parture from previous Rule 403 jurisprudence, because Rule 403 "was
designed as a guide for handling situations for which no specific rules
have been formulated." 9 Prior to Old Chief, commentators noted that
appellate courts have often wrongly interpreted Rule 403 to confer an
unreviewable grant of discretion to trial courts.60 Old Chief suggests
that the Court may have recognized a need for both clear boundaries
to trial court discretion and new methods of creating such boundaries.
The Court did not, however, resolve all ambiguities in Rule 403 ju-
risprudence. The Court failed to specify whether alternative evidence
must be equally probative to the evidence in question, noting only that
"a mere showing of some alternative means of proof" is insufficient to
show abuse of discretion.6 1 The Court also failed to provide guidance
regarding how courts should weigh probative value against unfair
prejudicd.62 The Court's avoidance of further details of the Rule 403
balancing test may reflect a desire not to intervene too deeply in the
discretion Rule 403 grants to trial courts. In fact, the Court's imposi-
tion of a iule for felon-in-possession cases may actually strengthen trial
court discretion generally: by imposing a clear limit in one type of case,
the Court may have signaled that within such limits appellate courts
should avoid interfering with the wide discretion of trial courts. The
Old Chief'Court's failure to specify whether alternative evidence must
provide all of the probativeness offered by the original evidence may
limit the applicability of Old Chief outside the felon-in-possession con-
text because most of the time both the original and the alternative evi-
dence will have varying degrees of probativeness and prejudice. In the
absence of clearer direction concerning the appropriate balance be-
58 Id. at 655-56.
59 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE app.
§ 4o3App.oo[2] at 4o3App.-6 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997).
60 See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5223, at 316; Leonard, supra note 6, at 1162-63;
cf. Lewis, supra note 5, at 343-44 ("Appellate courts apply a deferential standard of review to trial
court evidentiary rulings in general and regard rulings under Rule 403 as particularly deserving of
deference.").
61 Old Chief, 117 S. CL at 651 n.7.
62 The majority stated that evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it tends to "lure the factfinder
into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged," Old Chief,
117 S. Ct. at 65o, but this statement was simply a reiteration of the Advisory Committee's state-
ment that unfair prejudice "means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,"
FED. R. EvID. 4o3 advisory committee's note; cf. Gold, supra note 55, at 6o (stating that Rule 403
"neither defines probative value or unfair prejudice, nor suggests how these seemingly noncompa-
rable qualities of evidence should be weighed").
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tween prejudicial effect and probative value, trial courts will continue
to apply the open-ended balancing test they applied prior to Old Chief.
A more important weakness of the majority opinion was its broad
reaffirmation of the prosecution's right to achieve "the full evidentiary
force" of its case by using "evidence of its own choice. '63 The Court's
conclusions regarding the role of narrative in criminal trials may lead
lower courts astray. In an attempt both to respond to the dissent's
criticism and to cabin the Court's holding, Justice Souter dedicated a
significant portion of his opinion to explaining why the prosecution is
generally entitled to prove its case as it sees fit. This analysis of narra-
tive suffers from four flaws.
First, the Court failed to recognize that Rule 403 itself sufficiently
safeguards the prosecution's interest in narrative integrity. Instead of
considering the probative and prejudicial values of narrative coher-
ence as part of the Rule 403 balancing test, the Court argued that the
prosecution's interest in narrative coherence does not apply when, as
in felon-in-possession cases, the evidence in question relates to a de-
fendant's legal status.64 As the dissent noted, however, the absence of
evidence regarding the prior felony may confuse a jury just as much as
the absence of evidence of a nonstatus element of the crime would. 65
Indeed, the exclusion of evidence will almost always invite jurors to
fill in informational gaps.66 Juror confusion alone cannot be determi-
native of admissibility; the relevant inquiry, in all Rule 403 contexts, is
into probative value and unfair prejudice.
Second, the Court erred when it implied that the prosecution's in-
terest in narrative integrity is inapplicable when the evidence in ques-
tion "goes to an element entirely outside the natural sequence of what
the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to commit the cur-
rent offense." 67  Much evidence that is admissible pursuant to the
63 Old Chief, I17 S. Ct. at 653.
64 See id. at 654-55.
65 See id. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Jurors may infer that the prior crime was a serious
crime, or they may conclude that it was unimportant. Cf. Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect
of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL.
L. REv. ioui, io6o (1978) (noting that "juriesl often develop expectations about the proof that...
will be offered," and thus "[a] party's failure to satisfy those expectations may result in negative
inferences, often unfair ones, being drawn against that party").
The Old Chief decision did not address whether a defendant has the right to introduce the
name and nature of the prior felony when such information is beneficial to him or her. Cf. United
States v. Tavares, 2I F.3d 1, 4 (ist Cir. 1994) (arguing that permitting a defendant "to introduce
evidence that his prior conviction was for a technical, non-violent or white collar crime" would be
"no more appropriate than the reverse tendency").
66 See, e.g., William Finnegan, Doubt, NEW YORKER, Jan. 31, 1994, at 48, 5i (recounting that
the jury the author served on "guessed and speculated about the lives and motives of the alibi
witnesses, trying to put 'the evidence' into some narrative context that made sense").
67 Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655; cf. James Joseph Duane, Stipulations, Judicial Notice, and a
Prosecutor's Supposed "Right" To Prove Undisputed Facts: Oral Argument from an Amicus Curiae
in Old Chief v. United States, 168 F.R.D. 405, 437 (i96) (arguing that the distinction between
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prosecution's right to prove its case with full evidentiary force - such
as the introduction of photos of a murder victim - encompasses ele-
ments unrelated to the defendant's thoughts and actions.68 Instead of
arguing that narrative integrity was irrelevant, the Court should have
acknowledged that any additional probative value that results from
narrative coherence is properly considered by a district court weighing
the probative and prejudicial values of evidence; narrative integrity
may contribute more to prejudice than to probative value.
Third, the Court overstated the force of the "standard rule that the
prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own
choice."69 The Federal Rules of Evidence limit the ways in which a
prosecutor may construct a story.70 The presumption of admissibility
embodied in Rule 403's requirement that unfair prejudice substantially
outweigh probative value is sufficient to protect the prosecution's in-
terest in narrative integrity. The American adversarial system pro-
vides incentives for parties to introduce evidence that is helpful to
their cases, rather than evidence that assists the jury in ascertaining
the truth.71 Rules of Evidence limitations reflect both mistrust of ju-
ries and recognition that incentives to mislead juries are built into the
adversarial system. Thus, although the majority was correct to distin-
guish felon-in-possession cases from other cases in which Rule 403
plays an important role, the Court erred in its explanation of the dis-
tinction. The difference lies not in the role such evidence plays in the
integrity of the prosecution's narrative, but rather in the fact that, due
to the availability of evidence with identical probative value, the Rule
403 balancing test will almost always weigh against admitting the
name and nature of the prior conviction in a felon-in-possession case.
Fourth, the Court wrongly equated the role story-creation plays in
criminal trials with the prosecution's right to construct a story. Narra-
tive is at the heart of the criminal trial process, but trials consist of
status evidence and evidence of actions and state of mind is that in the former, the issue being
stipulated to is "not merely true, but [is] so clearly true that it would [be] a proper subject for ju-
dicial notice").
68 Similarly, although evidence relating to the identity of a murder victim is often relevant to
proving intent or motive, even when such evidence is not relevant, almost any judge would "ad-
mit evidence of [a murder victim's name] over a defendant's objection ... even if it was ... a
popular celebrity." Duane, supra note 67, at 432; accord Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 657 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
69 Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653; cf. Duane, supra note 67, at 435 ("lit is far from obvious ...
that the Government generally enjoys a right to prove any relevant facts any way it pleases .... ).
70 Mirjan Damagka argues that Anglo-American law strives "to structure the fact finders'
analysis of evidence." MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 24 (1997). Damaka char-
acterizes the Anglo-American evidentiary system as atomistic: "The comparatively complex man-
ner in which evidence is developed by opposing lawyers dramatically segregates information that
actually may sway the factfinder's mind from permissible evidence." Mirjan Dama~ka, Atomistic
and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: A Comparative View, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 93 (David S. Clark ed., x9go).
71 See DAMASKA, supra note 70, at 77-86.
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competing narratives, and the crucial story is the one that jurors create
in their own minds, not the story the prosecution presents to the jury.7 2
Tension between the Court's formulaic approach to the Rule 4o3 bal-
ancing test and the majority's broad statements regarding narrative
reflects the structure of a criminal trial itself. American evidence law
is atomistic: it lets the jury construct a story out of the myriad of in-
formation presented in a trial. 73 Rule 403 is one mechanism serving to
filter information presented to the jurors to aid their story construc-
tion.
The Court's opinion reflects the competing values of fairness inter-
ests under Rule 403 and narrative coherence. Ensuring narrative co-
herence does not correspond to truth-finding.7 4 Jurors are, however,
more likely to regard coherent narratives, not nontraditional or nonlin-
ear tales, as truthful stories. More importantly, jurors reach decisions
not only on the basis of information presented at trial, but also on the
basis of preexisting knowledge and world views75 as well as precon-
ceived storylines1 6 Rule 403 lessens the risk that such preconceptions
pose to the fairness of a trial by excluding evidence that is likely to
trigger bias against a defendant. Thus, rather than ensuring narrative
coherence, Rule 403 restricts the manner in which stories are told.
The Court reached the correct result in Old Chief but engaged in a
flawed discussion of the role of narrative in criminal trials. The
Court's unnecessary emphasis on the prosecution's right to narrative
coherence risks sending the wrong signal to lower courts. Outside the
context of felon-in-possession cases, lower courts may believe that Old
Chief instructs them not to take active roles in evidentiary questions.77
72 See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 15
(1983) ("The trial produces 'data' ... that the jurors have to utilize in their decision-making
task."); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE
THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAING 192, 194-95 (Reid Hastie ed.,
1993) (arguing that "jurors impose a narrative story organization on trial information" from evi-
dence that is "unwieldy and unstory-like").
73 See Damaika, supra note 7o, at 93.
74 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 389, 500 (1996) ("[S]torytelling unavoidably limits and shapes
how we determine what is real in a trial . . ."); cf. Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical
Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 41 (I994) (When truth
defies certainty and becomes complex, justice requires difficult decisions on the basis of that
doubt.").
75 See HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 72, at 36 (arguing that jurors attempt to
"construct] a credible narrative by integrating trial testimony and arguments with general world
knowledge"); Taslitz, supra note 74, at 475 C(Eimpirical data... strongly suggests that jurors will
rarely deviate from cultural themes."); Finnegan, supra note 66, at Si.
76 See Sherwin, supra note 74, at 77 ("The array of deeply ingrained, culturally inherited, and
socially instilled storylines that we carry, often subconsciously, in our heads recapitulate an
equally deep sense of how truth and justice operate in the world.").
77 Cf. United States v. Cottman, No. 96-1774, 1997 WL 340344, at *4 (2d Cir. June 20, 1997)
(stating that the Old Chief decision "confirms the vitality of the general rule" that the prosecution
is not required to accept a stipulation to elements of a criminal offense).
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If so, the Court's discussion of narrative may weaken the principles of
fairness that are at the heart of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
thus may undermine an otherwise principled resolution of the issue
presented in Old Chief.
C. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Sentencing Adjustments Based on Acquitted Conduct. - Sen-
tencing proceedings are nothing like criminal trials. Most of the con-
stitutional protections that shape criminal litigation do not apply to the
determination of a convicted defendant's sentence.' Perhaps most cru-
cially, a federal sentencing court is governed by a lower standard of
proof than is a criminal jury;2 thus, a defendant's sentence will often
depend on some facts about which a reasonable doubt exists. Most re-
cently, in United States v. Watts,3 the Supreme Court held that a sen-
tencing court may increase a defendant's sentence on the basis of the
conduct underlying related charges of which the defendant was acquit-
ted, as long as that conduct is established by a preponderance of the
evidence.4 Before Watts, almost every circuit had concluded that a
sentencing court could increase a defendant's sentence for acquitted
conduct - that is, conduct underlying a crime of which a jury found
the defendant not guilty s In order to mitigate the potential unfairness
of this rule, two circuits had held that a district court may depart
downward from an otherwise applicable sentencing range that takes
account of acquitted conduct.6 After Watts, this practice is still viable.
Watts established that a sentence based in part on acquitted conduct is
permissible under the Constitution, the United States Code, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. But even under Watts, a sentencing
court has discretion to fashion a just sentence and not merely to cal-
culate a permissible one.
I See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1179, 1219-20 (1993); cf.
Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 356 (1992) (noting
that the Court has taken a "laissez-faire attitude" toward factfinding at sentencing). The Due
Process Clause does not require sentencing facts to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986). At sentencing, a defendant does not have
the right to a jury trial, see id. at 93, or the right to confront witnesses, see United States v. Ki-
kumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 19go). Sentencing courts may consider prior convictions
that were obtained through unconstitutional criminal proceedings, see Custis v. United States, 51 x
U.S. 485, 497 (1994), as well as evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see United
States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir. 1992).
2 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-92.
3 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997) (per curiam).
4 See id. at 638.
5 See id. at 634 & n.i (citing cases).
6 See United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 185 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Concepcion,
983 F.2d 369, 389 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Both defendants in Watts were convicted of drug-related offenses.
A federal jury convicted Vernon Watts of possessing cocaine with in-
tent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(I), and acquitted him of
using a firearm in the course of a drug offense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). Despite Watts's acquittal on the firearms charge, the district
court, applying section 2D1.i(b)(I) of the Sentencing Guidelines, s in-
creased Watts's offense level because of his firearm possession.9 In an
unrelated prosecution, the government indicted Cheryl Ann Putra for
taking part in separate sales of one and five ounces of cocaine in viola-
tion of § 841(a)(I). 10 The jury returned a guilty verdict for Putra's in-
volvement in the one-ounce sale but found her not guilty with regard
to the five-ounce transaction." The acquittal notwithstanding, the
district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Putra had
taken part in both sales, and based her sentence on the total six ounces
of cocaine.' 2
In separate appeals, two Ninth Circuit panels vacated the defen-
dants' sentences.' 3 Both panels reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding
in United States v. Brady14 that the Sentencing Guidelines did not al-
low a court to increase a defendant's sentence by relying on facts that
an acquitting jury had necessarily rejected.' 5 Each panel held that the
district courts in Watts and Putra had improperly reconsidered the ju-
ries' findings. 16 The Ninth Circuit conceded in Putra that the Brady
holding constituted a "judicial limitation ... beyond any limitation
7 See United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. i995).
8 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a district court determines the range of appropri-
ate sentences based on several factors. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS
HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES 5-13 (1987) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK]
(describing the process of calculating a sentencing range). The circumstances and conduct in-
volved in the convicted offense might increase or decrease the applicable sentencing range. Sec-
tion 2D1.I(b)(i) of the Guidelines, for example, requires an upward increase in the sentencing
range - an enhancement - if "a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed" during
the offense of conviction. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Di.a(b)(I) (1997). After
applying any relevant enhancements, the court must select a sentence within the Guideline range,
unless a relevant departure provision permits otherwise. See, e.g., id. § 5K2.o; PROSECUTORS
HANDBOOK, supra, at 13-I5.
9 See Watts, 67 F.3d at 796. Under the enhanced sentencing range, the district court imposed
a sentence of 262 months imprisonment and 6o months of supervised release. See id. at 793.
10 See United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1387 (9 th Cir. 1996).
11 See id.
12 See id. Absent the added five ounces, Putra's sentencing range would have been i5 to 21
months. Under the six-ounce offense level, however, Putra's sentencing range was 27 to 33
months. See id.
13 See Putra, 78 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1996); Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (gth Cir. 1995).
14 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 199i).
Is See Putra, 78 F.3d at 1388-89; Watts, 67 F.3d at 796-97.
16 See Putra, 78 F.3d at 1389; Watts, 67 F.3d at 796.
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imposed by the Guidelines," but the panel insisted that its holding was
not inconsistent with the Guidelines.17
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, summarily reversed the
consolidated decisions, and remanded the cases to the Ninth Circuit.18
The Court argued that the Ninth Circuit's unique restriction 19 lacked
any basis in congressional legislation, the Court's prior holdings, or the
Sentencing Guidelines.20 The Court began by discussing I8 U.S.C
§ 3661, which codified the nearly unlimited discretion of sentencing
judges to consider various kinds of information. 21 Citing Williams v.
New York 22 and Nichols v. United States,23 the Court noted that sen-
tencing judges have always had the power to consider past criminal
behavior, even conduct that never led to a conviction.2 4 The institu-
tion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as the Court explained, had
not changed "this aspect of the sentencing court's discretion. '25 The
Court relied heavily on Witte v. United States26 for the proposition
that the related-conduct provisions of the Guidelines preserve the pre-
Guidelines discretion of sentencing judges to consider all relevant con-
duct.27 As the Court pointed out, the commentary to section IBI.3 -
the provision of the Guidelines that governs the general calculation of
the sentencing range - instructs district courts to consider all of the
defendant's acts committed in the course of the convicted crime, in-
cluding acts that did not result in a conviction or even a formal
charge.28
17 Putra, 78 F.3d at 1389. The Guidelines do require the aggregation of narcotics in multiple
sales whether or not a conviction resulted from every sale. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § IBI.3 commentary at 21 (1997). The Ninth Circuit argued, however, that the Guide-
lines address conduct that never resulted in a formal charge and make no explicit reference to ac-
quitted conduct. See Putra, 78 F.3d at 1389.
Is See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638. The Court decided that the issues in Watts were too easily re-
solved to warrant briefs or oral argument. See id. at 634. Tvo concurrences and two dissents
later, Justice Kennedy disagreed. See id. at 644 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
19 As the Court noted, all other circuits had held that sentencing courts may consider acquitted
conduct. See Watts, I17 S. Ct. at 634 & n.i.
20 See id.
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (i994), which provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person con-
victed of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose
of imposing an appropriate sentence."
22 337 U.S. 241 (I949). In Williams, the Court upheld a sentence increase based on the defen-
dant's involvement in 3o burglaries for which he had never been charged. See id. at 246, 250-52.
23 51I U.S. 738 (I994). In Nichols, the Court held that a sentencing court may increase a de-
fendant's prison sentence based on a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, even though the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel for any charge that results in a prison sentence.
See id. at 746-47.
24 See Watts, I17 S. Ct. at 635.
2S Id.
26 51 5 U.S. 389 (I995).
27 See Watts, 1'7 S. Ct. at 635.
28 See id. at 635-36 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBx.3 background
(i997)).
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The Court further explained that the Ninth Circuit had miscon-
ceived "the preclusive effect of an acquittal."29 A trial court may only
convict a defendant whose guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas a sentencing court, the Court noted, may rely on facts
established by a preponderance of the evidence.30 The defendants' ac-
quittals, the Court explained, did not certify their innocence but
merely established a reasonable doubt about their guilt.3 1 The Court
noted that "an acquittal is not a finding of any fact."32  Accordingly,
the Court asserted that the sentencing courts had the authority to find
by a preponderance of the evidence that Putra had been involved in
the five-ounce transaction and that Watts had possessed a firearm
while committing the drug offense.33
Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion to clarify that the Court's
holding does not prevent the Sentencing Commission from amending
the Guidelines to exclude acquitted conduct.3 4  In a separate concur-
rence, Justice Scalia disagreed. Citing i8 U.S.C. § 3661, Justice Scalia
argued that the Commission does not have the authority to prevent
sentencing courts from considering acquitted conduct, or any other in-
formation, in determining sentences.3 .
Justice Stevens, in dissent, would have prohibited sentencing courts
from considering acquitted conduct when calculating applicable sen-
tencing ranges under the Guidelines.3 6  Justice Stevens prefaced his
opinion with the observation that the calculation of a sentencing range
employs "mandatory rules '37 designed to "cabin the discretion of all
29 Id. at 637. Citing Witte, the Court put to rest any concerns that Watts's or Putra's sen-
tences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 636-37. In Witte, the defendant argued
that the government had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by charging him with crimes that
had already been the basis of a sentencing increase in a prior conviction. See Witte, 515 U.S. at
397. The Court rejected that argument and, by its broad language, all arguments for applying the
Double Jeopardy Clause to sentencing proceedings: "consideration of information about the de-
fendant's character and conduct at sentencing does not result in 'punishment' for any offense
other than the one of which the defendant was convicted." Id. at 4o. The Watts Court con-
cluded that "sentencing enhancements do not punish a defendant for crimes of which he was not
convicted, but rather increase his sentence because of the manner in which he committed the
crime of conviction." Watts, 117 S. CL at 636.
30 See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 637 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6Ai.3 com-
mentary (i997)). In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court held that the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard for sentencing satisfies due process. See id. at 91-92.
31 See Watts, 117 S. CL at 637. A jury acquittal, the Court noted, does not protect a defendant
from relitigation of the same issues presented at trial, as long as a lower standard of proof governs
the subsequent forum. See id. (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (i99o)).
32 Id. (quoting United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. i996) (Wallace, CJ., dis-
senting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33 See id. at 638.
34 See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
3S See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Such a restriction on the discretion of sentencing judges,
Justice Scalia concluded, would require an act of Congress. See id.
36 See id. at 643-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 640.
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judges"38 and thereby to curtail "an unjustifiably wide range of sen-
tences."39 The Sentencing Commission, Justice Stevens explained, had
incorporated § 3661 only into the provision governing the selection of
a particular sentence within the prescribed range - section IBI.4 -
and not into the provision concerning the calculation of the range itself
- section iBI. 3 .*° Justice Stevens posited that a sentencing judge
could consider acquitted conduct only when selecting a sentence
within a sentencing range; all relevant facts that the judge used to cal-
culate the range itself would have to be established beyond a reason-
able doubt.41
Justice Stevens insisted that the Court had never before addressed,
much less determined, the novel issue that Watts's and Putra's sen-
tencing raised: what standard of proof is required for facts used to in-
crease a defendant's sentencing range?42 Both Williams and McMillan
v. Pennsylvania,43 Justice Stevens explained, were cases in which the
consideration of uncharged conduct resulted in sentences within the
range already available to the courts.44 Watts's and Putra's sentences,
in contrast, exceeded the maximum sentences that would have been
available had the judge not considered their acquitted offenses. 45 Jus-
tice Stevens also attacked the Court's reliance on Witte, which he
viewed as a pure double jeopardy case that was unrelated to the rules
governing the initial imposition of punishment.46
Justice Kennedy filed a brief dissent to criticize the Court for not
setting the case for full briefing and oral argument.47 Justice Kennedy
asserted that the Court had never previously decided the precise issue
of the case: a sentencing court's treatment of "not just prior criminal
history, but conduct underlying a charge for which the defendant was
acquitted."48 Given the hundreds of sentencing proceedings in which
the issue has arisen, Justice Kennedy reasoned, the Court should have
confronted the potentially unique implications of acquitted conduct
"by a reasoned course of argument, not by shrugging it off."49
38 Id.
39 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40 See id. Moreover, Justice Stevens maintained that § 3661 does not establish a judge's
authority to assign particular weight to certain kinds of information. See id. at 639.
41 See id. at 643-44.
42 See id. at 641-43.43 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
44 See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 641-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens observed, the
McMillan Court had specifically noted that the state law had not increased the maximum penalty.
See id. at 642 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88).
45 See id. at 640-41 & n.2.
46 See id. at 642-43.
47 See id. at 644 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48 Id.
49 Id. Justice Kennedy urged that, if the Court could not diffuse the serious concerns about
undermining jury verdicts, then it ought at least to be upfront and "acknowledge [the] theoretical
contradiction" necessitated by "overriding practical considerations." Id.
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As Justice Kennedy's dissent suggested, lower courts should not in-
fer too much from the Court's silence; Watts does not preclude a sen-
tencing judge from taking into account a jury's decision to acquit. Be-
fore Watts, in fact, two circuits had held that a district court may
depart from the otherwise applicable guideline range, in the interest of
fairness, to temper the effects of a sentence increase based on acquitted
conduct.50 The Court's holding in Watts does not invalidate this prac-
tice: Watts neither restricts the use of downward departures nor re-
quires a court to ignore a defendant's acquittal on related offenses.
Under section 5K2.o of the Guidelines, a sentencing court retains
some discretion to impose a sentence below the Guideline range when
faced with mitigating circumstances that the Sentencing Commission
has failed to consider.51 In 1992, in United States v. Concepcion, 2 the
Second Circuit required a district court to consider departing down-
ward from a sentence that had been based in great part on an acquit-
ted charge.5 3 The First Circuit adopted the same approach in 1995 in
United States v. Lombard.54
By the time the Court decided Watts, the Sentencing Commission
appeared to have endorsed the First and Second Circuits' interpreta-
50 See United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 184-85 (ist Cir. 1995); United States v. Concep-
cion, 983 F.2d 369, 389 (2d Cir. 1992).
51 Section 5K2.o reads, in relevant part:
[T]he sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the appli-
cable guideline, if the court finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described."
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.o (1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).
Departures are never mandatory: a district court will not be reversed for refusing to employ a de-
parture from the Guidelines. See PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 77-78; I5B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3918.8, at 576 (2d ed. 199i).
52 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992).
53 See id. at 389.
54 72 F.3d 170, 184-85 (ist Cir. 1995). The First Circuit suggested that a downward departure
under section 5K2.o would be appropriate only in "extreme case[s]." Id. at 186. In Lombard, for
instance, a jury convicted the defendant of firearms offenses, and the sentencing court imposed a
life sentence based on a related (but acquitted) murder charge. See id. at 172. The sentencing
increase in Concepcion had also been "astronomical," which suggests that the Second Circuit
might limit its holding to extreme cases as well. See Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 389.
Such a restriction on section 5K2.o, however, has probably not survived the Supreme Court's
decision in Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996). Under Koon, appellate courts decide as
a matter of law what factors are permissible bases for departures under the Guidelines, but dis-
trict courts retain discretion to determine whether a mitigating factor is present to a degree suffi-
cient to justify a departure. See id. at 2046-47. Writing in the shadow of Koon, the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997), restated its departure rule more
broadly: "This Circuit mitigates [the related-conduct provision] by permitting the sentencing
judge to make a downward departure from a sentencing range calculated on the basis of acquit-
ted conducL" Id. at 1O89 n.2 (citing Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 386-89). Coincidentally, the Second
Circuit decided Shonubi on the same day that the Supreme Court decided Watts - January 6,
1997.
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tion of section 5K2.o. A few days before the Court handed down its
decision, the Commission presented several proposals addressing the
role of acquitted conduct in section iBi.3.  One proposal would have
made explicit the authority of district courts to depart downward to
soften sentencing enhancements based on such conduct.5 6 Although
the proposal never came to a vote, the Commission explained that the
option to depart downward was already "arguably implicit in the
Relevant Conduct guideline."57 Given the First and Second Circuits'
holdings and the Sentencing Commission's recent statements, district
courts likely had a good deal of discretion before Watts to depart
downward from a sentence that had been enhanced due to acquitted
conduct.58
Critics of this practice might make at least two arguments that
Watts curtails this application of section 5K2.o. First, under a broad
reading of Watts, courts might conclude that a jury acquittal is entirely
irrelevant for sentencing purposes. For instance, in United States v.
Shonubi,5 9 a district court on remand from the Second Circuit 60 noted
that the "escape route" of section 5K2.0 was "dubious in light of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Watts, which treats acquitted conduct the
same way as any other conduct."61 Under this reading of Watts, a jury
acquittal is simply not a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes.
This argument ignores the distinctly narrow ground for the Court's
holding. The Court focused its reasoning on an appellate court's lack
of authority to "invent a blanket prohibition against" sentencing court
consideration of acquitted conduct.62 Watts makes clear that the rele-
vant congressional statutes do not curtail a district court's power to
review acquitted conduct at sentencing - neither do the Sentencing
Guidelines, the comments to the Guidelines, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the preclusive effect of a jury's
55 See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 161-62 (1997) (pro-
posed Jan. 2, 1997).
56 See id.
57 Id.
5s The First and Second Circuits' holdings also have analogical support in the Court's recent
endorsement of the use of downward departures when troubling aspects of the procedural history
of a defendant's conviction exist. See Koon, xi6 S. Ct. at 2053 (upholding a district court's
downward departure based in part on the defendants' successive prosecution in state and federal
courts); Witte v. United States, 51S U.S. 389, 405-o6 (i995) (encouraging the use of section 5K2.o
because the defendant's offense had already been the basis of a sentencing increase in a prior
conviction).
59 o62 F. Supp. 370 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
60 United States v. Shonubi, 1O3 F.3d xo85 (2d Cir. 1997).
61 Shonubi, 962 F. Supp. at 373. The Shonubi district court appears to have misinterpreted
Second Circuit precedent. Watts merely confirmed the validity of United States v. Rodriguez-
Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, i8o-82 (2d Cir. 199o), and did not make new law in the Second Circuit.
See Watts, I17 S. Ct. at 634 n.i.
62 Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635.
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verdict.6 3  Watts, like Concepcion and Lombard, affirms rather than
limits a sentencing court's authority under the Guidelines to consider a
broad range of information to reach a just sentence.6 4
The purely doctrinal Watts opinion does not refute the attack of
scores of judges and scholars that sentencing increases based on ac-
quitted conduct are "blatant injustice."65 At most, Watts disposes of
arguments that sentencing enhancements based on acquitted conduct
are somehow unconstitutional.6 6 But Watts does nothing to mollify
concerns that these enhancements might undermine aspirations and
values inherent in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments67 - such as pre-
serving the finality of a jury's judgment,68 maintaining a single trier of
fact,69 depriving the government of a second chance to convict,70
63 See id. at 635-37.
64 Compare id. at 635 ("[S]entencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of
information."), with United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 176 (Ist Cir. 1995) ("[Tihere is a range
of discretion left to the district courts even within the ... Guidelines."), and United States v. Con-
cepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 389 (2d Cir. 1992) (remanding "to permit the court to consider" whether a
departure was permissible).
6S United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 549 (D.C. Cir. i996) (Wald, J., concurring specially);
accord, e.g., United States v. Booker, 115 F.3d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1997) (Evans, J., dissenting) ("The
law, of course, says this is perfectly cricket, but that doesn't make it fair."); United States v.
Hunter, I9 F.3d 895, 898 (4 th Cir. r994) (Hall, J., concurring); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d
844, 85i (9th Cir. I99I) (insisting that sentencing enhancements for acquitted conduct "would
pervert our system of justice"). Commentators have voiced similar objections. See, e.g., Barry L.
Johnson, If at First You Don't Succeed - Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct in Guidelines
Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REv. 153, i68-86 (i996); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice:
Real-Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 455
(1993). Judges and scholars have noted that most citizens would probably be shocked to learn
that sentencing courts may hold defendants accountable for conduct of which they were acquit-
ted. See, e.g., United States v. Putra, uo F.3 d 705, 706 (9th Cir. 1997) (Hug, C.J., concurring);
United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 437 (8th Cir. 2992) (Bright, J., dissenting); Daniel L.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 1oi YALE L.J. x68i, 1714 (1992); cf United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 1994)
(Oakes, J., concurring) ("This is jurisprudence reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland. As the Queen
of Hearts might say, 'Acquittal first, sentence afterwards.'").
66 See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 636-38. A number of judges and commentators had argued that
these sentencing enhancements violated the Constitution. See, e.g., Baylor, 97 F.3d at 55o (Wald,
J., concurring specially) (suggesting "plausibl[e]" constitutional attacks based on the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, the right to a jury trial, and due process); United States v. Lanoue, 71 F-3 d 966, 984
(ist Cir. 1995) (Fifth and Sixth Amendments) (dictum); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 2502,
2527 (6th Cir. 2992) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting) (due process); see also, e.g., Herman, supra note i, at
350-54 (double jeopardy and due process); Lear, supra note i, at 2218-23 (criticizing McMillan
and Williams).
67 See Johnson, supra note 65, at 18o-86.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (describing the
bar against relitigating a defendant's acquittal as "[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the his-
tory of double jeopardy jurisprudence").
69 See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (noting that, for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, jeopardy attaches when a defendant is first put before the trier of fact).
70 See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970) (noting that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects an acquitted defendant from "having to 'run the gantlet' a second time" (quoting
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1958))).
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avoiding an "impermissibly enhanced sentence,"71 enabling jurors to
speak for the community,72 and insulating not-guilty verdicts from ju-
dicial review. 73 Admittedly, in light of Watts, these concerns do not
forbid a court to consider a defendant's involvement in a crime merely
because an acquittal resulted. But in light of these concerns, Watts
does not require a sentencing court to overlook an acquittal either.
A second argument is that the First and Second Circuits' interpre-
tation of section 5K2.o does not survive Watts because Watts's reading
of the Guidelines implicitly forbids a downward departure based on an
acquittal of related conduct. The Court emphasized that the broadly
worded related-conduct provisions do include acquitted conduct in the
range of conduct that sentencing courts should consider.74 Under sec-
tion 5K2.o, sentencing courts may not depart from the Guidelines
based on any factor that has been "adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission."7 5 A judge might conclude from Watts
that the Sentencing Commission has adequately considered how a
court should treat acquitted conduct: a court should increase the sen-
tence. A sentencing court, the argument goes, should not be able to
decrease a defendant's sentence for the same reason.
The implications that this argument draws from Watts are un-
founded.76  The Guidelines make no explicit reference to acquitted
conduct.77 The Guidelines commentary refers generally to conduct
71 Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984).
72 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975).
73 See, e.g., Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 570-71.
74 See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 636 ("Application Note 3 explains that '[aipplication of this provi-
sion does not require the defendant, in fact, to have been convicted of multiple counts."' (quoting
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B. 3 application note 3 (1997))); id. ("Accordingly,
the Guidelines conclude that '[relying on the entire range of conduct, regardless of the number of
counts that are alleged or on which a conviction is obtained, appears to be the most reasonable
approach to writing workable guidelines for these offenses.'" (alteration in original) (emphasis
added by the Court) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.3 background
(1997))); id. ('[Section iBI.3 ] directs sentencing courts to consider all other related conduct,
whether or not it resulted in a conviction.").
75 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.o (1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76 This argument also mischaracterizes the theory underlying the departure practice sanc-
tioned by the First and Second Circuits: the acquitted conduct is the basis for the related-conduct
increase, whereas the acquittal itself is the basis for the downward departure. Compare U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.3(a)(i)(A) (1997) (applying to "all acts and omissions
committed" by the defendant), with United States v. Lombard, 72 F3d 170, 184 (Ist Cir. 1995)
(citing the defendant's acquittal as a mitigating factor).
77 The only instances in which the Commission has specifically addressed acquitted conduct
have been proposals to amend the Guidelines. See, e.g., Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 161-62 (proposed Jan. 2, 1997); Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,522, 67,541 (proposed Dec. 21, 1993); Sentencing Guidelines for United
States Courts, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,832, 62,832, 62,848 (proposed Dec. 31, 1992). However, under the
section SK2.o determination of adequate consideration, courts may look to "only the sentencing
guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission." i8 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (i994).
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that "is not an element of the offense of conviction."78 The illustra-
tions provided in section iBI13 are limited to cases in which the re-
lated conduct did not even result in a formal charge, much less an ac-
quittal.79 The Guidelines, like Watts itself, reflect no meaningful
contemplation of whether an acquittal should alter the treatment of
related conduct.8 0
Judges and scholars opposed to Watts on fairness grounds should
direct their criticisms to the lower courts. By failing to explore the
concerns of justice and fairness that its holding raised, the Watts Court
implicitly reserved to lower courts the task of evaluating under section
5K2.o whether the Commission has adequately taken into considera-
tion a defendant's acquittal on related charges.8 ' Under i8 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b), the federal courts are charged with ensuring that defendants
receive just punishments,8 2 even when the Sentencing Commission has
overlooked potentially substantial factors.8 3 The Court's and the
Guidelines' silence on the implications of a jury acquittal should invite
- rather than discourage - lower courts to question whether the
Commission has adequately considered the significance of acquittals.
The practice that Watts has validated will continue to elicit moral
objections from the legal community.8 4 The Court has answered these
78 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.3 background (1997).
79 See, e.g., id. § IB1.3 commentary at 21.
80 Many judges have argued that an acquittal is relevant at sentencing. See, e.g., United
States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 396 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of a
request for rehearing en banc) ("A just system of criminal sentencing cannot fail to distinguish
between an allegation of conduct resulting in a conviction and an allegation of conduct resulting
in an acquittal."); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (noting "the 'special weight' the Supreme Court has ac-
corded acquittals in its Double Jeopardy jurisprudence"); United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 14i,
154 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[A] judgment of acquittal is a more final and binding determination of facts
than the requisite standard of proof might at first seem to allow."); see also Johnson, supra note
65, at i8o-86 (arguing that an acquittal by a jury is accorded special significance under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments); cf Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 644 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court
for failing to address the particular implications of an acquittal for sentencing purposes).
81 Cf. United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ('Congress
could not have intended such a bizarre and dangerous result when it adopted guideline sen-
tences.").
82 See Freed, supra note 65, at 1698. The purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines, as stated by
Congress, is to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing ... while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating
or aggravating factors." 28 U.S.C. § 99I(b)(i)(B) (1994).
83 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); see also Freed, supra note 65, at 1734 (arguing that Congress
specifically delegated the determination of adequacy to the courts).
84 After Watts, on remand to the Ninth Circuit, Chief Judge Hug argued that the current
Guidelines "seriously undercut" the jury's function, and urged the Sentencing Commission to
amend its related-conduct provisions. United States v. Putra, no F.3d 705, 706 (9th Cir. I997)
(Hug, C.J., concurring); accord United States v. Jones, 863 F. Supp. 575, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1994); see
also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REv.
523, 55o-52 (1993) (arguing that the consideration of acquitted conduct renders the jury's verdict
meaningless); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Criminal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional
Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 459, 469-70, 48r-84 (1993) (arguing that
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concerns with silence and hesitation, but they need not be ignored by
the judiciary altogether. As the First and Second Circuits have discov-
ered, section 5K2.o allows district courts to ameliorate the effects of a
sentencing practice that potentially nullifies jury acquittals. Even un-
der Watts, a sentencing court should act in light of, rather than in spite
of, the jury's verdict.
II. FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
A. Bankruptcy Code
Valuation Standard for Assets in Cram Down. - The problem of
assessing value has challenged philosophers,1 economists, 2 bankers, 3
and even lawyers.4 In the context of bankruptcy, the circuit courts of
appeal have adopted three distinct approaches to assess the value of
undersecured collateral.5 Last Term, in Associates Commercial Corp.
v. Rash,6 the Supreme Court resolved this confusion by specifying a
uniform method of valuation for undersecured claims in a cram down
proceeding. Although uniformity among the circuits is certainly wel-
come, the rule set forth by the Court will lead to economically ineffi-
cient transactions between creditors and bankrupt debtors. This out-
come was unnecessary - the Court could have reached the
economically efficient result while also remaining true to the language
and meaning of the valuation provision in the Bankruptcy Code.
a sentencing court's consideration of acquitted conduct undermines the jury's ability to represent
the community and to protect the defendant from judicial abuse).
1 See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 33, 33-39 (Mary Warnock ed.,
1962).
2 See, e.g., I KARL MARX, CAPITAL 125-31 (Ben Fowkes trans., Vintage Books ed. 1977)
(1867).
3 See, e.g., TOM COPELAND, Tim KOLLER & JACK MURRIN, VALUATION: MEASURING AND
MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 97-100 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Alemante G. Selassie, Valuation Issues in Applying Fraudulent ransfer Law to
Leveraged Buyouts, 32 B.C. L. REV. 377, 386 (I991).
5 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), go F.3d io36, io6o-6i (5th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (adopting a foreclosure value standard); Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d I19o,
1192-93 (gth Cir. 1996) (en banc) (adopting a variation on the replacement value standard), cert.
denied, 117 S. CL 2478 (1997); Metrobank v. Trmble (In re Tfimble), 5o F.3d 530, 531-32 (8th Cir.
1995) (same); Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Inst. for Say. (In re Winthrop
Old Farm Nurseries, Inc.), 50 F.3d 72, 74-76 (ist Cir. 1995) (same); Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Pees
(In re McClurkin), 31 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Coker v. Sovran Equity Mortgage
Corp. (In re Coker), 973 F.2d 258, 260 (4 th Cir. 1992) (same); General Motor Acceptance Corp. v.
Valenti (In re Valenti), IO5 F.3d 55, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that bankruptcy courts have dis-
cretion to assess value at the midpoint between replacement value and foreclosure value); In re
Hoskins, 102 F3d 311, 316 (7th Cir. i996) (same).
6 117 S. Ct. 1879 (i997).
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In March 1989, Elray Rash purchased a Kenworth tractor truck
from Janoe Kenworth Trucks for use in his freight-hauling business3
The retail value of the truck was $73,700.8 Rash agreed to pay
$16,oii as a down payment and $I6io per month for sixty months.9
Janoe retained a lien on the truck in order to secure payment on the
unpaid balance; later it assigned the lien to Associates Commercial
Corporation (ACC).10
In I99I, Rash suffered a mild stroke that left him unable to drive
for approximately three months." In March 1992, Rash and his wife
filed a bankruptcy petition pursuant to Chapter 13 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code.12 At the time of the filing, the unpaid bal-
ance on the truck loan was $4ii7i.13  Under the Bankruptcy Code,
the Rashes could gain confirmation of their Chapter 13 plan if ACC
accepted it,' 4 if the Rashes surrendered the truck to ACC,' 5 or if the
court allowed the Rashes to invoke the cram down provision.' 6 The
Rashes invoked the cram down provision, 17 which allows a debtor to
keep the collateral despite the objection of the creditor.' Under cram
down, a debtor is required to provide the creditor with payments over
the life of the bankruptcy plan that will equal the present value of the
secured claim.' 9 Because it held a valid lien on the truck, ACC was a
secured creditor of Rash.20 However, the Bankruptcy Code specifies
that claims such as ACC's are secured only up to the value of the col-
lateral; claims beyond that value are unsecured. 2'
In order to determine the extent of the secured claim, the bank-
ruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing concerning the value of the
truck.22 At the hearing, the parties advocated different valuation
methods. The Rashes argued that the correct value was the net
7 See Rash, go F.3d at 1038-39.
8 See id. at xo39.
9 See id. In February i992, Rash rescheduled this obligation so that he would pay $1,408 per
month for thirty-six months. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 31 F-3 d 325,
327 (5th Cir. 1994).
10 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at x882.
11 See Brief of Respondent at 5, Rash (No. 96-454).
12 See Rash, Ix7 S. Ct at 1882.
13 See id.
14 See II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (i994).
15 See id. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
16 See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
17 See Rash, 1'7 S. CL at 1883.
18 See I IU.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).
19 See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
20 See Rash, i7 S. CL at x882.
21 See ii U.S.C. § 506(a). Secured claims typically receive post-petition interest, see id.
§ 5o6(b), and are entitled to protection of their security interest to ensure that their collateral does
not decrease in value, see id. § 363(e). Unsecured claims are not entitled to post-petition interest,
see id. § 502(b), and might be diminished by the administrative costs of the bankrupt estate, see
In re By-Rite Oil Co., 87 B.R. 905, 919-21 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
22 See Rash, I17 S. Ct. at 1883.
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amount ACC would realize upon foreclosure and sale of the truck.2 3
The Rashes' expert estimated that this "foreclosure value" was
$31,875.4 ACC argued that the correct value was the price that the
Rashes would have to pay to purchase a like vehicle.25 ACC's expert
estimated that this "replacement value" was $41,000.26
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that
foreclosure value2 7 was the appropriate valuation benchmark, inter-
preting § 5o6(a) of the Bankruptcy Code28 to require value to be as-
sessed from the creditor's perspective.29 The court approved the
Rashes' plan, and the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas affirmed.30 On appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, interpreting § 5o6(a) to require a re-
placement value approach.31 On rehearing en banc, however, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that ACC's secured
claim was limited to the foreclosure value of the truck.3 2
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 The bankruptcy court defined the issue in terms of "wholesale value" and "retail value,"
roughly analogous to the "foreclosure value" and "replacement value" used by the Fifth Circuit.
See In re Rash, 149 B.R. 430, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993) ("[R]etail value reflects actual replace-
ment cost to a debtor."); id. ("[W]holesale value ... is a reasonable indication of the net proceeds
[the creditor] will receive upon the disposition of the reclaimed collateral."). However, the Su-
preme Court threw these definitions into question by making certain adjustments to retail value
in order to get to replacement value. The Court ruled that the bankruptcy court should subtract
out from retail price the value of items that the debtor does not receive when he retains his vehi-
cle, such as warranties, inventory storage, and reconditioning, as well as the value of modifica-
tions to the property to which a creditor's lien would not extend under state law, such as the addi-
tion of accessories. See Rash, 1x7 S. Ct. at i886 n.6. The result is that "[w]hether replacement
value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or some other value will depend on the
type of debtor and the nature of the property." Id. Some commentators have expressed dismay at
this new definition. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Bankruptcy Reform?, Speech Before the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission (July 17, 1997) (on file with the Harvard Law School
library) ("'Replacement value' can't be looked up. It must be litigated; and in the process the
value of the asset will be paid out to the lawyers rather than to the creditors."). This Comment
does not explore these questions of administrability of the new rule promulgated by the Court in
Rash.
28 Section 5o6(a) reads as follows:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an in-
terest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the es-
tate's interest in such property, ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value
of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value
shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition
or use of such property ....
i U.S.C. § 5o6(a) (1994).
29 See Rash, 149 B.R. at 433.
30 See Rash, i7 S. CL at 1883.
31 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 31 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 994).
32 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), go F.3d 1o36, xo6i (5th Cir. x996) (en
banc).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to re-
solve a split among the circuit courts of appeal.3 3 In an 8-1 decision,
the Court reversed and remanded.3 4 Writing for the majority,35 Justice
Ginsburg held that the value of property retained by a debtor under a
cram down plan is the cost to the debtor of obtaining a like asset.3 6
Justice Ginsburg began her analysis with a review of § 5o6(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.37 Rejecting the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of this
section, Justice Ginsburg found that the first sentence of § 5o6(a) did
not compel the foreclosure value method.38
Instead, the Court looked to the second sentence of § 5o6(a) to shed
light on the valuation question: "Such value shall be determined in
light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or
use of such property ... -39 Justice Ginsburg held that only a re-
placement value standard gave meaning to the key words "disposition
or use."40 Without such a reading, a creditor's value received in fore-
closure and the value received in a cram down proceeding would be
the same.41 Justice Ginsburg held that the value received in cram
down should be higher than foreclosure value, because "[i]f a debtor
keeps the property and continues to use it, the creditor obtains ... nei-
ther the property nor its value and is exposed to double risks: The
debtor may again default and the property may deteriorate from ex-
tended use."42 Justice Ginsburg concluded that the replacement value
standard reflects a debtor's "use" of the property.4 3 Using this combi-
nation of statutory interpretation and law and economics analysis, the
majority concluded that replacement value was the appropriate
benchmark to use for valuing undersecured collateral in a cram down
situation."
Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter.45 In a brief opinion, he con-
ceded that the meaning of § 5o6(a) was "not entirely clear," but found
that its first sentence "points to foreclosure as the proper method of
33 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884. The Fifth Circuit applied the foreclosure value approach,
while the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth circuits applied variations on the replacement
cost approach. The Second and Seventh circuits split the difference between the foreclosure value
and the replacement value. See supra note 5.
34 See Rash, 17 S. Ct. at 1886-87.
3S Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer
joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion. Justice Scalia joined the majority except for a footnote in
which the Court examined the legislative history of § 5o6(a). See id. at i882 n.*.
36 See id. at 1885-86.
37 See id. at 1884.
38 See id. at 1884-85.
39 1i U.S.C. § 5o6(a) (I994), quoted in Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
40 Rash, 117 S. Ct. at I885.
41 See id.
42 Id.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 1886.
45 See id. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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valuation" because the first sentence "suggests that the value should be
determined from the creditor's perspective. '46 Justice Stevens also re-
jected the majority's interpretation of the second sentence of § 506(a).
He argued that courts should not assign greater value in a cram down
than in a repossession, because in a cram down the court can ensure
that the creditor is fully compensated for the increased risk by setting
a higher interest rate.47 He felt that using foreclosure value would
preserve the symmetry between cram down and repossession; using
replacement value, in contrast, would grant a "general windfall" to
undersecured creditors.48
The Court in Rash attempted to apply principles of economic
analysis to valuations in bankruptcy but only went halfway down that
track. A complete law and economics analysis of the question would
have yielded the opposite conclusion - that foreclosure value pro-
motes the optimal outcome between debtors and creditors. Instead,
the Court's decision in Rash will promote inefficiency in transactions
between debtors and creditors, and, in the long run, will hurt unse-
cured creditors, secured creditors, and debtors.
As a starting point, the language of § 5o6(a) could support either a
replacement value or a foreclosure value standard.49  The first sen-
tence of § 506(a) suggests that value should be calculated from the
creditor's perspective.50 This sentence read in isolation points to fore-
closure value as the correct standard, because that is the value that the
creditor would receive through a foreclosure sale. In contrast, the
"disposition or use" clause in the second sentence of § 5o6(a) suggests a
replacement value standard, because presumably the debtor would
have to replace the property in order to continue its business as a go-
ing concern.5' The method of valuation adopted by a particular court
depends entirely on the sentence on which the court focuses.5 2
46 Id.
47 See id. at 1887 n.*.
48 Id. at 1887.
49 See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A] simple rule of valuation is needed.
Wholesale price is one simple rule; retail price another; the midpoint of the two prices is a third.
None is enacted or excluded by [§ 5o6(a)]."); The Valuation Debate, Am. BANKR. INST. J., Nov.
1996, at 1, 40.
50 See David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation Standards in Chapter z3 Bankruptcy Cases,
13 BANKR. DEV. J. I, 32 (I996).
51 See Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 315; see also Isaac M. Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation
Under Chapter ix of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C. L. REV. 925, 939 (ig8o) ("It is incongruous to
value a business that is being reorganized on the basis of the price its assets could fetch on a
piecemeal liquidation when the entire theory of the reorganization is that the debtor is being pre-
served as a going concern."). But see The Valuation Debate, supra note 49, at 41 ("[This] view of
Rash focuses heavily on the 'or use' part of the second sentence of So6(a) and seems to all but ig-
nore the 'proposed disposition' language of the same sentence.") (comments of Romaine S. Scott
ID).
52 See Thomas E. Ray, Valuation Issues in Chapter z3 - Is There Consistency?, An. BANKR.
INST. J., Sept. r995, at I6, 16.
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Legislative history is also ambiguous regarding the proper interpre-
tation of § 5o6(a). Although the House Report on § 5o6(a) seems to re-
ject replacement value in favor of foreclosure value,53 the second sen-
tence of § 5o6(a), which is critical to its interpretation, did not appear
in the version of the bill addressed by the report.54 Instead, that sen-
tence was inserted into the final text of the bill after the House-Senate
conference.55  In I98I, the Senate Judiciary Committee proposed
amendments to § 5o6(a) that would have unambiguously declared that
the replacement value method is the proper approach,56 but these
amendments failed to become law. As a result, the legislative history
of § 5o6(a) is "unedifying."5- The difficulty in finding a definitive in-
terpretation of § 5o6(a) is illustrated by Rash itself - the circuit court
reversed the district court, then reversed itself, only to be reversed
again by the Supreme Court, all on the basis of interpreting § 5o6(a).
Faced with ambiguous statutory language and a murky legislative
history, the Court correctly decided to examine the incentives that each
rule would create for debtors and creditors. In doing so, however, the
Court reached the wrong conclusion. A more rigorous economic
analysis would have revealed that foreclosure value, not replacement
value, creates the correct set of incentives for both parties. Consider
the general case of undersecured collateral currently in the hands of a
debtor. Let V represent the value in use of the asset to the debtor; R
represent the replacement cost for the debtor; and L represent the liq-
uidation (foreclosure) value to the creditor. L diverges from R to the
extent that assets are specific to their particular use in the debtor's
hands; nonspecific assets, in theory, would have a smaller gap between
L and R.51 L must be less than R because if this were not the case
there would be a risk-free arbitrage opportunity to buy the asset for R
and sell the asset for L.59 Therefore, a situation in which L is greater
than R cannot be sustainable in the long run. Value in use (V) varies
according to the particular bankruptcy situation; it can be less than L,
between L and R, or greater than R.60
53 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 124 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6o85.
54 See H.R. 82oo, 95th Cong. § 5o6(a) (1977).
SS See 124 CONG. REC. 33,997 (1978).
56 See S. 2000, 97th Cong. (I98i).
S7 See Rash, 1i7 S. Ct. at 1886 n.4.
58 Completely nonspecific assets would still have a gap between L and R due to retail costs
such as the value added by the salesman or costs associated with physically moving the asset.
59 This statement applies the law of one price, which states that identical assets cannot have
different prices in the long term. See RicnARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 958-63 (5th ed. 1996).
60 In an efficient market, the market mechanism will equalize value in use and replacement
value at the aggregate level. However, in any individual case, value in use may diverge consid-
erably from replacement value. Cf. id. at 276 (illustrating scenarios in which value to a particular
individual may diverge from market value).
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The efficiency objective in this scenario is simple: the debtor should
surrender the collateral when the creditor values the asset more (when
L > V), and the debtor should cram down a bankruptcy plan (thus re-
taining the collateral) when the debtor values the asset more (when L
< V). In the aggregate, consider a situation with N debtors and N
creditors, with the same collateral involved in each debtor/creditor re-
lationship. By assumption, L and R are set in the marketplace and
therefore are unchanged across bankruptcy situations. If all debtors
are ranked according to their value in use, the efficiency objective is
illustrated by the dark line in Figure A below; the Court's decision in
Rash, however, will lead to the value creation line in Figure B: 61
Debtors
FIGURE A
N
Debtors
FIGURE B
Under the Rash rule, a debtor will allow collateral to be repos-
sessed even when the value he attaches to it (V) is greater than the
creditor's valuation of the asset (L), because if he were to keep the
property he would have to give value to the creditor equal to R. Only
when V exceeds R will the debtor keep the property and cram down a
bankruptcy plan on the creditor.
Putting these two curves together reveals the deadweight loss:
61 Value in use is depicted here as a straight line but in fact can be any monotonically increas-
ing curve. The analysis that follows assumes only that the value in use curve is monotonically
increasing and does not depend on its being a straight line.
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High
R deadweight loss
from Rash rule
L
Low
N
Debtors
FIGURE C
The area of the triangle represents a net loss to society.62 This loss
exists under the Rash rule because assets do not go to their highest
value use when V is between L and R. More intuitively, Rash makes
cram downs more expensive relative to repossession by forcing a
debtor to provide a value of R rather than a value of L in his bank-
ruptcy plan. The net result is too many repossessions and too few
cram downs relative to the socially optimal level.63
The magnitude of the deadweight loss is a function of two vari-
ables. First, the deadweight loss depends on the difference between L
and R, which in turn is based on the degree of asset specificity. The
greater the asset specificity, the wider the gap, and hence the greater
the deadweight loss. Second, the deadweight loss depends on the slope
of the value in use curve. If values in use diverge widely among debt-
ors, the curve will be steep and the deadweight loss will be small.
Classical economics suggests that nonspecific assets have a low vari-
ance in use value and therefore a low slope of the value in use curve.64
Using this factor, the lower the asset specificity, the greater the dead-
weight loss. Combining these two factors, the net effect of asset speci-
62 If a creditor repossesses the collateral and then resells it to a third party, the deadweight loss
will shrink to the extent that the third party values the property more than the creditor because
some value is recaptured by the subsequent resale of the collateral. However, such resale is un-
likely to eliminate the deadweight loss completely if the assets were at least somewhat specific to
their original use. Cf. In re Rash, 149 B.R- 430, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993) ("Unless a creditor is
in the business of selling collateral of a particular type on a retail basis [it] will most likely be re-
quired to sell the goods wholesale. Accordingly, the wholesale value reflects the maximum
amount that a creditor would realize as a result of its secured claim ....").
63 This conclusion is qualified somewhat by the possibility that the creditor and debtor will
negotiate to the efficient result in the situation in which L < V < R. However, barriers to negotia-
tion might prevent the parties from reaching an efficient outcome. See generally Robert H.
Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflicts, 8
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 235 (1993) (identifying barriers to achieving an agreement).
64 See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOICS 91 (8th ed. 1920).
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ficity on deadweight loss is ambiguous. However, from the geometry
of the deadweight loss triangle, it is clear that both specific and non-
specific assets can create a deadweight loss under the Rash rule.
This deadweight loss will be shared among debtors, secured credi-
tors, and unsecured creditors. In the short run, unsecured creditors
will be the clear losers from the Court's decision in Rash. The reason
is that under Chapter 13, a debtor must pay both secured and unse-
cured creditors out of future earnings. 6S If the debtor retains the prop-
erty as a result of cram down, less of the income produced by that
property will be available to pay unsecured creditors, because secured
creditors now receive replacement value rather than foreclosure value
for their claim. If, on the other hand, the debtor gives up the property,
the debtor will be unable to generate as much income as before to pay
off unsecured creditors. In either scenario, unsecured creditors receive
less than they previously did.
Medium-term effects may create an additional deadweight loss.
Secured creditors will receive more value in a cram down plan, which
should, in theory, lead to lower interest rates on secured debt. As de-
scribed above, unsecured creditors will lose part of their claim, which
should lead to higher interest rates for unsecured debt. For the debtor,
these price effects will lead to an increased reliance on secured debt
and a decreased reliance on unsecured debt. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that secured debt involves higher transaction costs than unse-
cured debt.66 Therefore, these new transaction costs will lead to an
additional deadweight loss resulting from the Rash rule.
Finally, in the long run, a debtor will understand that he may ra-
tionally surrender his collateral even though he is the most efficient
user of the asset. To compensate for this constrained choice, the
debtor will want better terms on his secured debt. In the long run,
therefore, debtors will reclaim some of the windfall that the Court has
given to secured creditors.
In short, everyone loses under Rash: unsecured creditors receive a
smaller share of the debtor's future income, debtors pay a higher cost
of capital, and secured creditors receive a lower return than would
otherwise be possible. There is also a societal loss because all three
parties will rationally engage in inefficient transactions under Rash.
The Court could have avoided these unfortunate results by adopting a
foreclosure value standard. Under such a standard, the decision-
maker (the debtor) directly compares his value in use (V) to the credi-
tor's value in use (L). The debtor will cram down if V is greater than
6S See II U.S.C. § 1322(a)(i) (I994).
66 See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, zio HARV. L. REv. 625,
659-63 (1997) (identifying information costs, documentation costs, and filing fees as potential costs
of secured lending).
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L and will allow repossession if V is less than L. This outcome follows
the socially efficient value creation line from Figure A above.
Admittedly, efficiency should not be the Court's only goal. But
here, even with a foreclosure standard, concerns for equity toward
creditors are adequately met by two other provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. First, throughout the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor's plan
of reorganization must be proposed in "good faith" in order to be con-
firmed by the bankruptcy court.67 Under this clause, bankruptcy
courts can assume broad authority to review debtors' filings to ensure
fairness to creditors. 68 Second, in the Chapter ii context, creditors can
make a § iiii(b)(2) election, which protects them from an unduly low
appraisal of their collateral by the bankruptcy court.69 Therefore, a
foreclosure value standard will not unfairly compromise creditors'
rights because creditors have other protections in the bankruptcy con-
text.
In defense of the replacement value approach, Justice Ginsburg ar-
gued that a foreclosure value standard would be inefficient because it
would not compensate secured creditors for the additional risk inher-
ent in leaving the collateral with the debtor.70 This argument is flawed
for two reasons. First, as Justice Stevens correctly pointed out in his
dissent, any increased risk could be compensated for through a higher
discount rate.71 Second, even if debtors were to compensate creditors
through a larger principal rather than through a higher interest rate,
there is no conceptual reason to believe that replacement value rather
than foreclosure value provides the appropriate "bump-up" to compen-
sate the creditor exactly for the additional risk undertaken. More
likely, replacement value either overcompensates or undercompensates
creditors; either result would lead to incorrect incentives for debtors.
The Court held that "more" risk requires "higher" compensation with-
out attempting to quantify either of these terms. The Court seems to
have chosen replacement value simply because it was the next rung up
67 n U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(9)(B)(ii), I129(a)(3), 1325(a)(3).
68 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Inc.
in Support of Respondents at 25, Rash (No. 96-454).
69 See Dale C. Schian, Section xz1z(b)(2): Preserving the In Rem Claim, 67 AM. BANKR. L.
479, 479 (i993). Under § iiri(b)(2), a creditor may retain his secured and unsecured claims that
result from bifurcation under § 5o6(a), or, in certain circumstances, he may elect to forego his un-
secured claim and have the entire amount of his claim treated as fully secured by the collateral.
See ii U.S.C. § iiix(b)(2). See generally Steven R. Haydon, Steven R. Owens, Thomas J. Salerno
& Craig D. Hansen, The 1111(b)(2) Election: A Primer, x3 BANKR. DEV. J. 99 (i996) (describing
the mechanics of a § i i x(b)(2) election and the limitations on its application).
70 See Rash, 1i7 S. Ct. at i885.
71 See id. at 1887 n.* (Stevens, J., dissenting); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In
re Valenti), io5 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) ("ITMhe [cram down] interest rate should also include a
premium to reflect the risk to the creditor in receiving deferred payments under the reorganiza-
tion plan.!).
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on the valuation ladder. Unfortunately, the Court's choice will create
more inefficiencies than it eliminates.
Perhaps most disturbing about the Court's holding in Rash is its
scope. Even though § 5o6(a) is invoked most commonly in the context
of personal automobile loans, 72 nothing in the Court's opinion suggests
that its rule should be limited to that context. Moreover, § 5o6(a) ap-
plies to all chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, not just Chapter 13."
Therefore, the Court in Rash has handed down a broad rule for valu-
ing property in the bankruptcy context.7 4 Unfortunately, the Court's
opinion is based on an incomplete law and economics analysis that will
often lead to inefficient transactions between creditors and debtors.
By failing to focus clearly on the economic effects of its decision, the
Court in Rash simultaneously penalized unsecured creditors, secured
creditors, and debtors.
B. Civil Rights Act
Qualified Immunity - Privatized Governmental Functions.
With prison populations increasing rapidly, more and more states are
turning to privatization to trim their corrections budgets.' Riding the
crest of this trend are the private sector prison providers,2 whose com-
bined business has grown more than fifty percent since 1996 and cur-
rently generates revenues of over a billion dollars a year.3 Industry
spokespeople and other advocates claim that prison privatization also
benefits the taxpayer by saving states millions of dollars annually in
incarceration costs.4 Civil libertarians, however, fear that placing re-
72 See Carlson, supra note So, at s ("In chapter 13, the battle is usually fought over cars."); The
Valuation Debate, supra note 49, at 41.
73 See Rash, 1i7 S. CL at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is crucial to keep in mind that
§ 5o6(a) is a provision that applies throughout the bankruptcy code .... "); Brief of Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 3, Rash (No. 96-454) ("The standard of valuation under ii U.S.C.
§ 5o6(a) affects all collateral, not just cars, and all types of bankruptcy cases, not just Chapter x3
filings.").
74 See Brief for Donald and Madelane Taffi as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5,
Rash (No. 96-454) ("Determination of the manner in which the amount of a secured claim is de-
termined ... will therefore have a significant impact on virtually every chapter ii and chapter x3
reorganization in which a creditor is asserting a secured claim.").
1 See Lisa Belkin, Rise of Private Prisons: How Much of a Bargain?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
z989, at Ai 4 . At least 27 state governments, as well as the federal government and some locali-
ties, have entered into contracts with privately run prisons, which currently house over 8o,ooo
prisoners across the country. See Fox Butterfield, For Privately Run Prisons, New Evidence of
Success, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 995, at A7; Nzong Xiong, Private Prisons: A Question of Savings,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997, at CS.
2 The two largest of these companies, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and Wack-
enhut Corrections Corporation, together control about 75% of the private prisons in America. See
Xiong, supra note i.
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., id. (reporting that a Louisiana study on prison costs per prisoner found that the
two private prisons in the study had per diem averages of $22.93 and $23.49, compared to a
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sponsibility for prisoners in private hands may lead to violations of
inmates' constitutional rights.5
Last Term, in Richardson v. McKnight,6 the Supreme Court gave
the civil libertarians something to cheer about by holding that private
prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity from liability un-
der 42 U.S.C. § I983. 7 Finding that competitive market forces operate
to discourage private prison guards from displaying unwarranted ti-
midity in the performance of their duties, the Court saw no need to ex-
tend qualified immunity in this case." It did not, however, address the
further question whether qualified immunity applies in the more likely
situation in which private parties perform government contracts in the
absence of competitive market forces. Lower courts should resist the
temptation to conclude from this silence that an extension of qualified
immunity is appropriate in such cases. As the private prison example
- incorrectly characterized by the Court as a competitive market -
illustrates, the profit motive animating private firms may mean that
qualified immunity for private parties is inappropriate even, and espe-
cially, when competitive market forces do not obtain. ,
South Central Correctional Center (SCCC) is a 15o6-bed, medium-
security prison in Clifton, Tennessee, operated for the state by the
Nashville-based Corrections Corporation of America (CCA).9 On
March 3, 1994, SCCC inmate Ronnie Lee McKnight, claiming a viola-
tion of his Eighth Amendment rights, filed an action for damages un-
$26.6o average at the state-run facility). But cf. id. (describing a G.A.O. report finding it impossi-
ble to conclude from previous studies that privatization saves money).
5 See Belkin, supra note i.
6 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
7 See id. at 2108. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for citizens who suffer "deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" at the hands of any
person acting "under color" of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
8 See Richardson, 117 S. CL at 2io6-07. Officials at risk of "personal liability for acts taken
pursuant to their official duties ... may well be induced to act with an excess of caution or oth-
erwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and in-
dependent criteria that ought to guide their conduct." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223
(1988).
9 See Kevin McKenzie, Tennessee Considers the Pros and Cons of Prisons for Profit, COM.
APPEAL, May 25, 1997, at Ar; Paula Wade, CCA Prisons Could Save $zoo Million, Exec Tells
Hearing, CoM. APPEAL, May 8, 1997, at Ai. SCCC is operated by CCA pursuant to a Tennessee
statute, which allows for the private operation of "only ... one (i) medium security or minimum
security facility." TENN. CODE. ANN. § 41-24-103 (Supp. 1996). In the Ig8os, CCA made a bid
for a 99-year lease of the entire Tennessee prison system that failed after questions were raised
regarding its legality. See W.J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization of Correc-
tional Institutions: The Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REv. 829, 841-42 (1987). A bill cur-
rently pending in Tennessee would enable state officials to contract with private prison providers
"for the operation of any or all 21 state prisons." Richard Locker, Prison Bill Won't See Action by
End of This Session: Privatization Foes Cheer Decision, COM. APPEAL, May 23, 1997, at Bi.
CCA has claimed that it could run the whole state system at savings of at least $ioo million,
though legislators are skeptical of this claim. See Wade, supra.
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der § 1983 against SCCC warden John Rees' ° and prison guards
Daryll Richardson and John Walker." McKnight alleged that
Richardson and Walker placed him in "tight restraints" during a trans-
fer and thereby caused "serious medical injury which actually required
hospitalization."1 2 The defendants responded that, as correctional offi-
cers, they were entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 actions, and
moved to dismiss.13
The district court denied the defendants' motion, holding that
"employees of a private, for-profit corporation" are not entitled to
qualified immunity. 4 The Sixth Circuit, hearing the case on interlocu-
tory appeal, affirmed.' 5 The court explained that the purpose of quali-
fied immunity is to strike a balance between "the vindication of consti-
tutional guarantees and the furtherance of the public interest.' 6 This
balance is upset when, as was true here, the officials in question are
"principally motivated" not "by a desire to further the interests of the
public," but rather by a desire "to maintain the profitability of the cor-
poration for whom they labor, thereby ensuring their own job secu-
rity."1 7  An extension of qualified immunity to the defendants in this
case, the court feared, would lead privately operated correctional fa-
cilities to "cut[] comers on constitutional guarantees."'Is
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed, 19 ruling narrowly
that qualified immunity is unavailable to employees of private firms
undertaking "a major lengthy administrative task (managing an insti-
10 Rees was subsequently dismissed from the litigation. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417,
418 (6th Cir. 1996).
In See id.
12 Id. at 418-I9. According to McKnight, his "discomfort was so evident that other inmates on
the bus implored petitioners to loosen the restraints." Brief of Respondent at x-2, Richardson
(No. 96-318), available in 1997 WL 58604. Richardson and Walker allegedly responded with
taunts and abusive language and told McKnight that "he 'was getting what he deserved' and that
he should 'suffer.'" Id.
13 See McKnight, 88 F.3d at 419. In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (978), the Court
extended qualified immunity to state-employed prison guards. See id. at 561. If the defendants
in Richardson had been granted qualified immunity, McKnight would have had to show that
their conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 818 (1982) (establishing the stan-
dard for qualified immunity).
14 McKnight, 88 F.3d at 419. The district court opinion was unreported and incorporated
Manis v. Corrections Corp. of America, 859 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), a prior decision de-
nying qualified immunity to private prison guards. See Brief of Petitioners at x, Richardson (No.
96-318), available in 1997 WL 10351.
15 See McKnight, 88 F.3d at 418. Denials of qualified immunity are appealable under inter-
Iocutory order. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985).
16 McKnight, 88 F.3d at 424.
17 Id. In so finding, the court did not deny the significant public service performed by prison
guards employed by private companies. See id. ("[lit is beyond peradventure that correctional
officers working for a private, for-profit corporation that has contracted with the state are serving
a public interest...
18 Id.
19 See Richardson, I17 S. Ct. at 2103.
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tution) with limited direct supervision by the government... for profit
and potentially in competition with other firms."20 Writing for the ma-
jority,2' Justice Breyer began his analysis by characterizing the recent
case Wyatt v. Cole22 as "pertinent authority."23  Admitting that Wyatt
"did not answer the legal question" precisely before the Court,24 Justice
Breyer interpreted the case to require the Court "to look both to his-
tory and to the purposes" of the qualified immunity doctrine to deter-
mine whether the petitioners were entitled to immunity.25
Canvassing the history of suits against private prison contractors,
the Court failed to find "a 'firmly rooted' tradition of immunity appli-
cable to privately employed prison guards."26 Instead, the Court spe-
cifically noted that the common law "forbade [private] jailers to sub-
ject 'their prisoners to any pain or torment"' 27 and that it "authorized
prisoner lawsuits to recover damages" in such cases.28  Turning to pol-
icy considerations, the Court observed that the purpose of immunity
doctrine is to protect the "government's ability to perform its tradi-
tional functions." 29  The doctrine achieves its purpose in two ways:
first, by "protecting the public from unwarranted timidity [in the exer-
cise of their duties] on the part of public officials" fearing lawsuits; and
second, by "ensur[ing] that talented candidates [are] not deterred by
the threat of damages suits from entering public service."30
Applying these two policy considerations to the case at hand, the.
Court found that neither compelled the application of immunity. With
20 Id. at 2io8. In so holding, the Court explicitly distinguished those cases involving "a pri-
vate individual briefly associated with a government body, serving as an adjunct to government
in an essential government activity, or acting under close official supervision." Id.
21 Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg.
22 504 U.S. I58 (1992). In Wyatt v. Cole, the Court addressed the question whether qualified
immunity is available to private parties "charged with § 1983 liability for 'invoking state replevin,
garnishment, and attachment statutes' later declared unconstitutional." Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at
2103 (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 159).
23 Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2103.
24 Id. at 2104. The Wyatt Court declined to extend qualified immunity to the petitioners in
that case but "explicitly limited its holding" to the narrow question of "private persons ... who
conspire with state officials." Id. (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 68) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
25 Id.
26 Id. The Court noted that "private contractors were heavily involved in prison management
during the x9th century" and in some cases shouldered the responsibility for a state's entire prison
system. Id. Yet, despite the fact that "[gjovernment-employed prison guards may have enjoyed a
kind of immunity defense arising out of their status as public employees at common law," the
Court found many cases suggesting a common law remedy for inmMes against private prison con-
tractors and no evidence of any immunity for these jailers. Id. at 2104-05.
27 Id. at 2205 (quoting In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599, 6oi (S.D. Ga. 1889)).
28 Id.
29 Id. (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 Id. The Court recalled Judge Learned Hand's warning that the threat of liability would
"dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible" public officials. Id. at
21o6 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 824 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1997]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
respect to the first prong - preserving the ability of government offi-
cials to serve the public good - Justice Breyer argued that, unlike
their state-operated counterparts, private prisons are subject to "com-
petitive market pressures" that make their employees less likely to ex-
hibit "the most important special government immunity-producing
concern - unwarranted timidity."31 According to Justice Breyer, these
market pressures mean that, in order to retain their contracts, private
prison operators must ensure that their employees are neither too ag-
gressive (which would create liability for "damages that raise costs")
nor too timid (which would leave the firm vulnerable to replacement
by a competing firm that had demonstrated an ability to do "both a
safer and a more effective job). 3 2 As for the second prong - the con-
cern about deterring talented candidates from seeking public service
jobs33 - Justice Breyer argued that, unlike the state, private prison
operators are able to shield their employees from personal liability
through salary offsets or statutorily required insurance schemes and
thus are able to neutralize this threat.3 4
In dissent, Justice Scalia 3 s berated the majority for departing from
the "settled practice of determining § 1983 immunity on the basis of
the public function being performed. '36 Expressly invoking this "pub-
lic function" approach, Justice Scalia reviewed both recent Supreme
Court precedent and case law "virtually contemporaneous with the en-
actment of § I983"31 and found no reason to deny relief to the petition-
ers, who in the performance of their duties were "indistinguishable"
from state-employed guards.3 8
31 Id. at 2105.
32 Id. The Court assumed that private prisons, unconstrained by "civil-service restrictions,"
are able to employ contractual incentives to pressure their employees to achieve this balance. Id.
at 2107. Justice Breyer noted that government employees, by contrast, are subject to lower levels
of accountability and to "civil service rules" that limit the ability of supervisors to reward or to
penalize individual employees. Id.
33 See id.
34 See id. Justice Breyer also addressed a third purpose of qualified immunity: to prevent the
increased risk of lawsuits from "'distrac[ting]' these employees 'from their ... duties.'" Id.
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (I985)). Justice Breyer argued that the Court's
qualified immunity doctrine "doles] not contemplate the complete elimination of lawsuit-based
distractions," id., and that the Tennessee legislature reserved to state officials important discre-
tionary tasks relating to prison discipline, parole, and good time, see id. This latter observation
seems to suggest that any increased distraction caused by the Court's holding will not interfere
with the tasks that the state deemed to be most important to the running of a prison. See id.
35 Justice Scalia was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas.
36 Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Richardson Court labeled this
claim a "misreading" of precedent. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 21o6. Although the majority
conceded that the Court "has sometimes applied a [public function) approach in immunity cases,"
it noted that such an approach was used only "to decide which type of immunity - absolute or
qualified - a public officer should receive." Id.
37 Id. at 2110 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Alamango v. Board of Supervisors, 32 N.Y. Sup.
CL 55S (d.21)).38 See id. at 2 12.
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After making clear his view that "history and not judicially ana-
lyzed policy governs this matter,"3 9 Justice Scalia proceeded to explain
why he found the Court's arguments distinguishing private from pub-
lic prisons to be "even on [their] own terms ... unconvincing."40 First,
Justice Scalia pointed out that a state's cancellation of a prison man-
agement contract is "not a market choice," but rather a political deci-
sion in which benign neglect or other less seemly considerations like
"personal friendship, political alliances, [and] in-state ownership of the
contractor" are likely to influence the result.4 1 In fact, "short of mis-
management so severe as to provoke a prison riot," state officials will
be inclined to award contracts not to the firm with the best discipli-
nary record, but to the lowest bidder.42 Second, rejecting the Court's
suggestion that private firms are better able to attract and keep tal-
ented candidates than are public agencies, Justice Scalia observed that
nothing prevents states from insuring public employees against civil
liability or from doing away with the restrictive civil service salary and
seniority "encrustations" that currently prevent the use of incentives to
influence employee performance.43
Having dispensed with the Court's arguments, Justice Scalia next
dismissed as "implausible" the basis for the Sixth Circuit's affirmance44
- that, because private prison guards are principally motivated by a
desire to ensure the continued profitability of the firm for which they
work, the extension of qualified immunity to them could lead to an in-
crease in constitutional violations.4S Criticizing the Sixth Circuit for
giving "no hint" as to how a guard's violation of inmates' constitu-
tional rights might lead to greater profits for the employer, Justice
Scalia argued that private prison operators, "whose § 1983 damages
come out of their own pockets,... would, if anything, be more careful
in training their employees to avoid constitutional infractions. '46 Jus-
tice Scalia concluded by scolding the Court for drawing an imprecise
and "obscure" public/private distinction and for reaching a decision of
which "[t]he only sure effect" would be to raise "artificially ... the cost
of privatizing prisons. '4 7
The Richardson Court's silence as to whether qualified immunity
ought to be available to private actors performing delegated govern-
39 Id. at 2 1o.
40 Id. at 2o110-11.
41 Id. at 21i1.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 2112.
44 See id.
45 See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 1996).
46 Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 2112-13 (CWhether this will cause privatization to be prohibitively expensive, or in-
stead simply divert state funds that could have been saved or spent on additional prison services,
it is likely that taxpayers and prisoners will suffer as a consequence.").
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